Dec 22, 2012 | Development, environment, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Weiting Chao
Passage au crible n°80
Source: Wikimedia
The 18th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change COP 18) and the 8th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP8) took place in Doha (Qatar) from 26th November to the 8th of December 2012. The outcome of the two-week negotiations, agreed by nearly 200 nations, extends to 2020 the Kyoto Protocol.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Signed in 1997, The Kyoto Protocol is the only global agreement which sets binding obligations on industrialized countries. It is based on the UNFCCC, signed by 153 countries in 1992, which set the goal of reducing GHG emissions (greenhouse gas emissions).
The protocol divides the countries into two groups, Annex I and Non-Annex I countries, with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and the principle of equity. In 2001, the United States pulled out of the Protocol, saying that it would damage the US economy. This decision has proved detrimental to the success of the international efforts. Therefore, the EU (European Union) has played a leading role in maintaining the ongoing negotiations.
The Protocol came into effect on 16th of February 2005, following its ratification by Russia. Since the agreement was set to expire at the end of 2012, negotiations about the post-Kyoto period have been underway since 2005. During the Bali Conference (COP13, 2007), the participating nations agreed to the Bali Road Map which set out a two-year process to finalize a binding agreement for 2009 in Copenhagen. However, there was no significant progress and only a diluted version of the agreement was achieved. Indeed, as the Copenhagen Accord was not legally binding, it did not commit countries to agree to a new binding text. In 2011, Russia, Japan and Canada confirmed they would not participate in a second round of emission reductions under the new Kyoto Protocol. Further, the United States reaffirmed their commitment to stay out of the treaty. In 2011, at the Durban Climate Change Conference, a subsidiary body was established: it was an ad hoc Working Group, part of the Durban Platform for enhanced action set up to drive the development of another document. The adoption of a universal agreement on this issue was postponed to 2015, with expected implementation in 2020. In 2011, at the Durban Conference on Climate Change in Doha, however, negotiations led to a simple extension of the Kyoto Protocol until 2020.
Theoretical framework
1. Procrastination as a negotiation technique. Postponing the signing of a settlement ad libitum, while extending talks, is a well-known diplomatic strategy. The parties can hold up negotiations if they do not want any agreements to be reached.
2. The persistence of the North-South divide. After two decades of negotiations the difficulties between developed and developing countries have worsened considerably because of climate change, making the signing of any new treaty more difficult to achieve.
Analysis
The Doha agreement is designed to be a tool to resolve the problem of global warming governance. But in reality it only helps to keep the protocol and ensure that negotiations continue to take place. The second period of the Protocol commits the EU, Australia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine, and Monaco to another 8 years (1 January 2013 to 31 December 2020). But these countries account for only 15% of global GHG emissions. In addition, they have disparate commitments ranging from a 20% reduction on emissions levels from 1990 for the EU to a decrease of only 0.5% compared to 2000 levels for Australia. Finally, this arrangement does not commit the United States, Canada, Japan, Russia, New Zealand and other emerging countries. However, at the very least, the agreement buys participants more time to implement policies against global warming. In other words, developing countries and countries outside the Kyoto Protocol can still enjoy a secure benefit until 2020. The failure of the first sequence of Kyoto and the withdrawal of United States emphasizes the considerable number of “free riders” who wish to evade the constraints of collective action (Olson). However, when a key player retires, it can be detrimental not only to the other participants but also to the success of the whole arrangement. A second problem is also caused if all stakeholders reject the implementation of the Treaty this would lead to an outright cancellation of the whole agreement. Parties tend to oscillate between these two scenarios because they believe that non-completion is ultimately the strategy that best suits their individual needs. Recent negotiations have been postponed to the post-Kyoto period, as participants remain uncertain about the costs and benefits of such an agreement. Accurate forecasting can be difficult: it can lead to, for example, an underestimation of the future costs. Moreover, parties tend to delay and wait to see how others engage with the agreement. All these factors lead to a state of procrastination. Even though numerous scientific studies have recently shown how the climate might deteriorate more quickly than expected, this policy of procrastination could lead to a major ecological disaster. In other words, the harmful policies of stowaways are already at work.
The conflict between developing countries and industrialized countries forms a central element of environmental governance. Therefore, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities was recognized in 1992. This principle allows developing countries to increase their emissions to ensure their economic development. However, since some of them have emerged as BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China), the traditional North-South divide has intensified. It is also particularly complicated because China has now become the biggest CO2 emitter in the world, surpassing the emissions of the United States in 2006. During the post-Kyoto negotiations, many developed countries in the UNFCCC – including the United States and Australia – have therefore advocated the replacement of the Kyoto Protocol by a new text, which also includes the commitment of many of the countries of Annex I and developing countries. But for now, developing countries still refuse to accept any obstacle to their development. They demand that developed countries take the lead in a substantial reduction of GHG emissions.
We can see that there is little progress in the fight against global warming. The extension of the Kyoto Protocol only allows the negotiations to continue. To reach a real agreement and prevent an ecological disaster, states should abandon their strategy of procrastination, such as bringing NGOs into discussions. The EU, the U.S. and the BASIC need to play a role in the adoption of a new protocol. If the EU implements emission reductions, the United States and other emerging countries such as China cannot escape the “prisoner’s dilemma” of climate change.
References
Akerlof, George. A, « Procrastination and Obedience », American Economic Review, 81 (2), 1991, 1-19.
Churchman, David, Negotiation: Process, Tactics, Theory, (2nd Ed.), Boston, University Press of America, 1997.
Kontinen Tiina, Irmeli Mustalahti, « Reframing Sustainability? Climate Change and North-South Dynamics », Forum for Development Studies, 39 (1), mars 2012, 1-4.
Olson Mancur, Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1965.
Timmons Roberts J., Parks Bradley, A Climate Of Injustice: Global Inequality, North-South Politics, and Climate Policy, The MIT Press, 2006.Site de COP18: http://www.cop18.qa [15 décembre 2012].
Uzenat Simon, « Un multilatéralisme sans contraintes. Les engagements des États dans le cadre de Copenhague », Passage au crible, (15), 18 fév. 2010.
Dec 22, 2012 | Articles, Fil d'Ariane, Publications (English)
Par Daniel Drache
Abstract
Canada has been both blessed and cursed by its vast resource wealth. Immense resource riches sends the wrong message to the political class that thinking and planning for tomorrow is unnecessary when record high global prices drive economic development at a frenetic pace. Short-termism, the loss of manufacturing competitiveness (‘the dutch disease’) and long term rent seeking behaviour from the corporate sector become, by default, the low policy standard. The paper contends that Canada is not a simple offshoot of Anglo-American, hyper- commercial capitalism but is subject to the recurring dynamics of social Canada and for this reason the Northern market model of capitalism needs its own theoretical articulation. Its distinguishing characteristic is that there is a large and growing role for mixed goods and non-negotiable goods in comparison to the United States even when the proactive role of the Canadian state had its wings clipped to a degree that stunned many observers. The paper also examines the uncoupling of Canadian and American economies driven in part by the global resource boom. The downside of the new staples export strategy is that hundreds of thousands of jobs have disappeared from Ontario and Quebec. Ontario, once the rich have province of Confederation, is now a poor cousin eligible for equalization payments. Unlike earlier waves of deindustrialization, there is little prospect for recovering many of these better paying positions. Without a focused government strategy, the future for Canada’s factory economy is grim. The final section addresses the dynamics of growing income polarization and its lessons for the future. With a global slowdown or worse on the horizon Canada’s unique combination of mixed goods and orthodox market-based policies is likely to be unsustainable in its current form. For countries with a similar endowment the Northern model is unexportable.
Télécharger l’article Canada’s Resource Curse: Too Much of a Good Thing
Dec 9, 2012 | European Union, Passage au crible (English), Peace, UN
By Josepha Laroche
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°79
Source: Wikipedia
On 29 November 2012, Palestine became a non-State member of the UN, thus benefiting from the same status as the Vatican. 138 states voted in favor of its candidacy, allowing it to move from the status of “entity” to that of “Non-member State” and thus finalize the formal request by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas from the rostrum of the United Nations on September 24, 2011.
41 States chose to abstain, while 9 countries voted against. These include the United States, Israel, the Czech Republic, Canada and five micro-States: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, the Republics of Nauru, Palau and Panama.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Symbolically, this vote took place sixty-five years to the day after the adoption of the partition plan of Palestine. Indeed, on 29 November 1947, the UN voted for this text establishing a “Jewish state” and an “Arab State” and conferring international status to Jerusalem. The British mandate, which had begun in 1920, thus ended in 1948. But that year is also marked by the creation of the State of Israel (May 14) and the outbreak of the first Arab-Israeli conflict. After the Six-Day War (5-10 June 1967) – which brought head to head Israel and Egypt, Jordan and Syria -, Israel conquered the West Bank and Gaza. The Jewish state also took the Old City of Jerusalem which then became its capital, but many states did not recognize this latest initiative. The UN then passed, on 22 November 1967, the famous resolution 242. Reaffirming “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by war and the necessity to work for a just and lasting peace enabling every State in the area to live in security”, this Resolution certainly realized a clever compromise between differing claims, but its inherent ambiguities would not facilitate the elaboration of a future settlement. In October 1973 (6-24 October), Israel won the Yom Kippur War, also called the October War or the Arab-Israeli War that had brought it in confrontation with a coalition led by Egypt and Syria. More generally, one of the consequences of this conflict was the oil crisis of 1973, when in retaliation to Israel’s allies, the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) decided to increase by 70% the price of the oil barrel, while reducing its production. In 1974, the PLO (Organization for the Liberation of Palestine) was admitted to the UN with observer status. Then, a few years later, the Palestinian National Council – the legislative body of the PLO – proclaimed in Algiers the independence of a State of Palestine on 15 November 1988, following the liberation of the West Bank area (which was occupied by Jordan since 1948). But this statement was not accompanied by any de facto independence although the United Nations considers as legitimate “Palestinian territories” the two areas located on either side of the State of Israel: the Gaza Strip in the West and the West Bank in the East. It was not until 13 September 1993, though, that Israel and the PLO recognized each other and signed the Oslo Interim Agreements. These aim to expand Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza and to provide for a democratically elected Council that is to supersede the Israeli military and civilian authorities. These agreements also indicate that Israel will continue to control the external security and the protection of Israelis. However, their implementation has kept on proving difficult. The creation of a Palestinian state, under the Oslo Agreements, should have seen light in 1998 according to modalities jointly elaborated by the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority but this did not happen. In addition, Israel went on building settlements, despite the disapproval of the European Union and of the United States. On 25 March 1999, the European Union spoke in favor of the Palestinians’ right to self-determination and statehood. On 9 January 2005, Mahmoud Abbas was elected president of the Palestinian Authority. On 12 September, all Israeli settlements in Gaza were dismantled and the last Israeli soldiers withdrew. Control of the entire territory of Gaza then returned to the police forces of the Palestinian Authority, while the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, underlined he intended to bring forward the project of a Palestinian state. But on 12 and 14 June 2007, Hamas drove the PLO away from Gaza, challenging Abbas’ presidential power and more generally opposing the Fatah forces. In other words, against Israel, representatives of the Palestinian people appear completely divided: to Hamas, the Gaza Strip; and to the Palestinian Authority, the West Bank.
Theoretical framework
1. The absence of a European diplomacy. The EU Member-States have spoken in a disorderly manner on this crucial issue. In so doing, being so divided, they have demonstrated the absence of any European diplomacy as to an issue that is yet a major one for world peace.
2. The deadly spiral of coercive diplomacy. On the occasion of this issue, Israeli diplomacy has refused to incorporate the Palestinians’ wish for recognition. Exclusively defined in terms of strategy, such diplomacy neglects however, the symbolic dynamics this new status can launch.
Analysis
If the Nobel Peace Prize awarded on December 10, 2012 to the European Union underlines well the ‘performative authority’ of the Nobel diplomacy, it however cruelly highlights the inconsistency of European diplomacy. In fact, for the European Union to finally become a global player, the path seems still long and difficult. On the occasion of this historic vote, did one not notice abstentions by the following EU Member-States: Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom? Even though the Czech Republic decided to align onto the Israeli positions, France, Spain, Italy, Sweden and ten other European countries chose, for their part, to side with the Palestinians.
Faced with such scattered support towards Palestine on the one hand, and the unwavering support of the United States on the other hand, Israel could all the more easily carry out severe reprisals against Palestine as soon as the vote was adopted. The Jewish state in effect disclosed immediately a new construction project of colonies (3,000 new homes) in an area hitherto free of all occupation. This project thus undermined the very viability of the Palestinian state. In addition, the Israeli government – which is preparing new elections – decided to confiscate the income from taxes levied on goods imported in Palestine, taxes which Israel had until then collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority and had always transferred back to the P.A. In fact, this decision comes down to economically asphyxiate an already very vulnerable territory. This economic and financial warfare reflects a diplomatic escalation mainly based on pure force, in brief on hard power. However, it is not certain that eventually this approach proves rationally relevant for Israel.
To be sure, this new status of Palestine in the United Nations will from now on enable Palestine, if necessary, to file a complaint against Israel to the ICC (International Criminal Court). Therefore, the Palestinians will be able to argue that an occupation must be seen as a “war crime”. Finally, they will also have the opportunity to seek full membership in the UN specialized agencies (WHO, FAO, etc.). But this is perhaps not the most important point. The most important point lies primarily in the symbolic potential released by this new status, which opens up and multiplies perspectives of reconfiguration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a way where the Israeli hard power will soon show its limits.
References
Finkelstein Norman G., Tuer l’espoir : Introduction au conflit israélo-palestinien, Paris, Aden éditions, 2003.
Laroche Josepha, La Brutalisation du monde, du retrait des États à la décivilisation, Montréal, liber, 2012.
Lindemann Thomas, Sauver la face, sauver la paix, sociologie constructiviste des crises internationales, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2010. Coll. Chaos International.
Quigley John, The Statehood of Palestine: International Law in the Middle East Conflict, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010,
Schelling Thomas, Arms and Influence, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966.
Schelling Thomas, La Stratégie du Conflit, Paris, PUF, 1986.
Nov 9, 2012 | environment, Global Public Health, Passage au crible (English)
By Clément Paule
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°78
Source : Wikipedia
Published on September 19, 2012, the study led by Gilles-Eric Séralini – professor of molecular biology at the Caen University, France – revived the debate on GMOs (Genetically Modified Organisms) and their use in the food industry. The findings of this research, to be sure, point to the toxicity of two chemicals produced by the Monsanto firm: the pesticide Roundup and the GM corn NK 603. These results, however, have been questioned by a large portion of the scientific community, which pointed out the statistical and methodological weaknesses of the demonstration. Some commentators have even mentioned the potential conflicts of interest of a survey funded by an association known for its militant positions. In addition, several French organizations – such as the HCB (Haut Conseil des Biotechnologies) and HANDLE (National Agency for Food Safety, Environment and Labor) – as well as some international organizations – such as EFSA (European Food Security Authority) or the German and Australian health agencies – have successively invalidated the investigations by Prof. Séralini and his team. Let us note that this controversy quickly involved many political actors – including four former Environment Ministers – and many actors from associations, across national borders. The need to assess, over the long term, the impact of transgenic plants was therefore reiterated in policymakers’ agendas, opening up the prospect of more stringent regulations at the European level.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The first genetic manipulation took place in the early 70s, leading a decade later to pioneering GMO crops. These technical advances have stimulated large private investments in biotechnology. Mainly used by pharmaceutical companies, applications of transgenesis quickly spread to agriculture under the aegis of transnational companies such as Monsanto and Bayer. In this regard, special notice ought to be paid to the introduction on the market in 1994 of the Flavr Savr tomato, the first genetically modified food to obtain the approval of the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) in the United States. More generally, the agrochemical industry born out of the Green Revolution, until then specialized in inputs – pesticides and herbicides – has now been redeployed in the production of transgenic seeds widely used throughout the American continent. According to the ISAAA (International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications) – lobbying organizations in favour of plant biotechnology -, 160 million hectares are said to be concerned today by these techniques – against 1.7 million in 1996 – a total area in increase by 8 % in 2011 alone. If these figures seem overestimated according to Greenpeace, one must nevertheless note that the share of GM corn grown in the United States, estimated at 30 % in 1998, reached 85 % in 2009.
In this logic, this model of agriculture has spread in so-called emerging countries as shown by the emblematic example of soybeans in Brazil and Argentina. The exponential growth of agricultural and food biotechnology has benefited in this respect from a lack of real control until the early 90s. However, the occurrence of repeated health crises in Western states – such as BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) – has caused the rise of citizen mobilization of transnational magnitude – from consumer associations to NGOs (Non governmental Organisations) – as well as the strengthening of legislation implemented by specialized agencies. GMOs then appeared as a public problem in several European countries. Evidence of this is the de facto moratorium on the commercialization of genetically modified products, adopted by the European Union (EU) on behalf of the precautionary principle from June 1999 to May 2004. Let us finally mention, on the international scale, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety – relative to the Convention on Biological Diversity of 1992 – entered into force in 2003, which counts 164 signatories (but neither the United States nor Canada).
Theoretical framework
1. Internationalisation of a socio-technical controversy. Marked by considerable uncertainty, questioning about GMOs in the food industry seems to embody these difficult-to-govern situations where politics tends to be lagging behind. Therefore, the expertise plays a determining role in regulating a sector with global implications.
2. Construction of an alarm-launching vehicle. In this sense, studies involving transgenic products make up as many tactical moves whose effects can be measured especially in their multiple social usages, largely beyond the sole scientific field.
Analysis
The controversy about plant biotechnology is thus characterized above all by its complexity as it involves many actors located at different levels. Production and dissemination of GMOs are controlled and supported by the oligopolistic group of agrochemicals firms, essentially in the USA – Monsanto, DuPont, Dow AgroSciences LLC – and in Europe – Bayer Cropscience, BASF or Syngenta. Clearly, the economic dimension is fundamental here both in the commercial war being waged by the U.S. and the EU in the WTO (World Trade Organization) and in the domination over the DP (Developing Countries) which import these farming techniques. But this economic dimension cannot be separated from the health and environmental issues, defended by militant networks and by some governments. In this case, the intricacy of these different issues allows us to deconstruct the legitimacy strategies resorted to by industry managers. Let us quote the humanitarian argument presenting GM foods – including the initiative of Golden Rice – as a pragmatic solution to chronic malnutrition ravaging the South. Even though the producers of seeds have sought in parallel to protect their patents by relying on Agreements on Intellectual Property Related to Commerce and through the development of the Terminator gene, a method not commercialised for the time being.
Overall, these multiple arenas of conflict reveal the dynamics of transnationalization of a controversy that presents itself differently from one state to the next. If GM foods constitute a public problem in many European countries – including France, Greece or Austria – they are considered in substance equivalent to other products by the FDA. In this sense, the principle of precaution makes full sense within the EU, justifying restrictive regulations in terms of traceability and labelling. Conversely, these requirements do not exist in the United States as shown by Proposal 37 in California. In the absence of a consensus as to the long-term safety of these products, politicians often fall back on strategies of blame avoidance characterized by the transfer of responsibilities onto experts. As the debate grows on GM foods, symbolic actions – like those by the volunteer reapers in France – also tend to give way to a technicalisation of the controversy.
In this respect it is important to circumvent the impact of scientific studies: released in 1999, Prof. Losey’s research on the toxicity of a Bt-type corn for the monarch butterfly was used to justify the European moratorium on the extension of cultivation and marketing of GMOs. With regard to the research lead by Prof. Séralini, let us note that this is a real communication campaign. Indeed, the results were sent to a part of the French press two weeks before their official release, with a confidentiality clause. The media coverage then proved all the more sensationalist since journalists were unable to refer to other scientific opinion. Then, two books and a documentary accompanied the publication of the article by Prof. Séralini, dedicating his position as alarm-signal and ensuring the success of the mobilization despite the almost unanimous disapproval of his peers. As such, the very concept of ‘assessment’ appears here redefined, to the extent that we are witnessing a militant reconfiguration of its limits and of its role. Beyond recurrent stigmatisations affecting potential conflicts of interest, this activity primarily located between power and knowledge helps to redefine politically issues neglected by the authorities.
References
« OGM : comment ils conquièrent le monde », Alternatives internationales (43), juin 2009.
Bérard Yann, Crespin Renaud (Éds.), Aux Frontières de l’expertise. Dialogues entre savoirs et pouvoirs, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2010. Coll. « Res Publica ».
Kempf Hervé, La Guerre secrète des OGM, Paris, Seuil, 2003.
Oct 28, 2012 | European Union, Nobel Peace Prize, Non-state diplomacy, Passage au crible (English)
By Josepha Laroche
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°77
Source: Wikipedia
On Friday 12 October 2012, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the European Union. The Chairman of the Nobel Committee, Thorbjorn Jagland, stated in his proclamation speech that “The EU and its ancestors have contributed for more than six decades to the promotion of peace, reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe”.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In his will of 27 November 1895, Alfred Nobel, the Swedish chemist, industrialist and philanthropist, laid the foundation of an international system of rewards that was to be resolutely pacifist and cosmopolitan. His will comprised the creation of five annual prizes 1- all of which must equally contribute to pacifying the world stage – Physics, Chemistry, Physiology-Medicine and Literature – as well as a Peace Prize whose attribution he required be entrusted to the Norwegian Parliament (the Storting). At the time, this will aroused a deep disapproval in Sweden because Norway was then placed under the authority of Stockholm. But the activity which the Storting had already deployed in favour of peace appeared to the inventor of dynamite more important than the conflict within the Union between Norway and Sweden. A liberal and a democrat, Nobel thus expressly designated this Chamber to manage the awarding of this prize, believing that it was the best qualified and most legitimate institution. Since 1901 and the awarding of the first prizes, it is therefore a committee emanating from the Norwegian parliament in Oslo that rewards an individual or an organization which has worked particularly in favour of peace. Paradoxically, it is in Norway, one of the most Euro sceptic countries today that this prize was awarded to Europe.
As regards the prize for peace, the Swedish philanthropist did not indicate specific selection criteria. He simply outlined three main directions: “One must have worked for fraternity among nations, for the abolition or the reduction of armed forces and for the holding and the promotion of peace conferences”, he wrote. However, we can distinguish four ideal-types of recipients who participated in the development and implementation of a Nobel diplomacy. 1) Pacifist and humanitarian activism. 2) Peace through law. 3) Missionary Volunteering. 4) Expertise at the service of peace. However, obviously, the Nobel Prize awarded to the European Union does not enter into any of these categories. Yet, these have structured, for over a century, the policy of awarding the Nobel Peace Prize. How then is one to analyze this nobelisation?
Theoretical framework
1. Performative authority. We owe the concept of performative utterance to the linguist Austin. Unlike a descriptive statement such as “it is raining”, a performative utterance generates practical effects as it holds in itself the possibility to alter reality due to the institutional status of one who produces it and as a consequence due to the authority it has.
2. A window of political opportunity. This term, coined originally by John Kingdon, refers by analogy to the idea of a “window of opportunity”, a very special situation. Indeed, a situation that appears – at some point – conducive to the attainment of a political action. It represents the relevant sequence which allows taking measures that would have no chance to exist otherwise.
Analysis
This policy of allocation of the Nobel prizes has sought for over a century to contain the brutalization of the world. In doing so, it is at the origin of a coherent diplomacy by which the Nobel system intervenes globally on the world stage to impose the irreducibility of values such as freedom or democracy. Let us recall that the Nobel system is a comprehensive one that has developed over time, a non-state diplomacy which has created supports, protects and enshrines certain political processes in order to uphold its priorities and agenda on the world stage. In this case, we are dealing with an innovative diplomacy that designs norms and gives itself the means to deal with international issues considered as priorities. There also appears as an interventionist diplomacy which interferes when applicable into the internal affairs of States or into inter-state relations, regional and international disputes. Finally, an unusual diplomacy is affirming itself, powerful enough to now be able to exercise a performative authority. Therefore, why wondering that it seeks to get involved in the issues of the century by nobelising the European Union?
Because this diplomacy seeks to state the forms of the future peace, it irrupts more and more frequently into High Politics, thus determining a new mode of enunciation politics. The institution and its awardees consider themselves, in this respect, as the strongest defenders of human rights against the Raison d’Etat. By coming across as a universal power of criticism, they intervene more and more often in the international arena, whether addressing societal issues or managing more directly political issues. In doing so, they do not hesitate to interfere in the internal affairs of States or to engage in international regulations. They then deploy their actions in all directions to promote a policy which they label in the name of knowledge or common property of which they proclaim themselves the guardians.
With this award, a new doctrinal line appears that confirms the grandiose ambition which had already been sketched in 2009, when awarding the Nobel for Peace to President Barack Obama. Nobel diplomacy is indeed now powerful enough at the symbolic level to be able to exercise performative authority. In this case, the question is not whether the European institution deserves or does not deserve the prize since we are no longer there in the register of moral and good sentiments, but clearly in that of politics.
Admittedly, by nobelising the EU, the Committee has rewarded an already-achieved trajectory of peace. Similarly, it wanted to encourage and support the Union by giving it a significant trump card in the face of current difficulties and criticism. The jury thus underlined that the prize was purposefully awarded to a Europe in crisis and “experiencing severe economic hardship and social unrest”. With the Nobel and all the decorum associated with it, the Committee chose to distinguish Europe among other potential recipients in order to confer greater legitimacy worldwide. Therefore, the European Union is now the custodian of Nobel aura and values. The EU bears a project of universality that transcends it and embodies the Nobel diplomacy instead of simply being the architect of the European construction. At a time when it is so criticized and weakened, this is a political bias in its favour that is clear and simple. In this regard, this choice corresponds very closely to the designs of the great European who Alfred Nobel was, because it is a symbolic and political investment that adds credentials to the integration process. Naturally, this also constitutes a risk since the Nobel system commits all of its credit, both symbolic and institutional. In the near future, this symbolic coup could for example make it easier for the EU to claim a seat on the Security Council of the UN. Also, this nobelisation gives the EU additional authority to restore social peace in the Member States tempted by a lesser communitarism and by populist discourses, as it implicitly points to public opinions, prone to be forgetful, all that the European construction has brought them. Finally, it gives the Union a valuable symbolic resource at a time when there is talk that the ECB support the mechanisms of stability and of financial solidarity, common budgetary surveillance, and soon the Banking Union, or even a budget designed to relaunch growth for the Euro zone. In short, at a time when Europe is on the verge of becoming an integrated federal entity, the Nobel diplomacy seized a window of political opportunity to order the world by norming Europe. In other words, the prize is far from being a mere reward. It is more clearly a marching order through which the EU is mandated by the Committee to effectively accomplish and carry institutionally everything on which the EU has been engaged up till now. That is why this Nobel can be read in many ways, as a burden, an obligation of result by which the Nobel institution commands the Union to at last realize the European dream: nobelisation oblige !
References
Austin, Quand dire, c’est faire, trad., Paris, Seuil, 1972.
Cobb Roger, Elder Charles, Participation in American Politics. The Dynamics of Agenda Building, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1972.
Kingdon John W., Agenda, alternatives and Public Policies, 2nd ed., New York, Longman, 2003.
Laroche Josepha, La Brutalisation du monde, du retrait des États à la décivilisation, Montréal, Liber, 2012.
Laroche Josepha, Les Prix Nobel, sociologie d’une élite transnationale, Montréal, Liber 2012.
Laroche Josepha,
http://www.chaos-international.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=107%3Aune-injonction-symbolique-le-prix-nobel-de-la-paix-decerne-a-barack-obama&catid=40%3Aliste-des-passages-au-crible&directory=64&lang=f
1. In order to more accurately perpetuate the concerns of A. Nobel, the Bank of Sweden has founded in 1968 – on the occasion of its tercentenary and in the Memory of Nobel – a sixth prize: that for economics. Awarded since 1969, it still however seems singular because it is the only Nobel that crowns a social science. It is even to this day the only internationally determinant distinction in this field of research.
Oct 20, 2012 | Africa, Defense, Passage au crible (English), Security
By Jean-Jacques Roche
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°76
Pixabay
On 15 October 2012, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution 2071 presented at the request of the Malian authorities and with the support of France. Pressing countries in West Africa to develop modalities for military intervention in northern Mali, France is committed by its president to assist “materially and logistically” such an intervention. Three days earlier in Dakar, the French president had ruled out any possibility of negotiation with armed groups “that impose a law, Sharia, cut off hands and destroy monuments hitherto considered part of the heritage of the humanity!”
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
“Africa is the last continent that is still within reach of France, within its scope, the only continent where, with three hundred men, France can still change the course of history.” This quotation by Louis Guiringaud, former Foreign Minister of Valery Giscard d’Estaing (1974-1981), is as often used as the claim that “the time of the ‘France-Africa’ is gone” (François Hollande, Dakar speech of 12 October 2012). As all his predecessors, François Hollande feels compelled to stress, at the beginning of his mandate, his determination to end postcolonial practices. As François Mitterrand, who dismissed late 1982 the Minister for Cooperation initially entrusted with implementing this rupture (Jean-Pierre Cot), François Hollande classically begins his mandate by laying the foundations of a new relationship, but without changing the fundamental objective of ensuring the continuity of the French presence in Africa. As with François Mitterrand, the “will to renew (the) partnership between France and Africa” (Dakar speech of 12 October 2012) is consistent with the assurance that “France would not be quite herself in the eyes of the world if she renounced to be present in Africa “(Mitterrand, XVIII Conference of Heads of State of Africa and France, November 8, 1994). This presence in Africa has certainly changed shape and the times of secret defense agreements are over. However, France still believes it guarantee the security of States within her backyard and there is not a single President of the Fifth Republic who hasn’t been associated with two or three armed interventions in the former territories of the French Union. Note however that François Hollande is quicker than any of his predecessors to authorize an intervention on African soil. Valery Giscard d’Estaing had indeed launched Operation Lamentin in Mauritania in 1977, three years after coming to power. As for François Mitterrand, he had intervened for the first time in Chad, more than two years after his coming into the Elysée (Operation Manta, August 1983). For his part, Jacques Chirac had authorized the operation Aramis in Cameroon in February 1996, nine months after his election. Finally, Nicolas Sarkozy decided to intervene in the battle of N’Djamena in February 2008 (also nine months after his election) as much to support the regime of Idriss Déby as to organize the evacuation of European nationals in the Chadian capital.
Theoretical framework
Although it is today out of the question that French soldiers would participate in this operation, one wonders how support and logistics would be provided? The question remains whether it is possible to design a war that would remain limited for France while its opponents will inevitably fight a total war. In other words, is the Clausewitzian approach of the ‘total war’ out-dated? The questioning of the Clausewitzian war has not appeared in the post-Cold War. To be sure, the debates of the 60s and 70s on the impact of nuclear power took place at a time when the Malenkov doctrine excluded the possibility of a resort to war between the possessors of nuclear weapons. Already at that time, one could ask whether the conceptual risks of “escalation to extremes” did not render obsolete the Clausewitzian framework whereas the only possible war should be pushed back to the periphery of the central strategic system. The massive literature which since 1990 has taken up this theme must thus, in spite of its interest, be addressed while keeping in mind the recurrent nature of this questioning.
In 1991, The Transformation of War, by Martin Van Creveld was published. For the Israeli historian, the Clausewitzian trinity (people, army, government) had ceased to function, but Western armies still wanted to see their opponents in their own image (mirror image) which condemned them to consider these as savages. Going even further in distancing himself from Clausewitzian analysis, John Keegan considered in 1993, in his History of Warfare, that man is not a reasonable political animal since war reveals above all his instincts. In a more socio-economic perspective, Mary Kaldor analyzed in 1999 the new wars (New and Old War, 1999) in terms of a triple rupture. First, their purpose is to ensure political mobilization on the basis of identities. Second, terror and massive violation of human rights replace conventional tactics. Finally, actors are occurring simultaneously at different levels, global and local, public and private, and they interact across the whole world. The success of reprints (in 2005 in the United States and in 2008 in France) of Galula, the French theorist of counter-insurgency fits into this whole questioning of Clausewitzian analyses, counter-insurgency aiming to ensure victory by winning the “the hearts and the minds”, while being measured in the use of force.
Analysis
The current challenge against counter-insurgency – which will inevitably lead to the planned abandonment of the concept of “asymmetric warfare” – is explained by the three pitfalls concealed in the related concept of “limited war”.
First, war is a test of will. The two parties involved in this type of conflict are not stirred by the same desire to win. Paradoxically, the asymmetry of means favors the weakest party that benefits from the asymmetry of wills. Threatened of losing everything, the weakest is engaged in a “total war” whereas the strongest reasons in terms of “limited war”. However, “it is the opponent who makes the law of the other” (Clausewitz), it therefore follows that the strongest – who fears above all the escalation to extremes – will be reluctant to comply with this immutable rule of war that determines a winner and a loser.
This reluctance thus precipitates the second pitfall theorized by Mao: “the certainty of success by strong states pushes them towards escalation to achieve their objectives at the risk of cutting themselves loose of populations or of appearing as incompetent.” Since the weakest dictates his law to the strongest, the latter is inevitably drawn into a war that he is not capable of winning. For regular armies, violence must in effect be governed by jus in bello. In contrast, irregular forces are wasteful of their own soldiers and use their civilian population as a shield. They take it for instance as hostage in order to force the opponent to make mistakes. As they can accept reckless losses, rebel forces condemn their opponents to be on the defensive, which is, at best, a means not to lose, but which provides little assurance of victory. Finally, the war aims of the forces involved are not identical. As Raymond Aron noted, the strongest “has the will to win, and the rebel party not to let himself be eliminated or exterminated […] The rebels simply need not to loose militarily to gain politically”. Therefore, a war of attrition begins, which rarely turns to the advantage of regular armies when, weary of expeditions as distant as costly, public opinion imposes withdrawal without glory or victory.
As the author of On War noted, “one would not introduce a moderating principle in the philosophy of war itself without committing an absurdity.” The authors of “current horrors” (Dakar speech of 12 October 2012) and other rebels, insurgents and terrorists, pirates and anti-socials (names borrowed from the colonial vocabulary) will have at heart to prove either the inhumanity, or the irresolution of their opponents. Between these two evils, we can today choose only the second (the absurdity of Clausewitz), which bodes ill for the commitment in preparation.
References
Keegan John, Histoire de la Guerre : du Néolithique à la Guerre du Golfe, Paris, Dagorno, 1996, 497 p.
Kaldor Mary, New and Old Wars – Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford University Press, 2007, 2° éd., 231 p.
Van Creveld Martin, La Transformation de la Guerre, Editions du Rocher, 1998, 318 p.
Oct 5, 2012 | Defense, North-South, Passage au crible (English), Security
By Josepha Laroche
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°75
Pixabay, Téhéran
From 26 to 31 August 2012, Tehran hosted the 16th summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which comprises today 120 member-countries. At the end of the rally, attended by 35 Heads of State and Government, the Islamic Republic of Iran took over the presidency of the Movement for the next three years.
On this occasion, Tehran undertook an extensive diplomatic and media operation designed to break its isolation on the nuclear issue and to elicit support towards its pro-Syrian policy. At this rally, were present, among others, the Secretary General of the UN Ban Ki-Moon –despite the strong reservations of Washington – the Presidents and Secretaries General of the Arab League, of the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) and of the OAU (Organization of African Union), and Russian President Vladimir Putin (Russia, Invited State) and Latin American presidents Hugo Chavez (Venezuela), Evo Morales (Bolivia), and Rafael Correa (Ecuador) and Michel Temer, the vice-president of Brazil, the latter a State with observer status.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The MNA was launched in September 1961 at the Belgrade Conference. Three Heads of State, Marshal Tito (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Colonel Nasser (United Arab Republic/Egypt) and Nehru (Indian Republic) played a role particularly important in the creation of this organization and in its more doctrinal development. Its doctrine was then based essentially on two pillars: anti-colonialism and opposition to bipolarity. In other words, the non-alignment (NA) was defined exclusively in terms of the East-West conflict and, against the North-South gap. Member-States of the NAM have always asserted themselves – in direct line with the Bandung Conference (1955) – as the representatives and spokespersons of the South against the North.
At that time, they refused from the outset to build a permanent structure which would have the monopoly of the formulation and representation of NA and would thus establish a single and standardized non-alignment policy. Since its foundation, the NAM has taken a pragmatic approach that rejects systems of alliances in general and the two blocks in particular, while exploiting antagonisms between different State actors in the context of an active policy of mediation and oscillation.
This continued until the end of the Cold War. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Eastern bloc, symbolized by the dismantling of COMECON and of the Warsaw Pact as well as by the disappearance of the People’s Democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, the NAM lost most of its raison d’être. Since then, it has undergone a significant decline. Hasn’t the balance of terror, as the founding marker of its identity that had hitherto structured international relations, given way to a more fluid and chaotic global configuration, devoid of any conceptual link with the NA? The movement has thus gone through several years of political apathy and media eclipse. However, the Tehran government now intends to put an end to this situation by working to restore its long-since lost aura.
Theoretical framework
1. By-passing the coercive diplomacy introduced by Westerners. The objective of coercive diplomacy is not to occupy territory, chasing an enemy or inflicting that enemy the greatest possible loss or destruction. Instead, the invocation of a possible coercion aims simply to spur the negotiations and haggling necessary to the more rapid implementation of a peaceful solution. In other words, it is a bargaining power. “To exploit it is diplomacy, vicious diplomacy but diplomacy still” (Thomas Schelling).
2. Raising an anti-Western diplomatic line. In order to defeat the policy of exclusion to which it is subjected, the Iran of the Mullahs intends to federate the NAM Member-States around its siege and fundamentally anti-Western vision.
Analysis
Coercive diplomacy initiated several years ago by the West against the Islamic Republic of Iran is seeking to sanction the undercover development of its nuclear program in blatant violation of the provisions of the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968), of which Iran is a signatory. The persistent refusal by Iran to suspend its sensitive nuclear activities, as well as its refusal to shed light on its nuclear program, has been confirmed by several reports of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). Similarly, the Iranian State subtracted itself repeatedly from proposals to negotiate with the Six (E3 +3: Germany, France, United Kingdom + United States, China, Russia). This systematic blocking has thus not offered any alternative to the Security Council of the United Nations but to increase pressure on Tehran and implement sanctions (Committee on sanctions against Iran established pursuant to UN resolution 1737). For example, a strict embargo device developed by the United States and the European Union has been put in place to increase the pressure on the CBI (Central Bank of Iran) and impose to the Iranian government the giving-up of a program of nuclear weapons.
Faced with this coercion by the UN, Iran has developed a response within the Non-Aligned Movement which consists in having Iran’s positions endorsed by representatives of a very large number of States. Tehran has for example obtained that the final declaration of the NAM endorse its own reading of the nuclear issue that is the subject of such a heavy litigation. In other words – and against the unanimous opinion of all experts – the Islamic Republic has managed to validate the argument that its nuclear program would be of civilian purposes only. In addition, Iran has received recognition by NUM participants of its right to control the full nuclear cycle. However, these pronouncements amount to openly violate the prohibition, ordered to Iran by the West and by the UN, to stop its enrichment program, a ban which Russia and China, have joined themselves.
However, can we consider a real diplomatic success garnered by Iran, a success that could enable Iran to bypass – in the near future and over the long term – the ostracism to which it is being subjected? This is certainly not the case for two reasons. Firstly, its political concern to unify the NAM under its authority is mere posturing and an ephemeral display – as divisions over Syria have clearly shown –, and the Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi has not publicly hesitated to oppose Iran’s positions. Secondly, the NAM has remained permanently weakened ever since the end of the Cold War. Also, the NAM seems today more an empty shell than a spearhead. In fact, it no longer corresponds to the new international scene as the world stage is now covered in countless transnational flows and structured by complex interactions where the inter-state dimension is no longer predominant. Finally, the MNA has become an anachronistic movement and, as such, devoid of credit. Therefore, how could a state without credibility expect any salvation from it?
References
Hassner Pierre, « Violence, rationalité, incertitude: tendances apocalyptiques et iréniques dans l’étude des conflits internationaux », RFSP, 14 (6), déc. 1964, pp. 1019-1049.
Levy Jack, « Prospect Theory, Rational Choice and International Relations », International Studies Quarterly, 41 (1), 1997, pp. 87-112.
Schelling Thomas, Arms and Influence, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966.
Willetts Peter, The Non-aligned Movement: the Origins of a Third World Alliance, Londres/New York, F. Printer, 1978.
Sep 22, 2012 | Articles, Fil d'Ariane, Publications (English)
Par Alexandre Bohas
Published in Global Society review
Abstract
This article deals with the seeming paradox of a lasting American power and a global anti-americanism, which brings into question the relevance of the concept of soft power. Indeed, discontent over the current hegemon does not affect the consumption of its goods and the diffusion of its symbols. The contradiction results from the state-centric perspective of traditional scholars which do not shed light on the diverse aspects of American supremacy. In addition, Nye’s notion of soft power does not stress the shaping of foreign societies by non-state actors and thus their important role in American predominance. As a consequence, the concept of soft power will be revised in order to reduce its ‘shallowness’ and highlight the constraining aspect of today’s prominent power.
Télécharger l’article The Paradox of Anti-americanism: Reflection on the Shallow Concept of Soft Power
Sep 15, 2012 | Culture en, Global Public Goods, Passage au crible (English), UN
By Alexandre Bohas
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°74
Wikipédia
The looting of Muslim shrines perpetrated in Mali in 2012 by religious extremists has raised consternation of global proportions. However, after this unanimity without effect, it is important to examine the specificity of the common goods of a cultural nature that requires a renewed governance.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
On May 4th 2012 the graves of Timbuktu – classified by UNESCO as World Heritage of Humanity –are destroyed by Islamists who consider the cults of Muslim saints contrary to the fundamentalist Islam they claim to ascribe to. These abuses have continued despite these monuments being declared as Heritage in Danger and despite the condemnation of these acts by many countries and international organizations such as UNESCO and the International Criminal Court.
Northern Mali, including the cities of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal, has been occupied for several months by armed gangs, which came into rebellion on January 17th, 2012. The latter consisted of a motley alliance of Islamic movements such as Eddine Ansar, AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), and MUJWA (Movement for Unicity and Jihad in West Africa), as well as some Tuaregs form the NMLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), ousted from the coalition shortly afterwards.
To achieve territorial conquest, the rebels relied on the particularistic claims of indigenous populations and on the revenues of traffics combined with the vacuum of the State in the region and with chaos in Libya. They were then able to make quick advance through the dislocation and mutinies within government forces in Bamako.
Theoretical framework
1. The peculiarity of certain common goods. Unlike global public goods, cultural goods may be subject to rivalries and are characterized by their non-exclusivity. With the process of globalization, they cover more and more areas including culture where they are doubly threatened. They undergo behaviors of “free-riders” (Mancur Olson) and sub-optimal logics of self-interest (Garrett Hardin). As evidence of cultural diversity and as expression of a universal community in the making, they symbolize a vision of the world which many economic, social and religious actors do not share and even oppose.
2. Inadequacy of institutions in post-Westphalian times. International organizations are obsolete in “post-Westphalian” times (Richard Falk). The process of globalization that currently undermines the state system established by the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), leads to a compression of space-time (David Harvey), an ever higher interconnection (David Held), a dissemination of authority (Susan Strange) along with a plurality of spheres and global actors (Philip Cerny). The preponderance of non-state and identity violence as well as the emergence of territories beyond any political structure, reflect the interstate inability to resolve global issues. In other words, it cancels all proceedings based on sovereign States.
Analysis
Presupposing the existence of a proto-community of planetary order, International Relations theorists have formally considered the legal and institutional mechanisms with a view to global governance (David Held). In this regard, common goods of a cultural nature refer to the substantive definition of the latter. Also, the Convention for the Protection of the World Heritage, adopted on November 16th 1972 under the auspices of UNESCO, recognizes “the outstanding interest which requires the preservation of [some goods] as part of the World Heritage of all mankind [and] the importance which represents, for all the peoples of the world, the safeguarding of these unique and irreplaceable goods, whatever people they belong to 1 “. In March 2012, 189 States had ratified 774 artifacts classified in this list. The Ad Hoc Committee stated in its Global Strategy that it wants a classification that better reflects “the diversity of cultural treasures […] of our world […] recognize and protect sites that are exceptional evidence of interactions [. ..] among human beings, of cultural coexistence, spirituality and creative expression 2”. Thus, this patrimonial policy induces a recognition of universal values and of common goods on a human scale. However, integrating transformations are accompanied by a fragmentation that causes the return of Manichean logic and identity and religious tensions. Destructive madness manifested in Timbuktu, “the city of 333 saints”, provides an illustration.
Responsible for “ensuring the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural heritage”, states play a central role in dealing with fully global issues 3. This state-centered vision is based on the realistic hypothesis that they remain capable and legitimate to resolve these issues. However, nowadays, this theoretical framework is exceeded as the non-state dimension of international relations is clear. In this case, the Malian failed state is emblematic of territories where a myriad of uncontrollable networks of all kinds, economic, criminal and religious, remain entangled in the trading of licit and illicit goods, smuggling, and illegal migration.
We witness the relative failure of state intervention. Indeed, UNESCO alerts as to the degradation of certain monuments multiply while mobilizations against the imminent destruction of sites remain without avail. Besides the case of Mali, remember the Bamiyan Buddhas destroyed by the Taliban in Afghanistan in March 2001. In the future, these problems can only worsen due to inadequate governing and the exacerbation of identities caused by globalization. Finally, there is a vibrant lack of instruments of a cosmopolitan governance to achieve a consensual classification of this common heritage, its global ownership and its promotion. Its definition and its preservation, which cannot be left to market mechanisms nor to intergovernmental organizations, are a challenge today as the symbolic effect and the impact on knowledge of this recognition face anti-universalist conceptions relayed by archaic institutions.
References
Chirac Jacques, Diouf Abdou, « Urgence à Tombouctou. Il faut sauver la paix au Sahel », Le Monde, 16 juillet 2012.
« Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine – Les crises malienne et soudanaise préoccupent», All Africa, 18 juillet 2012.
Cerny Philip, Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010.
Falk Richard, « Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia », The Journal of Ethics, 6 (4), Dec. 2002, pp. 311-352.
Grégoire Emmanuel, Bourgeot André, « Désordre, pouvoirs et recompositions territoriales au Sahara», Hérodote, (142), mars 2011, pp. 3-11.
Hardin Garrett, « The Tragedy of the Commons », Science, 162 (3859), Dec. 1968, pp. 1243-1248.
« La folie destructrice d’Ansar Dine », Al-Ahram Hebdo ,19 juillet 2012.
Harvey David, The Condition of Postmodernity : An Enquiry into the Origins of Culture Change, Cambridge, Blackwell, 1990.
Held David, « Restructuring Global Governance: Cosmopolitanism, Democracy and the Global Order », Millenium, 37 (3), April 2009, pp. 535-547.
Olson Mancur, La Logique de l’action collective, [1965], trad., Paris, PUF, 2001.
Rémy Jean-Philippe, « Mali : La Route de Tombouctou passe par Bamako », Le Monde, 17 juillet 2012.
Strange Susan, The Retreat of the State: the Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
UNESCO, Convention pour la protection du patrimoine mondial culturel et naturel, Adoptée par la Conférence générale à sa 17e session à Paris le 16 novembre 1972, consultable à l’adresse suivante http://whc.unesco.org/.
UNESCO, Stratégie Globale, 1994, consultable à la page web : http://whc.unesco.org/fr/strategieglobale.
1. UNESCO, Convention pour la protection du patrimoine mondial culturel et naturel, Adoptée par la Conférence générale à sa 17e session à Paris le 16 novembre 1972, consultable à l’adresse suivante http://whc.unesco.org/,p. 1.
2. UNESCO, Stratégie Globale, 1994, consultable à la page web : http://whc.unesco.org/fr/strategieglobale.
3. UNESCO, Convention, op. cit., p. 3.
Sep 7, 2012 | Global Public Health, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Clément Paule
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°73
Source : Wikipedia
From 22th to 27th July 2012, nearly 24,000 people from 183 countries participated in the 19th International Conference on AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome) held in Washington by the IAS (International AIDS Society). This conference, held every two years since 1994, hosted many activities, whether scientific workshops, speeches by decision-makers or artistic events aimed at raising public awareness as to the HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus) / AIDS pandemic. The disease has caused 30 million deaths in three decades but the Summit was considered a success insofar as the possibility of ending the scourge in the near future was seriously envisaged. It seems clear that this relatively optimistic outlook –explicitly asserted by the slogan “Turning the tide together” – rely on essential technical breakthroughs while the financial crisis is leading to donor disengagement. Since then, calls for mobilization have succeeded one another in order to facilitate access to treatment for the 97% of patients living in low and middle-income countries while intensifying the efforts of medical research.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
After the identification and isolation of the virus in the early eighties, many states implemented programs of public action designed to control the epidemic. Often criticized for their excluding or stigmatizing nature – thus, the quarantine procedures –, these local initiatives proved ineffective to contain the HIV/AIDS that turned into a pandemic during the decades that followed. Ultimately, the fight against this health disaster did take shape globally, as illustrated by the creation of institutional arrangements such as UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV / AIDS) in 1995. Meanwhile, there ahs been a multiplication of NGOs – such as Sidaction or AIDES in France – some of which manage to internationalize themselves, like ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power). For their part, states do not remain still and establish various cooperation mechanisms to reduce mortality in severely affected areas, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. As such, PEPFAR (President’s Emergency Fund for Aid Relief) created by George W. Bush in 2003 with several billion dollars, appears to be the largest government intervention in global health. In this logic, UNITAID was launched in 2006 to facilitate the purchase of medical treatments for developing countries from a solidarity tax on airline tickets implemented by thirty countries. Finally, we note the emergence of public-private structures such as the Global Fund to Fight against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria set up as soon as 2002, a financial instrument in charge of centralizing and distributing funds dedicated to anti-HIV/AIDS activities.
Within this complex architecture, IAS was founded in 1988, with 16 000 members, including many researchers and health professionals specialising in the virus. This nonprofit organization has imposed itself as the holder of a leading multifaceted expertise: the recent appointment of Françoise Barré-Sinoussi – 2008 Nobel Prize for Medicine – as President of the organization bears testimony of the organisation’s prominence. As such, the IACs (International AIDS Conferences) play a crucial role insofar as they make it possible to render public the latest scientific discoveries about the disease, while boosting international mobilization and soliciting donors. Also, the choice of this forum to announce the possibility of halting the pandemic is very significant on a symbolic level, especially as this position is based on considerable technical advances. Let us mention here the patient in Berlin, presented as the first patient cured of AIDS after a bone-marrow transplant in 2007. It should also be noted that 34 million people now live with HIV but that only 54% of the 15 million people having developed the disease – about 8 million people – benefit from antiretroviral therapy. In addition, the UN estimates indicate that 2.7 million new infections would have occurred in 2010 – down 20% since 2001 – – while the number of deaths related to the virus is estimated at 1.8 million for the same period.
Theoretical framework
1. Global governance of health in action. This conference suggests a range of partnerships gathered around a given ‘global public concern’, namely the HIV / AIDS pandemic. But it is important to explore the lines of tension of the space that brings together actors with heterogeneous status and capital, which is not without an impact on the international management of the scourge.
2. Scientific advances Vs. socio-economic logics. If progress of research on the virus makes it now possible to consider its withering, most participants agree that a strictly technical approach is insufficient. In effect, the disease is deeply embedded into social relations on different scales, from the North-South gap to the moralizing stigmatisations.
Analysis
The diversity of contributors to the event ought to be emphasised: alongside political figures – Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, former President Bill Clinton and South Africa’s Vice-President Kgalema Motlanthe – artists were present – Elton John – as well as international officials – the president of the World Bank Jim-Yong Kim, the UNAIDS Executive Director Michel Sidibé, businessmen as Bill Gates or renowned scientists. This multisectoral mobilization illustrates the gradual coexistence of state and interstate actors with the rise of non-state actors, including multinational corporations or private foundations. In this regard, let us mention the multipositionality of individuals such as former President Bill Clinton, who negotiated with pharmaceutical companies the reduction of the price of certain treatments. Yet, the growing role of philanthrocapitalists – like the Gates Foundation, which invested a total of 2.5 billion of dollars against HIV – and several States of the South is not enough to make up for the disengagement of donor countries in a context of austerity: UNAIDS estimates this loss at 7 billion of dollars for objectives three times more costly in 2015. Especially since Barack Obama, in fact absent from the conference, announced budget cuts for PEPFAR as soon as 2013.
Despite these difficulties, the research results are promising according to the Towards an HIV Cure initiative launched by the IAS, while health indicators seem to be improving. If a vaccine does not yet appear likely, new perspectives have been proposed to refine existing therapies, whose costs were lowered. Consider the case of Truvada, a prophylactic treatment which reduces the risk of transmission – up to 90% when taken daily, according to clinical studies – during a high-risk sexual intercourse, which was approved by the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) on the eve of the IAC. However, this latest innovation has aroused the concern of organizations like ACT-UP, which discussed the potential adverse effects of the medication in terms of prevention. More generally, the implementation of these techniques remains at the heart of controversies because the social logics in which the pandemic ascribes remain complex.
Thus, despite repeated denunciations of the stigmatization of people infected with the virus, many activists from the South failed to obtain a visa to go to Washington. The US administration in effect rejected visa applications from sex-workers, who then chose to organize simultaneously a counter-Summit in Kolkata, India. This parallel event called Sex Workers Freedom Festival brought together a thousand demonstrators, and gave itself the goal of claiming and obtaining the participation of these particularly vulnerable populations in decision-making for the fight against HIV/AIDS. This initiative was supported by the UNAIDS Executive Director, who recalled that less than 1% of international funding was devoted to sex workers while these were one of the groups most affected by the disease. In addition, protesters denounced the conditionalities attached to funds distributed through PEPFAR, which require the signature of an anti-prostitution clause by the organizations seeking financial support. This example shows, beyond the technical nature of the responses, the difficulty of ending a pandemic whose political dimension is proving omnipresent.
References
Dixneuf Marc, « La santé publique comme observatoire de la mondialisation », in : Josepha Laroche (Éd.), Mondialisation et gouvernance mondiale, Paris, PUF, 2003, pp. 213-225.
Website of the 19th International Aids Conference : http://www.aids2012.org [20 août 2012].
UNAIDS, UNAIDS Guidance Note on HIV and Sex Work, April 2012, to be accessed at : http://www.unaids.org [Aug.21th 2012].
UNAIDS, Together We Will End AIDS, July 18th 2012, to be accessed at : http://www.unaids.org [Aug. 25th 2012].
