Oct 22, 2014 | Articles, Fil d'Ariane, Publications (English)
by Josepha Laroche
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Before analyzing the current situation, it seems necessary to recall the historical context in which the Nobel prizes register. The Nobel system has been in existence for over a century. We owe it to the will of the Swedish philanthropist Alfred Nobel who decided to devote his fortune to it1. A literary man, a polyglot and an amateur poet, Nobel was primarily a chemist at the origin of more than 300 registered patents. This famous inventor of dynamite was also a particularly shrewd industrialist and financier who created one of the first multinationals with, already in his time, subsidiaries in a large number of countries (Germany, United States, France Italy, Norway, Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, etc.). This entrepreneurial dimension allowed him to carry out the pacifist project to which he was attached more than to anything else.
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Oct 22, 2014 | Articles, Fil d'Ariane, Publications (English)
Par André Cartapanis
Revue d’économie financière, Numéro 103, Les politiques de sortie de crise Automne 2011
Summary
Is it really a good idea to consider that reduction of global imbalances is a priority, as proposed by the participants at the G20 Finance in Washington on 13 and 14 April 2011, adopting a set of indicative guidelines to address major and persistently large imbalances? To answer, several questions must be addressed. What was the role of global imbalances in the rise of financial fragility before the crisis? What are the theoretical foundations of such a limiting external surpluses and deficits? Is it an intrinsic objective of economic policy, or rather an intermediate target in the way to more coordination in economic policies and exchange-rate dynamics? And above all, is it appropriate in times of crisis?
Télécharger l’article Est-ce réellement une bonne idée de vouloir réduire les déséquilibres globaux en temps de crise ?
Oct 22, 2014 | Articles, Fil d'Ariane, Publications (English)
Par Florent Bédécarrats
CEMCA. TRACE 52, dec. 2007
Abstract
This article is a critical synthesis of the report “Políticas públicas y servicios financieros rurales en Mesoamérica” written by Michelle Deugd, Hans Nusselder, Iris Villalobos and Ignacio Fiestas. The document analysed consists in a comparative study in five Mesoamerican countries (Mexico, Guatemala, el Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua) of the articulation between public policies of promotion of rural financial services and public policies for rural development. After presenting a detailed panorama of the national situations,
the authors show that there are some recurring schemes of disarticulation between the considered public interventions. On the basis of their diagnostic, they present some propositions for a better integration of these policy frameworks. Here we put forward the valuable findings of this research that contribute to a good understanding of complex institutional architectures. We also point some approaches that have not been taken in account by the authors and that should be explored in order to have a more complete vision of the problematic.
Télécharger l’article Políticas públicas y servicios financieros rurales en Mesoamérica
Oct 22, 2014 | Articles, Fil d'Ariane, Publications (English)
Par Florent Bédécarrats GRET-CERISE et Reynaldo Marconi FINRURAL
Cet article est publié avec l’aimable autorisation de la Revue Tiers Monde, 197(1), 2009.
Abstract
Bolivia, a microfinance pionneer, is also among the first countries that implemented a regulation of this activity. Firmly supported by international institutions, this framing was designed to support a commercial vision of the sector, promoting its growth and sustainability. The settled rules urged upon the practice standardization and gave priority
to profitability and stability. Nevertheless, they hampered the capacity of microfinance service providers to meet the social mission they initially stood for. Given these limitations, the Government impulsed public policies that pressure them to intervene more in support to rural and productive sectors. To overcome these antagonist constraints, some actors put some norms forward that combine social and financial criteria. In the current context, such evolutions can contribute to the reflexions toward a better regulation of the financial sector.
Keywords: Bolivia, microfinance, development, regulation, norms..
Download L’Influence de la régulation sur la contribution de la microfinance au développement. Le cas de la Bolivie
Oct 20, 2014 | International Political Economy, Passage au crible (English)
By Yves Poirmeur
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°114
Pixabay
On June 3, 2014, BNP Paribas concluded a final agreement with the American justice system. Whereby, after having pled guilty, it accepted to pay an 8.834 billion dollar fine (6.5 billion euros). For having used American money in transactions with countries under embargo by the United States. Equally, it is prohibited from doing any clearing in dollars on behalf of oil and gas traders. Otherwise, BNP had to let go of thirteen of its managers, including those at its Swiss branch, as all of them were implicated in disputed payments. The bank also had to put into place a structure designed to monitor the respect of American legislation when its in dollars must be carried out in New York. This is the conclusion of the proceedings begun by the New York prosecutor who suspected this institution – like other European establishments – of violating unilaterally imposed embargos by the United States against Cuba, Iran and Sudan, countries considered “enemies” or “supporting terrorism”, between 2002 and 2010 (Foreign Assistance Act, (1961); Cuban Liberty and Democracy Solidarity (Libertrad) Act, (the Helms-Burton Act), (1996); Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, (law called D’Amato-Kennedy), 1996). This agreement results in the payment of the highest fine ever inflicted on a foreign bank for transactions that – although irregular in American law – were not so in French law and did not infringe on sanctions which were supposedly decided by the UN Security Council, to maintain peace (UN Charter, Ch. VII).
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
While States may possess exclusive jurisdiction over their national territory for acts of coercion because of the sovereignty principle and to its corollary – the non-intervention principle – international law also recognizes their freedom of principle. In reality, the Permanent Court of International Justice estimated, in the famous Lotus case (PCIJ, September 7, 1927, France vs. Turkey), that the limitations on their independence could not be presumed. This presumption allows them to exercise their normative competency to determine localized situations either completely or in part on their territory, and abroad, those that entail a person bearing their nationality, that involve their fundamental interests or else that detract from universal values. However, as a state does not have coercive power within the jurisdiction of another state, it cannot impose the respect of certain behaviors that it proscribes without the other’s consent (IJC, April 9, 1949, Corfu Channel incident, United Kingdom vs. Albania). The application of extraterritorial interstate norms thus clashes rather classically with the impossibility of reaching their recalcitrant recipients, with the cooperation of the countries that harbor them. This is notably the case for measures – embargos, boycotts, freezing of financial assets, prohibiting managers to travel – decided unilaterally by a state in order to oblige another or a foreign entity to change its practices. The success of most of these containment operations depends on their application by foreign companies whose assistance proves necessary to ensure their imperviousness. Attempts to force their respect are often blocked by the impossibility of imposing sanctions in cases when they are breached; the state actor is then reduced to propelling the consequences of violation onto its own sphere of sovereignty. In this way, the enormity of the penalties afflicting BNP Paribas appear to be revelatory of an increase of the coercive power of the United States and of a repressive paradigm shift. By showing itself capable of sanctioning foreign firms whose activities abroad infringe upon its laws, the US substantially raises the cost of the violation of embargos that it put in place. In this way, it reinforces the level of effectiveness of the legal instruments of its foreign policy.
Theoretical framework
1. The structural power of the United States. If the deterritorialization of the economy has reduced the ability of state intervention on the operators of global markets, the United States has retained its capacity in this domain. From now on, it is able to weigh on economic agents more than they are able to influence it. Exploiting the vital necessity of transnational companies to trade on its domestic market or to accomplish different activities on its territory, the US succeeds in linking these companies to its jurisdiction under the sovereign threat to restrict access or else to deny the exercise, for which its cannot take the risk.
2. Transnational exercise of judicial constraint in the service of American hard power. Thanks to its economic and financial hegemony as well as the preponderance of its money, the United States manages to place transnational firms under the influence of its law. With these companies, it enlarges the scope of its extraterritorial jurisdiction intervention. Not needing the assistance of other countries in order to force its respect, but only the collaboration of firms in the hold of its legal nets, the US thus exercises a regulatory power of transnational scope and has unequaled coercive power.
Analysis
Mobilizing all of the resources of its structural power, the United States has diversified the objects of attachment of foreign companies to its jurisdiction – exercise of activities on its territory, stock notation, use of digital platforms under American law…- and transformed its economic dominance into legal hegemony. In the BNP Paribas case, it is through transactions in US currency, at best tenuous, that it made these international exchanges. In reality the United States considers that all the payments in its currency must be conform to its legislation. Consequently, disputed transactions having been made in American dollars and compensated by the New York branch of BNP Paribas, American justice considered itself competent for prosecution. However, it would not have been able to take these actions if another money had been used for these payments.
Risking the loss of its operating license, or of being prohibited from offsetting transactions in dollars and having to face a long trial with an uncertain outcome before being struck by criminal sanctions, BNP Paribas ultimately preferred to cooperate with legal authorities. For this reason, it participated in its own incrimination by offering proof of its guilt. Rather than resisting them and going to trial, it sought to take advantage of the American system of negotiated justice, which allows one to make an arrangement or deal and to terminate the proceedings by limiting the transaction sanctions. In other words, the bank submitted itself to the procedural mechanisms of American law. It is in this way that the bank had to 1) carry out an internal investigation at its own cost in all of its branches by following the instructions given by legal authorities, 2) negotiate the amount of the fine to be paid, 3) promise to secure an internal inspector or monitor charged with the mission of verifying that it will in the future confirm to American legislation and finally, 4) institutionalize a procedure to this end. This judicial mechanism is perfectly adjusted to the globalization of exchanges. It also appears adapted to the dispositions of companies that are structurally given to maximize their profits by carrying out a cost/benefits analysis that incorporates legal risks. Its effectiveness depends on the establishment of a set of institutions having a means of investigation and of negotiation in order to pilot the program. Directed by the Department of Justice and by US prosecutors – in this case the District Attorney of New York – naturally the investigations mobilize the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation). The investigations benefit from the support of specialized regulatory agencies such as OFAC (Office of Foreign Asset Control) dedicated to the management of a program of economic sanctions and the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) charged with the surveillance of stock markets.
While since the Cold War the United States has not stopped developing its extraterritorial legal arsenal establishing economic sanctions to isolate certain countries – Cuba, North Korea – or else to fight against terrorism – Iran, Syria, Libya, Sudan –, this repressive model insidiously converts transnational companies into auxiliaries of American diplomacy with which other democracies are not always in agreement (case of France and the Cuba embargo). As this legal strategy not only concerns programs of economic penalties, but also spreads to the fight against corruption and the repression of stock market offenses, it makes American law into the primary regulator of globalization. In so doing, this United States is allowed to benefit from the financial windfall of the fines that it imposed. In this case, it is a question of a sort of annuity of legal domination. Taken globally, it undeniably consecrates its hegemony.
References
Garapon Antoine, Servan-Schreiber Pierre (Éds.), Deals de justice. Le marché américain de l’obéissance mondialisée, Paris, PUF, 2013.
Strange Susan, Le retrait de l’État. La dispersion du pouvoir dans l’économie mondiale, Paris, Éd. Du Temps Présent, 2011.
Waltz Kenneth, Theory of International Society, Addison Wesley, Reading MA, 1979.
Oct 14, 2014 | environment, Global Public Goods, Passage au crible (English)
By Valérie Le Brenne
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°113
Pixabay
From September 11-18, 2014, the IWC (International Whaling Commission) convened in Portorož, Slovenia for its 65th biannual meeting. During this gathering which brought together nearly 90 states, the debate centered notably on Japan; its government being regularly accused of using science to make an argument for its pursuit of commercial whaling. In March 2014, a decision ordered by the ICJ (International Court of Justice) in The Hague had thus demanded – following a complaint filed by Australia – that Japan put an end to its program in Antarctica.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Created in Washington on December 2, 1946, by the International Convention on the regulation of whale hunting, today the IWC brings together 89 member states. Its primary objective is to “ensure the judicial conservation of whale stocks in order to allow for the organized development of the whaling industry”. Also, its mission comprises the development of protective devices for these mammals, fixing capture quotas and leading scientific studies for which it ensures the propagation of the results.
In this framework, the Commission recognizes three types of whale hunting that come under different regulations: 1) commercial whaling, 2) aboriginal subsistence whaling, 3) scientific whaling. While the first was strictly prohibited by the moratorium of 1986, the second remains authorized as long as the meat is used on the spot for human consumption. On the other hand, scientific hunting, which does not come under its control, retains its legal status.
Let us recall that the creation of the IWC is a continuation of the first restrictive measures, which resulted in the formal outlawing of this activity in the southern hemisphere beginning in 1939. Indeed, the intensification of captures since the 19th century – thanks to the appearance of whaling ships then floating fish factories – and the development of the glycerin-based explosives market during the First World War had rapidly led to the quasi-extermination of certain species such as the blue whale and the humpback whale.
Nonetheless, commercial hunting began again in 1949. In Japan especially, this practice has allowed for a response to the serious food shortages, which were rampant after World War II. Following that, the lack of respect for quotas and the incapacity of the International Commission to impose sanctions to offender countries led to a new collapse of whale populations. During the 1961-1962 season, no fewer than 66,000 whales were killed in the Antarctic. Faced with this alarming observation and this environmental emergency, in 1982 the International Commission’s member countries voted for the implementation of a moratorium. To be exempt from it, the main whaling countries – the USSR, Norway and Japan – officially filed their objections.
Supported by Iceland, Norway maintained its rejection of the text and continues even today commercial whaling. For its part, Japan – which reconsidered its 1986 decision – grants special research permits, thus exploiting the loophole induced by the authorization of captures for scientific means.
Theoretical framework
1. Political use of scientific legitimacy. By systematically using a scientific argument to orchestrate large-scale campaigns, Japan is working to circumvent the regulations inherent to all global governance. In this way, it is also contributing to the erosion of the capital of legitimacy specific to expert assessments conducted in the environmental field.
2. The protection of biodiversity by sanctuary. Faced with the difficulty that safeguarding endangered animal species represents, sanctuary – in other words, the creation of vast protected zones – from now on seems to constitute one of the most effective ways to conserve biodiversity.
Analysis
Strongly marked by the IJC’s decision, the 65th meeting of the International Commission accorded an important place to the debate on scientific hunting authorized by Article VIII of the 1946 Convention. The latter specifies that “if states must submit proposals to be examined, […], the member state decides to grant a permit as a last resort and this right takes precedence over other regulations set up by the International Commission, including the moratorium”. While it accepted the 1986 text, Japan relies on the prior provision in order to grant special permits through its research program in Antarctica (JARPA). Begun in 1987, this program has otherwise been renewed without prior accreditation by the IWC’s scientific committee in 2005 (JARPA II). Also, it is estimated that 10,000 mammals were harpooned between 1987 and 2009. This evaluation seems all the more alarming with the knowledge that IWC Whaling – the Institute of Cetacean Research – had until recently had very few results. A study published in 2006 indicates that only four articles were published in sixteen years. In this way, the decision made by the International Justice Court in The Hague confirms the accusation by concluding that these research missions concealed what in reality was commercial whaling. Summoned to put an end to these practices, however, Tokyo replied by announcing the creation between now and year’s end of a new program (JARPA III). By systematically invoking scientific necessity, Japan benefits from the structural weakness of this international authority to overcome regulation that continues to be hesitant and lacks the means to impose sanctions. In particular, it contributes to the erosion of the credit granted to all scientific expertise concerning environmental preservation.
In this context, the creation of sanctuaries remains the favored way of preserving whales from hunting and illegal commercial practices. In this case, the establishment of vase protected spaces at the heart of strategic regions for the biological safeguard of the most threatened species should substantially improve their rate of reproduction. Besides the protected marine areas – which fall under state’s sovereignty in their EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) –, two are currently managed by the IWC in the Southern Ocean and the Indian Ocean. But in the absence of surveillance models, securing these zones that cover several millions of square kilometers remains an extremely complex task. Notably, last January, the NGO Sea Shepherd – which campaigns for the conservation of marine biodiversity and organizes sea campaigns – denounced the raids carried out by the Japanese fleet in the sanctuary located in the Southern Ocean. This organization is reputed for its remarkable operations that aim to intervene between boats and cetaceans at the moment of their capture. It leads much mediatized actions to sensitize citizens of the archipelago. In this sense, it is appropriate to highlight just how much the consumption of this luxurious commodity has diminished over the course of the last few years. According to IWC Whaling, 908 of the 1221 tons from the 2012 campaigns were not sold. If the protection of these cetaceans implies the implementation of major global governance, it could not do so without a serious effort to sensitize public opinion so ass to modify this market’s logic.
References
Habermas Jürgen, La Technique et la science comme idéologie, [1973], trad., Paris, Gallimard, 1990.
lemonde.fr, Planète, « Le Japon repart à la chasse à la baleine », disponible à la page : http://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2014/09/07/le-japon-repart-a-la-chasse-a-la-baleine-dans-le-pacifique_4483326_3244.html
Marguénaud Jean-Pierre, Dubos Olivier, « La protection internationale et européenne des animaux », Pouvoirs, 131 (4), 2009, pp.113-126.
Raffin Jean-Pierre, « De la protection de la nature à la gouvernance de la biodiversité », Écologie & politique, 30 (1), 2005, pp. 97-109.
Site officiel de la CBI, disponible à l’adresse suivante : http://iwc.int/home
Jul 7, 2014 | Development, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Florent Bédécarrats*
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n° 112
Pixabay
On April 15-16, 2014, Mexico hosted the meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, the fruit of an OECD initiative. The conference brought together some 1500 participants from 140 countries: heads of state and government, ministers, members of parliament, directors of international organizations, representatives from the business world and from civil society, foundations and development professionals. The assessment of these two days remains mixed: the failure that certain participants expected did not occur and the participation of such a diversified range of actors comprise grounds for satisfaction for organizers. But the final declaration lacks substance and several key partners did not ratify it.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Until the fall of the Berlin Wall, ODA (Official Development Assistance) provided evidence of great predominant cleavages: the big push model, import substitution, integrated rural development or structural adjustment. But it especially obeys the rules of influence of former colonial powers and the logic of blocs. After the end of the Cold War, the observation of the failure of decades of intervention and the mistakes of neoliberal policy fed a profound questioning of this mechanism of interstate solidarity. In 2000, the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals offered a start which favored a restrained number of precise and measurable priority targets, shouldered by the ensemble of contributors from the field and which should be attained by 2015.
To support this movement and to restore credibility to their action, under the protection of the OECD, the followers of ODA lead a vast negotiation aiming to regulate their practices in order to improve aid efficiency. After a first international meeting in Rome (2002), two stages proved to be decisive: Paris’ declaration on development aid efficiency in 2005, then the promises by Busan, adopted in Korea (2011). With the deadline for the MDGs approaching, these stakeholders are today trying to restructure a common agenda for the post-2015 period, notably by advancing the notion of sustainable development. The Mexico City meeting aimed to set a benchmark for this transnational process.
Theoretical framework
1. Aid diplomacy. Whether be under its humanitarian aspects, those related to reconstruction or to development, aid is frequently mobilized by states as a supplementary instrument in the service of their political strategy. With the decline of the bipolar system and the weakening of alliances stemming from colonization, ODA was backed by other plans, such as the enlargement of commercial opportunities, the security of access to raw materials, the search for support for international initiatives, or else the diffusion of technical, commercial, social or environmental norms. Today this domain is seeing the rise in power of new participants: emerging countries, private foundations and companies, NGOs, consulting firms and think tanks.
2. Aid efficiency. The dissatisfaction shown in regards to interventions in the name of solidarity has incited aid actors to underscore the results of their activity. This concern manifested itself by highlighting evaluation as an instrument for accountability. Systematic reviews have thus been established for gauging development projects or programs with regard to common criteria such as pertinence, effectiveness, efficiency, durability and impact. On the other hand, transnational authorities have been put into place in order to coordinate the interventions. Besides, cardinal principles have been adopted to regulate the programming of aid contributors: appropriation by beneficiaries, harmonization of initiatives, alignment with locally defined priorities, partnerships with public and private organizations, and finally transparency.
Analysis
The governance of the Global Partnership for effective development cooperation sparks debates, notably regarding the representation of civil society to the Steering Committee. For the moment, its tripartite presidency is aiming to assure a balance between developed countries, developing countries and emerging countries. The current team, comprised of British, Nigerian and Indonesian representatives, has, however, been criticized for its lack of transparency. As a result, some are calling for the modification of the composition and mandate of this structure. The next phase will be led by three co-presidents representing Mexico, the Netherlands and an African country yet to be determined. A high expectation in this regard will be to exceed the priority accorded to launching events, to focus on the long-term animation of a substantive discussion. Nonetheless, etching out a clear direction, for an ensemble as composite as this one, remains a challenge.
This meeting has equally conveyed the development of the balance of power in the aid field. Thus, emerging countries have demanded a tangent position. While they actively participate, Mexico and Nigeria have criticized this multilateralism. As for Brazil and Argentina, they have shown themselves to be even more skeptical. Regarding China and India, they have not even participated in the exchanges.
On the other hand, the private actors appear much more active. In the context of parallel meetings where they have shown themselves to be very present, foundations have for the first time adopted a common charter on the effectiveness of their actions. Large companies – in particular those from the raw materials and industrial sectors – have otherwise been very visible. Upon the invitation of financial backers, representatives of civil society, while quite numerous, have participated in a limited capacity or else have been critical. The rivalry remains strong between the United Nations and the OECD regarding the most legitimate organization to guide the process. Yet this debate seems outdated in light of the multiplication of PICS (Partnerships Initiative Coalitions).
The object of negotiations has also evolved. Indeed, if initially the groups’ discussions centered on aid effectiveness, they have progressively expanded, and today it’s the question of multi-actor partnerships that is proving to be at the center of concerns. The partnerships have shared the observation of a singular absence of debate at plenary sessions during which exchanges have remained much codified, without untimely speeches, including by the organizations of the target society. We have, for example, noted few advances on the questions placed at the top of the official agenda, like the role of the private sector, multilateral actors and the environment. In contrast, parallel events have been more dynamic and have allowed for progress on certain subjects, like tax evasion or else the fight against money laundering, etc. For its part, France is seeking to adopt the role of catalyzer on the stakes relative to norms of social and environmental responsibility, and on the partnerships between public and private operators.
Nevertheless, the question of resources has not been treated during these discussions and the respect of engagements taken by donor states to set aside 0.7% of their GDP has not even been discussed, while however this theme is crystalizing numerous arguments in forums on development in the North.
References
Bearce David H., Tirone Daniel C., « Foreign Aid Effectiveness and the Strategic Goals of Donor Governments », The Journal of Politics, 72 (3), 2010, pp. 837–851.
Wood Bernard et al., The Evaluation of the Paris Declaration, Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2011.
*This document has been put together using elements shared by the representative of the ODA at this meeting, Armand Rioust de Largenaye. The analyses and conclusions drawn here remain, nevertheless, the responsibility of their author and in no way take on the official point of view of the French Development Agency or its partner institutions.
Jun 16, 2014 | Globalization, North-South, Passage au crible (English), Sport (English)
By Élie Landrieu
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°111
Pixabay
While the 20th edition of the World Cup will be held in Brazil between June 12-July 13, 2014, the institution in charge of its organization, FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association), appears more criticized than ever. Indeed, this powerful entity has managed to impose drastic conditions on the host country, loaded with socioeconomic, even human, consequences.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Created in Paris on May 21, 1904, by the representatives of athletic associations from 7 European countries (Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland), FIFA aimed to regulate the practice of a sport, association football, which at that time was in full expansion. Besides the guarantee of rules and the recognition of national federations, this authority sought to organize its own international competition.
Despite the first promising steps and the rapid integration of new members, it wasn’t until 1930 that the institution organized the first World Cup, in Uruguay. But in a context of economic crisis and of resurgence of international tensions, the event was not an immediate success. The primary European football nations (England, Germany, and Italy) were still absent from the list of participants, while only thirteen teams took part in the tournament. Rapidly however, the political power measured the symbolic impact of the competition and the international prestige that it could glean from it. Beginning in 1934, by hosting the FIFA World Cup, Benito Mussolini’s Italy managed to make the tournament into a showcase of its supposed grandeur. Pretentious staging conjugated with resounding success of the national team allowed the fascist regime – on the eve of the eruption of the Second World War – to offer the world a glorified image of power and modernity.
However, it wasn’t until the advent of television that the political and economic stakes surrounding the competition, took on their full dimension. Sixty million viewers watched the first live broadcast of the World Cup final played in London in 1966, which opposed the Queen Mother to the West German Mannschaft. From that moment on, the World Cup became a platform for the exhibition of commercial brands. Also, beginning in the 1970s, the sport authority under the direction of the Brazilian businessman João Havelange, concluded its first contracts with the large companies Coca-Cola and Adidas, which since that time have remained its constant partners. The story of the institution then became that of an irresistible rise to power. Seizing the entirety of the rights which emerged with the quadrennial tournament, (broadcasting rights, marketing rights, multimedia rights), FIFA recorded constant progression of its earnings. For example, during the period 2007-2010, its profit culminated at 4.2 billion dollars. At the same time, the global football authority did not cease to extend its political influence by managing to impose ever more strict conditions on states in regards to the organization of the flagship competition.
Theoretical framework
1. International intrusion of a private agency. Mobilization leads to a redistribution of political authority, which confirms the rise in importance of non-state actors. Private authorities such as FIFA establish themselves in the regulation of transnationalized sectors and manage to thwart, even to divert the action of states on their territory.
2. Reconfiguration of state power. In so doing, these new actors contribute to the transformation of the forms of state power. In this, it is clear that under the orders of FIFA, the Brazilian government renounces the realization of significant regulatory functions, while it considerably reinforces its security prerogatives.
Analysis
The World Cup bestows on FIFA a characteristic of considerable power, which allows it to impose itself as an autonomous actor on the international scene. Certainly, this institution, contrary to intergovernmental organizations, holds no delegation of sovereignty. In reality, the supreme football authority only constitutes a federation of national athletic associations; as such it does not maintain direct links with states. However, by putting them in competition for the title of World Cup Champion, it manages to impose organizational conditions on them, which involves renouncing a significant part of their independence. Thus, FIFA succeeds in exerting its control on the wealth produced within the borders of these states. Indeed, for this edition of the World Cup – as for the two preceding competitions in Africa and in Germany – the host country accepted tax exemption on the all of the earned revenues by the sports authority and its commercial partners during the entire World Cup. Besides that, to the detriment of local economic actors, FIFA has imposed a series of measures promoting the activity of its sponsors. For example, the international federation has obtained from the public powers the installation of a zone of exclusivity around the stadiums that is strictly reserved for the sale of official brands. Pre-empting the state on this point, the authority protecting football seems able to dispose of a significant amount of the revenues generated by the event. All this to say that the aptitude of the state actor to play its role of social regulator is put into question. In these conditions, the growth of public deficit brought on by expenses dedicated to the World Cup (11 billion dollars) runs a strong risk of eventually compromising the government’s capacity to invest in social policy. From now on, the executive has planned for a program for the reduction of budgetary expenses, which – despite the demands expressed by protestors – could ultimately harm public services. In the same way, its aptitude to ensure democratic regulation is proving to be compromised. Indeed social movements show that public authorities are ready to move outside consultation procedures. Still, if Brazil gives up a significant part of its sovereignty under FIFA’s pressure, it will not remain deprived. On the contrary, in a common accord with the coordinating authority of the World Cup, it is considerably reinforcing its security prerogatives and therefore increasing its control over the population. Thus, claiming the organization of the World Cup, the Brazilian government extends its police and judicial powers. Let us recall that it invested nearly 2 billion reals (900 million dollars) in material, surveillance equipment and special intervention troops, while the authorities have normalized the use of the military in order to quell protests. In parallel, the General World Cup Bill of Law negotiated with FIFA representatives, added new crimes and misdemeanors to Brazilian penal code. Finally, even more preoccupying in terms of public liberty, congress is currently examining an anti-terrorist bill on the acceptance of a wide notion of terrorism, notably comprising the deterioration of goods and services. This could lead to fear of an abusive recourse against protestors, which would disrupt World Cup play. Ultimately, these developments promote a climate of impunity specific to the exacerbation of police violence. In this respect, numerous NGOs are denouncing the growth of excessive demands imposed by police forces during protests. They are condemning the offensive models put into place in the expulsion of residents of favelas located near tourist centers. But it would be wrong to envision the relationship between the Brazilian State and FIFA merely on the level of opposition and competition. In reality, the governing body of football is managing to cause the public power to fail in its constitutive elements such as the control of wealth, redistributive functions or democratic regulation. However, these two institutions are equally linked in relationships of alliance and partnership. Indeed, they find a common interest in the hardening of power, while FIFA strives to maintain order for the smooth execution of its World Cup, the state is treating deep problems with force whilst Brazilian society bears witness to it, such as the existence of favelas or social demands. From now on, it seems that this new actor in international relations contributes less to the surrender of state power than to its security development, even to its “brutalization”.
References
Laroche Josepha, La Brutalisation du monde. Du retrait des États à la décivilisation, Montréal, Éditions Liber, 2012.
Rosenau James N., Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990. Rousseau Juliette, « Villes marchandes et villes rebelles : préparation aux méga-événements et reconfiguration des formes d’exercice du pouvoir au Brésil », Mouvements, 2014, (2), p. 24-30.
Amnesty international, « “Ils utilisent une stratégie de la peur”. Le Brésil doit protéger le droit de manifester », 5 juin 2014.
Apr 21, 2014 | Research dissemination, Théorie En Marche
Renowned specialist on China, Jean-Pierre Cabestan delivers a complete summary of the Chinese political system, which fills a major void. Indeed, in the last 20 years, no French work has treated this subject, even though China has undergone unprecedented socioeconomic upheavals. Right away, this publication appears to be an indispensable work for any researcher in IR, no matter the area of study, given the pre-eminent role played by the Chinese power on the world stage.
The outline proves to be as simple as it is instructional: the author devotes his first section to institutions and his second to society. This allows for a better understanding of the domination of a communist party 85 million members and 10 million executives strong. Then, he analyses the challenges confronting the country: systematic corruption, significant social inequality, diverse ethnic claims, and the hindered emergence of a civil society.
Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Le Système politique chinois, un nouvel équilibre autoritaire, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2014, 708 pages, including 43 pages of annexes, classified bibliography, general index and index of names.
Apr 7, 2014 | International Finance, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Elie Landrieu
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°110
On March 17, 2014, the rating agency Moody’s lowered the score of securities issued by the Argentine state onto financial markets to “Caa1”. It qualified the nation’s risk of defaulting on payment as “very high”. In this regard, this organism evokes the alarming drop of exchange reserves – from 52.7 billion dollars in 2011 to 27.5 billion currently – conjugated with the pursuit in parallel of “ill-adapted policies”.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In December 2001, Argentina declared the cessation of payment on 103 billion dollars in international obligations. Since then, the country has remained in isolation, paying few of its international obligations. It first sought to lighten its commitments. In fact, in January 2005, the government of Nestor Kirchner led its first debt restructuration plan. Then, one year later, it succeeded in paying the entirety of the sum due to the IMF (International Monetary Fund), namely 9.8 billion dollars. A second restructuration obtained by the government of Cristina Kirchner in June 2010, brought the total of private renegotiated debt to 90%. Thus in 2012, it was able to reduce its indebtedness by nearly 70% (from 166% of GDP in 2002 to 44.9%).
This state then profited from the world economic context to insure its financial autonomy. With the sudden rise of the price of agricultural material – like that of soy which represents 25% of Argentine exports – it generated large surpluses on the balance of payments and consequently grew its foreign currency reserves, primarily dollars, money in which nearly 90% of the Argentine debt is denominated. Otherwise, the rapid and vigorous economic recovery – between 7 and 9% of growth between 2003 and 2008 – led to a regular increase in tax revenues for the entire period. These resources also permitted it to cover its expenses and to progressively reimburse its debts, without resorting to financial markets.
Generally speaking, such financial empowerment allows for substantial flexibility for governments. Thanks to this, they can divert from neoliberal orthodoxy and put interventionists policies into place. Among them, let us mention social services, protectionist measures – taxes on imported goods and manufactured products – or else nationalizations (retirement funds, 2008; Aerolineas, 2011; Repsol-YPF, 2012). In parallel, the central bank engages in a rigorous inspection of the movements of capital.
However, the reversal of the world economic situation since the crises in 2008 has seriously compromised the ability for Buenos-Aires to do without the international bond market. Its financial resources are therefore mechanically reduced because of the drop in world activity. Said activity is mostly notably translated by a dip in agricultural prices, a reduction of trade surplus, a slowing of activity and a decrease in tax revenues. From that point, this situation has once again driven Argentina towards investors. But regaining their confidence supposes aligning itself to their demands, this is to say, to submit to their normative coercion.
Theoretical framework
1. Regulation by the norm. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault describes the emergence of a form of disciplinary power that, beginning at the end of the 18th century, moves away from the domain of law to join that of the norm. Still, if the first proves exterior and punitive, the second remains interiorized and leads to self-regulation by individuals. Let us underline that in the absence of all sovereign authority on the world scale, globalization comes under the same logic. In this regard, we observe the deployment of rules that emanate from specialized agencies and function according to the principles of self-control and voluntary adhesion. Such principles draw their strength from the interest of the stakeholders of globalization to integrate a club from which they could not exonerate themselves without damages.
2. Stigma as a corrective device. In this context, assigning a stigma acts as a powerful regulatory instrument. For Erving Goffman, it disqualifies and marginalizes the targeted actor, all the while reaffirming the dominant values within a given system. However, the new downgrading of Argentina’s sovereign rank casts profound discredit onto this State and contributes to ostracizing it from financial markets. It shows the hidden side of criterion on which it must necessarily align its policy – transparency, budgetary rigor, loosening of exchanges control – if it wants to access new financing on obligatory markets.
Analysis
Downgrading Argentina’s rank maintains the country at the edges of financial markets. It reinforces its image of a deadbeat. In so doing, this situation compromises its relationship with all the other members of the financial sphere (IMF, private investment funds, U.S. courts, economic press) and legitimizes its placing bonds out of the bounds of markets.
The agency’s decision orders the country to conform to the neoliberal norm promoted by markets. This evaluation is combined with a comment bemoaned by certain interventionist policies, like the support for the price of energy, the interventions on change markets or else the excessiveness of public spending qualified as “unsuitable” to the situation. As a result, this authority exhorts the government to reorient its action by putting into place the neoliberal precepts based on the control of the deficit and the stabilization of money. According to the agency, all these provisions are necessary to secure the repayment of debt.
The urgent financing need that Argentina faces obliges its political leaders to consider these orders. Indeed, the flight of capital, galloping inflation and the generalized drop in activity seriously degrade its finances and make its isolation more and more unsustainable. The multiplication of confidence signals sent in the direction of financial markets these last few months, testifies to the concern of satisfying their demands. Thus, for example, the country concedes large indemnities to nationalized companies – 5 billion dollars were disbursed to the Spanish oil company Repsol – or else it reimbursed the arrears of a certain number of private creditors. Finally, it is allowing the peso to depreciate against the dollars, while it is engaging in discussions with the Paris Club, an organism that brings together public creditors. Nevertheless, in order to regain the support of financial markets, its government will make an even deeper revision of its economic policies, which Moody’s experts have clearly made known.
Ultimately, as the dependence of the State on bond markets grows, rating agencies are tightening the noose. From now on, these agencies are able to refuse the normative frameworks of finance. In the same way, they succeed in orienting the public policies of governments; the reimbursement of debt is currently imposing itself as an essential point of reference. But it must understand that the investor’s interest takes precedence over the public interest.
References
Foucault Michel, Surveiller et punir [Discipline and Punish], Paris, Gallimard, 1975.
Goffman Erving, Stigmate. Les usages sociaux des handicaps, Paris, Minuit, 1975.
Gaillard Norbert, « La notation souveraine », Politique étrangère, (1), 2012, pp. 53-63.
Web Publication of Moody’s March 17th decision
