Jun 28, 2016 | Africa, Global Public Goods, Global Public Health, Human safety, Passage au crible (English)
By Clément Paule
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible n° 142
Source: France Bleu
On March 4, 2016, a study published in the Cell Stem Cell Review specified the relation between the Zika virus and specific neurological disorders, such as GBS (Guillain-Barré Syndrome), characterised by progressive paralysis. While this research describes the destruction of brain cells by this pathogen, its responsibility in the occurrence of microcephaly – head circumference of the newborn inferior to average, with serious and irreversible damages – has not been clearly and positively demonstrated. Though, this risk of congenital malformation appears to be at the heart of the concerns raised by the epidemic disease that has been spreading in the last few months on the American continent and the Caribbean. As such, about twenty countries and territories might be facing the spreading of this arbovirus, among which we may quote Brazil, Colombia, Guyana or Venezuela. Millions of contaminations are expected before the end of 2016, to such extent that the WHO (World Health Organisation) declared a PHEIC (Public Health Emergency of International Concern). On a global basis, health authorities are once again exposed to a major crisis, just when the Ebola risk had come under control in Western Africa.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Investigations carried on the yellow fever identified the Zika flavivirus in 1947 for the first time on tropical forest apes in Uganda. Akin to other arboviruses such as dengue or Chikungunya, this pathogen is transmitted by Aedes type mosquitoes – especially the Aegypti type – and has similar epidemiological characteristics. It must be underlined that the infection remains benign: during the following decades, only a few cases have been recorded on the African continent, such as Tanzania, Nigeria or Egypt – and some Asian countries such as India, Thailand and Indonesia. This relative innocuousness – 80% of the patients do not show any symptoms – might explain the little knowledge accumulated on this virus, whose genome has been sequenced only in 2006.
Only in 2007 appears the Asian viral strain of Zika in some Pacific territories, starting with the Yap Archipelago part of the Federated States of Micronesia. In the following years, the virus spreads to New-Caledonia and Cook Islands. It should be noted that the urban outbreak that hit French Polynesia from 2013 is unheard of: 180 000 people – two thirds of the population – would have been infected. More than 40 GBS are recorded retrospectively, more than 20 times the usual occurrence. Moreover, this rise comes along with cases imported by North-American, Japanese or European tourists. Spring 2015 marks a turning point, as local transmission of Zika virus is observed on a large scale in South America. In May, the first contamination is being confirmed in Brazil, the pathogen spreading even more quickly as the affected societies are not immune to it. A few months later, doctors of the Pernambuco State (North-East) report an unusual number or neurological disorders and microcephaly, alerting the authorities about potential links with arbovirus propagation. As the epidemic progresses towards other countries of the region, health monitoring intensifies and leads the WHO to declare a PHEIC on February, 1st, 2016. For now, more than 1.5 million Brazilians have been infected, as well as dozens of thousands of citizens from other States, such as Colombia which recently declared three deaths imputed to this new plague.
Theoretical framework
1. The cautious consideration of weak and unmarked signals. Long considered as secondary to dengue or Chikungunya, the Zika virus was not under close monitoring before its recent outbreak. New risks unknown before put the light onto this pathogen, in a situation of uncertainty structured by the legacy of previous epidemics.
2. A controversial framing of the problem, between ethical conflict and public health. Without precise knowledge of viral transmission mechanisms, experts’ recommendations are partly facing a re-characterisation of the problem by local authorities.
Analysis
It may be recalled that the Zika virus epidemic develops in a context still marked by recent failures of global health governance. As such, the arduous management of the Ebola crisis in Western Africa shows a lack of leadership from the WHO, overwhelmed by the events and branded as passive. The organisation mobilised quicker on this occasion, bordering on an alarmist stance which was severely pointed out during the last AH1N1 flu outbreak in 2009. Following this line, the health organisation advocates a precautionary approach and declares a PHEIC on February, 1st 2016: this decision is not taken upon available data – low or non-existent mortality, benign symptomatology – but upon foreseen consequences of the arbovirus. By doing so, the WHO activates a strategic framework enabling quicker diagnosis and therapeutical research, while ensuring coordination of the monitoring scheme. In a well-mastered communication process, Director-General Margaret Chan evoked in January 2016 « concerning circumstantial proofs » yet to be scientifically supported. This wording refers to GBS and especially to microcephaly, suspect of being linked to contamination of pregnant women by the Zika virus, which caused panic amongst the media in 2015.
Because of their visible impact on cognitive and sensory functions of the newborns, these malformations tend to concentrate the fears and tend to epitomize the epidemic. However, etiology of these fetal anomalies may involve environmental factors – risky maternal behaviour, diabetes, malnutrition, etc. – infectious factors – rubella, toxoplasmosis or cytomegalovirus – or even genetic factors. Then, data collection is rather uncertain and hardly harmonized, which leads to distortion: on more than 4000 suspect cases – mainly localised in Brazil – 641 would have been confirmed as microcephaly. These figures show a marked increase compared to average – estimated to 160 occurrences a year – which shows greater vulnerability among pregnant women. Since then, circumstances led the United States and some NGOs (Non Governmental Organisations) to advocate abortion, even though it being illegal and criminalized in many Latino-American countries. A call for more flexible regulation immediately faced strong political opposition from the conservatives and Churches, in spite of the repeated tragedy of clandestine abortions. Several governments, such as Colombia, even advised their female citizens to “delay their pregnancy” until further notice. These clumsy and irrelevant political contortions illustrate how difficult is the enforcement of a top-down, strictly health-oriented approach in a context of overall uncertainty paired with social tensions. In Brazil, mistrust and development of alternative theories – putting the blame on Monsanto insecticides or faulty vaccines – must be understood in relation to the authorities de-legitimisation, repeatedly caught into corruption scandals. This situation might appear detrimental and likely to hamper the seemingly consensual vector control efforts, aiming however to minimize the epidemic and reduce it to a mere mosquito problem. The quick propagation of the Zika virus, quite similar to the recent spreading of Chikungunya, may seem related to the colonization of a wide part of the planet by Aedes Aegypti and Albopictus. But it most importantly highlights issues related to human mobility – Brazil hosted the Football World Cup in 2014 and gets ready to organised the Olympic Games this summer – and the growing exposure of populations to low-key pathogens which until now, were confined to their natural breeding-grounds. Since IHR (International Health Regulations) has been reworked in 2005, this type of health crisis shows the complexity lying behind the formulation of well-balanced answers to cope with risks that may evolve abruptly and sometimes unnoticed. In this perspective, global health governance may not rely only on increasingly technical tools and anticipation of emerging diseases: the challenge lies ahead, in the ties that link societies to their environment.
References
Gilbert Claude, Henry Emmanuel (Éds.), Comment se construisent les problèmes de santé publique, Paris, La Découverte/Pacte, 2009.
Heymann David L. et al, « Zika Virus and Microcephaly: Why is This Situation a PHEIC », The Lancet, (387), Feb. 20th 2016, pp. 719-721.
OMS, « Épidémiologie et manifestations cliniques potentiellement associées à l’infection à virus Zika : mise à jour mondiale », Relevé épidémiologique hebdomadaire (91), 7, Feb. 19th 2016, pp. 73-88, check following web address : http://www.who.int/wer [March 3rd 2016].
May 28, 2016 | Climate change, English, environment, Global Public Goods, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Weiting Chao
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible n° 141
Source: Flickr
The Paris Climate Conference (COP21) opened in Le Bourget on November 30, 2015. The conference reunited 147 State Leaders, negotiators representing 195 countries and 50 000 participants. On December 12, a global agreement replacing the Kyoto Protocol has been adopted. The member States envisioned a limitation of the rise of global temperatures well below 2°C and sought to keep up the actions undertook to stop the temperature rise at 1,5°C in relation to pre-industrial levels.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Global warming is today one of the main threats to the survival of the human kind. In order to cope with this issue, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed in 1992 by 153 countries. With respect of equity, this document had been drafted to identify, both for industrialised and developing States, a principle of common and differentiated responsibility. Five years later, the UNFCCC signatory countries adopted the Kyoto Protocol, first legally binding global instrument meant to compel developing countries to reduce their GHG emissions (GreenHouse Gas). Or, the United States pointed out an infringement to the development of the American economy and hence opposed the ratification of the treaty. The protocol was nonetheless enforced when ratified by Russia in 2005. As the protocol was to expire by the end of 2012, the post-Kyoto period had been considered from then. According to the roadmap signed in 2007 in Bali, the States had to finalise a new document in Copenhagen in 2009 (COP 15). But if that summit successfully gathered a large number of leaders, NGOs and civil societies, no significant progress had been made then. In Copenhagen, the final draft had been negotiated in a closed session by a small group composed of the USA, and the BASIC group of emerging countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China). However, the text did not pass. At COP 18, which took place in Doha in 2012, the Kyoto Protocol has been extended until 2020, while postponing the adoption of a new treaty to year 2015. Two weeks before the opening of COP21, Paris was hit by unprecedented attacks, on November 13 2015, which resulted in 130 killed and 352 injured. Security measures worldwide have been strengthened because of the terrorist threat, and the holding of COP21 even questioned. Yet, the summit took place without any incident.
Theoretical framework
1. A model of joint regulation. At the heart of the climate talks, we may identify hierarchies of authority. In this respect, the United Nations represents an asymmetric interdependent system between unequal parties. The rules are constantly re-shaped, resulting from action or non-action. According to Marie-Claude Smouts, two types of regulation, two rationales constantly confront each other in this type of organisation. The first one comes from dominant players holding the power to shape new rules and have them adopted in order to master the collective game. The second one comes from subordinates. The latter strive to set up bypassing and dodging strategies to nonetheless influence the final decision.
2. North-South de-territorialization and re-territorialization. In the post Cold War period, the territoriality principle has gone through major transformations. The territory of the State has been questioned by material and immaterial transnational flows, which result from lighter border controls and decline of spatial and logistical constraints. This has been followed with the de-territorialisation of international exchanges that led to a reorganisation of the governance in various sectors (security, ecology, migrations, health, etc.). But recent multilateral negotiations on climate change introduced a confrontation of this rationale with the traditional North-South divide, which hampered the adoption of a global agreement. In fact, the climate threat imposes a global management of the atmosphere as a common good, which breaks out the classic notion of territorial appropriation.
Analysis
The UN Climate Conference represents a major opportunity for the member States. In 2015, 195 countries ratified the UNFCCC. In the multilateral negotiations, diversity and heterogeneity of the parties add up to the United States hegemony. In the light of this, the US opposed the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol considering it an infringement to the development of its own economy. Consequently, the non-action of a dominant country considerably diminished the efficiency of the public authority on international cooperation. Moreover, many countries have decided to get not involved in the second phase of the Protocol (2013-2020). Moreover, after 2000, the emerging BASIC changed the situation. China became one of the most prominent CO2 emitters in the world, exceeding the emissions of the United States in 2006. In Copenhagen, the two leaders and emerging countries jeopardised the mutual trust built within the United Nations, which eroded even more the negotiations. As a consequence of this tense climate, the Copenhagen agreement has not been adopted by the UNFCCC, even though not legally binding for the parties.
On the other hand, the subordinate countries attempted to expose their point of views during the talks through an “iterative game“, which contributed in pacifying conflicts between members. In this framework, the parties sought any opportunity to meet their expectations on specific topics, but had to compromise on some others, resulting in a feeling of eternal restarting. This process compelled the COP21 to come up with reciprocal commitments. It is worth remembering that the action taken to limit the temperature rise to 1,5°C and the expression “loss and damage” firstly mentioned by the alliance of small Island States have been included in the Paris Agreement. However, these principles were strongly rejected by the United States.
It should be underlined that this document is the first universal agreement in which all of the developed countries, together with developing countries, have recognised their obligations to manage their GHG emissions. From this point of view, the traditional North-South governing mode has been altered according to the threats related to climate change. This de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation movement erodes the localisation constraints. For example, an IPCC report (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) indicates that climate change is today the first cause of regional conflicts and forced human migrations. Moreover, the de-territorialisation process is also linked to the joint policies that countries have committed to, in order to achieve economic stability and levelling of social challenges. The long-term objective is really ambitious (below 2°C) and entails a collective effort. It raises an issue of financing. In this regard, the Paris Agreement sets an obligation to developed countries to support poor countries and help them tackle climate change. From 2020, 100 Billion dollars will then be delivered on a yearly basis. Developing countries are also invited to fund them on a voluntary basis. This global agreement will be enforced when 55 countries counting for at least 55% of the global emissions will have completed their ratifying procedure. However, the text also introduced the INDC (Intended Nationally Determined Contributions) for the reduction of the countries’ GHG emissions. This tool enables countries to determine their own contributions on a voluntary basis, according to their respective capacity, economic context and national priorities. In other words, this very ambitious treaty is barely binding from a legal point of view. In the future, an achievement-oriented agreement should mainly rely on the respective expectations of the parties influential enough to make a mark on the outcome of the negotiations.
References
Aykut Stefan C. and Dahan Amy, Gouverner le climat ? 20 ans de négociations internationales, Paris, Presses Science po, 2015.
Chao Weiting, « Le triomphe dommageable des passagers clandestins. La conférence de Doha », in: Josepha Laroche (Éd.), Passage au crible, l’actualité internationale 2012, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2013, pp. 111-115.
Smouts Marie-Claude (Éd.), Les nouvelles relations internationales : pratiques et théories, Paris, Presses Science po, 1998.
Apr 25, 2016 | Africa, Passage au crible (English), Terrorism
By Philippe Hugon
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible n° 140
Source: Youtube
Originally a hallmark of democratic transition, Burkina Faso was hit by major attacks in Ouagadougou, on Friday 16th, January 2016, resulting in at least 30 killed of more than 14 nationalities. These attacks took place two months after the Bamako attacks at the Radisson Blu Hotel. Responsibility for the attacks has been claimed by Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which imputed it to the Al Mourabitoune group led by Jihadist chief Mokhtar Belmokhtar. French Special forces stepped in to rescue the hostages of the Splendid Hotel and eliminate the attackers.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Burkina Faso is an isolated Sahelian country with porous borders: Ivory Coast in the South, and Mali and Niger in the North. One of the world’s poorest countries, it is located in a vulnerable zone coping with many issues, from demographic explosion to increasing unemployed youth, climate hazards and incapacity for border control. Led by Blaise Compaoré for 27 years, this State has subsequently known a deep political turmoil. For a long time, the President had played the intermediate between Jihadist groups and their targets. He had sealed a non-aggression pact with islamists and mediated hostage rescue operations. In the neo-patrimonial system he set, resources leveraged through various alliances and control of some trafficking networks, allowed him to finance the political game from an internal point of view. But Blaise Compaoré eventually lost his power when he tried to amend the constitution, which would have allowed him to run for President again.
At the end of October 2014, the youth uprisings led in a few days to the demote of the ‘President for life’. The movement ‘The Citizen’s Broom‘ then somewhat embodied an ‘African Spring‘. A transitional government that would lead to legislative and presidential elections, on October 11, 2015, had then been established. But the political/military and business clan of Compaoré sought revenge and failed their attempted coup staged by Gilbert Diendéré. The loyalist military eventually forced the perpetrators to surrender, and the process of democratic transition then resumed. After being delayed, the presidential elections have been won in the first round of November 29, 2015 with 53,49% of vote cast, by Roch Marc Kaboré, Blaise Compaoré ex-Prime Minister.
The terrorist attacks happened three days after the new government had been formed, on the very day judicial authorities had launched an arrest warrant against Guillaume Soro, President of the National Assembly of the Ivory Coast, accused of being part of the plotted coup. Most importantly, these attacks happened while Burkina Faso was reinstating a new security system as the PSR (Presidential Security Regime) and Intelligence Service had grown weaker.
Theoretical framework
The Burkina Faso terrorist attacks are linked to two main international thrusts.
1. A reorganization of the Islamic forces. The attack, attributed to Al-Mourabitoune, brings great media coverage to the group, and attests of the broadening of its geographical area of intervention. Finally, on a background of alliances and antagonisms shaped at its very heart, it confirms the pledge of loyalty taken to AQIM against the Islamic State.
2. Ruling out the Western forces. Besides Burkina Faso, these Jihadist attacks intend to threaten French economic interests, expatriates and military intervention. On a symbolic level, it is worth highlighting that this operation has been launched in the city where French and North American Intelligence Service and Special Forces are located. Hitting Ouagadougou amounts to striking at the heart of Intelligence Ops (Operation Sabre, DGSE, Military Intelligence) in the Operation Barkhane.
Analysis
The attacks are linked to the strategies of various Islamic groups that recruited youths from various African countries. These attacks intensified within the last four-year period in the Sahelo-Saharan area. In this case, the attackers where young Peuls, Tuaregs and Arabs from Northern Burkina Faso. In fact, the idle youth of these regions may only choose between informal activities, trafficking or being recruited by militias. Available reports show that this creates the perfect breeding-ground for cluttered enlisting from Jihadist militias, from a socio-economic, academic, or even ethnic and religious point of view. This is why large terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are constantly competing when recruiting, but also on a strategic level. Al Mourabitoune, which claimed the responsibility for the Ouagadougou attacks, is affiliated to AQIM even though a sub-group declared to be loyal to the Islamic State. Originally a member of Al-Qaeda, its leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar broke with AQIM and merged with the Those who Sign with Blood Brigade and Mujao Group. He then resumed his allegiance to Al-Qaeda and is now considered as Sahara’s Ben Laden. On this account, he is considered liable for the In Amenas (Algeria), Arlit (Niger) and Radisson Blu (Bamako) attacks. Other Sahelian groups appeared also to be close from Al-Qaeda such as the Somalian Al-Shabaab, the Malian Peul MLF (Macina Liberation Front), and Ansar Eddine of The Tuareg Ag Ghali in Mali.
Further than referring to Salafism and Takfiris, these terrorist groups actually control trafficking networks. For instance, Al Mourabitoune took hostages to demand ransoms and took part in cigarette trafficking. It then avoided direct confrontation with security forces to replenish its strength. Due to this strategy, it has now great operational capacity and may clearly compete with the Islamic State. This terrorist scheme mainly hit expatriates. But beyond victims and destabilisation of African States, the goal is to create havoc amongst Westerners, likely to drive them out – both investors and humanitarians – of Burkina Faso. In fact, it is necessary to underline the relative powerlessness of world leaders. Namely, Operation Barkhane, supported by African and multilateral forces, has admittedly prevented a territorial takeover of Jihadist forces in the Sahelo-Saharan basin. At the same time, it has certainly eased the spreading of numerous small groups in this wide area. The aims of these attacks appear to be multiple. They are a striking example of the competition between Jihadist groups to control trafficking networks and recruit new adjuvants. They also seek to wage and win the media war through the globalisation of fear and increase the vulnerability of Western countries by driving them out of the Saharo-Sahelian zone.
References
Hugon Philippe, Géopolitique de l’Afrique, 3rd ed, Paris, SEDES 2013.
Jacquemot Pierre, « Les trois paradoxes du Burkina Faso, Lettre de l’IRIS, Nov 2, 2014.
Serge Michailof, Africanistan, Paris, Fayard 2015.
Apr 15, 2016 | Financial crisis, International commerce, International Political Economy, Passage au crible (English)
By Moustafa Benberrah
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible n° 139
Source: Pixabay
On Saturday, October 18th 2015, the Algerian Minister of Commerce, Bekhti Belaid, announced that his government applied for external financing from the PRC (People’s Republic of China) for “some large infrastructures projects”. His Industry and Mines counterpart Abdessalem Bouchared mentioned on the same day ongoing negotiations regarding a Sino-Algerian vehicle assembly project. Hence, the political leader called for the development of subcontracting activities in Algeria, recalling the importance of the Chinese experience in this sector. During a press conference organised with Lyu Xinhua, President of the Chinese Council for the promotion of South-south cooperation, Abdessalem Bouchareb even encouraged the Chinese firms to get involved in the steel extraction program of Gara Djebilet (Tindouf), that required massive investments and high-tech equipment.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Let it be mentioned first some contextual events that might explain the reason why Algeria had to resort to public debt. According to figures provided by the Algerian Bank, external debt is estimated to a 3.7 billion dollars (2.27% of the GDP – Gross Domestic Product) when reserve currency amounts to 159 billion dollars. On the first hand, falling oil prices have deeply affected the Algerian economy, mainly relying on the hydrocarbon sector, which led the government to freeze many development projects. A rise of the electricity and fuel prices has then been resolved in the frame of the 2016 Budget law. Moreover, article 66 of this law plans the opening-up of public enterprise capital and the complete cession to partners after 5 years, which reactivates the privatisation process. As a justification, the Finance Minister advocates a ‘protective‘ management of the State’s resources. On the other hand, the economic slow-down of the Chinese GDP must be underlined: according to Chinese official figures published in October 2015, the growth reaches a 6.9% per year on the first trimester. Yet, it has been the lowest performance of the second world’s largest economy since the 2009 financial crisis. This appeared clearly in last September sensible decline of the industrial production. As well, retail sales, considered as a barometer of the Chinese households’ consumption, showed only a slight acceleration, and a pick-up limited to 10.9% in 2015. This economic stagnation led the People’s Republic of China to intensify its trade with some of its partners, such as Algeria. Most notably, it sought to spread its activities, currently limited to construction industry and hydraulic systems, namely by diversifying into mechanical and electronically industry, steel industry and mines.
Theoretical framework
1. The monetisation of an emerging economy. More and more, sovereign functions of the State are handed down to intermediates, coupled with a division of prerogatives: on the one hand, transformation of production and transport systems, and on the other hand, monetisation and financialisation of the economy. In this regard, the conditions of the capital holder prevail, hence ensuring its domination.
2. A win-win partnership. Facing the collapse of the financial bubble, China is looking to maintain its economic growth. Such a relationship relies on postcolonial specialisation, established between suppliers of raw materials and producers of manufactured products and services. This system foreshadows a Chinese redeployment in Africa and Asia, characterised by straddling techniques, brushing aside every distinction between public and private, State and market, networks of influence and economic accumulation.
Analysis
It should be highlighted that emerging countries, such as China, have been strongly impacted by the third phase of the 2007 world financial crisis. This stage, concomitant to the collapse of raw material prices, follows the burst of the American real estate bubble in 2008 and its consequences on the European debt in 2011. According to Goldman Sachs consultancy,”the growing uncertainties relative to the after-effects of the decline in emerging economies, collapse of raw material prices and rise of American interest rates have raised concerns regarding the durability of the increase of asset prices, marking thus a new phase of the global financial crisis“.
In order to cope with this issue, the People’s Republic of China seeks to deepen its business partnerships, in order to meet the imperatives of global competition. This is the reason behind a policy of economic transnationalisation, as a balance between national policies and international demands. As an example, the AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has been established on June 29th, 2015, requiring an 800 billion dollar investment per year. This initiative embodies the Chinese ambition to come up with an interesting alternative for lenders such as the Global Bank or African Development Bank. Such initiative is in line with the three PRC main interests: 1) strengthen its diplomatic position. 2) Wisely invest its reserve currency in order to reinforce the Yuan. 3) Provide its construction and hydraulic industry groups with transnational growth connections.This policy is in line with the process of the new silk road, a Chinese fund estimated to 40 billion dollars, and the BRICS bank (Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa). Yet, if these intermediaries hold a structural power that strengthens their political influence and legitimacy, Philip Cerny notes however that the Competition State holds its position and domination through public-private partnerships. In the light of this, the Chinese government doubles its aid programs in writing-off debts or providing low-rate loans likely to attract developing states. In this regard, the privileged relationships that PCR and Algeria have had since 1958, and the fact that one is the first supplier of the other when it comes to external trade – are greatly facilitating this type of cooperation.
In order to account for its use of long-term debt, the Algerian government brings forward large infrastructure projects that have been mainly attributed to Chinese firms, employing more than 40000 workers on the national territory. Moreover, the authorities have been stating that this should strengthen production, while ensuring new income pivotal to debt repayment, and a surplus bound to cover the loss-making sectors. It should be underlined also that an ADB report (African Development Bank), published in 2012, shows that Algeria has granted between 2002 and 2012, 20 billion dollars worth of contracts to Chinese companies, without a clear increase showing on national employment rates. Consequently, Chinese companies such as CSCEC (China State Construction Engineering Corp) clearly appear as the main recipients and beneficiaries of this public aid initially bound to the Algerian economy. Collaborating with major banks in their country of origin, these companies have a prominence even out of their national territory and a key position when tendering to public procurement due to competitive costs and a good knowledge of local politics and economics. However, the Algerian economy may not rely on such good prospects, and suffers, on the contrary, a loss of independence.
References
Cabestan Jean-Pierre, Le Système politique chinois. Vers un nouvel équilibre autoritaire, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2014.
Cerny Philip G., Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Pluralism, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010.
Chiu Justin, « Une banque multilatérale entre coopération et prédation. La signature des statuts de la BAII », consulted on November 12, 2015 on Chaos International.
El Watan consulted on November 15, 2015 at www.el-watan.com
Hibou Béatrice, « Retrait ou redéploiement de l’État », Critique internationale, (1), aut 1998, pp. 151-168.
Hugon Philippe, « La Chine en Afrique. Néocolonialisme ou opportunité pour le développement ? », Revue internationale et stratégique, (72), 2008, pp. 219-230.
Strange Susan, The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Mar 28, 2016 | Climate change, English, environment, Global Public Goods, Passage au crible (English)
By Valérie Le Brenne
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible N° 138
Source: Pixabay
From November 30 to December 11, 2015, the 21st Convention of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 21). Following intense talks, the negotiators compromised on a 40 pages agreement, aiming to restrict the global warming to 2 degrees Celsius. Presented as the major missing issues of this Summit, oceans were finally taken into account but only with limited scope. As such, the preamble of the appendix details that, « Parties to this Agreement […] note that it is important to maintain the integrity of all ecosystems, including oceans ».
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Signed in 1992 at the Earth Summit in Rio, the UNFCCC counts 196 members today. Every member state recognises the existence of a climate change caused by human activity, and commits to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Enforced in 1994, the agreement plans that a conference of the Parties (COP) should be held to evaluate the policies carried out in this regard and negotiate new dispositions.
In 1997, the COP3 resulted in the signature of the Kyoto Protocol, assigning to « the developing countries and transitional economies quantified targets regarding GHG emissions » (Aykut, 2015). But, the fact that the US did not ratify the accord, added to a patent lack of results triggered a deep crisis that peaked in Copenhagen in 2009. After two years of discussions, member states could not agree on the next treaty bound to take effect in 2020, ending the summit in failure. Postponing the deadline to 2015, the Paris talks thus appeared as the « last chance summit ». The role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in allowing the climate issues to reach political agenda must be here underlined. Founded in 1998, the IPCC « assesses the current state of scientific, technical and socio-economical knowledge on climate change, their causes, potential impact and response strategies ». Since its creation, the IPCC has published five reports (1990, 1995, 2001, 2007 and 2013-2014), each one delivered with a synthetic guidance note addressed to policymakers, elaborated by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA). In their last report, experts alerted on the impacts of climate change on oceans. Besides the risks induced by the rise of sea-level, scientists evidenced the issues of the oceans acidification and global warming of the seas, due to the absorption of up to 30% of the human-related carbon dioxide emissions released in the atmosphere. In fact, these brutal bio-geo-chemical transformations impact the marine system overall and is has been already jeopardising many species.
Theoretical framework
1. The scientific legitimisation of an environmental cause. IPCC most recently published scientific conclusions contributed in establishing the legitimacy of this environmental cause. This tends to demonstrate how the knowledge structure (Strange, 1994) plays a major role in shaping issues and allowing them to access political agenda.
2. Pooling hybrid resources. In spite of IPCC alerts, oceans issues were not inscribed on the COP21 agenda. As a response, many representatives from the civil society, scientific world, public and private sectors gathered in the Ocean & Climate Platform (OCP), and organised the Ocean for Climate Days from December 2 to 6, off Le Bourget Talks.
Analysis
It should be underlined that this subject did not appear all of a sudden on the climate change global agenda. In fact, previous IPCC reports stated the alarming state of the risks induced by the rise of the sea level. Nevertheless, their last assessment revealed new emergency issues. Indeed, this rationalisation worked for the legitimisation of the topic while encouraging initiatives focusing on marine preservation. As such, the Global Ocean Commission had been launched in February 2013, London. Composed of key political figures such as former foreign affairs minister David Miliband or Costa Rica President José Manuel Figueres, the GOC published in June 2014 a report entitled From Decline to Restoration. This emergency plan for world oceans is prescriptive and addressed to political leaders. The TARA Expedition research project stands out as well and has been published in the prestigious American Science review in May 2015. This work has for instance evidenced the consequences of global warming on plankton, microorganisms at the base of all the sea life chain. American Secretary of State John Kerry has also created the Annual Our Ocean Conference in 2014. The second edition took place in Valparaiso, Chile, in September 2015, and has been marked by several official announcements regarding the creation of important marine preservation areas, such as the one located around Easter Island. Eventually, on the eve of the COP21 grand opening, eleven countries signed the Because the Ocean Appeal launched by the Chilean and French Government, the Prince Albert II of Monaco Foundation, the Global Ocean Commission, the Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI) and TARA Expeditions. This declaration notably claims “1) the publication of a special IPCC Ocean Report, 2) The respect of the Sustainable Development Objective n°14 regarding the ocean and marine resources 3) The creation of an ‘Ocean task force’ placed under the aegis of the UNFCCC”.
This renewed interest was not enough to list the topic on the Parisian Summit programme. This is why an international coalition of representatives from the civil society, scientific world and public and private sectors joined their resources in the Climate & Ocean Platform. Created on June 10, 2014, with the support of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) of the Unesco, this institution seeks “better consideration of the ocean in the climate talks“. Besides the Ocean Appeal for Climate, an online petition developed under the aegis of the American oceanographer Sylvia Earle, the OCP also drafted nine recommendations based upon and completing those proposed by the GOC in 2014. Finally, the organisation of the Ocean for Climate Days in the Climate Space Generation in Le Bourget provided entry points to the Blue Zone and furthered the talks with parties to the negotiation process. However, these initiatives do not dim the fact that eventually, COP21 only marginally considered oceans issues, a surprising fact in regard of the widespread, acknowledged and alarming scientific data.
References
Aykut Stefan, « Désenclaver les négociations climatiques. L’enjeu crucial de la COP 21 à Paris », Passage au crible, (133), Chaos international, 20 sept. 2015.
Aykut Stefan C., Dahan Amy, Gouverner le climat ? 20 ans de négociations internationales, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2015.
Strange Susan, States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy, Londres, Pinter, 1994.
Site officiel du GIEC, available to this web address :
https://www.ipcc.ch/home_languages_main_french.shtml.
Site officiel de la Plateforme Océan & Climat, available to this web address : http://www.ocean-climate.org/.
Mar 15, 2016 | English, Human rights, Nobel Peace Prize, Non-state diplomacy, Passage au crible (English), Terrorism
By Josepha Laroche
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible n° 137
Source: Wikipedia
The Nobel Committee, reunited in Oslo, awarded this year (on October 9, 2015) the Nobel Peace Prize to the quartet who has been leading the « national dialogue » in Tunisia for more than two years. The committee pays here a tribute to « its decisive contribution in the building of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia in the wake of the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ of 2011 » This group is formed of four civil organisations: 1) The Tunisian General Labour Union, UGTT. 2) The Employers’ Association, the Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (Utica). 3) The Tunisian Human Rights League. 4) The Tunisian Order of Lawyers. The jury indeed considered that they collectively took essential steps to de-escalate the conflict between islamists and non-islamists at a time when the country was on the brink of civil war.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
During winter 2010, young unemployed graduate Mohamed Bouazizi, like many other young Tunisians, sells fruits and vegetables on Sidi Bouzid market to survive. Lacking administrative license, Mohamed Bouazizi is arrested and his products confiscated. Not able to defend his case, he chooses to set himself on fire on December 17, 2010. From then, in every town and village, a major part of the Tunisian population expresses its solidarity with the young man. At the same time, protests rise against the regime, held responsible for mass unemployment and corruption undermining the economy. In the following days, the whole country flares up as the government fights the protests through ruthless police crackdowns. Eventually, after a month of riots and a major strike, the regime collapses. In spite of reshuffling the government and some vague statements towards appeasement, President Ben Ali has to escape to Saudi Arabia on January 14th, 2011, putting an end to 23 years of unchallenged reign. This historic phase is soon called the “Jasmine Revolution“.
Mohamed Ghannouchi forms then a transitional government of national unity. Simultaneously, all political prisoners are set free, Human Rights League reinstated and the principle of total freedom of information proclaimed. Finally, the Department of Communication, accused during Ben Ali’s regime to censor the press and impede freedom of speech, is suppressed. Facing the pressure, Ghannouchi has to resign as well on February 27th, 2011. He is replaced by Bourguiba’s former minister, Beji Caïd Essebsi. The state of emergency, in place since January 2011, is extended. After the legislative elections of October 26, 2014, where anti-islamic party Nidaa Tounes (Call of Tunisia) comes in first, the Assembly of People’s Representatives replaces the constituent assembly. In the second round of the presidential election organised on December 21, 2014, Caid Essebsi wins the election with 55,68% of the votes cast, against 44,32% for Marzouki. Caid Essebsi becomes then the first president accessing power through a democratic and transparent election. After several months of political instability, troubles and a period of institutional trial, Tunisia seemed to have gained some of a stability. However, the country was soon severely hit by several islamist operations. Firstly, the attack led by the Islamic State against the Bardo museum on March 18, 2015, results in 24 killed (21 tourists, one policeman and two terrorists), and 45 injured. Then, on June 26th, 2015, Daesh targets the Port El-Kantaoui seaside resort in the so-called Sousse attacks, killing 39 persons and wounding 39 others. Lastly, the terrorist organisation also claimed responsibility for the suicide-bombing that took place in Tunis on November 24, 2015 and hit the presidential guard.
Theoretical framework
1. A Nobel for a secularisation process. Built throughout decades, the Nobel diplomacy is now clearly stated and identifiable. Founded on humanist values stated from 1895 onwards by Alfred Nobel in his will, the organisation is now able to take marked positions in international matters. For instance, in awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to activists in favour of a democratic and secular Tunisia, the Norwegian Committee expressed its support against islamists they are victims of. In fact, the committee intends to bring all its weight in the political struggle actually taking place in the country. Even better, further than Tunisia, the Committee actively takes the side of all of those who fight Daesh throughout the world.
2. A Nobel for an entire civil society. The very strict conditions regarding Nobel awards, detailed by Alfred Nobel himself and enforced in 1901 do not allow the Committees – whether it be Physics, Chemistry, Physiology-Medicine, Literature or Economy – to award the Nobel to more than three laureate for one prize. It must be noted, indeed, that the Oslo Jury sidestepped and even transgressed the ban when nominating the quartet as sole and unique recipient of the prize. However, one must understand that through the quartet, the Nobel institution distinguishes rewards and politically supports the entire Tunisian civil society.
Analysis
We count today several hundreds of thousands of deaths in the war that has been raging for 4 years now in Syria. A war that begun, in fact, in 2011, in the wake of the Arab Spring triggered by the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution. Daesh islamists (Islamic State) leading the fights against both troops of shiite President Assad and Kurds, took over several cities and especially large territories in eastern Syria. So much so, the conflict has been internationalised insofar as Russia and Iran offer military backup to the regime, while an international coalition, led by the United States, endeavour to contain the Islamists’ progression. However, the military achievements run farther than this geographical area. Indeed, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Somali and Afghanistan – to name only a few weak links – appear to be deeply unstable and destabilised by Islamist movements, whether it be Daesh, the Islamic front, Al-Qaida, Bokoh Haram, AQIM (Al Qaida in Islamic Maghreb) or AIG (Armed Islamic Group).
In such international context, awarding the Nobel to the quartet this year has particular significance. That four Tunisian associations promoting human rights and secularisation received the Nobel must be understood as a clear political engagement towards their mission and objective. With this award, the Nobel institution enshrines their political orientations bestowing on them the worldwide prominence and reputation of the prize, and states once again its diplomatic line built year after year. Yet, the institution has been steadily opposing the Nobel’s philosophy to the States. For this to happen, the institution is not reluctant to – through its global rewarding system – interfere in ongoing disputes, with the clear aim to influence, modify, reverse or oppose prevailing rationales. In many ways, it may be seen as a diplomatic intervention policy. For the record, the Norwegian Committee designated the OPCW as the 2013 laureate (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) in charge since 1997 to monitor the compliance with the Prohibitions of Chemical Weapons Convention, signed in 1993. At that time, this organisation was specifically coping with the Syrian case, in the wake of the chemical attack that took place in Damascus, on August 21, 2013. In this case, the Nobel diplomacy intruded in the States High Politics, irrupting in the global arena to interfere with the political handling of the Syrian conflict. Furthermore, as it payed a tribute to collective security and multilateralism, and put these notions on the global agenda, the Nobel institution established itself as an essential intermediary to state parties involved in the war.
The 2015 Nobel awards proceeds from the same diplomatic template. This template may be deciphered as such: 1) identify a conflict, 2) clearly take a side by awarding a Nobel prize to one of the parties, 3) act as a regulator by creating and securing international norms. But awarding a Nobel to the entire Tunisian society clearly follows a new pattern. This previously unseen choice marks indeed a significant milestone for the Nobel institution, stating its symbolic significance and repeated global impact on world’s state powers, in accordance with its very own positions.
References
Benberrah Moustafa, La Tunisie en transition. Les usages numériques d’Ennahdha, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2014. Coll. Chaos International.
Bono Irène, Hibou Béatrice, Meddeb Hamza, L’État d’injustice au Maghreb. Maroc et Tunisie, Paris, Khartala, 2015.
Laroche Josepha, Les Prix Nobel. Sociologie d’une élite transnationale, Montréal, Liber, 2012, 184 p.
Laroche Josepha, « L’interventionnisme symbolique de la diplomatie Nobel», in : Laroche Josepha (Éd.), Passage au crible de la scène mondiale. L’actualité internationale 2013, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2014, pp. 119-123.
M’rad Hatem, Le Dialogue National en Tunisie : Prix Nobel de la Paix 2015, Paris, Editions Nirvana, 2015.
Feb 27, 2016 | China, environment, Globalization, Human safety, International Political Economy, Passage au crible (English)
By Clément Paule
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible n° 136
Source: BBC
On the evening of August 12, 2015, a blast shook off Tianjin City, the fourth most populated urban area of the People’s Republic of China. According to Chinese media, the incident had been caused by accidental fire of a storage station containing ethanol and alcohol based products. It is not the first time the 15-million metropolis, located in North-West China and one hundred kilometers away from capital Beijing, faces that kind of event. Two months earlier, a series of huge explosions destroyed the Binhai port area and adjoining residential zones, resulting in 173 killed and about 700 injured.
The disaster originates from a warehouse, property of the Chinese company Rui Hai Logistics, where large quantities of hazardous chemical products were being stored. In this case, media mentioned that several hundreds of tons of sodium cyanide – used in gold mining exploitation – were stored in the warehouse, exposing the population to major water and air pollution risks. This is why Chinese authorities issued an evacuation order concerning 6000 residents and launched large scale cleaning operations. According to Press agency Xinhua, 17 000 households and 1700 companies overall were affected by these events, while a study carried out by Crédit Suisse assesses the damages to 1.3 billion dollars.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Some elements related to the country’s recent history may set the context. The situation is still marked by ongoing economic slowdown with growth figures increasingly called into question, whilst the government has devaluated the Yuan twice. On a political level, we may highlight the intensification of anti-corruption measures driven by First Secretary Xi Jinping that resulted in the arrest of several CCP leaders (Chinese Communist Party). Some authors, such as sinologist Jean-Pierre Cabestan, outline an increasing militarisation of the regime coping with the downturn of the leading model pushed forward since the 80’. On top of this, a series of major industrial disasters occurred such as the August 2014 explosion of an automotive parts manufacturer in Kunshan (146 victims), or the deadly fire of a slaughterhouse in 2013 in the Jilin Province. In this regard, NGO (Non Governmental Organisation) China Labour Bulletin has recorded more than three hundred similar accidents causing death of several hundreds of workers since late 2014.
In this context, the Tianjin Township has a strategic role given its location as maritime entrance of capital Beijing and as international hub for transportation and logistics. Some 540 million tons of material transit every year, placing Tianjin in the international ports top ten. Close to the central government, the city experienced an unprecedented growth in the last decades, enough to be nicknamed “The New Manhattan”. Indeed, special economic zone Binhai showcases technological innovation in aeronautics, electronics, petrochemicals or pharmaceutics. Estimated to 143 billion dollars in 2014, its GDP (Gross Domestic Product) increased by 15,5%, more than the double of national average. This outstanding economic take-off has given rise to chaotic urbanisation and environmental damages caused by frenzy industrialisation over the last three decades. The disaster of August 12, 2015 strikes at the core of the system and highlights the paradox of frantic modernisation.
Theoretical framework
1.The “black hole” of globalisation. Industrial insecurity brought to light by this incident is due to systematic bypass of economic regulations. Moreover, collusion capitalism or crony capitalism operating at the heart of the Chinese regime creates unregulated zones or black holes (Susan Strange) eventually jeopardising its authority.
2. Selective liability. Facing this complex crisis, the government relies on solutions applied to previous disasters, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Besides controlling information streams, culprits are identified and held responsible for the failure of the whole political and administrative system.
Analysis
Several investigations regarding the catastrophe rapidly revealed a series of infringements to current regulations, in spite of recent strengthening of existing legislation. The devastated warehouse contained 40 times the legal limit of sodium cyanide, stored without any legal operating permits. Moreover, the first residential buildings were only 600 meters away from the site of the explosion, well underneath the legal threshold of 1 km. It is to be noted that Rui Hai Logistics were not operating outside the regulatory framework as they passed successfully several surveys, let alone a consultancy audit. However, the audit report did not mention the immediate vicinity of residential areas as a problem. These series of breaches to security procedures reveal how deep the collusion goes between local town officials and the incriminated company. The company’s stakeholders admitted to using their networks of influence – referred to in China as guanxi – as well as corruption of civil servants, to develop their activities. Such predatory techniques might be the harbinger of pervasive deviating behaviour that township authorities apparently fail to contain, due to lack of political will or resources.
It should be underlined that the emergency response is also faulty, as some sources pointed out the inexperience of temporary employed firemen sent to the front line to extinguish a localised fire. In fact, explosions would have been caused by the contact of water with specific substances such as sodium cyanide, releasing quantities of inflammable gases. Besides, the rushed evacuation of thousands of people and lack of clear communication during the crisis spurred an unusual wave of protests. Several spontaneous demonstration gathered hundreds of residents concerned with water and air contamination from hazardous chemicals. Protestants also claimed for re-housing solutions, but only some of them were granted a compensation agreement. Facing the burgeoning protests, the Chinese state implemented a systematic censorship of the contradictors, in the name of the fight against misinformation and rampant rumours. Dozens of websites were then taken down by the Cyberspace Administration of China. Hundreds of user accounts on the WeChat and Sina Weibo social networks were also blocked. In a press release of august 18, 2015, NGO RSF (Reporters Without Borders) drew attention to this reinforced control leading to sometimes harsh exclusion of foreign journalists. Summoned to publish official dispatches, some of the national media close to the CCP nevertheless criticised the lack of transparency in the behaviour of city officials, potentially fuelling conspiracy theories.
Never formally called into question, the central government launched a series of investigations that led to the arrest of a dozen of individuals, starting with Rui Hai Logistics leaders. Some senior officials were also placed under investigation, such as M.Yang Dongliang, Director of the State Administration for Work Safety. In this regard, one must note that this targeted repression is in line with the anti-corruption measures enforced by Xi Jinping since he first came into power in 2012. For now, this strategy of targeted liability seems to be an attempt to placate public protests. But these empty statements cannot cover the lack of structural reforms and the need to foster a genuine risk management culture. As this disaster is only a temporary halt to entrepreneurial implementation strategy in Tianjin, the scale of the damages opened up the way to Chinese and International insurance companies that have already absorbed a large part of the losses incurred. In a close future, this sector might indirectly be part of a more efficient regulatory environment than the one based on a political system that operates in secrecy and is rotten by conflicts of interests.
Analysis
Cabestan Jean-Pierre, Le Système politique chinois. Vers un nouvel équilibre autoritaire, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2014.
Laroche Josepha, « La mondialisation : lignes de force et objets de recherche », Revue internationale et stratégique, (47), 2002, pp. 118-132.
Site de l’ONG China Labour Bulletin : http://www.clb.org.hk [25 octobre 2015].
Feb 19, 2016 | Digital Industry, English, International Finance, Internet, Passage au crible (English)
By Adrien Cherqui
Translation: Lea Sharkey
Passage au crible n° 135
Source: Flickr
The American financial regulation organisation CFTC (US Commodity Futures Trading Commission) has made public on September 17th 2015 that any virtual currency may now be considered as a commodity. This statement aims to secure Bitcoins’ high volatility, and entrusts the CFTC with monitoring powers over this currency highly sought for black markets operations on the Dark Web.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The Dark Web consists in non-indexed online information, invisible on traditional search engines. It is a main component of the Deep Web and is not be confused with surface web. The Dark Web is only accessible via specific tools such as the anonymous network TOR, and has a wide variety of applications. On the one hand, this significant portion of the Internet could bypass political restrictions over the web and be used as a tool for free expression, but on the other hand, it also hosts illegal activities related to cybercriminality.
Launched in February 2011 by Ross Ulbricht, Silk Road is one of the biggest commercial platforms on the Dark Web. From the beginning, the website has offered illegal products such as drugs, firearms, forged documentation or credit card numbers. Shut down in October 2013 for the first time, the website is definitely suspended in November 2014 during the operation Onymous, jointly led by the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), Europol, Eurojust and other organisations aiming at a complete stop of more than 410 similar websites.
2015 is a critical year for the cybercriminal ecosystem. On February the 4th, 2015, Ross Ulbricht, who has accumulated a 18-million-dollars personal fortune, is charged with computer hacking, criminal enterprise, money-laundering and drug trafficking, amongst others. Later, Shaun Bridges, federal agent in charge, confesses he himself embezzled $ 820 000 during the investigation. This series of closures is followed by the opening of new commercial platforms on this hidden side of the net. Evolution Market is for instance a major leader of these black markets. Nonetheless, the platform suddenly closes and reveals a major fraud. 12 to 35 million euros stocked as bitcoins are siphoned away by administrators using an exit scam. These bitcoins came from Evolution Market users’ electronic wallets. In the following crisis, the value of the virtual currency drops by 22% compared to the dollar, even though the bitcoins to dollars exchange rate was being published on the New York Stock Exchange since May 2015.
Theoretical framework
1. The digital transformation of criminality. Technological tools are used by criminal networks to elude public authority regulation. Subsequently, nothing is stopping the expansion of international criminality.
2. Regulation by the state. Modern states were built up with strong regulations powers, holding exclusive responsibility over several functions deemed as necessary to exert political domination. Norbert Elias showed that progressive absorption of political and economic activities secured the authority of the administrative system, especially needed to create money.
Analysis
Development and democratisation of the Internet and communication tools spurred globalised changes affecting all kinds of social interactions. Ideas, goods and services are today accessible directly online, and take part in a process of digital transformation, blurring the concepts of borders and temporality. Internet’s ubiquity reshaped social, political and economic issues usually tackled by public authority. The Web, and the Dark Web in particular are perfect tools for skillful individuals (Rosenau), enabling them to bypass surveillance programs and censorship without being tracked or identified.
But the Dark Web showcases as well illegal products and services. More and more fight over a highly competitive market led by Agora, Alphabay and Nucleus. The demise of Silk Road has been followed by the rise of similar black markets, contributing to the complex construction of a criminal ecosystem; a space where every protagonist has innovative strategies to gain new market shares. To this end, black markets spurred professionalisation and specialisation in terms of product (stolen data, malware programs, hardware, drugs, weapons, forged documentation, counterfeit goods, etc.) and language used. Innovations and techniques regarding security of online shopping are also implemented. Co-opting and invitation systems are developed, and transactions are made through third-party fiduciary deposit. Entrance fees are required from new sellers and feedback is collected via buyers’ forums.
Eventually, a search engine named Grams has also been developed. It indexes items from various platforms and increases their influence. This new Eliasian configuration reveals deep transformations within transnational criminality henceforth shifting towards new technologies. By choosing cyberspace for the implementation of their activities, these networks developed a form of « Cyberpower », as coined by Joseph Nye. In other words cybercriminality has learnt how to make the most of the web by using its specific features.
To elude national sovereignty and increase the potential of this underground economy, the cybercriminal body is mainly using Bitcoins. Completely decentralised and not bound to any official issuing institution, this currency enables relatively low-key transactions. Indeed, these transactions are registered in a block chain featuring the complete transaction history. Aware of the risks linked to such records, cybercriminals use various services to cover their identity and launder bitcoins.
Bitcoins are also subject to speculation as there is no regulation body. This gaming is materialised through mining, a type of reward allowing users to obtain money without carrying out any transaction. This tells how valuable are bitcoins to those wishing to stay out of the law. However, by trespassing on public administration responsibility over money regulation, Bitcoin is eroding state authority.
Therefore, we may understand the growing interest of various countries for Bitcoins. Nonetheless they disagree over the symbolic recognition of the currency. As Thailand had it prohibited for a long time, Germany was one of the first to acknowledge it officially. Facing their inability to fight cybercriminality in an efficient way, some countries engaged in a process of normalising Bitcoins, committing to regulate the industry and control transactions.
As to banking institutions, they are also taking Bitcoins into account and adapting to this technology. It is worth mentioning that Barclays allowed Bitcoins transactions made for charity donations. Recognition of this currency matches massive bank investments in startups of the Fintech sector, as an investment in the future. A report published on March 17th 2015 by the Juniper consultancy stated that Bitcoins should reach 5 million users before 2019.
It is worth highlighting how much this virtual currency and the Dark Web structure and support the economy of cybercriminality thanks to their inner characteristics. Being deeply intertwined, these tools speed up diffusion of criminal networks powers hardly regulated by states.
References
Even Maxence, Gery Aude, Louis-Sidney Barbara, « Monnaies virtuelles et cybercriminatilité : État des lieux et perspectives », 2014, note stratégique disponible à cette adresse :
http://www.ceis.eu/fr/system/files/attachements/note_strategique-monnaies_virtuelles_fr_0.pdf
Herlin Philippe, Apple, Bitcoin, Paypal, Google : la fin des banques ? : Comment la technologie va changer votre argent, Paris, Eyrolles, 2015.
McCusker Rob, R. (2006) « Transnational organised cybercrime: distinguishing threat from reality », Crime, Law and Social Change, 46 (4-5), 2006, p. 257-273.
Observatoire du monde cybernétique, « Cybercriminalité 2.0: guerre entre les blackmarkets », 39, juin 2015, p. 2-5.
Rosenau James N., Turbulence in World Politics: a Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990.
UIT, « Understanding Cybercrime : Phenomena, Challenges and Legal Response », septembre 2012, report available here :
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/Cybercrime%20legislation%20EV6.pdf
Untersinger Martin, « Les coulisses de l’opération « Onymous » contre des dizaines de sites cachés illégaux », Le Monde, 11 novembre 2014, disponible à l’adresse suivante: http://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2014/11/11/les-coulisses-de-l-operation-onymous-contre-des-dizaines-de-sites-caches-illegaux_4521827_4408996.html
Feb 2, 2016 | Africa, Diplomacy, Global Public Health, Non-state diplomacy, Passage au crible (English)
By Clément Paule
Translation: Cécile Fruteau
Passage au crible n° 134
Source : Flickr CDC Global
On September 14, 2015, the health authorities of Sierra Leone reported the death of a teenage girl infected with Ebola in Bombali, a district located in the Northern Province. Yet, during the previous six months, the area had not registered any new cases and the country had hoped to reach the forty-two days threshold without any new infections – i.e. twice the normal incubation period of the virus – that would have meant the transmission of the disease had stopped. Such resurgence is somewhat similar to what happened in Liberia where the haemorrhagic fever reappeared at the end of June 2015, one and a half months after the World Health Organisation (WHO) had declared the State “Ebola-free”. Even if the evolution of new Ebola occurrences has registered a constant decrease since its peak recorded between September and December 2014, the situation is far from being over, not when the rainy season is about to start and humanitarian funding is drying up. So far, up to 28,000 cases with 11,300 fatalities have been reported in West Africa alone and WHO estimates that such numbers are probably underestimated. Despite having weathered numerous criticisms regarding both its conduct qualified as “irresponsible” by MSF (Doctors Without Borders) and its achievement described as “a failure of dismal proportions” by the President of the World Bank, the health organisation has again taken on the supervision of the operations in August 2015.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
From the moment it was founded in 1948, WHO was meant to coordinate operations relative to public health threats. However, some elements have to be considered to better comprehend where the organisation’s claim now stands. Despite the success it registered with the eradication of the smallpox in 1980, its failed attempt at eliminating malaria as well as its lack of flexibility both weakened its influence during the following years. WHO was then regarded as a profligate and politicised institution. Only with the structural reforms undergone in the nineties, and more precisely under Dr Brundtland’s administration, was the organisation able to re-establish its leadership during the outbreaks of SARS (severe acute respiratory Syndrome) in March 2003 and of H5N1 avian influenza later on. For the latter, WHO did not hesitate to confront the Chinese Government it accused of withholding information. With a brand new Division of Communicable Diseases created in 1996 and the precious Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) set up in 2001, the organisation had the capacity to work according to the revised 2005 version of the IHR (International Health Regulation), which constitutes a legally binding instrument for all 196 States Parties. Its credibility however was again undermined by the H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2009 when its undue alarmism raised a new bout of criticisms and its experts were suspected of likely collusions with the pharmaceutical industry.
Such is the context when the Ebola outbreak engulfs rural areas of Guinea-Conakry, West Africa. Alerted by MSF, WHO seems to minimise the threat and implies that the spreading of the haemorrhagic fever is under control. After a deceiving weakening of the propagation of the disease in late April, Ebola amplifies again and moves to the urban spaces of Liberia and Sierra Leone in May before reaching Nigeria. Confronted with the inability for local authorities to cope with the exponentially increasing number of victims, WHO finally declares the crisis as a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) on May 8. This belated decision comes four and a half months after the outbreak started, at a time when waves of moral panic are forming because of discriminatory measures that in complete contradiction with the International Health Regulations. Indeed, if the unilateral closures of borders or the interruption of many air links provide the illusion of a possible containment of the disease, these actions impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Theoretical framework
1. The clear failure of global governance for health. Shunned because of its inertia, WHO is not able to ensure the management of the crisis. Hence, the task goes to other actors.
2. The structural challenges of a necessary reform. After the fiasco of the summer 2014, the health organisation works to learn from the past and redefines both its operative system and priorities. However, some of the observed deficiencies result from various aspects that are directly linked to the very role of the institution.
Analysis
When the Ebola outbreak starts, non-State actors such as MSF, who work alongside national health personnel, carry out the first emergency response. Quickly overtaken by the crisis, the WHO Regional Office for Africa is so slow to react that it is accused of minimising the seriousness of the situation to accommodate some governments eager to reassure mining investors. Since the international organisation has no real communication strategy, it does not manage to coordinate its own actions with the humanitarian operations, nor does it manage to have its own regulations respected by overreacting States. In this context, the appointment of a health crisis veteran as special coordinator of the UNS (United Nations system) on August 12, 2014, indicates a change of management at its expense. A month later, the unanimous adoption of Security Council Resolution 2177 defines the outbreak as a threat to international security and leads to the adoption of the UNMEER (United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response). The constitution of this novel structure run by knowledgeable executives can be seen as a disavowal for WHO and the organisation is relegated to the sidelines. To add insult to injury, in October 2014, the institution has to face a new scandal. An internal memorandum leaks to the media. Are then disclosed some incriminating elements on the delays preceding WHO’s involvement in the crisis, its staff’s ineptitude and the politicisation of some appointments. Reported by the Associated Press agency, other documents further suggest that the organisation’s indecisions stem from concerns about possible diplomatic tensions emerging between the different affected States. Indeed, if an alarmist stance were to be adopted, it would have a likely socio-economic impact on these countries. It is also important to remember the previous controversy regarding the H1N1 influenza pandemic for it may have partially shaped the institution’s deliberated caution. In any event, and in reaction to the many criticisms, WHO convenes an extraordinary meeting in Geneva on January 25, 2015. Even though some contributors denounce the delays and failures of the international response, a resolution is unanimously adopted and reasserts the leading role of the organisation in preparing and managing health crises. The creation of a specific $100 millions fund, the deployment of a “global public health reserve force” and the use of a panel of independent experts to assess the conducted operations are part of the announced measures. In July 2015, the panel of experts does publish a report listing WHO’s many deficiencies and advocating a thorough reform of its operative norms and processes.
That being said, it is essential to review some of the constraints WHO’s actions are encountering, the first of which being its limited funding. The organisation receives $4 billions for a two-year programme, an amount that ranges far behind the $6.9 billions allocated to the American Centres for Disease Control and Preventions (CDC) for the sole year 2014 or the funds given to the Gates Foundation. Furthermore, WHO’s funding comes from voluntary contributions. These latter have reached a standstill since the financial crisis of 2008 and often limit the actions the organisation sets as priorities since the money is only allotted for specific missions (earmarking, etc.). If the institution’s limited degree of latitude results in part from both internal power struggles and a far too bureaucratic system, it also originates from its administration’s incapability to foresee the importance of the Ebola threat just because the disease had already been contained in the past. More generally, there is a discrepancy between WHOs’ claimed leadership that gives the organisation a semblance of an operational and supranational actor and its role as an agency specialised in advisory and coordination tasks. The reciprocal misconception existing between humanitarian and health actors is the best example of this disparity. In fact, the ensuing distorted perceptions about WHO give rise to sometimes misguided stigmatisations and disappointment. Hence, the health organisation’s redeployment is not just another legislative and financial reform. It implies the choosing of a new institutional identity inherited from its complex history where the organisation either becomes a full political advisor or a technical expert.
References
Guilbaud Auriane, Le Paludisme. La lutte mondiale contre un parasite résistant, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2008. Coll. Chaos International.
Lakoff Andrew, Collier Stephen J., Kelty Christopher (Éds.), « Issue Number Five: Ebola’s Ecologies », Limn, janv. 2015, consulté sur le site de Limn : http://www.limn.it [10 août 2015].
Paule Clément, « L’illusoire confinement d’une crise sanitaire. L’épidémie Ebola en Afrique de l’Ouest » in : Josepha Laroche (Éd.), Passage au crible de la scène mondiale. L’actualité internationale 2014, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2015, pp. 137-142. Coll. Chaos International.
Paule Clément, « Une remise en cause du savant et du politique. Dividendes et suspicions mondiales autour des politiques de vaccination », Passage au crible, (12), 26 janv. 2010, consultable sur le site de Chaos International :http://www.chaos-international.org
Paule Clément, « Le traitement techniciste d’un fléau mondial. La troisième Journée mondiale du paludisme, 25 avril 2010 », in : Josepha Laroche (Éd.), Passage au crible de la scène mondiale. L’actualité internationale 2009-2010, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2011, pp. 129-134. Coll. Chaos International.
Rapport du panel d’experts indépendants intitulé « Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel », publié le 7 juillet 2015 et consultable sur le site de l’OMS : http://www.who.int [15 août 2015].
Jan 26, 2016 | Climate change, English, environment, Passage au crible (English), United Nations
By Stefan C. Aykut
Translation: Cécile Fruteau
Passage au crible n° 133
Source: Wikimedia
In December 2015, Paris will host the 21st Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention (CoP21). Great expectations surround what is advertised as the global governance’s major environmental event since the conference is supposed to secure an international agreement to cope with global warming. More than twenty years of discussions since the subject had been first broached at the Conference of Rio in 1992 were necessary to enable this issue to get its own given place on the international agenda. Yet, concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG) have set records in 2013 and the international panel of experts on climate change (IPCC)’s fifth report states that global warming is bound to exceed the additional 2°C critical threshold. Highlights on why such a dismal failure occurred.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Basically, the climate change debate went through three main phases. The first one starts with the signature of the Climate Convention in 1992 and is marked by the emergence of the climate regime. When the Berlin wall falls, a world where States cooperate with each other can indeed be envisioned. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol defines specific objectives for greenhouse gases reductions to be completed by developed countries and economies in transition alike. It also establishes three market-based flexible mechanisms enabling countries to pursue these goals at minimal costs. The second step begins in 2001 when the United States decide not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol handing any further negotiations over to the European Union. Hence, the Kyoto Protocol comes into power without the United States in 2005 whilst the less developed countries (LDC) rise and press forward matters of direct concerns to them. For instance, they are particularly concerned about finding ways to adapt to climate changes and securing the necessary technology and financial transfers enabling them to achieve economic development without heavily relying on carbon. This second phase ends up with the fiasco of the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009. Whereas the signing of a new treaty in lieu of the Kyoto Protocol is expected, the conference only leads to a minimal agreement, which conveys a new deal where Europe is shunned and the United States as well as emerging countries can impose their views.
Subsequently to the Copenhagen Conference, a dual imperative shapes the post 2012 period. The first goal concerns the signature of a new agreement including all State actors before 2015 for it would allow it to come into force in 2020. The second imperative is about negotiating an agreement covering the time lapse up to 2020 and preventing LCDs from interrupting their gas emission reduction efforts for lack of appropriate funding. Now at the eve of the opening of CoP21, it is important to remember that the conception of an apolitical and global governance has known many drawbacks due to events such as the US war in Iraq, the financial crisis in 2008, and the Copenhagen Conference in 2009. These latter were more or less connected to climate issues but forcefully terminated any wishful thinking on mutual and efficient ways to tackle them.
“political agreements, treaties, international organisations, legal procedures, etc.” structuring the world political stage on any given subjects (Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1984). This concept also covers other disciplinary fields. Thus, in foucauldian work, it describes all cultural, institutional or other mechanisms constituting a “regime of truth” (Foucault, 2001: 160; Leclerc, 2001). Within the body of science and technology research, the notion includes the contemporary ways to produce scientific knowledge that are intricately linked to political and economic challenges (Gibbons et al., 1994; Pestre 2003). When applied to climate issues, these various conceptions overlap and define a multi-layered system where arenas and institutions gather an increasing number of States and stakeholders. This complex structure initiated new research practices as well as assessment and validation procedures. If it witnessed numerous clashes between opposite economic and political interests, it also led to novel connections between sciences, expertise, politics and markets.
Theoretical framework
1. Climate regime. In international relations, regime designs any “political agreements, treaties, international organisations, legal procedures, etc.” structuring the world political stage on any given subjects (Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1984). This concept also covers other disciplinary fields. Thus, in foucauldian work, it describes all cultural, institutional or other mechanisms constituting a “regime of truth” (Foucault, 2001: 160; Leclerc, 2001). Within the body of science and technology research, the notion includes the contemporary ways to produce scientific knowledge that are intricately linked to political and economic challenges (Gibbons et al., 1994; Pestre 2003). When applied to climate issues, these various conceptions overlap and define a multi-layered system where arenas and institutions gather an increasing number of States and stakeholders. This complex structure initiated new research practices as well as assessment and validation procedures. If it witnessed numerous clashes between opposite economic and political interests, it also led to novel connections between sciences, expertise, politics and markets.
2. A “schism of reality”. German political scientist Oskar Negt (2010) introduced the notion of “schism of reality” in his reference work on political education to describe on an analytical level the early signs of serious constitutional crises that were overlooked because of a deceivable continuity in the democratic process. By analysing the paradigms of both the Roman Republic before the Principate and the Weimar Republic before the Nazis took over, Negt concludes these phases presented two forms of coexisting legitimacy. The first one is intrinsic to the democratic process and is based on rules of decorum and civility as well as on rhetoric and parliamentary debates. The second one relies on military power, violence, and the occupation of the public space. The consequent hiatus that Negt calls Wirklichkeitsspaltung or schism of reality after a concept borrowed from psychology, then gradually increases. Citizens still go out and vote whilst democratic decorum remains in place. In these conditions, perceiving any warning signs tends to be challenging.
Analysis
A similar hiatus seems to be affecting the climate governance. Historically, the schism takes place in the late nineties when the neo-conservative movement imposes its views on the United States leading them to bet on military power and to reject multilateralism processes . In 1997, the famous Byrd-Hagel resolution approved by the Senate reflects their hostility toward a treaty that would enforce constraints on Americans without implementing “comparable” pressure on LDCs (Senate 1997). At the same time, while the two Gulf wars (1990 and 2003) and the conflict in Afghanistan are raging, Washington protects American vital interests in terms of security and oil supply, enticing the American way of life to go unchanged. Neither the deeper meaning of these conflicts nor the sudden American decision to disengage from the Climate process has been substantially studied.
Such segregation in the negotiations can be analysed on a more structural level. Research on how international regimes interplay (Oberthür and Stokke, 2011) gives evidence that the Climate regime does interfere with many others, which all have their own proceedings and specialised institutions. A key component of the schism is how far removed the climate discussions are from other institutions. As a matter of fact, the World Trade Organization (WTO) does not distinguish between polluting and non-polluting activities, which contributes to a generalisation of a pro-carbon economy. Furthermore, the World Bank still heavily finances large infrastructure projects as well as an industrialisation that leaves little room for environmental concerns . Even worse, the Kyoto approach tends to separate two energy regimes: it indeed promotes discussions and measures on GHGs and CO2 thus trying to solve output issues, but it does not tackle the input aspect of the problem, namely, the extraction and burning of energy resources. By targeting gas emissions instead of addressing patterns of economy development or international trades or even global energy systems, the Climate regime only managed to build “fire walls” (Alvater, 2005: 82) isolating climate challenges from other regimes.
Hence, a schism does separate two realities. On one side stands a world of global economy and finance, unbridled exploitation of fossil energy resources and stiff competition between States. On the other side, a world of negotiations and global governance gets more and more isolated. The conference opening in Paris can only succeed if the different stakeholders acknowledge such segregation and open up the debate, finally coming to an end with their lack of awareness concerning other critical issues that have been impeding previous discussions.
References
Altvater Elmar, Das Ende des Kapitalismus, wie wir ihn kennen, Münster, Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2005.
Foucault Michel, Dits et écrits, Paris, Quarto Gallimard, 2001.
Gibbons Michael, Nowotny Helga, Limoges Camille, et al., The New Production of Knowledge. The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies, London, Sage, 1994.
Keohane Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton (N.J.), Princeton University Press, 1984.
Krasner Stephen D., (Éd), International Regimes, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983.
Leclerc Gérard, « Histoire de la vérité et généalogie de l’autorité », Cahiers internationaux de sociologie, 2 (111) 2001, pp. 205-213.
Negt Oskar, Der politische Mensch. Demokratie als Lebensform, Göttingen, Steidl Verlag, 2010.
Oberthür Sebastian et Stokke Olav Schram, (Éds), Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2011.
Pestre Dominique, Science, Argent et Politique. Un essai d’interprétation, Paris, Inra, 2003.
