Feb 10, 2015 | Africa, Defense, Diplomacy, Human rights, Passage au crible (English), Security, Terrorism
By Philippe Hugon
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n° 124
Source: Wikimedia
The 24th Summit of the AU (African Union) was held in Addis Ababa from January 21-28, 2015. The major issues were related to the “Year of Women’s Empowerment and Development towards Africa’s Agenda 2063”. The question of the Ebola epidemic was addressed with a request for cancellation of debt up to 3 billion US dollars for the three countries concerned: Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The Peace and Security Council was held on January 29 with 15 heads of state in attendance, but without the Nigerian President, Good Luck Jonathan. On the authority’s agenda was the fight against terrorism, particularly targeting Boko Haram. Appealing to UN financing, a multinational force of 7,500 was proposed.
However, the highlight was the designation of the president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, as the new president of the African Union. At 90 years old, this autocrat in power for 35 years, hero of the fight against Apartheid, increased criticism of the West. His election symbolizes the contradiction of African countries expressing an anti-western Pan-Africanism, despite member states’ inability to deal autonomously with questions related to peace and security or to solve the problem of epidemics. It also testifies to the constancy of gerontocrats, presidents for life, in the face of the African youth seeking their place in the political game and which, in so doing, opposes constitutional manipulations.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The African Union reinforced the political integration of Africa by implementing the NEPAD (The New Partnership for the Development of Africa) and the transformation in 2002 of the OAU (Organization of African Unity) into the AU (African Union). Today the AU is an assembly of 53 African states. Yet, Morocco is not a member due to the position adopted by the OAU, and then the AU, in favor of the independence of Western Sahara. The AU reinforced its institutional strength (Assembly, Executive Council, Permanent Representatives’ Committee and Commission). Initially a coordination organization, it has now turned into an institution of integration modeled after the European Union.
The Action Plan, adopted in Ouagadougou on October 12, 2014, had defined five priorities:
1/ institutional transformation (Pan-African Parliament); 2/ promotion of peace (Peace and Security Council), human security and governance (African Court of Human Rights the Peoples); 3/ regional development and integration; 4/ construction of a shared vision within the continent; 5/ adoption of protocol relative to the Court of Justice of the UA. It otherwise provided for the designation of a president of the UA for one year, while the president of the commission would be elected for a 5-year term.
The UA made two major innovations in relation to the OAU: 1/ It allowed for sanctions to be imposed on member states not respecting policies and decisions by the AU. Besides that, the 2007 charter strengthened the objectives in terms of democracy and governance. 2/ It recognized a right of intervention when legitimate order is threatened; a decision that goes against the principle of non-intervention, protector of sovereignties. Created in 2003 for deployment in the context of peacekeeping or peace support missions, the African reserve force is divided into five regional brigades integrated into the African architecture of peace and security of the African Union.
The reality remains far from these norms since the margins of maneuver of the AU appear slim in the face of the EU and its financing. Yet, it should be noted that with the disappearance of certain African leaders (Gaddafi, Wade) who would have wanted to promote a government of the United States of Africa, the AU has experienced a loss of influence. Especially since this ambition has clashed with the reticence of South Africa, and with the division between Arab-Muslim Africa and Sub Saharan Africa and the weak regional integration.
Ultimately, the election of Robert Mugabe as president of the organization strengthens the weight of South Africa. Like the election of Ms. Dlamini-Zuma in July 2012, as president of the Commission, the election of Mr. Mugabe is a result of alliances formed during the fight against Apartheid. It also confirms the relative unity of the bloc of the SADC (Southern Africa Development Community) in the face of the ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States) and the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and French-speaking countries represented by the OIF (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie) and especially Nigeria.
Theoretical framework
The weakness of the African Union refers to two main elements.
1. A conflict of interests. The African Union reflects the rivalries between member states. It is marked by the opposition between two rival powers: Nigeria and South Africa. They want to exert a continental leadership and aim long-term to obtain a seat as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.
2. A poor collective mobilization in favor of security. The pan-African rhetoric of the pax Africana stumbles in the face of weak financing and low-level engagement in favor of peace and security. To the point that the architecture of peace and security functions poorly on the continent. Faced with conflicts, the development of terrorism and jihadism in Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Mali, Nigeria in the region of Lake Chad, in the Central African Republic or else in the DRC, the African Union has not known how or else has been unable to demonstrate its authority. Thus, the African force available to fight Boko Haram finds itself confronted with financing difficulties and the difficult implementation of a multilateral framework. So that the African forces involved in the background, behind armed nationals or bilateral forces before being relieved by United Nations forces.
Analysis
Despite the African Commission of Human Rights and Peoples, the AU continues to remain far behind concerning the infringement of rights taking place in numerous countries, notably in DRC Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia and Zimbabwe. The same goes as to denials of democracy or when it comes to addressing popular uprisings (i.e., the “Arab Springs” taking place since January 2011). Most often, constitutional manipulations aim to free themselves from rules guaranteed by Constitutional Courts or Councils. Thus, a connection exists in Africa between the duration of mandates and the personalization of power and the risk of authoritarian tendencies. This explains that elections of a contentious nature have led to crises in Côte d’Ivoire (2000, 2010), Kenya (2007, 2008), Zimbabwe (2007) or in RDC (2011); identity clientelism having only been exceeded in certain rare cases (Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, in 2013).
The election of a gerontocrat or autocrat Robert Mugabe also presents a challenge to African youth. Certainly, his populism and the fight against British mining interests are still of a certain echo. But his role in the fight against Apartheid is henceforth a thing of the past. Young Zimbabweans today are subjected to the effects of the country’s agrarian reform which – in giving land to war veterans – has ruined their agriculture. This is why they are submitted to a regime controlled by the army. Still, African youth – time bomb or change factor – now intend to participate in the political, social and economic life of the continent. However, demographic majority, the youth remain the social and political minority. A consequence of their lack of perspective, they often waver between resignation and contestation; showing that they are listening to all types of extremists (oppositions to imams and Sunnite brotherhoods, Shiism in Senegal or in Nigeria, evangelical churches).
Mugabe’s victory also underscores the failure of the UA in the domain of peace and security. Of course, this organization recommended an African intervention force against Boko Haram, which continues to commit crimes against humanity. To do this, it sweeps aside the reluctance of Nigeria worried about its national sovereignty. On the other hand, its declaration of intent simply accompanies regional initiatives of countries neighboring Lake Chad, members of The Lake Chad Basin Commission and the logistical support of France or the United States. Finally, it has a serious lack of financing and of consensus, with only 40% of its budget coming from member contributions.
Beyond rhetoric, the AU must develop the principles it has proclaimed in matters of democracy, governance and intervention. But this implies financing by member states, notably those that – mining or oil countries – have significant financial resources. Transfers of sovereignty and production of public goods on a regional scale could be the answer to the overflow of sovereignties in a transnational context. In the same way, regional economic integration could help to counter the economic dependence of state actors. However, a process such as this assumes strong, democratic states that are capable of avoiding territorial fragmentation; a public power that would be based on a civil society equipped with counterpowers and recognizing the rights of minorities. Still, the election of Mugabe radically contradicts this orientation.
References
Nougarel Fou, Briga LMI, L’architecture de paix et de sécurité en Afrique : bilan et perspectives, Actes colloques, Bordeaux, Ouagadougou, Nov. 2012-Oct. 2013.
Philippe Hugon, Géopolitique de l’Afrique, 3e ed., Paris, SEDES 2013.
Romuald Likibi, La charte africaine pour la démocratie, les élections et la gouvernance, Paris, Publibook 2012.
Dec 30, 2014 | Cultural industries, Passage au crible (English), Publications (English), Security
By Alexandre Bohas
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n° 123
Source: Wikimedia
Sony, which just filmed and produced The Interview, was recently threatened by terrorist attacks. The film derides the North Korean regime and ends with the assassination of the current president, Kim Jon-un. Previously, the firm’s IT system had undergone attacks and confidential information that it possesses was compromised. For now, it has stopped the distribution of the production.
Sony studios – known by the name Columbia TriStar before being bought by the Japanese firm – produced a satiric comedy on the North Korean regime in 2014, produced by Seth Rogen and Evan Goldberg. This full-length feature film tells the story of two reporters who, after having obtained an interview with the current dictator, receive orders to assassinate him. Originally set for release next fall, it was censured by North Korea, which threatened to take “merciless” actions against the United States.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In November, Sony Pictures Entertainment’s computer systems were hacked by self-proclaimed hackers, The Guardians of Peace. Yet, according to the FBI, the aforementioned group liaised with North Korea. This incursion led to revelations concerning the upcoming productions of the major film studio, the salaries of its top leaders as well as the contents of their Internet communication. This group otherwise threatened terrorist attacks on cinemas where the film would be shown. Following these warnings, which sparked the cancellation of its release in many film operating companies, the studio itself suspended the release and opted for a limited online launch. This decision was then received negatively by numerous critics, including President Barack Obama.
Theoretical framework
1. The coming of a post-international era. Crossed by contradictory trends of integration and fragmentation, the world has left the inter-state era consecrated by the Treaties of Westphalia, signed in 1648. Henceforth, it is characterized by multiple actors, identities superposed and loyalties fragmented. We must also consider the world broadly, in the same way that James Rosenau, Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach did, by using the concepts of polities and spaces of power.
2. A political economy of culture. Based on the inseparability of the cultural and social spheres, this new area of research contributes to the enrichment of the analysis of international relations because it integrates the semiotic and ideological aspects of transnational phenomena. According to this approach, collective representations reflect the society in which they are observed, all the while taking part in its creation. In this way, the analysis of culture implies an understanding of the different processes of massive diffusion and symbolic appropriation, which form an essential issue for every actor on the world stage.
Analysis
Governed with an iron fist and in a practically autarkic manner, North Korea may fear, despite its mastery of the means of broadcasting and telecommunication, that this satiric comedy might create internal disorder. Besides that, if the film is an international success, it will help to shape the collective representations of many countries beyond the United States, notably by conveying an exaggerated and devaluing image of the country. It is noteworthy that otherwise, its regime has also used cinema as a means of propaganda and diffusion of ideas. In this respect, we can recall that Kim Jong-il, the current leader’s father, had initiated large-scale film productions – like Souls Protest (2000) -, which experienced limited success outside the country’s borders.
Today the digital era highlights and exacerbates these already existing conflicts. Like the leaderless and non-state network Anonymous, states, whether they be authoritarian or democratic, experience or practice cyberattacks, sometimes taking recourse in the services of professional hackers. North Korea allegedly has an elite unit of 3,000 experts in the matter. In this case, these interventions can target private organizations, – large newspapers – but also intranet servers belonging to administrations, like that of the Department of State, thus harming the targeted entity in multiple ways. It can then become a question of paralyzing its activity, ruining its reputation and/or accessing its secret documents, in order to penalize it economically, symbolically and politically.
In Sony’s case, in addition to the shortfall in earnings of the film The Interview, produced but not marketed in theaters, confidential data as well as email exchanges between top company officials have been rendered public by these operations. Yet, via the correspondence between them, these executives give proof of their character, which alternates between racist, unscrupulous and scornful. In addition, this attack came while Sony had just overcome a massive hacking of its PlayStation network. Clearly, we are far from traditional, inter-state conflicts that oppose two armies on a battlefield, and on which Realist theorists concentrate their analyses.
Quite the contrary, we are witnessing a confrontation which sets a major Hollywood film studio – operating on the world scale and supported by Washington – against a criminal group suspected of being supported by North Korea. In this asymmetrical shock, one of the largest companies in global cinema goes against the opinion of the government of its country by effectively submitting to the blackmail of unknown activists, exploiting individuals’ fears over possible terrorist attacks, which supposedly would be committed in movie theaters. We are witnessing disorder, “turbulence” – in the words of Rosenau – during which a few individuals succeed in destabilizing an American giant with an annual turnover of 8 billion dollars. This demonstrates that from now on, international relations have lost their inter-state character.
References
Best Jacqueline and Paterson Matthew (eds.), Cultural Political Economy, London, Routledge, 2010.
Ferguson Yale, Mansbach Richard, A World of Polities. Essays on Global Politics, Abingdon: Routledge, 2008.
Rosenau James N., Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990.
Sum Ngai-Lim, Jessop Bob, Towards A Cultural Political Economy. Putting Culture in its Place in Political Economy, Cheltenham, E. Elgar Publishing, 2013.
Dec 23, 2014 | Constructivism, Defense, Europe (English), Human rights, Passage au crible (English)
By Thomas Lindemann
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n° 122
Source: Wikimedia
The drastic fall of the Russian ruble, the plunge of energy revenues, the freeze of leaders’ assets held abroad: Russia has already paid a heavy price for the annexation of Crimea. Western countries have decided to impose various sanctions – military (embargoes on imported and exported weapons from or bound for Russia), economic (for example the impossibility for European citizens to buy or sell Russian stocks), technological or energy-related. Besides that, European states forbid their companies to make new investments in transportation and telecommunications infrastructure and in the energy sector in Crimea and in Sevastopol. The EU has also decided to block the assets of several Russian businessmen in close contact with President Putin. Finally, Russia seems more and more politically isolated. During the 9th G20 Summit in Brisbane, Australia, on November 15-16, 2014, President Putin received a cool welcome from his Australian host. Prior to that, Russia had been excluded from the G8 initially planned for June in Sochi and ultimately replaced by a G7 in Brussels. In these conditions, why has Russia annexed Crimea and why has it supported separatists in eastern Ukraine, despite the high economic and political costs?
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The crisis between Russia and Ukraine might be understood in four major sequences. The first radicalization of Russia where recourse to armed forces against Ukraine did not seem to be excluded occurred after the bloody repression of protesters in Maidan Nezalezhnosti (“Independence Square”, in Ukrainian) in Kiev and the removal of President Yanukovych by Parliament on the night of February 21-22, 2014. At that time, dissenters rose up against the Ukrainian government’s decision not to sign the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement. A new government, led by Oleksandr Turchynov then Aresniy Yatsenyuk, declared itself in favor of association with the EU strongly criticized by Russia. The latter then qualified the new government as illegitimate and accorded the right of asylum to the former president all the while brandishing the danger of a new anti-Russian fascism. A second moment of radicalization occurred on February 27, when – to “test its ability to act” – Moscow took military measures with its land army in zones bordering Ukraine. On February 28, armed men took control of the airport in Simferopol. Consequently, a large number of observers suspect Russia of supporting the eastern Ukrainian separatists, especially since a part of the East is not recognized by the new government. Moreover, the ban of the Russian language in 13 of 27 regions in Ukraine does not ease the adherence of the eastern portion of the country to the new institutions. A third stage occurred in the month of March when Crimea, which has a large Russian-speaking population, declared its independence and its re-attachment to Russia. The latter accepted the proclamation despite threats of heavy economic sanctions. Finally, a fourth sequence is still playing out, which is characterized by Russia’s military support of separatists, an assistance which does not exclude recourse to armed forces. During his New Year’s speech, President Putin, all the while placing the responsibility of the situation on Europe’s shoulders, warned his fellow citizens that difficult economic times were ahead.
Theoretical framework
1. Universalist approaches. from appeasement to sanctions. In order to understand the development of Russian policy in light of Ukrainian and western policy, there are three major theoretical orientations, which each have two sub-variants – threat of punishment or promise of reward. 1) Deterrence (offensive realism), 2) reassuring appeasement (defensive realism), 3) sanctions and/or economic rewards (liberalism) or else sanctions or symbolic reward (for example the exclusion of Russia from the G8).
2. Contextual analysis. But we will take a different path, more concerned with the target’s social properties. This contextual process proves to be attentive to the type of legitimacy demanded by the leaders of a political community. Indeed, if they want to maintain their power, decision-makers must first consider the way in which exterior political decisions affect their symbolic capital domestically. According to our thesis – inspired by Weber – the Russian government is currently demanding a charismatic legitimacy to protect Russian minorities and Orthodox Slavs as well as a masculine identity which emphasizes the display of physical strength and contempt of death. Thus, we can better illuminate the failure of western sanctions and the Russian government’s symbolic need to help its brothers.
Analysis
By following the sequences of radicalization of Russian politics, we see that it is first of all reacting to significant challenges that we can qualify as symbolic vulnerabilities in terms of image and self-esteem. The new government’s western anchor and the ban of the Russian language precede the early stages of radicalization. The Russian fear of a Ukrainian association with the EU, or even with NATO, should otherwise be kept in mind. We must also not underestimate the appeals to Russian brothers in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine which are not necessarily inspired by President Putin. Concerning economic and diplomatic sanctions against Russia, it is difficult to affirm that they have aggravated the crisis, but in any case, they have not been favorable to negotiations. Hence, a time-linked logic reveals that Ukrainian and western policies appear to be symbolically costly for the image of the country that Russian leaders intend to project into the world and into their own territory. The motivations of Russian leaders illustrate the burden of symbolic considerations in the decision to support the Russians of Ukraine. The Russian president, friend of motorcyclists and black belt in judo, has always presented himself to be masculine, showing himself bare-chested, even with a tiger, and often in uniform. He is relentless in his affirmation that Russia will remain a great power and that his country will continue to possess – unlike westerners – the qualities of self-denial and sacrifice. Yet, this rhetoric still seems just as popular in Russia, and the president maintains an equally high level of approval amongst public opinion.
Putin’s story of heroism and protection remains incompatible with political concessions under economic pressure, which might risk making him appear cowardly. Yet, western leaders certainly do not ignore these symbolic constraints. Like Putin, they must also be attentive to their legitimacy, which for their part is based on democratic values and the respect of Human Rights. Every exterior decision by policymakers seems to be playing also a role on the domestic scene so that the state’s actions will be congruent with its claimed role.
References
Jego Marie, “Poutine, le mâle absolu”, www.lemonde.fr, January 24, 2014.
Lindemann Thomas, Causes of War. The Struggle for Recognition, ECPR, Colchester, 2011.
Tsygankov Andrei P., Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin. Honor in International Relations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2014.
Dec 17, 2014 | China, Human rights, Passage au crible (English)
By Justin Chiu
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°121
Source: Wikipedia
On August 31, 2014, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) adopted a restrictive plan designed to impede the election of an executive leader of Hong Kong in 2017. At the end of September, this decision sparked a significant mobilization of civil disobedience, henceforth called the umbrella revolution. Mostly students, the protestors demanded the organization of an election with universal suffrage, free and pluralistic, in order to choose the primary leader of the Hong Kong administration. However, the territory’s authorities – and especially those in Beijing – demonstrated their firmness by not ceding to any demand. Ultimately, law enforcement evacuated the occupied sites in mid-December.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Democracy has only existed for a short time in Hong Kong. During the colonial era, between 1841 and 1997, Hong Kong’s governors were directly designated by the British monarchy. Chosen from the diplomatic corps, with the exception of the last governor, Chris Patten, former minister of the conservative party. In the 1980s, the principle of an election was gradually introduced in the cantons in the form of a District Council. In 1991, the first ever a direct vote was organized. Its aim was to elect eighteen of the sixty members of the legislative Council.
Signed by the Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and Zhao Ziyang, the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 provided for the retrocession of Hong Kong to China in 1997. It otherwise guaranteed the territory’s political autonomy with the famous principle of one country, two systems. However, the Hong Kong Basic Law adopted in 1990 by the NPC now serves as the territory’s constitution. According to this document, “the permanent residents of Hong Kong have the right to vote and to present themselves for elections” (Article 25). Besides that, it was decided upon that “the head of state [would be] chosen by universal suffrage, after approval of the candidates by a broadly representative nominating committee, in accordance with democratic procedures” (Article 45)
Since 1997, three heads of state have come one after the other over four terms. An electoral committee designated each figure. Leung Chun-Ying, the current head of state, earned a score of 57.8% (689/1193) in 2012. In reality, this result remains very mediocre considering that the electoral committee was composed of pro-Beijing delegates who were obliged to limit themselves to ratifying the choice of an already nominated candidate.
At the end of December 2007, the ANP approved the organization of the election of a Chief Executive of Hong Kong by universal suffrage in 2017. Yet, on August 3, 2014, the ANP tightened the rules for the future election. From now on, two candidates, a maximum of three – would first have to obtain a majority within the election committee that would then become the nominating committee. According to this logic, the CCP will control the election process starting at its earliest stages. Nonetheless, this antidemocratic measure has provoked indignation. Starting at the end of September, the primary roadways in the center of Hong Kong were occupied by students, soon joined by a large part of the population.
Theoretical framework
1. Authority based on a centralized surveillance system. Equipped with a democratic façade, the political structure of China is ruled by the system of nomenklatura, a means of designation borrowed from Bolshevik institutions. This opaque system allows the CCP to force the election of preselected candidates. Otherwise, upper level senior management draws up the list of candidates. Thus the central power in Beijing puts into place a pyramidal system of control on all levels. Yet, wanting to extend its monopoly of political power to Hong Kong, the Chinese authorities enter into conflict with a transnationalized movement of citizen resistance.
2. Citizenship constructed by a transnational network of information. Vector of information and tool of mobilization, social networks have played a decisive role all throughout the demonstration. With Facebook, Twitter and other applications useful for instantaneous sharing, the latest technical innovations appearing in telecommunications contribute to the transformation of social space on a global scale. Indeed, the appearance of these networks of networks allows for the emergence of democratic debates beyond Chinese borders. Benefitting from transnational support, their dynamic lies in the instant willingness of individuals and evolves without a true leader or a developed organization. But, the drawback of this advantage lies in the fact that this spontaneous and hierarchical mobilization remains unstructured and unstable throughout time.
Analysis
Today the world stage is experiencing a succession of popular revolts. Despite diverse socio-political configurations, these movements calling for democracy participate in the emergence of a transnational citizenship made possible by social networks. The demonstrations – in Hong Kong, in Taiwan or in numerous other countries in the Arab world – show, above all else, the tensions between centralized state power and the transnational dynamic of networks of individuals.
These last few years, innovations in telecommunications have transformed the public sphere on at least two major points. 1) By broadcasting and receiving a significant quantity of information and ideas, the capacity of individuals to promote their own views has grown. Brought together, individuals defining themselves as citizens, acquire considerable power to defend the public interest. 2) Social networks reinforce the global interdependence between individuals and communities. The perception of a threat – even if it emanates from the other side of the world -, of the values that we defend, elicits the will to act. Otherwise, the immediate approval by others perceived as being like us, via likes, shares or comments, produces a feeling that legitimizes this desire.
Thus, we are not surprised that following the violent acts perpetrated by law enforcement against Hong Kong students, an international mobilization was quickly organized. On October 1, support rallies were relayed by sixty cities worldwide, each mobilizing hundreds if not thousands of people. In addition, the preoccupations expressed by a large number of western political leaders and the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon. To such an extent, that the head of Chinese diplomacy, Wang Yi, recalled the principle of non-intervention during his visit to Washington.
However, the mobilization weakened throughout time while the government of Beijing maintained its reform of the election of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong. In other words, the opaque and Leninist system of nomenklatura was established in Hong Kong. Note in this regard that this normalization coincides with the coming to power of the new Chinese leader. From the moment he assumed his role in 2012, Xi Jinping had to first establish his authority in order to then secure a second term. In this case, the number one Chinese leader must continue to establish himself opposite his Prime Minister Li Keqiang, who supports further reforms. As a result, at a time when Xi Jinping is striving to assert his authority, democratic demands must be mastered, or else annihilated.
References
Cabestan Jean-Pierre, « Hong Kong : comprendre la révolution des parapluies», Le Figaro, 10 Oct. 2014, disponible à la page : http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/2014/10/10/31002-20141010ARTFIG00244-hong-kong-comprendre-la-revolution-des-parapluies.php
Cabestan Jean-Pierre, Le Système politique chinois : Un nouvel équilibre autoritaire, Paris, Presses de Science Po, 2014.
Musso Pierre, Télécommunications et philosophies des réseaux : La Postérité paradoxale de Saint-Simon, Paris ; PUF, 1997.
Rosenau James N., Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990.
Dec 10, 2014 | Passage au crible (English), Publications (English), Security, Theories of international relations
By Jean-Jacques Roche
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°120
Source: Wikipedia
One year ago, on December 5, 2013, France launched operation Sangaris1 in the Central African Republic, its 7th since the African nation’s independence in 1960. The French army arrived in Bangui with the mission to remove the militiamen of the Seleka (Muslims) who had taken power and were multiplying the abuses against the anti-balakas (Christians). Another important matter was the preparation of the terrain for an international force that the United Nations had accepted to form on the same day the operation began (the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic or MISCA, French acronym for (Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine).
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Today the specter of the Rwandan genocide has faded. However, 2.5 million Central Africans remain dependent on humanitarian aid. As for the displace persons, they are counted by the hundreds of thousands. At the same time, in Chad, neighboring country to the CAR, other French forces are also deployed within the framework of the Barkhane military presence. This plan furthers Operation Serval put into place in Mali to fight against Islamist terrorists, traffickers and secessionists; their alliance threatens the stability of the entire Sahelian region. All the while objecting to the practices inherited from Françafrique and the role of gendarme of the continent, Paris is justifying its double presence by different considerations: the first intervention allegedly falls within the framework of the R2P (Responsibility to Protect), while the second purportedly complies with cooperation agreements already in place.
Theoretical framework
1. The Responsibility to Protect. Appearing in 2001 following the projects by the ICISS (International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty), this concept is a continuation of the former notions of interference, duty and the right to intervene. The semantic progression reflected the maturing process of a project that appeared at the beginning of the 1980s at the meeting point of four phenomena. Firstly, academic research allowed for the convergence of Realist approaches (based on work by Kenneth Waltz then Richard Ullman) and of Scandinavian peace keeping (Johan Galtung) through the idea of “societal security“. United Nations reflections committees (O. Palme, G. Brundtland, W. Brandt…) reclassified it as “global security“, an expression that was then formalized by the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in 1987. The third element, diplomacy of Human Rights, which had largely opposed humanitarian law, evolved when by entryism the French doctors steadily became the majority members of the Secretary of State for Human Rights and facilitated the adoption of the first resolutions of the General Assembly on interference (43/131 and 45/100). Finally, the diplomatic positioning of middle powers like Canada in favor of “freedom from fear” (Gareth Evans, Lloyd Axworthy) and Japan favorable to “freedom from need” (Sadako Ogata) substantially contributed to the transformation of the international agenda. The fall of the Berlin Wall, as an emblematic event, served to highlight these four global tendencies that liberal authors interpreted as the coming of a “post-Westphalian world“. By replacing “the billiard balls” – which for Arnold Wolfers symbolized the relations between States likened to Hobbesian gladiators – with John Burton’s cobweb or Norbert Elias’ net, the adherents of this new world thus intended to substitute the Durkheimian solidarity of a civil society, freed from any exclusive citizen allegiance, for the Weberian logic of States. However, considered too radical, interference was quickly replaced by the “right to intervene” (Resolution 770 in 1992), then by the “duty of humanitarian assistance“. The latter qualification seemed to want to abandon the principle by opposing a moral duty (humanitarian assistance) to states’ positive law before the ICISS formalized the conditions of cohabitation between the obligation to assist populations in situations of crisis (“the duty of non-interference stops where the risk of non-assistance begins“, according to François Mitterrand) and the respect of states’ sovereignty. Formalized in 2005 by points 138 and 139 of the final document of the United Nations 60th Anniversary Summit, the concept of R2P was again used in September 2009 by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which by consensus adopted Resolution A/RES/63/308.
2. The conformity of the Realist tradition. As far as they are concerned, Operations Serval and Barkhane led in parallel to the Sangaris intervention are true to the Realist tradition. Their justification falls very clearly within the traditional framework of inter-state relations. The first argument lies in the request for assistance from an allied country and in the right of collective self-defense recognized by Article 5 of the UN Charter. Inasmuch as this support is true to defense agreements concluded by France with a number of its former African colonies; it is not even necessary to resort to a theoretical argument since any lack of interference would have been interpreted as the demonstration of an avoidance strategy and the non-respect of commitments made. At the same time, the historic responsibilities of France with regards to its former colonies explained the recourse to classic rhetoric of “rank” and the defense of “values” by which the French state uses its armed forces both as a “shield” and as a “pavilion“. As such, these distant and expensive intrigues contribute to what John Mearsheimer calls “the fatality of great powers” obliged to intervene in order to justify their status. Finally, the invocation of security risk fits within in the framework of Neorealism that replaced power by security as the keystone of international institutions (C. Glaser, J. Grieco…). The situation of failed states was unanimously considered to be a major source of global insecurity (2013 French White Paper on Defense, European Security Strategy, 2003 and 2008). These interventions can easily be justified by France’s interest in stabilizing grey zones liable to become a direct threat for its own security in the short term.
Analysis
How then do we reconcile these two approaches, theoretically contradictory, but diplomatically comprehensible. We can cite three elements. Firstly, it appears very clear that we are faced with distinct situations that impose different solutions. Just like Canada can pursue different policies based on human security throughout the world and using Realist arguments can defend its maritime rights in the Northwest Passage, France intends to call upon its values and interests in order to undertake operations – more complimentary than really contradictory – in action areas (issues) and zones that do not call for the same responses. Secondly, from now on, the Liberal two-level game is integrated into Realism (Neoclassic) that concedes the influence of interior considerations on exterior practices. Thus, the support of public opinion, necessary for an operation that, like Barkhane, is designed to last, has humanitarian intervention as compensation, like Sangaris in the CAR. Finally, Liberals and Realists have been able to reduce their mutual opposition, insofar as the concept of global security is concerned – of which humanitarian security is a component – and this requires taking the security of each individual into consideration. However, this condition necessary to global security is not sufficient. A new equilibrium between every individual’s natural right to security and the demands of positive law must now be established. Without reference to past practices, this equilibrium must be redefined.
If a problem of coherence persists, it must nonetheless be considered a reverse situation to the extent that the multiplication of humanitarian interventions advocated by Liberals appear henceforth to be a factor of instability, while Realism contents itself with building peace on the balance of threats. By reinventing just war, Liberal causes must from now on be considered as threats to the peace of States, which has however been acquired by forgetfulness (and sacrifice) of civil societies. It is proving to be possible to choose between the lesser of two evils, but it not clear whether peace will result from the convergence of doctrines that consider strength to be vital to peace (Realism); which can be sacrificed when it is a question of offering assistance to populations in a state of emergency (Liberalism). Avoiding the negative effects of this merger may require paying attention to the teachings of critical theory that, via Ken Booth, revise the three major dangers that would allegedly establish for world peace 1) the Cult of Urgency (presentism); 2) transitional justice (culturalism) and 3) alleged scientific neutrality.
References
Booth Ken, « Human Wrongs and International Relations », International Affairs, 71 (1), 1995, pp. 103-126.
Glaser Charles L., « Realist as Optimist. Cooperation as Self help », International Security, 19 (3), Winter 1994-1995, pp. 50-90.
Jeangène-Vilmer Jean-Baptiste, La Guerre au Nom de l’Humanité. Tuer ou Laisser Mourir, Paris, PUF, 2012.
Roche Jean-Jacques, « La Société Civile et la Guerre », in : Josepha Laroche, Yves Poirmeur (Éds.), Gouverner les Violences. Le processus civilisationnel en question, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2013, pp. 231-246.
Ullman Richard, « Redefining Security », International Security, 8 (1), Summer 1983, pp. 129-153.
1 Name of an African butterfly
Nov 25, 2014 | environment, Global Public Goods, Passage au crible (English)
By Weiting Chao
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°119
Source: Wikimedia
On September 21, 2014, hundreds of thousands of people protested in major cities around the world in favor of the fight against global warming. Led primarily by the NGO Avaaz-Le Monde en Action, the gathering was structured around 2,700 events in 158 countries. Moreover, it mobilized numerous politicians, experts and celebrities including the Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon, the former American Vice President Al Gore, the mayor of New York Bill de Blasio, the anthropologist Jane Goodall, the French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, the French Minister of Ecology Ségolène Royal, and the American actor Leonardo DiCaprio.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Discussions on the theme of climate governance began at the end of the 1980s in order to respond to scientific findings on changes of atmospheric composition. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – which aimed to reduced greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) – was signed at the end of the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992. Based on the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997, and entered into force in February 2005. It was the only global treaty to impose binding obligations on industrialized countries. However, the United States’ 2001 decision to refuse to ratify it proved to be detrimental to its implementation. This is why the signature of a brand-new treaty in the post-Kyoto phase is proving to be just as difficult. According to the future roadmap approved in Bali in 2007, states should have finalized a new treaty in Copenhagen in 2009 (Conference of the Parties, COP 15). Yet, despite expectations and heightened pressures, notably from civil societies, no significant progress was observed during this summit. In December 2012, during the conference held in Doha (COP 18), the Kyoto Protocol was extended until 2020, while the adoption of a new universal treaty was postponed until 2015. During the COP 19 which took place in Warsaw in 2013, environmental NGOs implemented their first boycott of the conference in an effort to denounce the immobility of the process as well as the supremacy of large companies in the course of negotiations.
On September 23, 2014, more than 120 heads of state and of government gathered for the summit of the UN in New York in preparation for revival of the project of a veritable treaty to be in force by 2020. Two days before the summit, protests were organized across the globe in places like London, Berlin, Paris, Stockholm, Rome, New Delhi, Melbourne and Rio de Janeiro. Thousands of citizens paraded alongside NGOs. In New York, the largest march ever organized assembled more than 300,000 participants, divided into six large groups each making distinct thematic demands. Representatives of the populations most vulnerable and most affected by climate change appeared on the front lines.
Theoretical framework
1. Individual dynamics. It is a question of ordinary, individual networks mobilized by their collective membership. According to James Rosenau, if we examine the individual parameter, we note that the feeling of submission and loyalty of individuals and groups towards state authorities weakens. On the other hand, we observe at the same time that their capacity to be moved and to feel concerned by an international problem grows. Today it should be noted that the inter-state system coexists with a multi-centered operation. We have entered into a period of “global turbulence” where citizens can be pivotal on the world stage. These phenomena illustrate a revolution in the aptitudes of commitment. Accordingly, we are invited to re-evaluate our roles by taking into consideration what Rosenau deemed “micro-macro mixing”.
2. International fame. It refers to people who due to their personal qualities and skills, use their prestige and notoriety to involve themselves in international questions, sometimes to the point of rivaling states. This concept of the “altruistic citizen” is also evoked by Rosenau.
Analysis
Despite difficulties put into place by new measures to treat global warming, the level of awareness has risen considerably since the 1980s. Thanks to the initiative of NGOs, international experts and media, citizens are more engaged in matters of environmental politics. Often during conferences, demonstrations and civic activities have succeeded in accelerating the processes of negotiation. We shall recall that during the COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009, around 3,000 people gathered outside the Bella Center where the meeting was to take place, in order to hold an “Assembly of the people” alongside NGOs and other representatives. Unquestionably, the impact of this individual parameter has been accentuated during recent decades with the Internet. Clearly this technology allows millions of people, who share the same opinions, to unite rapidly to the point of forming a powerful collective dynamic. Thus, Avaaz is not an example of an environmental NGO, but a global platform of individuals presenting the characteristics of a poorly institutionalized movement and with no hierarchical authority. Rather, its strength comes from its potential to unite which allows it to pool and to synergize the fight of numerous NGOs, communities and networked individuals. This collective union is the best guarantee of efficiency in seeking to be heard by states who themselves are condemned more and more often to seek to dialogue with their citizens. This new type of cooperation is treated as a specific strategy aiming to optimize the plans of reduction of CO2 emissions and of adaption to climate change.
During the demonstrations, people identifying themselves by their reputation and their knowledge do not comprise a group of specialists on climate change, but an international elite benefitting from high media visibility. To the point that in certain cases, they even exert an authority more powerful than that of many rulers. These individuals – such as the Secretary General of the United Nations, the mayor of New York or else any given Hollywood star – are capable of mobilizing their symbolic capital on the international scene. They draw their legitimacy not only from themselves, but also from the institutions that they incarnate. Their engagement to the international movement Avaaz testifies to their ability to act in favor of the fight against climate change. Thus, the actor Leonardo DiCaprio, designated a “messenger of peace“, has been given a symbolic and institutional credit allowing him to call these issues to the minds of the general public. In the same way, marching with citizens struck by the vagaries of weather, these celebrities spread an urgent message to the world to act in the face of this planetary menace.
This recent and unprecedented mobilization of civil societies aims to remind heads of state that they must address climate change in a more significant way. From now on, millions of individuals capable of combining their actions exert effects, sometimes major, on more and more challenged and weakened states. During the meeting which will be held in Lima in 2014, the first draft of a global treaty will be developed to be approved in Paris by all countries at the 2015 summit.
References
Rosenau James, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990.
Ford Lucy, « Challenging Global Environmental Governance: Social Movement Agency and Global Civil Society », Global Environmental Politics, 3 (2), 2003, pp.120-134.
Weiting Chao, « Le triomphe dommageable des passagers clandestins. La conférence de Doha », in: Josepha Laroche (Éd.), Passage au crible, l’actualité internationale 2012, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2013, pp. 111-115.
Chao Weiting, « Le boycott des ONG, une diplomatie offensive. La conférence de Varsovie sur le réchauffement climatique », in: Josepha Laroche (Éd.), Passage au crible, l’actualité internationale 2013, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2014, pp. 143-147.
Le Monde, « New York fait ville pleine contre le réchauffement climatique », 22 Sept. 2014.
Laroche Josepha, Politique Internationale, 2e éd.,Paris, L.G.D.J Montchrestien, 2000, pp.176-201.
Nov 16, 2014 | Africa, Global Public Health, Passage au crible (English)
By Clément Paule
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°118
Source : Wikipedia
The first Ebola virus contamination outside the African continent was confirmed on October 6, 2014: a Spanish nurse’s aid supposedly contracted the illness in Madrid while treating a repatriated missionary. We shall note that this announcement comes a few days after the diagnosis of another case, in the United States, in this instance a Liberian who arrived in Dallas from Monrovia. Subsequently, the epidemic, especially ravaging in three countries – Guinea-Conakry, Liberia and Sierra Leone –, represents an immediate threat apt to be exported to the rest of the world; especially as malfunctions are identified during screenings and in care procedures in Spain as well as in Texas. So much so, that the international media is evoking a growing psychosis of populations faced with an infection characterized by dramatic bleeding symptoms and a high mortality rate. On November 2, 2014, the figures published by the WHO (World Health Organization) reported 4,951 deaths for 13,567 cases identified essentially in western Africa. It should be noted that the management of this health crisis is becoming a leading political issue, even in states that are not directly affected by the disease.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Identified in 1976 during two waves which appeared simultaneously in ex-Zaire – 280 deaths for 318 documented cases – and in Sudan, the Ebola virus belongs to the family of filoviruses and breaks down into five different types, including the Zaire strain at the origin of the 2014 epidemic. If the mechanisms of transmission of this zoonosis – the natural reservoir is allegedly made up of fruit bats – to humans are not completely understood, several massive contaminations took place during the last two decades. We shall mention twenty crises that occurred in Gabon, in DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo), in South Africa and Uganda which claimed hundreds of victims. The illness – whose incubation period can last from two days to three weeks – typically consists of an acute hemorrhagic fever disturbing the hemostasis and provoking serious immunosuppression, which ultimately leads to a terminal shock and multiorgan failure resulting in death. With no approved treatment or vaccine, care should minimize the risk of contagion by direct contact with bodily fluids and organic tissues of infected individuals.
According to epidemiological investigations, the health crisis currently afflicting West Africa allegedly began in December 2013: the patient zero supposedly being a two year old child who died in a village in southeast Guinea-Conakry located not far from the borders with Liberia and Sierra Leone. Although the disease was already spreading throughout Liberia, it was not recognized until March 2014. After a brief lull at the end of the month of April, contaminations began again with force and in May extended to Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Senegal. On August 8, 2014, the WHO declared a state of “global public health emergency” and called for large-scale international mobilization in the face of the growing number of victims and the powerlessness of local authorities.
Theoretical framework
1. The brutal exposure of the crisis. Despite several poorly publicized warnings on the degradation of the health situation in western Africa, the first reported exported triggered overexposure by the media, which led certain decision-makers to hurriedly improvise little adapted measures.
2. The risky instrumentalization of a moral panic. The sociologist Stanley Cohen identified this concept when a condition, an event, a person or a group is designated as a threat for the values and interests of a society. In the case at hand, this notion allows us to understand a host of disproportionate or even discriminatory reactions, in the face of the epidemic.
Analysis
If we must underline the novelty of this outbreak in West Africa and moreover in an urban setting – while the preceding episodes were relegated to relatively isolated forest areas in central Africa –, we can attribute the late response to inertia on the part of the WHO as well as to an underestimation of the threat. The recurrent alerts issued by MSF (Doctors Without Borders) led us to believe in the foreseeable collapse of fragile health systems, in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone, due to several years of civil war and extreme violence. Besides the deficit avowed by professionals – Liberia counted around fifty doctors for 4.3 million inhabitants in 2014 – aggravated by nosocomial infections, affected states have been confronted by the mistrust of their own populations. In Guinea, health workers have reported multiple accounts of people fleeing once they see approaching medical teams who themselves are accused of spreading the virus: eight people engaged in medical outreach in the southeastern part of the country were killed in mid-September 2014 in the context of their work. Otherwise, measures improvised in haste by the governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone – militarization of curfew and imposed quarantines of entire neighborhoods, obligatory cremation of all deceased persons, closing borders – have given rise to riots in shanty towns. Refusing to allow the presence of the illness, armed demonstrators attacked a treatment center in Monrovia in August, provoking the diaspora of patients and the flight of potentially contaminated materials. These attitudes of rejection fall in line with recent history of societies divided by intense conflicts that have discredited central authorities; moreover, these authorities struggle to communicate rationally about the risk and to justify the necessary control of movement.
As evidenced, these indispensable yet not easily accepted models are likely to feed the perverse effects of an epidemic whose economic impact could be counted in the hundreds of millions of dollars. If fiscal imbalances – brutal augmentation of public and health spending and declining tax revenues – and the fall in productivity are already being felt, the consequences could especially be indirect according to a study by the World Bank which underlines the social dynamics generated by the fear factor, or the anxiety of possible contagion. We shall cite the suspension of transportation and the closing of workplaces, the slowing of the mining industry – principal engine of growth – and of the agricultural sector – in a context where food insecurity remains chronic – leading to shortages and price inflation. These disturbances are worsened by suspensions of airline connections in the affected countries, decided by most companies – including Brussels Airlines, Arik Air or British Airways – despite requests by the United Nations, which complicate the routing of aid. In this logic, it is important to consider the effectiveness of border closings – reputed to be quite porous – decreed by the states in the region and likely to stimulate clandestine networks capable of escaping all control.
By its sudden and alarmist character, putting the health crisis on the agenda late in the game maintains an ensemble of practices and discourses founded on fear. Particularly as the Ebola virus has inspired disaster movies – as with the films Outbreak (1995) or 28 Days Later (2002) – and also literary works such as The Hot Zone, a best seller by Richard Preston published in 1994. The West African epidemic therefore finds a particular resonance in the imagination of numerous societies, which can go against a comprehensive process of action mechanisms and transmission of the illness. Beyond the expected emergence of conspiracy theories, the difficulty lies especially in the instrumentalization of a potential moral panic by political actors in order to justify discriminatory measures. The crisis has thus become an issue relative to the midterm elections in the United States; following the Dallas incident, a number of Republican candidates are demanding the closure of borders and systematic quarantine, an issue facing the Obama administration. Moreover, the successive decisions of the Australian and Canadian governments – which have not, however, recorded any cases on their territory – to suspend the deliverance of entry visas for all citizens of countries affected starting at the end of October, also participates in the isolationist temptation. This gesture has been denounced within the Commonwealth by the government of Sierra Leone to the extent that these stigmatizing models overshadow the fact that the fight against this global plague is first of all being played out in western Africa, whose confinement appears utopic and counterproductive. Faced with this viral threat, officials must now divest themselves from the idea that a physical containment of the scourge is still possible in light of the unprecedented intensification of international flows of goods and people.
References
Cohen Stanley, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers, Londres, MacGibbon & Kee, 1972.
Website of the UNMEER (United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response) : http://www.un.org/ebolaresponse/mission.shtml
[20 October 2014].
World Bank, The Economic Impact of the 2014 Ebola Epidemic: Short and Medium Term Estimates for West Africa, Washington D.C., World Bank Group, 7 October 2014, consulted on the website of the World Bank: http://www.worldbank.org [22 October 2014].
Nov 15, 2014 | Africa, Diplomacy, Passage au crible (English), Security
By Philippe Hugon
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°117
Source: Wikimedia
At the end of October 2014, in Burkina Faso, youth movements led to the departure of the president for life Blaise Compaoré, in power since 1987. With nearly 500,000 people in the streets on October 28th, the population of Ouagadougou was significantly mobilized against the attempt to modify the constitution aiming to maintain the president in power. This attempt clearly appeared to be of the same order as constitutional manipulations already committed in Algeria (2008), Angola (2010), the Cameroon (2008), Djibouti (2010), Gabon (2003), Uganda (2005), Chad (2009), Togo (2002) and envisioned in Burundi, Congo Brazzaville, Congo and Rwanda.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Upper Volta, which became Burkina Faso in 1984, experienced an alternation of presidential elections and coups d’État after its independence had been stabilized for some time. Following the assassination of President Thomas Sankara in 1987, the young captain Blaise Compaoré accessed power. Since that time he established a semi-authoritarian regime in the context of two 7-year mandates and two others each lasting four years. Burkina Faso, “country of honest men”, until that time was perceived as politically stable and economically well managed. One of the poorest countries on the planet despite its gold mining resources (80% of exports and 20% of the budget) and its cotton production, this landlocked State demonstrated economic growth on the order of 7% per year, all the while respecting financial balancing (low inflation, budget deficit and reduced external debt).
In the last few years, Burkina Faso had diversified its partners, creating for example personal links with Taiwan, all the while knowing how to benefit from the United States’ support and to perpetuate its historical ties to Paris, otherwise with Françafrique. A diplomatic power in the region, it had recently become an important piece in the French military operation Burkhane at the heart of regional cooperation against Jihadism. Until now, it had shown civic actions in a political game neither based on ethnicity nor on religious references. Blaise Compaoré’s regime relied on a party that was certainly dominant, but nonetheless allowed for debate. As for the army, it had remained republican until this point, despite the mutiny in 2011. Coexisting with traditional powers, notably those of Mogho Naba, king of the Mossi and authorities legitimated by vote. However, this positive façade hid less presentable characteristics. We can indeed recall the assassination of Thomas Sankara in 1987, the links maintained by Blaise Compaoré with Charles Taylor in Liberia and in Sierra Leone, or else with the Unita in Angola. We shall also mention the control of arms and diamond trafficking. Besides that, we shall underscore its role in the rebellion in the North of the Ivory Coast, its opaque relationship with Gadhafi and finally the responsibility in the unsolved disappearance of the journalist Norbert Zongo.
This president was obliged to leave power because he wanted to modify the constitution, an operation that would have permitted him to aspire to a new mandate during the presidential election planned for November 2015. The political and economic oligarchy that he supported risked losing its advantage. Therefore, the Parliament’s meeting on Thursday, October 30th proved to be a decisive one. For the opposition, it was a matter of countering what it labeled a “constitutional coup d’État”. On a judicial level, the revision of article 37 that limited the number of mandates to two remained possible in two ways. The first assumed a majority vote of ¾ (or 96 votes for) of the Parliament, the institution should have given its judgment on Thursday, October 30th; the second implied a referendum. Blaise Compaoré had discretely organized the vote. Mathematically, his CDP party (Congress for Democracy and Progress) had 70 out of 127 parliamentary votes at its disposal. Moreover, it was linked to small parties representing 11 votes. Therefore, he needed no more than 15 votes, which he had haggled from the ADF (Alliance for Democracy and Federation) and the RDA (African Democratic Assembly). In other words, he indeed had the 96 necessary votes. But the social mobilization and the opposition brushed aside any chances the project had. Violent confrontations between demonstrators and security forces firing live bullets left at least one person dead and triggered a popular uprising that the cancelation of the vote has, however, not stopped.
Theoretical framework
1. The political demands of African youth. Today African youth are claiming their place in the political and socio-economic field. Without perspective or social model, they are opposed to political racketeering and political patronage. In Burkina, they refer to heroes such as Thomas Sankara. Kept up to date by social networks, they denounce African “presidents for life”. In other words, in Africa the political and economic game largely presents itself as a struggle of age classes.
2. A system of transnational neopatrimonialism undermined. The resources mobilized in the context of political alliances and various trafficking with regional actors has permitted Compaoré to finance his internal policy while the requirements of his international partners were changing registers.
Analysis
This African or Black Spring that recalls the Arab Spring, refers to intergenerational conflicts. We shall recall that 60% of the West African population was not yet born when Blaise Compaoré took power. However, these youths want to assert themselves in the political game. In order to do so, they are opposing the power of notable figures and the political gerontocracy treated as “parlementeurs ”. The slogan “clear out Blaise” heard in the place de la revolution testifies to this movement. We have, however, noted certain confusion around this semi coup d’État and observed tensions amongst the principal forces present: protesters, political leaders and the military. The youth are opposing the power near Compaoré and the military, refusing to see their revolution be confiscated. As for the military, they remain divided between the Regiment of Presidential Security, 600 to 800 well-equipped and armed men strong – who besides that make up part of the current strongman, the lieutenant colonel Zida –high ranking officials (generals Traoré army chief of staff and Kouamé Lougué, coauthor along with Compaoré of the coup d’État against Sankara) and the base. In this way, each of the chiefs has proclaimed himself head of State by asserting the necessity to ensure order against what they have qualified as an insurrectional movement. For its part, the opposition appears divided between 74 parties. The CDP (Congress for Democracy and Progress) as well as its allies represent around ¾ of parliamentarians. The principal parties opposed who left the CDP at the beginning of the year (Kaboré, Diallo, Compaoré) have for example, founded the People’s Movement for Progress (MPP). The other main opponents are Sankara from the Sankarist party and Diabré. The presidency of the national assembly, which according to the constitution should have ensured the interim after the resignation of the head of State, ultimately preferred to leave the country with him.
Presently the inter or transnational balances of power have been radically modified. We notice for example that the African authorities of the African Union or of the ECOWAS are threatening the army with sanctions if they do not return power to civilians in the next two weeks. Besides that, financial backers are able to exert pressure on a country where aid represents more than 10% of GDP. For his part, Barack Obama also spoke out so that new generations can rapidly access responsibilities, no matter the qualities of “presidents for life” currently in office. According to the same logic, the European Union equally affirmed on October 28th “its attachment to the respect of the constitutional provisions in place as well as the principles defined by the African Union and the ECOWAS on constitutional changes”.
At first glance such a reversal and collapse of international support from which Compaoré’s neopatrimonialism was benefitting can be surprising. In fact, this radical change of agenda can first of all be explained by the new global deal. The situation in Burkina Faso has indeed become imminently strategic due to its border with North Mali where special French and American forces are stationed. Yet, these forces are facing Islamist forces whose capacity to do transnational harm is confirmed on a daily basis to the point that certain state actors – such as the United States and France – are henceforth upsetting the order of their diplomatic and strategic priorities.
References
Philippe Hugon, Géopolitique de l’Afrique, Paris, SEDES 2013, 3e ed.
Pierre Jacquemot, « Les trois paradoxes du Burkina Faso, lettre de l’IRIS, 2 novembre 2014.
Frédéric Lejeal, Le Burkina Faso, Paris, Karthala, 2002.
Oct 28, 2014 | Digital Industry, Passage au crible (English), Publications (English), Symbolic politics
By Justin Chiu
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°116
Source: Flickr
On September 9, 2014, high-tech journalists from around the globe as well as the general press gathered at the Flint Center in Cupertino to attend the presentation of the iPhone 6. Led by Apple’s general manager, Tim Cook, and broadcast on the Internet, this great event was acclaimed by numerous celebrities, such as Gwen Stefani and Dr. Dre, who arrived in a private jet, and Coco Lee, a singer popular in Asia, whose arrival was even announced on the band’s official website. Lacking significant innovations, the iPhone 6 was, nonetheless, warmly welcomed by the public at the Flint Center.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
It was in the same mythic room in 1984 that Steve Jobs had presented the very first Mac computer. With a subtle mixture of humor and superlatives, the founder of Apple excited the shareholders participating in the event. Incited by the original soundtrack of the film Chariots of Fire, the audience roared and applauded at the end of the presentation. Since then, the Cupertino Company has not only provided an insanely great product – the formula for the presentation – but also an extraordinary experience. In this sense, users of Apple products always expect a unique experience and are willing to spend more in order to get it.
With the iPod in 2001, Apple launched into the very competitive consumer electronics market. Clearly positioned as a high-end product, Apple’s audio player appeared as an object to be desired, even a symbol of leisure for the middle class. Moreover, the product was intended for use with iTunes installed on a computer. In doing this, the professional use of Mac combines with the more leisurely use of the iPod. According to this logic, costumer fidelity vis-à-vis Apple products grew considerably with a more intensive utilization. Besides that, from year to year the keynote speech, led by Steve Jobs, has become a must for the Apple community.
In 2007, Steven Jobs presented the first generation iPhone, a product that he himself qualified as revolutionary. Since then, ten models have followed. In 2013, Apple became the second most popular smartphone on the planet behind Samsung, delivering 153.4 million devices. Nonetheless, with 15.3% of the market, Apple succeeded in clearing 60% of the profit, in other words, 129 billion dollars (research firm Asymco). Facing market newcomers, Apple has chosen to no longer maintain its low price strategy. On the contrary, the two models, the iPhone 6 and the iPhone 6 plus are proving to be more luxurious than ever; the most costly model, exceeding the symbolic price ceiling of 1,000 euros.
Theoretical framework
1. The global construction of a media event. Since the launching of the first iPhones, Apple’s press conferences have become veritable planetary spectacles. Formerly led by the charismatic Steve Jobs, then by the general manager, Tim Cook, from now on these ceremonies are simultaneously broadcast on the Internet, serving to show the economic and cultural strength of the company as well as its ability to attract journalists and consumers from around the globe. Despite a relaxed atmosphere, these presentations are meticulously prepared. Nothing is left to chance: each image, each gesture is calculated and codified in order to create an extraordinary atmosphere.
2. The intensive diffusion of incremental innovations. Far from being a revolutionary product, the iPhone 6 only offers two major improvements compared to previous versions: a more powerful processor and a larger screen. Nevertheless, the Apple’s strength lies precisely in its talent to constantly produce better terminals and to diversify its activities. Not only do smartphone techniques benefit from improvement, but so do production structure and product services. If above all else the digital revolution is experiencing a “technological acceleration” (Lorenzi), it is therefore necessary to analyze how Apple has built its ecosystem with its line of iPhones.
Analysis
The nature of Apple’s keynote is proving to be deeply different from other events taking place on a global scale. Such events are indeed organized either by the states, like royal weddings, or by inter-state organizations, like the Olympic Games. On the other hand, here a private actor, a company, has designed a show by mobilizing all of its financial and symbolic resources that extend beyond its borders. In thirty years, Apple has succeeded in institutionalizing its press conferences, from now long anticipated appointments. The personality of Steve Jobs contributed much to this end; his charisma and talent for convincing were intimately connected to the reputation of the brand. Journalists and celebrities remain in a state of permanent anticipation that these events will fascinate them, to the point that they are captivated before the conference even begins. In this sense, acquiring an iPhone entails displaying one’s superior social status; exhibiting this object of desire is akin to ostentatiously mobilizing a symbol of power.
Apple product users seek a personal and special experience. They identify with it because among all smartphone manufacturers, only Apple presents itself as a high-end brand. This strategy allows it to assure a considerable margin all the while masterfully securing the loyalty of its buyers. With a system operating exclusively via iTunes and the App Store, one must acquire a Mac, an iPhone and an iPad in order to fully benefit from the optimal functions of its terminals. As a result, fearing the slightest dysfunction or incapability, even dreading exclusion from the Apple community, fans rarely envision abandoning the brand.
Like all capitalistic organizations, Apple innovates in order to garner more profit. However, in the context of the global deregulation of telecommunications, competition has grown with low-cost Chinese firms, like Huawei and Xiaomi. In so doing, the actors in this sector are investing more and more in applied research and favoring short-term projects to the detriment of fundamental research. Bearing this in mind, manufacturers constantly renew their product lines without having made any significant discoveries. Thus, we observe the continued decreasing of a smartphone’s life span, while consumers feel obligated to acquire the latest model. Nonetheless, with the accumulation of small innovations in the last decade, the smartphone has considerably transformed our way of life.
During the presentation of the iPhone 6, the contactless payment service, Apple Pay, was also introduced. Used until now by Samsung and Sony without any great success, this payment technique will finally be generalized with this new model. Since the successive launching of the iPod, the iPhone and the iPad, it must be noted that Apple masters not only the diffusion of new techniques, but can also count on the fidelity of its users, ready to live the Apple experience.
References
Chiu Justin, « L’anarchie mondiale dans la téléphonie mobile », in : Josepha Laroche (Éd.), Passage au crible, l’actualité internationale 2012, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2013, pp. 117-122.
Dayan Daniel, Katz Elihu, La Télévision cérémonielle : anthropologie et histoire en direct, trad., Paris, PUF, 1996.
Le Monde, « La grande et les petites révolutions d’Apple », 11 sept. 2014.
Lorenzi Jean-Hervé et Villemeur Alain (Éds.), L’Innovation au cœur de la nouvelle croissance, Paris, Economica, 2009.
Strange Susan, Mad Money, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1998.
Strange Susan, States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy, Londres, Pinter, 2e éd, 1994.
Veblen Thorstein, The Theory of the Leisure Class, [1899], New York, Dover Publications, 1994.
Oct 26, 2014 | Culture en, Non-state diplomacy, Passage au crible (English), Symbolic politics
By Josepha Laroche
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°115
Source: Wikipedia
On October 10, 2014, the Swedish Academy awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature to the French writer Patrick Modiano. After J.M.G. Le Clézio, who obtained the award in 2008, this author allows France to boast of a 15th trophy and to remain to this day – ahead of the United States – the State with the most awards in this discipline, with 13.5% of the recipients.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In his will recorded on November 27, 1895, Alfred Nobel developed a resolutely cosmopolitan, pacifist and humanist project. This essential document details the financial decisions and the criterion, which after his death would govern the creation of an international prize system, suitable for organizing the globe. However, his two testamentary executors had to face the tycoon’s family who found themselves disinherited by his express will. Refusing to lose one of the largest global fortunes of the era (31 million Swedish kroners equivalent to 1.5 billion euros), his family then entered into a long contentious procedure at the end of which they earned 1.3 million Swedish kroners. In return, they recognized the validity of the models put forth by the Swedish industrialist and therefore permanently renounced its financial ambitions. Henceforth the Nobel Foundation was then able to take shape and to forge the powerful tool in favor of knowledge and peace that the industrialist had called for in his last will and testimony. In 1901, a system of five prizes (physics, chemistry, physiology-medicine, peace and literature) was finally put into place. In 1968, to celebrate the three hundredth birthday of the bank of Sweden, it decided to finance an economic prize “in memory of Alfred Nobel” awarded on the same basis as the others. It is this global framework which today remains in vigor.
No matter the specialty being honored, each prize must reward those who “will have given the most benefits to humanity” (will). Concerning the Nobel Prize for Literature, throughout the years, the institution has enacted the “variants of dominant taste” in the international scene. Actually, for more than a century, its humanist orthodoxy has not ceased to oscillate between two opposing yet complimentary lines of force: 1) The discovery of an author; this process primary aims to encourage innovation and/or to promote forms of expression which for too long have been ignored. The committee sought to reveal artists who are little known outside of their linguistic or cultural domain, and to which few people had access until that point. Using this logic, let us mention as an illustration Saint-John Perse, (France, 1960), Seamus Heaney (Ireland, 1995), Wisława Szymborska (Poland, 1996), or else Mo Yan (China, 2012). 2) The consecration of a notoriety and of confirmed values, already known the world over recognized by a large readership, as for example Thomas Mann (Germany, 1929), Albert Camus (France, 1957), and Jean-Paul Sartre (France, 1964). In this situation, the jury is constantly forced to fill the two apparently contradictory objectives based on one doctrinal line. As Lars Gyllensten1 said it well; “The prize must not crown the achievements of the past […] it must constitute a stake or else a wager on the future […] which can encourage the laureate”. In other words, the Nobel Prize in Literature aims to “allow a writer who is both original and innovate to pursue his work; a literary genius, neglected until then but prolific, to emerge from obscurity and to receive help, a cultural or linguistic area insufficiently noticed, or for other attempts and human struggles to be supported by the attribution of the prize.”
Theoretical framework
1. A normative Dissonance. Each year, the attribution of this distinction gives way to interminable controversies – even violent debates – which center around the pertinence of the selected choice. It is indeed often reproached for not having designated the “best writer of the moment” to borrow Lars Gyllensten’s expression which, rightly so, saw in such an idea, “an impossible task”. Besides that, not only has this injunction appeared utopic, but also it does not correspond to the directives explicitly formulated by Alfred Nobel. More modest, these directives are less on the literary map and more so in the ethical register.
2. A Hierarchization of States. Only individuals or institutions can receive a Nobel Prize. This fact has not, however, prevented states from considering this distinction as an international device of measurement for gauging their scientific level, their cultural reach and their political stature. They recognize the symbolic power to evaluate their intellectual potential and to attribute them a more or a less prestigious rank: in short, to hierarchize them. Having therefore become a constitutive element of their power, this title of nobility currently acts as a sanction of their research policy, cultural production and respect of the common good. We are therefore indeed in the presence of a non-state diplomacy which influences the interstate game.
Analysis
Since the creation of the prizes in 1901, the prestige attached to this international system of gratification has not ceased to expand to the point that the laureates have become, throughout the years, synonyms of global excellence, exemplary intellect and citizenry. Defined as eminent personalities, they constitute a transnational elite bearing exceptional qualities, simultaneously social, moral and intellectual, to the point that they are sometimes given a quasi thaumaturgic power.
As for the Nobel Prize in Literature, it is perceived as an ambassador of the literary richness of a country, the best indicator of the cultural balance of power opposing nations much more than the recipients. However, the misunderstanding erupts quite quickly, as soon as it is time to acknowledge one’s preference for this or that personality. According this award to whosoever “will have produced the most remarkable work of literature in the sense of idealism” – as Alfred Nobel said it himself – does not imply gratifying any particular literary qualities. The writers Sully Prudhomme (France, 1901) or else Pearl Buck (United States, 1938), to only mention two examples, illustrate well this humanist logic, not very demanding concerning contributions withheld. Of course, such logic does prohibit the jury from favoring an innovative style, a precursor, and a pioneering enterprise, even an esoteric one. Quite the opposite, each year the jury endeavors to reconcile the esthetic and humanist orthodoxy. Assuredly, it works as much as possible to fill every lacuna between these two dimensions, as attributing the prize to Hermann Hesse (Switzerland, 1946), William Faulkner (USA, 1949), Ernest Hemingway (USA, 1954), Samuel Beckett (Ireland, 1969), Harold Pinter (UK, 2007) and so many others.
As for Patrick Modiano, the Committee clearly dedicated its development for a long time recognized and benefitting from a broad public just as faithful from year to year. Child prodigy of French literature in the 1970s, he quickly accumulated honors. Beginning in 1968, when he was only 23 years old, he received the Roger-Nimier and Fénéon Prizes for his first book La Place de l’Étoile. In 1972, he became the youngest beneficiary of the Grand Prix du roman by the Académie Française, for his third work, Les Boulevards de ceinture. Then in 1976, he was given the Goncourt for Rue des boutiques obscures. Then, the distinctions multiplied nationally as well as internationally. His melancholy universe centered entirely on the Paris of the Second World War, comes under memorial duty. He testifies to the frenzied refusal of seeing the smallest trace of anonymous beings wiped away forever, crushed by the war or simply by the hurly-burly of life. Indefatigably, he says of the urgent need to explore a painful pain to better calm the injuries of an absence and an uncertain identity. The Royal Swedish Academy, saluted this archaeological work led hard by Modiano “the art of the memory with which he evoked the most elusive human destinies and unveils the world of the Occupation”. In other words, the Academy took cared to underscore mezza voce the conformity of his work to the humanist project of the industrialist, all the while succeeding in crowning a writer with unquestionable talent.
This Nobel laureate honors a fictional world, a solitary and in many ways atypical journey. At the same time, it also allows the French State to benefit. In so doing, France appropriates the fame of a man, capitalizes it and converts its into a political resource for itself in order to maintain its rank in the global competition where all state actors are condemned to compete.
References
Laroche Josepha, Les Prix Nobel, sociologie d’une élite transnationale, Montréal, Liber, 2012.
Laroche Josepha, (Éd.), Passage au crible, l’actualité internationale 2009-2010, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2010, pp. 19-22 ; pp. 41-45.
Laroche Josepha, (Éd.), Passage au crible, l’actualité internationale 2011, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2012, pp. 35-38.
Laroche Josepha, (Éd.), Passage au crible, l’actualité internationale 2012, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2013, pp. 47-52.
Laroche Josepha, (Éd.), Passage au crible, l’actualité internationale 2013, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2014, pp. 119-123.
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/
1 Secretary of the Royal Swedish Academy in office in the nineteen sixties
