Dec 21, 2013 | Internet, Passage au crible (English), Security
By Adrien Cherqui
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°103
Source: Flickr
According to the files of the NSA (National Security Agency) revealed by Edward Snowden in July 2013, more than two billion emails and phone calls from Brazil were allegedly intercepted by the United States for a period of nearly ten years. In fact, the South American country is supposedly one of the principal targets of the surveillance program known as PRISM (Planning Tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization, and Management) along with Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan.
On December 17, 2013, the Whistleblower Edward Snowden published an open letter in the newspaper Folha de S.Paulo. Speaking to the “Brazilian people”, he declares himself ready “to contribute” to the investigations of the Senate. But taking refuge in Russia since July 31, 2013, he underscores that “until a country gives [him] permanent political asylum, the American government will interfere in [his] ability to express himself”.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Since the revelations of the website WikiLeaks, whistleblowers benefit from unprecedented media coverage. Drawing inspiration from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 19), and advocating protection of the freedom of speech, this association uncovered innumerable amounts of information. In 2010, the organization put online nearly 400,000 secret documents relative to the war in Iraq and more than 90,000 War Logs, in other words, confidential reports on the American army on the operations of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in Afghanistan. Finally, it released 250,000 diplomatic cables from the Department of State. The source of these leaks, the American soldier Bradley E. Manning, was then condemned to thirty-five years in prison.
The year 2013 also marked a decisive turning point for the American administration. The former NSA analyst, Edward Snowden, brought to light several programs of mass surveillance piloted by the agency, such as XKeyscore or PRISM which made it possible to collect various data. Following these revelations, Martin Schulz, president of the European parliament, estimated that “this will seriously harm the relationship between the European Union and the United States”. Several countries partnered with the American power, like France, Germany and China, were themselves allegedly monitored by the NSA, the organization responsible for the intelligence derived from electronic signals. We recall, for example, the telephone calls by the current Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, which were the target of this kind of espionage.
Facing numerous condemnations for these actions, a report filed by experts appointed by the White House, submitted on December 13, 2013, estimates that the NSA must change its surveillance practices. Amongst the 46 recommendations contained in this document, specialists advocate a better cooperation between the United States and their “close allies”, adding that “some of the authorities which have been created or developed in the wake of September 11th, unduly sacrifice the fundamental interests of individual freedoms, privacy and democratic governance”.
Theoretical framework
1. The breach of confidentiality as a repertoire of action. Structuring the interactions between different political units, the secret lies at the heart of inter-state relations. It’s the concealment of information that gives it, its importance. By detracting from the state’s monopoly of intelligence and by circulating this information freely on the Internet, via numerous media, whistleblowers have forged a powerful and innovative repertoire of action which decidedly brought their protest into the public arena.
2. Transparency, the constitutive element of a new loyalty. The symbolic action of these providers of confidential data is founded on the demand for absolute transparency in the diplomatic and governmental conduct of democracies. But this imperative, the foundation of their ideology, leads to a disqualification of the prevailing systems of loyalty.
Analysis
The global revelations of the whistleblower Edward Snowden could easily have quickly passed by as a mere epiphenomenon. However, they instead correspond to a deep and irreversible movement. From now on, individuals interfere in international affairs and sometimes enter into direct competition with states. Since the WikiLeaks affair, these new stakeholders have shown themselves by revealing large amounts of information.
By violating the United State’s monopoly on its classified data, whistleblowers’ repertoire of action desecrates state authority. Their intelligence makes visible a world plagued by turmoil in which states are overtaken by networks of individuals, real underlying powers constituting a new power built on the knowledge and the mastery of information. This phenomenon corresponds to what Joseph Nye qualified as cyberpower. In other words, it refers to the ability of certain people to mobilize cyberspace, and beyond being able to resort to its specific tools. As an illustration, let us recall that this form of power threatened the process of negotiating the transatlantic free trade agreement. In the same way, following the disclosures by Edward Snowden, Brazil’s president, Dilma Rousseff, suspended an official visit to Washington and condemned this American espionage in the General Assembly of the UN.
But dealing in secrecy necessarily supposes associating it with the concept of loyalty. In this way, let us underline the common point which unites Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden: the former was a military analyst, while the latter operated successively for the CIA and the NSA. Both worked for the American government. Yet, if they have not fulfilled their commitments to reserve and confidentiality towards their respective institutions, they have, however, remained faithful to their cause and to their transparency-based ethos. This civil disobedience corresponds to a repository system while suppressing the only loyalty they demonstrated previously to their state. This form of protest highlights the fact that they have indeed become “actors outside of sovereignty”, capable of desecrating public power. In other words, we are more so dealing with the prioritization of several loyalties rather than with the absence of loyalty altogether. We are indeed dealing with a conflict of loyalties. While they discard their primary function as analysts in the service of governmental agencies and the army and while they have defected, the action of these whistleblowers actually remains conform to their values. In this way, the systems of loyalty to the state find themselves disqualified by the refusal to accord the least bit of opacity or impunity to governments. This shows us how much whistleblowers go beyond and contradict the simple state framework. Above all, they register their interventions in the framework of a global civil society at the heart of which this model of transnational protest movement is organized. Within it, new configurations are structured which defend Human Rights, Civil Liberties and free Internet; leading them at the same time to stigmatize all authoritarian excesses of democratic regimes. It is obvious that whistleblowers are taking part in this dynamic. Thus we observe today a strong interdependence between these activities and medias such as The Guardian, The New York Times, Der Spiegel, El País or the journalist Glenn Greenwald, as many stakeholders who have the resources necessary to analyze, organize and disseminate these leaks.
References
Alastdair Roberts, « WikiLeaks : L’illusion de transparence », Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives, 78 (1), 2012, p. 123-140.
Dewerpe Alain, Espion : Une anthropologie historique du secret d’État contemporain, Paris, Gallimard, 1994. Coll. Bibliothèques des Histoires.
Gomart Thomas, « Écrire l’histoire des relations internationales après WikiLeaks », Revue des deux mondes, mai 2011, p. 83-94.
Hayes Graeme, Ollitrault Sylvie, La désobéissance civile, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2013. Coll. Contester.
Laroche Josepha (Éd.), La Loyauté dans les relations internationales, 2e éd., Paris, L’Harmattan, 2011. Coll. Chaos International.
Laroche Josepha, « La désacralisation du monopole diplomatique des États », in : Josepha Laroche (Éd.), Passage au crible de la scène mondiale 2011, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2012, pp. 35-38.
Rosenau James N., Turbulence in World Politics: a Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990.
Simmel Georg, Secret et sociétés secrètes, [1908], trad., Paris, Circé, 1998.
Dec 19, 2013 | Development, environment, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Weiting Chao
Translation : Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°102
Source: Chaos International
From November 11-23 2013, the 19th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 19) in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was held in Warsaw and the 9th session of the Conference of the Parties acting as the union of the Parties of the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 9). For the first time in history, and on the eve of its official closure, the environmental NGOs boycotted the climate conference.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
One hundred fifty-three countries created the UNFCCC after the Earth Summit held in Rio in 1992. The organization put into place the principle of common and differentiated responsibility in respect of equity. The period preceding the Summit was marked by intense activity by NGOs. Many of them sought to directly influence governmental decisions. In 1997, the States signed the Kyoto Protocol founded on work completed by the UNFCCC. This document is the sole global treaty to date that enforces binding obligations on industrialized countries. Yet, in 2001, alluding to a breach of the development of the American economy, the United States refused to ratify it. After Russia’s signature of the Protocol, the treaty came into force in 2005 and expired December 31, 2012. The post-Kyoto period was mentioned beginning in 2005 and during the Bali Conference (COP 13, 2007), the signatory States adopted a roadmap that they should have been finalized in Copenhagen in 2009. However, no significant progress was recorded. During the Durban Conference in 2010, a subsidiary body was established: the ad hoc working group, integral part of the Durban Platform for a reinforced action ; this aim of this authority is to design another document. During the same period, a financial mechanism the Green Climate Fund was launched. It should bring about the transfer of resources from the most advanced countries towards the most vulnerable ones. The adoption of a universal treaty on this question was postponed until 2015, with an implementation planned for 2020. However, in 2012, the Doha negotiations only led to a simple prolongation of the Kyoto Protocol until 2020.
In 2013, little before the conference was held, the industrialized countries reaffirmed that they would not participate in a second wave of reduction of CO2 emissions under a new Kyoto protocol. Following this logic, Australia must for example abandon its carbon taxation system. As for Japan, it announced that due to the Fukushima accident, its CO2 emissions would go up 3.8% between now and 2020, despite the fact that it had previously committed itself to reduce them by 25%. During the negotiations, the United States, Australia and Canada attempted to modify the principle of common responsibility, changing the obligations of the States in respect to equity and the framework of the treaty. Furthermore, they strongly opposed the implementation bearing on losses and damages. This position, however, drove the countries of the Group of the 77 (G77), including China, to leave the negotiations. Finally, the latter having proved to be sterile and unproductive, NGOs such as Oxfam International, Greenpeace or the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), decided to leave the climate conference on Thursday, November 21, in other words, on the eve of the official closure.
Theoretical framework
1. States dominated by merchant logic. The confrontation between developed countries and developing countries worsened due to the modification of the principal of common responsibility and the global lack of financial resources. At present, states appear to be dominated by a structural logic – that of the market – which imposes itself on them, divides them and by way of consequence ruins all possibility of concluding an ambitious treaty on climate change.
2. Collective lobbying of NGOs. The boycott springs from a form of non-state diplomacy. It makes up an integral part of the repertory of NGOs’ collective action. In this case, it’s about pressuring states’ decisional process, without ceding whatsoever on the final objectives. It’s about a strategy that resembles a zero-sum game (Schelling).
Analysis
The conflict between developed and developing countries remains fundamental and clearly shows the difficulties of inter-state cooperation. It should be noted that the mistrust between states is due to the inefficient financing of the Green Climate Fund. In Copenhagen, while developing countries were promised 100 billion dollars (73.8 million euros) per year between now and 2020, progress remains to be seen as to the aid promised by industrialized countries to countries in the Global South so that they can face climate disasters. Between 2010 and 2012, around 30 billion dollars were given, but since then, developing countries do not have any assurance for the years to come. In other words, for lack of capital, there is no real cooperation between state actors, eroding all negotiations. Besides, states hardly control the production process and from now on they direct little trade. Indeed, the governments of industrialized countries allowed themselves to be led almost exclusively by the interests of large fossil fuel energy companies or insurance companies. Thus, market mechanisms such as Emissions Trading and the Clean Development Mechanism, are inspired from the imminent major regulations intended to reduce carbon emissions. Ironically, it is therefore the high investments and commercial interests that have allowed continuity of the negotiations.
To be able to develop in a particular area, environmental NGOs have acquired expertise and hold a key role in the works on climate change. They have issued suggestions and technical advice to the CCNUCC, and some of their proposals have strongly influenced the Kyoto Protocol. Indeed, they mobilized their capacity to produce scholarly studies that are authoritative in the area. In the same way, they benefitted from field experience, old and in-depth, in order to guide the texts. Finally, they have succeeded in participating in global coalitions comprising both governments as well as companies and organizations of the sector concerned ; seeking in that way to influence the global process. Consequently, the volume of assistance for technological development brought by NGOs to LDCs (least developed countries) or to small, developing, insularly states has progressively grown since 1997. In certain cases, their power to mobilize protests, which confers an important role on them, is considered to be a detector of discontent or dissatisfaction.
This boycott represents a diplomatic pressure that compensates their status of non-state operators. In so doing, it accentuates the pressure on the United Nations, which fears losing its credibility, but also on Poland, the host country. Otherwise, NGOs are worried about the deficit of governance on climate issues. Their refusal to help with the conference makes for a strong symbol : by removing themselves from negotiations, which did not put the public’s interest ahead of that of companies, they led a symbolic, global conflict. Whereas the environmental pressure increases, government delegates will – during their next meeting – give more scope to their proposals, if they want a substantial agreement for 2020.
References
Corell Elisabeth, Michele M. Betsill, « A comparative look at NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: Desertification and Climate Change », Global environmental Policy, MIT press, Nov. 2001 (4), pp. 86-107.
Chao Weiting, « Le triomphe dommageable des passagers clandestins. La conférence de Doha », in : Josepha Laroche (Éd.), Passage au crible, l’actualité internationale 2012, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2013, pp.111-115.
Esteves Olivier, Une Histoire populaire du boycott (1880-2005), Paris, L’Harmattan, 2006.
Schelling Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960. York, 1963.
Strange Susan, Le retrait de l’État. La dispersion du pouvoir dans l’économie mondiale, trad., Paris, Temps present, 1996.
Dec 18, 2013 | Global Public Health, Passage au crible (English), UN
By: Michaël Cousin
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°101
Pixabay
On November 13, 2013, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published its latest report and gave an alarming analysis concerning Afghanistan, the world’s top producer of poppies. Certainly, this plant with its tranquilizing properties serves as a therapeutic when it is transformed into morphine, but it becomes dangerous in the form of opium or worse, heroine. Yet, 90% of the sales of this psychotropic poppy come from this war-torn country.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
For several years, the UN agency has been warning the international community about the dangers for this State of growing opium poppy. At the time of the arrival of western troops in 2001, the cultivation of land had decreased sharply, tumbling from 82,000 to 8,000 hectares. Since that time, however, the farmed surfaces have not ceased to grow, to the point of attaining nearly 209,000 hectares in 2013, while the average between 1994 and 2000 hovered around 68,150 hectares.
The UNDOC explains this development by several factors. First of all, the growth of world demand for these opiates, but also the attractiveness of the buying prices. Afghan peasants received about 160 to 203 dollars per kilo of opium, depending on its condition – fresh or dried – while the price of wheat does not exceed 0.41 dollars per kilo. Besides the financial return, drug traffickers offer a certain financial security to growers; the latter are in fact paid for their crop before even harvesting it.
In fact, the warlords allegedly only receive between 10 and 15% of the profit from the drug and therefore do not appear to be the only stakeholders in the trafficking. Even if the Afghan state has put policies into place intended to fight against cultivating opium poppy – destruction of land and products –, it would appear that 60% of elected officials remain more or less associated with this market. The UN agency also insists on the plurality of the ethnicities concerned: the Hazaras, Tajiks and the Pashtuns continue to be involved.
Otherwise, Afghanistan is now proving to be one of the most significant consumers of opium and heroin. In 2009, around 1.6 million Afghans purchased this substance (out of 35 million inhabitants) including some 120,000 intravenous heroine users. Still, in the current context, the political and sanitary conditions do not allow heroine addicts to get reliable information and sterilized paraphernalia. Yet, these injections comprise a serious vector of the transmission of HIV – without accounting for the hepatitis viruses – where the pandemic of this thirty year old virus is already strongly cracking down and where the number of users rises exponentially each year.
Theoretical framework
1. Shadow State. Drawing inspiration from the concept of the politics of the belly, William Reno
showed with the Shadow State that illegal markets develop when state authorities default. Lacking financial autonomy, the political elite then seeks fresh opportunities in a newly globalized space. This elite tries hard to control certain envied resources and to direct illicit sectors (diamonds, wood, arms, ivory and drugs) permitting them to maintain their power over the country.
2. Institutional Order. Let us understand UNODC from the basis of its institutional organization.
In this case, we shall concentrate on its system of values and behaviors, which its members must interiorize and to which they must conform, all the while forcing themselves to obtain the objectives defined by their directors.
Analysis
After the deposal of Mollah Omar and the loss of his sovereign functions, the government of George W. Bush and its western allies formed a democratic Islamic republic in Afghanistan. However, this new imported state does not function like the American government would like. On the one hand, the presidential election of 2009 was tainted by numerous difficulties such as violence, a weak percentage of participation and numerous electoral frauds. On the other hand, the socioeconomic system of the Afghans remains unstructured and national security is still not assured.
For this reason the Obama administration – while it pulled out of Iraq in 2011 – continues to maintain a presence in Afghanistan. At this very moment, Kabul is negotiating with Washington so that the Pentagon will assure its security for yet another year. Still, without a viable economy, the Afghan government will remain without the means to finance its law enforcement officials. Excluding such exceptions as the New Silk Road or the oil pipeline, the White House wants to withdraw without proposing local solutions more attractive than the poppy trade.
The UN bureau report underlines this deficiency, just like certain NGOs and Afghan associations. These different organizations of course share the same economic analysis. In contrast, they do not envision the medical treatment of the adverse health effects caused by hallucinates. Therefore, the UNODC’s course of action or norm is dependent on implementation of healthcare for addicts based on proven scientific research. However, if one considered the medications proposed to heroine addicts by this agency, all of them offer limited efficiency. Conversely, the WHO (World Health Organization), NGOs and national associations recommend therapy based on methadone. Classified as an opiate, methadone is not made from soporific plants. This molecule is actually a chemical synthesis, which is ingested either orally – as a liquid solution or a gel cap – or else anally – as a suppository. In doing so, it avoids all risk of blood contamination. Moreover, it possesses a pharmacological agent that is longer than heroine, which more easily stabilizes the weaning of the consumer.
If scientists recognize the virtues of methadone, they diverge in regards to its therapeutic quality, while western states who use it, however, boast promising results. In other words, this substitution does not yet offer scientific proof of its efficiency. Obliged by its own norms, the UNODC is unsure of which position to espouse. But this indecision is proving to be detrimental to the safety of Afghans.
References
UNODC, « Afghanistan : Opium Survey 2013, Summary findings », 2013, http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop- monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_report_Summary_Findings_2013.pdf Médecins du Monde, « Guerre à la drogue ou guerre aux drogués : le quotidien des usagers de drogues afghans », 2013, http://www.medecinsdumonde.org/A-l-international/Afghanistan
Briquet Jean-Louis, Favarel-Garrigues (Éds.), Milieux criminels et pouvoir politique. Les ressorts illicites de l’État, Paris, Karthala, 2008, Coll. Recherches Internationales.
Lagroye Jacques, Offerlé Michel (Éds.), Sociologie de l’institution, Paris, Belin, 2010.
Dec 13, 2013 | Defense, Passage au crible (English), Security
By: Josepha Laroche
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°100
Source : Wikipedia
After ten years of successive failures, a temporary accord on the Iranian nuclear program was signed in Geneva on November 24, 2013, between Iran – by Mohammed Javad Zarif – and the representatives of the group 5+1, namely the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Russia) and Germany. This document predicts a renewable period of six months before final negotiations will be undertaken. For the moment, the participating parties have agreed on a substantial deceleration of the Iranian nuclear program. It has therefore been established that its uranium enrichment cannot exceed 5%, and this in order to distance the spectrum of a military nuclear program. As for the existing stock of uranium already – enriched to 20% near the military level – it will have to be neutralized. Lastly, the planned new centrifuges must remain non-operational. Similarly, it will be necessary to stop the work in progress relative to heavy water. In return for this series of obligations, Iran will obtain a partial lifting of the sanctions that until now have been weighing it down. For example, the country will be able to access previously inaccessible funds, which reached 4 billion dollars. However, the essential aspects of the embargo measures remain in place, in particular those concerning the exportation of oil and financial transfers from Iran. It is certain that this conversation constitutes a first step towards the appeasing of tensions, but it remains entirely reversible.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The NPT (Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons), signed July 1, 1968, came into force on March 5, 1970, after the ratification by the depository states (the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the USSR and forty other signatories, including Iran, which signed and ratified the treaty in 1970). It rested on the established distinction between NWS (Nuclear Weapons States) and non-NWS (Non-Nuclear Weapons States). It established that the former (USA, USSR, UK) were committing not to help another country acquire nuclear weapons. As for the non-NWS, they were renouncing their aim to create and to try to obtain them. On the other hand, the NWS (called “the nuclear club”) guaranteed the non-NWS an ease of access to civil nuclear capabilities, on a basis of non-discrimination (articles IV and V). In other words, these measures, which principally target the reduction, even the containment, of horizontal proliferation, that is to say, the extension of nuclear armament in the world, are still in effect.
Since then, in virtue of article III of the NPT, the IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency) upholds its mission to monitor the peaceful use of nuclear matter by non-NWS countries. In order to do this, it has signed guarantee agreements with each one of them so that it can verify that the parties are respecting their engagements. A reinforcement program of the IAEA guarantees, called “93+2” was then put into place to expand the reach and the precision of these inspections; the objective being to guarantee a better efficiency of the non-proliferation regime.
Still part of the NPT today, Iran must therefore submit itself to all requirements for verification of the IAEA’s authority in its nuclear program. However, the Agency suspects that Iran has been engaging in secret operations in order develop nuclear arms for the last ten years. Since that time, the negotiations have multiplied, soon followed by a flood of sanctions whose termination is a currently a pressing subject.
Theoretical framework
1. The civilizational scope of the sanctions. Constitutive elements of international public law, the sanctions belong to the repressive arsenal put into place by States over the last few centuries. Their intention is to avoid wars by condemning to contrition every aggressive actor that might attempt to violate international rules. Thus, by efficiently bringing about a diplomatic framework for war violence, state actors endeavor to civilize their interventions.
2. The dissuasive limits of coercive diplomacy. Less well determined than military strategy, this coercive diplomacy remains nonetheless a delicate maneuver. Of course, it aims to sway negotiations in the required direction, all the while avoiding the human and material cost of a classic conflict. But it necessarily implies the acceptance of a zone of uncertainty, inherent to the games of strategic interaction between the actors present. Yet, this zone abandoned to hazard is denounced and refused by Israel who claims that Iran is simply exploiting this model.
Analysis
In 2003, the IAEA announced the Iranian site in Natanz indicated levels of enriched uranium that exceeded civil standards. Therefore, the Agency asked Iran to prove that it was not developing a nuclear weapon. Since that time, Tehran and the States concerned with the respect of the NPT have been engaging in an increasingly tough power struggle. Due to a lack of progress, the IAEA transmitted the dossier of the Iranian nuclear program to the UN Security Council in 2006. The Council sanctioned Iran by voting for resolution 1737, which prohibits the sale of all material or technology able to contribute to Iran’s nuclear or ballistic activity. Additionally, this text imposed an ultimatum on the country. In 2007, the Council adopted new economic measures (resolution 1747) aiming to strike the uranium enrichment program in Natanz. As for the United States, they have taken repressive measures, directed against the 3 principal Iranian banks. Finally, in 2008, the UN adopted new economic and trade restrictions. Beginning in 2009, the IAEA multiplied alarmist reports, while Iran was launching the first factory for the production of nuclear fuel in Isfahan, even announcing that it had installed 7,000 centrifuges. Otherwise, the country admits to having a uranium enrichment plant near Qom. In 2010, while a 4th coercive wave was being voted for, the IAEA evoked “serious concerns regarding a possible military dimension of the nuclear program”, this drove the United States and the European Union to also stifle the entire Iranian banking sector. The decisions made against it concern the energy sector, foreign holdings, the automobile industry, transportation and commerce in general. Besides that, the West prohibits more than 3,000 Iranians from traveling abroad. To enforce respect of the NPT, while also avoiding a conflagration, which in turn could ignite the entire region, this embargo has built up an economic stranglehold over time, which heavily burdens the development of the country without regulating the dispute. In these conditions, many observers consider that the signature on November 24, 2013, contributes to appease tensions and reinforce global security.
On the other hand, for Israel, according to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, this agreement “is an historic error”. It is allegedly not credible and simply corresponds to a clever policy of procrastination and whose terms permit Iran to continue more or less secretly in its enrichment of uranium for military purposes. As a result, Israeli leaders are harshly criticizing the softening of sanctions, continuing to maintain their right “to defend ourselves […] against all threats”. Jerusalem, not bound by this concession, intends to maintain the option of military strikes. If in the short term it proves to be obsolete, this scenario could, however, be on the agenda in six months. Indeed, if a definitive accord were not concluded, the principle uncertainty would unite all stakeholders involved in this affair detrimental to world peace.
References
Davis Jacquelyn K., Pfaltzgraff Robert L., Anticipating a Nuclear Iran: Challenges for U.S. Security, New York, Columbia University Press, 2013.
Elias Norbert, La Civilisation des mœurs, [1939], trad., Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1973.
Elias Norbert, La Dynamique de l’Occident, trad., Paris, 1975.
Laroche Josepha, La Brutalisation du monde, du retrait des États à la décivilisation, Montréal, Liber, 2012.
Lindemann Thomas, Sauver la face, sauver la paix, sociologie constructiviste des crises internationales, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2010. Coll. Chaos International.
Tertrais Bruno, Iran : la prochaine guerre, Paris, Le Cherche-midi, 2012.
Dec 9, 2013 | Africa, Passage au crible (English), Security, UN
By Philippe Hugon
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°99
Pixabay
On December 5, 2013, under Chapter VII of the charter, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted for a resolution authorizing French intervention in the Central African Republic in order to reestablish order, secure the roads, permit humanitarian access and facilitate the return of civilian populations to their villages. Besides that, the text formalizes the presence of the MISCA (French abbreviation for African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic) already present with 2,500 men on site. The number should quickly grow to 3,600. The mandate provides the possibility to send between 6,000 and 9,000 UN peacekeepers for a period of 12 months. The stated objective consists of eventually restoring constitutional order and permitting elections before February 2015. This finality naturally implies the disarmament, control, stationing and dismantling of the armed troops beforehand.
Following the operation Serval, undertaken last year in Mali, France finds itself on the frontline and in the position of watchdog of Africa with the operation Sangaris, which will take its numbers from 400 to 1,200 men.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
With a territory equaling that of France, but populated by less than 5 million inhabitants, the Central African Republic has been amongst the poorest countries in the world since its independence. Besides being constantly ravaged by crises and coups d’Etat. Recalling that indeed out of 8 successive heads of State, only Patassé has come to power by election, in 1993. The failure of the State has facilitated the rise in power of ethno-regional referents that have taken the place of the construction of a national will to live. The richness of the subsoil (diamond, uranium, oil, gold) and of the soil (cotton, wood) fuel smuggling via porous borders and make up – notably by diamonds – the financial wherewithal of various rebel groups.
The Seleka formed in 2012. From the North and essentially composed of Muslims, it presents itself as a coalition of several political parties and rebel forces, opposed to the president François Bozizé. Last December, the Seleka came as far South as Bangui and participated in the Libreville accords in January 2013. On March 23, 2013, François Bozizé was driven from power by the Seleka and by Michel Djotodia, one of the rebel leaders who proceed to self-proclaim himself Head of State on March 25, all the while maintaining the Prime Minister, Nicolas Tiangaye, in place. Only South Africa supported the then President Bozizé. On the other hand, Chad and Sudan supported the rise to power of Djotodia. As for France, it considered that the conflict revealed the domestic policy of the Central African Republic, and yet should not intervene, except to protect the 1,500 French citizens, to ensure the security of Bangui and to control the airport, vital the country’s economy.
Since the armed seizing of power, not only has half of the population found itself in deep alimentary insecurity, but one also counts more than 400,000 displaced persons and 70,000 refugees. In addition, one observes numerous violations of the human rights such as the recruitment of child-soldiers, as well as rape and murder. The confrontations have taken an ethno regional and religious dimension, despite the pacifying role played by different religious leaders. And thus, as an example, the acts of violence committed by rebels of the former Seleka have driven to the creation of Christian groups of auto-defense (anti-balaka). According the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Laurent Fabius, all the elements of a civil war, even genocide, are allegedly present. The International Crisis Group already mentioned all sources of concern in the report from June 2013.
Theoretical framework
1. A failed, outdated State overrun by infra-State forces. Eight deeply unstable countries surround this landlocked State, the Central African Republic. The conflicts that it is currently experiencing refer to criminality, extreme poverty and marginalization of northern populations. The rivalries between infra-State groups aim to control resources such as cotton and wood, but even more so diamonds, uranium, oil and gold.
2. The incapacity of regional forces. Facing the total failure of the Central African State, incapable to ensure sovereign functions, the African forces appear to be poorly equipped, poorly trained and little mobilized. As a result, they find themselves completely unable to safeguard order and to avoid chaos. With Europe’s absence, and taking into account the American retreat from the same zone, the former colonial power, France, is obliged to intervene in terms of maintaining order, all the while without supporting the regime in place.
Analysis
The failure of the Central African State, the criminality and the extreme poverty of the population are directly linked to the stakes represented by natural resources, notably diamond, which is extracted by 80 up to 100,000 miners. This precious stone, which is controlled by political and militia forces, is the object of significant trafficked contraband, facilitated by the porous borders. The Central African Republic also illustrates the regional dimension of African conflicts. Covering a territory of more than 6,000,000 uncontrolled km2, one remarks the consequences of the Darfur and South Sudan conflicts, giving sanctuary in Chad to the opponents and the presence of the Lord’s Resistance Army of Konny from Uganda. One also observes the impact of litigation particular to the RDC. According to the International Crisis Group, there might also be an infiltration of members of Boko Haram from Nigeria.
Otherwise the Central African Republic reveals the weakness of regional African armies (logistic, financial, involvement, clarify of mandate). As all conflicts contain a regional dimension, one localized event can rapidly engulf an entire region. One therefore understands how much all of these obstacles ban the establishment of a Pax Africana.
This country highlights the contradictions in which France finds itself, obliged to intervene despite itself, all the while being confronted by the difficulties of bringing about durable peace and permitting African actors to build lasting security. Certainly, the French State is intervening with the support of the United Nations Security Council. Certainly, it exercises sovereign functions – providing money, an army – and therefore fills in for certain feeble States, which were formerly its own colonies. But the costs of such engagement appears very high, even while its economic interests are from now on essentially located in English-speaking or even Portuguese-speaking countries. Ultimately, the current situation in the Central African Republic underlines once again the absence of Europe, even if it participates in the financing of the operations. And so Paris finds itself isolated once more faced with a Europe that declares its attachment to the human rights, all the while restraining from implicating itself in what it often considers the “African quagmire”.
References
Hugon Philippe, « Le rôle des matières premières dans les conflits africains », in : Vettoglia Jean-Pierre (Éd.), Les Déterminants des conflits, Bruxelles, Bruyland, 2013, pp 213-224.
Hugon Philippe, Géopolitique de l’Afrique, 3e ed., Paris, A Colin, 2012.
International Crisis Group, « Rapport sur la crise de la Centrafrique », June 2013.
Dec 2, 2013 | environment, Global Public Goods, Passage au crible (English), Security
By Clément Paule
Translation: Marion Marchet
Passage au crible n°98
Source : Wikipedia
The removal of more than 1,500 nuclear fuel rods immersed in the reactor 4’s pool of Fukushima Daiichi’s damaged plant – a huge enterprise expected to last about a year – has started on November 7, 2013. TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) directors, in charge of this pressing operation, have described it as a major step in the process of dismantling the damaged infrastructure since March 11, 2011. However, the highly risky character of this intervention should be underlined, as a 7.1 magnitude earthquake struck in the Pacific Ocean on October 26, 2013, leading to the immediate evacuation of the staff working on the damaged site. Moreover, the multiple breakdowns of the radioactive water treatment system – such as the recurring leaks in storage tanks – have revealed the limits in the management of the disaster by the Japanese firm, which had been nationalized in July 2012. This permanent state of crisis, that has now lasted for two years and a half, remains framed by uncertainty, starting with the future of the Fukushima Daiichi installations – the definitive closing down of which is expected to span over several decades. Yet, in the course of those last months the Japanese government have developed a reassuring discourse illustrating their willingness to regain control – at least symbolically speaking – of a complex situation that seems to be far from being stabilized.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
First, some data about the pollution resulting from the events of March 2011. In July 2013, the IRSN (Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety) stated that an estimate of 60 and 27 petabecquerels (millions of billions of becquerels) of radioactive material were present in the atmosphere and the ocean respectively. If the global level of contamination seems to be decreasing, its long-term impact on groundwater and rivers may turn out to be more important than anticipated. In July 2013, TEPCO finally admitted that 300 tons of radioactive water poured daily into the Pacific. Nevertheless, these numbers do not allow us yet to measure precisely the sanitary consequences on the disaster-stricken populations, who are the object of competing and controversial assessments. Faced with the uncertainty of the post-accident crisis, the Japanese authorities had rapidly organized a series of evacuations within a radius of several dozens of kilometers, leading to the perennial exile of more than 150,000 people. In this respect, a system of restricted access areas has been established based on an unacceptability threshold of dose set at 20 mSv (millisieverts) per year. The definition of an exclusion perimeter has then been accompanied by measures for decontamination of irradiated areas. These boundaries have nevertheless been reduced since 2012, as the government endeavor to encourage the return of displaced inhabitants by modifying standards for the measurement of radioactivity.
Theoretical framework
1. Liquidating Symbolically the Disaster. Since the election of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the end of 2012, the new team in office have tried to regain control of the situation through the delivery of speeches that tend to minimize the consequences of the accident in the name of national recovery.
2. Deficiencies in the Protection Apparatus. Yet, the measures implemented to protect the population are constantly embroiled in polemics, insomuch that the managing of the crisis is marked by opacity and contradictions colliding with the government’s rhetoric.
Analysis
Although antinuclear mobilizations have been fading away two years and a half after the outbreak of the crisis, they nevertheless remain vocal when it comes to providing second opinions. Members of the permanent camp set up in front of the MCI (Ministry of Commerce and Industry) since September 11, 2011 and named Tento Hiroba – Tent Plaza – continue to organize protesting activities despite the judicial proceedings filed against them. So far, periodical demonstrations relayed by national petitions call for the permanent end of nuclear power all the while contesting the official estimates minimizing sanitary and environmental risks. It should be noted that the controversy has recently spread onto the report published by UNSCEAR (United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) and submitted to the United Nations General Assembly on October 25, 2013. The conclusions elaborated by eighty scientists who contributed to this assessment were rejected by numerous Japanese NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) and associations, as well as by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health. Appointed by the United Nations Human Rights Council, this independent expert elaborated as early as May 2013 a virulent report against the protection apparatus that had been set up, targeting in particular its definition of the unacceptability threshold regarding radioactive exposure.
However, as early as May 27, 2013, this document prompted a quick and detailed reply from the Japanese government – a refutation that falls into a large-scale counteroffensive led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s team. Since his entry into office in December 2012, Shinzo Abe has worked on orchestrating Japan’s recovery of its economy – through Abenomics, a set of measures based on the depreciation of the yen in order to increase money supply, fiscal stimulus, as well as the announcement of structural reforms – but also of its diplomacy. Through this strategy Japan aims to impose itself as a major actor in Asia Pacific regional security – as illustrates the militaro-humanitarian intervention by the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in the Philippines after the deadly typhoon Haiyan – all the while adopting a firm stand on memory and territorial disagreements with China and South Korea. In that regard, the election of Tokyo as the host city for the 2020 Olympic Games has marked the confirmation of this rhetoric of reassurance. Indeed, the Prime Minister had stated during his audition before the International Olympic Committee (IOC) on September 7, 2013 that ‘‘the situation [at Fukushima was] under control’’. This statement was strongly criticized in the national media and was described as a government’s lie by activists, especially as a high-ranked TEPCO member contradicted it as early as the following week.
Such a crack in the official communication process seems far from being the only one, inasmuch as the Japanese political class do not seem to unanimously support this liquidation discourse pushing into the background the unfinished handling of the disaster. Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Shinzo Abe’s mentor, has recently positioned himself in favor of the end of nuclear power, thus stigmatizing the end of the safety myth. It represents an obvious disavowal of his former protégé who supports the restarting of plants and the exportation of the Japanese nuclear technology, going as far as to relying on the capitalized experience in Fukushima. Moreover, members of Naoto Kan’s government have revealed that for two years TEPCO had deliberately dissimulated information about contaminated water leaks in order to safeguard their position on international markets. In addition to those discordant elements is Tetsuya Hayashi’s testomy, a former worker working at the accident site and a whistleblower who denounced the suspect system of subcontracting and exploitation of Fukushima 50 involving the criminal organizations yakuza. Those contradictions at the heart of the handling of the crisis itself may lead the state to take responsibility for the direct and exclusive control of the operations of decontamination, as recently recommended by a LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) committee in power. But beyond this potential public management of the process, issues of transparency and responsibility in the post-Fukushima era seem to remain in the background. After the rejection of complaints filed by Tokyo’s Public Prosecutors Office in September 2013, the Japanese House of Representatives have just passed a law designed to impose heavy sanctions for information leaks to the press. In those conditions, the return of the state appears more as a risk factor likely to ensure the continued existence of instability and opacity within this global peril.
References
Grover Anand, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, Mission to Japan (15-26 November 2012) – Advance Unedited Version, 2 mai 2013, consulté sur le site de l’OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) : http://www.ohchr.org [25 novembre 2013].
Ribault Nadine, Ribault Thierry, Les Sanctuaires de l’abîme. Chronique du désastre de Fukushima, L’Encyclopédie des nuisances, Paris, 2012.
Site de l’UNSCEAR (United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) consacré à Fukushima : http://www.unscear.org/unscear/en/fukushima.html [22 novembre 2013].
Nov 24, 2013 | Digital Industry, Non-state diplomacy, Passage au crible (English)
By Adrien Cherqui
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°97
Source: Wikimedia
i24News has just been created. This new international news station is based in Tel Aviv. Since July 17, 2013, it broadcasts news in French, English and Arabic for Europe, the Middle East, Africa and China. It plans to gradually enter the American market beginning in 2014.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The global media represent some of key actors of globalization. Amongst them an oligopoly sets itself apart. Its major players are the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) founded in 1922, CNN (Cable News Network) created in 1980 by Ted Turner and finally Al Jazeera founded in 1996 by the Emir of Qatar, the Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani. Veritable institutions, they form a configuration of actors that have been able to gain worldwide influence with their content. As for France 24, the news station was launched in December 2006 by the impetus of the French government.
i24news is a perfect example of the news stations which first appeared in the 1980s offering continuous coverage. In fact, it aspires to produce news from Israel and “to give voice to the diversity in this country” according to its President Frank Melloul, former director of audio-visual strategy outside of France – regrouping RFI, TV5 and France 24 – and former communications advisor to the French Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin. Mr. Melloul partnered with Patrick Drahi, manager of several cable operators around the world, principal shareholder of Numéricable in France, holder of Hot located in Israel and owner of the former television channel Guysen TV, dedicated to Israel. Mr. Melloul directs i24News, while Mr. Drahi finances it. This media recorded in Luxembourg and not linked to Israeli institutions – aims to offer an alternative and independent view of the international. Born of a desire for audio-visual autonomy, this station provides a media tool profitable to Israel.
Theoretical framework
The construction of a transnational public sector. Stakeholders in the process of globalization, global media participate in the emergence of a public sector and in the advent of the global village by intensifying the relationships and interactions between social entities. By disseminating and sharing of information, they work towards a reconfiguration of the political identities and perceptions that individuals have of the world.
A non-State reinforcement of the Soft Power of States. Information providers exert a more subtle influence than simple cultural products permit. Able to undertake a soft diffusion of values and symbolism, they thereby contribute to the attractiveness of States.
Analysis
Unlike France24, Russia Today and CCTV from China, the agency i24News does not respond to a logical rationalization of foreign broadcasting. Rather, this new global media places itself in a highly competitive and ever more dense information market. There is competition in terms of audience but also in terms of production of audio-visual content and images. i24News does not claim to create its own identity that would distinguish it from its counterparts and its rivals such as Al Jazeera, strongly present in the Middle East. Thus, i24News takes part in the multiplication of international broadcasters that have characterized the advent of media diversity in recent years. It is in this new configuration that States attempt – as producers of cultural matrices – to weigh on the globalization of information.
According to a May 2013 survey by BBC World on the supposed positive influence of sixteen European Union countries on the world, a panel of 26,000 people ranked Israel fourteenth, just ahead of North Korea, Pakistan and Iran. It should therefore be noted that this country must also not have a good image. The ambition of i24News is thus to “connect Israel to the world, but also to connect the world to Israeli society” in order to show all of its complexities. Supported by multilingualism founded on French, English and Arabic, this new media made the choice of entering the anglosphere, a decision echoed by a overwhelming majority of its rivals, which permits it to win a large audience, insofar as English has been established as the veritable lingua franca of globalization. As for broadcasting in Arabic, this decision corresponds to the desire to communicate alternative information to Israel’s neighbors and to compete with Al Jazeera, the dominant media actor in the region. i24News, which participates in a public sector in which schemes of perception, references and cognitive frameworks combine, is also prepared to provide a specific approach on the world stage. It promotes Israeli society and takes part de facto in the world influence of the State of Israel.
i24News participates in the development of Israel’s soft power and is already contributing to the country’s prestige. Indeed, while Israeli authorities are hesitant to authorize the broadcast of this station on their own territory, this private initiative incorporates itself into Israeli diplomacy. Yet, it constitutes an instrument of public diplomacy without simply forming an extension of it. Actually, this undertaking meets the Israeli deficit in terms of global audio-visual. In this respect, it appears as a response aiming to stem the erosion of State power in globalization.
References
Blet Cyril, Une Voix mondiale pour un État. France 24, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2008. Coll. Chaos International.
Brinkerhoff Jennifer, Digital Diasporas : Identity and Transnational Engagement, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Chong Alan, Foreign Policy in Global Information Space. Actualizing Soft Power, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Habermas Jürgen, L’Espace public : archéologie de la publicité comme dimension constitutive de la société bourgeoise, Payot, Paris, 1997.
Keohane Robert, Nye Joseph, “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age”, Foreign Affairs, 77, Sept.-Oct. 1998, pp. 81-94.
Melissen Jan, The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
Perez Maxime, “Israël: i24news, la voix de Tel-Aviv”, Jeune Afrique, 3 May 2013, available at: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2729p054.xml0/
Reed John, “Israel’s Hard News and Soft Power”, Financial Times, 29 August 2013, available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/33805a2e-0fd9-11e3-99e0-00144feabdc0.html
Nov 20, 2013 | Global Public Health, International commerce, Passage au crible (English)
By Michaël Cousin
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°96
On September 25, 2013, the IRACM (Institute of Research Against Counterfeit Medicine) presented a report on counterfeit medicine as organized crime. This study intended to better expose the phenomenon, but also to provoke reflections and to provide the tools needed to protect oneself from it.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Pixabay
For a long time, medicine has been spared from counterfeiting despite the globalization of national economies and the expansion of communication techniques. However, according to the IRACM, global prescription drug fraud allegedly began the moment the USSR collapsed. It seems to have intensified when China became a member of the WTO (World Trade Organization). The distribution of counterfeit medicine apparently became so significant that it may have even surpassed the sale of legal products by 20% between 2005-2010. Even if this phenomenon appears to be global, it more so concerns developing countries. According to the IRACM report, 10% of prescription drugs sold in such countries may be counterfeited versus only 1% in developed countries.
These falsified substances don several characteristics. It generally concerns copies of legal, non-generic substances. Most of them prove to be poorly dosed or in poorly packed. Certain ones contain no active principle, while others may even contain toxic substances. Furthermore, all types of medicine are concerned: antiseptics, painkillers or anti-inflammatories, but also vital products like antiretroviral drugs (HIV, Hepatitis C, etc.). As a case in point, the analysis reveals that in the 90 states receiving false treatments for malaria and tuberculosis, there are regrettably 700,000 deaths annually.
In most cases, clients become the accomplices of the counterfeiters. Yet, in the trafficking of imitation drugs, the buyer acts for his own account, therefore putting his life at stake. This is why IRACM qualifies this type of counterfeiting as organized crime. It is structured around many actors – from the individual to organized crime – and on different scales, from the small group to transnational organizations. For that matter, due to the liberalization of markets and the growth of communication methods, traffickers have numerous means of infiltration available to them including cyber criminality. But certain counterfeiters also use official distribution networks to the point that health professionals – notably pharmacists – are themselves as deceived as patients.
Theoretical framework
1. The social determinants of health. The health of individual is affected by several factors such as the environment in which they grow and develop, from birth to old age, their living and working conditions as well as the quality of the healthcare systems available to them. As it happens, public policies play a predominant role in this area because they are themselves conditioned by relationships of money, power and resources available at the local, national and global level.
2. The commercialization of health in favor of organized crime. In a neoliberal economic context, the privatization of drugs on the world scale – both in terms of their production and distribution – permits a maximization of profits. Criminal organizations, as well as individuals, then benefit from the competition between medical treatments delivered by firms in order to offer counterfeit products that are more competitive in terms of price, but are less efficient. The effect is to guarantee their high profitability.
Analysis
Illegal companies present themselves as legitimate businesses. They too are looking to sell products and to ensure the best financial gain possible. In order to do so, they resort to management techniques that are as well developed as they are effective. Finally, they employ competent staff while at the same time being careful to refinance and to recycle their treasury. In this case, the counterfeiting of drugs proves to be more profitable than legal production because it avoids all investment in research and development. Additionally, their manufacturing does not meet any quality standards (poor conditions, insufficient packaging, no active principal, etc.) and remains clandestine.
In this respect, Carol Reed’s British thriller, The Third Man, remains paradigmatic. Viewers see traffickers profiting from a shortage of penicillin in a post-war Vienna to sell the drug in a more diluted form. Like those in Vienna, today’s counterfeiters also thrive on poverty or the impoverishment of populations attracted by treatment at a lower cost. In the same way, modern day traffickers benefit from the consumers’ lack of information and the weakness of border controls.
For want of possessing an efficient system of physical or immaterial control, States suffer from current border openings, which unquestionably facilitate the work of criminal organizations. Such organizations capitalize on the deregulation of national economies and their virtual counterparts (market financialization) in order to distribute their production around the globe. An increase in the number of steps of manufacturing of false therapeutic substances complicates the struggle against them. Added to this is the use of tax havens in order to launder the profits from this prohibited trade.
The difference between these criminals and pharmaceutical companies lies in the methods used to achieve their goals. Admittedly, corruption is present in both entities, but the legal industries do not use violence as a means to enter markets. However, these negotiations are not solely built on the domination over all actors, they can develop by the involvement of those seeking benefits. In this respect, let us recall that individuals sometimes sell products via a virtual pharmacy without knowing their quality or origin. As for local politicians or government employees, we have already seen cases of their facilitating the trafficking of counterfeit drugs within official distribution systems (hospitals, pharmacies, medical visits, etc.) with the avowed objective of receiving clandestine services or better salaries in return.
These transgressions are not the only problem that States must contend with. Countries’ financial problems, especially developing ones, distort the proper functioning of their healthcare systems. On the one hand, industrial protection restricts access to the most affordable medications, such as generic brands. On the other hand, their governments cannot substantially commit to the prevention of this transnational criminality. It is true that the Palermo Convention, adopted in the context of the United Nations in December 2000, provides a framework for the reinforcement of police and judicial cooperation on an international scale. However, none of the accompanying protocols (trafficking of persons, migrant and arm smuggling) is exclusively dedicated to this new human disaster.
References
Institut de Recherche Anti-Contrefaçon des Médicaments, “Contrefaçon de medicaments et organisations criminels,” 2013, link: http://www.iracm.com/2013/09/liracm-presente-un-rapport-detude-inedit-contrefacon-de-medicaments-et-organisations-criminelles/
Organisation Mondiale de la Santé, “Déterminants sociaux de la santé,” link:
http://www.who.int/social_determinants/fr/
Briquet Jean Louis, Favarel-Garrigues Gilles (Éds.), Milieux criminels et pouvoir politique. Les ressorts illicites de l’État, Paris, Karthala, 2008, Coll. Recherche Internationales.
Pouvoirs, “Le crime organisé,” (132), Jan. 2010, pp. 5-137.
Nov 20, 2013 | Research dissemination, Théorie En Marche
This collective work takes an interdisciplinary approach by bringing together the contributions of anthropologists, historians, legal experts, political scientists, and sociologists. The analyzed cases of rape refer to numerous countries like Bangladesh, Columbia or the Republic of the Congo. It also talks about numerous conflicts: the two World Wars as well as local confrontations such as the Greek Civil War or the clash that opposed private militias and Maoist guerrillas in Bihar. This collective body of research underlines an object all too often neglected by the social sciences. It has indeed remained marginalized in the academic field and on the battlefield. However, rape constitutes a weapon of mass terror with regards to civilian populations. It is a question of a crime occupying a central place in wars even though by and large it has been explicitly outlawed by civil and military penal codes since the beginning of the modern era.
Raphaëlle Branche, Fabrice Virigili, Viols en temps de guerre, Paris, Payot, 2013, 359 p.
Oct 30, 2013 | Human rights, International migrations, Passage au crible (English), Publications (English)
By Catherine Wihtol de Wenden
Translation: Lawrence Myers
Passage au crible n°95
The drama in Lampedusa, followed by new arrivals between Malta and Lampedusa, have since October 2013, led to new international negotiations on migration politics, both on the European and world scales. Let us recall that 366 people perished in Lampedusa during the night of October 3-4, 2013, at the precise moment that the second High Level Dialogue on migration and development was being held in New York. Spearheaded by Kofi Annan in 2006 to evaluate the progress of multilateralism in the governance of migrations, this summit brought together numerous IGOs and NGOs, sending and receiving countries, experts as well as members of civil society linked to the question of migration. In response to this tragedy, Brussels reinforced the powers of the agency Frontex by conferring on it more financial wherewithal. At the same time, a European summit (October 24-25) devoted to the control of migratory politics, reminded attendees of the necessity for European countries to share the burden of the arrival of illegal migrants and asylum seekers.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
This is not the first time that people are talking about Lampedusa. In his film “Le Guépard” (The Cheetah), Lucchino Visconti evoked this ancient possession of the princes of Lampedusa and the interchange of Sicily, which during the Risorgimento passed between the Bourbon kings of Spain and the Kingdom of Italy. But today, the island is experiencing drama of a different nature. In the last twenty years, we can count twenty thousand deaths in the Mediterranean, of which Lampedusa was one of the principal cemeteries due to its southern location between the Tunisian Cap Bon and Sicily, which makes it particularly accessible. Its inhabitants are divided between rescuing the shipwrecked in the name of the Law of the Sea – which places them in a position of infraction with Italian legislation sanctioning the assistance of an illegal stay – and the necessity of welcoming tourists from the North who today bring in more revenue than fishing. This dilemma was recently illustrated by Emmanuele Crialese’s film, “Terra ferma”. Among the most extreme cases, let us recall the case of the victims of the Senegalese shipwreck in the middle of the Mediterranean, who, grasping onto the wire fish netting, were saved by Tunisian fishermen condemned in 2008 for facilitation of unauthorized residence in Italy. The Island of Lampedusa, after having been a point of arrival for asylum seekers and undocumented aliens until the mid-2000s, was thereafter less often used for such purposes, as the new arrivals were directly convoyed onto Italian soil. It was at the time of the Arab revolutions in 2011 that Lampedusa once again became the target of people smugglers and makeshift boats, the Arab Spring having witnessed the surge of tens of thousands of Tunisians and Libyans. The summer season – peak period of transit – also explains the remarkable affluence, since other small boats arrived off the coast of Malta and Lampedusa after the catastrophe. At that time, the occupants came from the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Somalia) and from Syria. They had sometimes traveled for several months, had been imprisoned, and then had paid smugglers in order to arrive at what they considered to be the European Eldorado, in the hopes of finding asylum and of entering the job market. Children accompanied them. Nevertheless, this is not an isolated case, as they are many other Lampedusas, and there will be new ones, if reinforced border control continues to be the only European response to the Mediterranean migrations. Otherwise, Brussels considers Frontex, which patrols the region, to be financially ill equipped (87 million euros). The right to asylum is not adapted to the situation of these mixed flows whose treatment appears to be too slow, as for example we saw with the Leonarda affair in France, which arose after four years of proceedings. In this humanly delicate context, the UN summit in New York presented a discourse favorable to mobility, a source of human development. It also recommended securing the migrants’ route in respect of Human Rights. Likewise, it advised adapting the qualified and unqualified workforce to the job markets in need. Finally, it underlined the demographic disequilibrium that exists between the North and the South. Consequently, we might be surprised that the ultimate response was as safe and short term.
United by the Community since 2004, polls bear witness to the fact that European immigration policy is defined by those European States plagued by the rise of concerns for safety. It is in this way that the sharing of the burden between European countries in matters of reception of immigrants which resulted in the Dublin II Accords on asylum – often results in the absence of solidarity between northern European and southern Europe, as the majority of illegal arrivals come via the South. Let us briefly note that most undocumented immigrants did not enter Europe in this manner: they arrived under legal circumstances and then prolonged their stay. Finally, European policy invites countries situated on the exterior borders of Europe, notably on the southern coast of the Mediterranean, the task of policing their boarders and filtering illegal immigrants. However, this duty appears to be less diligently taken on by current-day Tunisia and Libya than in the days of Ben Ali and Gaddafi. How can we then reconcile the international discourse on migration – as shown by expert reports, international organizations, law texts – and European responses? For the States of the Union who content themselves with a safe approach and a militarization of controls, this shift testifies to the incapacity to accept a position in the medium and long term.
Theoretical framework
1. A multilateral governance of migration. Migration is talked about at neither G8, nor at G20 because the question is “bothersome,” so it is said. It is true that no world conference has been held concerning international migration, as was the case in Cairo (on population), then in Beijing (on women), and in Durban (the fight against discrimination). However, the theme has been pulled from the Accords of Barcelona on the Mediterranean euro (1995-2005) and from the Union for the Mediterranean. Yet, an international discourse on migration indeed exists. It is seeking to reconcile three objectives:
1) securing the board 2) respecting Human Rights 3) improving the flow of the workforce necessary to the labor market. But the world’s interdependence is barely taken into account in these analyses, as factors external to migration (regional crises management, raw materials pricing or the definition of development policy can exert an impact on the entry into mobility of populations). Finally, the current crisis of regional governance of migration is underscored by the prudence of European policy in response to the tragic event in Lampedusa. In lieu of promoting circulation to combat the traffic economy, reinforcement of controls remains the only response. It is clear that Europeanization of migration politics struggles to affirm itself in a context of the rise neo-sovereigntism and the security imperative. The governance demonstrated is thus in contradiction with the definition of the global objectives assured in New York.
2. The reassurance of the sovereignty principal. In its globalized dimension, the question of migration puts the United Nations to the test of confirming their sovereignty, as the physical borders of the planet do not correspond to the political borders of States. The absence of world governance of migration and the absence of a definition of the right to mobility as a Human Right, underline the preeminence of the Nation State in the management of migration flows. In reality, governments refuse mobility as a figure of globalization, because they esteem that they are the greatest losers of an international order that ever continues to elude them. Let us note, nonetheless, that for the last thirty years, neither dissuasion policy nor return policy, nor even the perspective of better development, has been able to show any efficiency whatsoever in controlling borders.
Analysis
If counted, the total number of spaces of free migration in the world comes to 25, but few among this number function in a satisfactory manner due to political conflicts that oppose member states. Nevertheless, in an interdependent world, international migration appears to be the less fluid factor of globalization. It is a structural phenomenon, paradoxically linked to the development of the more urbanized countries of the global South, where the more educated population aspires to a wellness which it achieves thanks especially to migration. Departure countries encourage this mobility, in order to export social protests – half of the population under the age of 25 – due to funds transfers (400 billion dollars in 2012 were sent by migrants to their home countries). All research has shown that levels of emigration tend to rise along with economic levels of departure countries, as the aspirations of the population also increase and because migration flows count higher qualification levels than those of natives. In short, emigration also shows that the more borders are open, the more people circulate and less they settle down. This is exactly what was observed in Eastern Europe since the fall of the Iron Curtain. In the southern Mediterranean, the opening of migration to an increased number of categories of migrants (work contracts for unqualified workers, tourists, students, transnational entrepreneurs) would permit development for both sides, as many of these actors are blocked by difficulties linked to visas. From now on, it is clear than impenetrable borders cannot stop the migratory flow, it will merely enrich smugglers.
References
Wihtol de Wenden Catherine, Le Droit d’émigrer, Paris, CNRS Editions 2013.
Wihtol de Wenden Catherin, Pour accompagner les migrations en méditerranée, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2013.
