PAC 44 – The Resources of Cybercrime The Piracy of the Google Network

Jun 14, 2011 | Digital Industry, Globalization, Passage au crible (English)

By Jenna Rimasson

Translation: Davina Durgana

Passage au crible n°44

Pixabay

On June 1st, 2011, Google announced the piracy of its network. Affected by this operation are high government officials, Chinese dissidents as well as members of the army. Peking refused all implication in this cyber-attack, which was taken very seriously by Washington.

> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References

Historical background

Developed during the Vietnam War, the Internet became a technology intrinsically tied to the idea of combat, as militaristic as it is democratic. From then on, computer espionage became one of the threats against which States and transnational firms are trying to protect themselves. In terms of the virtual, it often sustains an engaged fight on other fronts. Thus, in April 2001, after the death of a Chinese pilot, above a Hainan island, caused by an American spy plane, the official website of the Pentagon was the victim of a cyber-attack. In 2004, the South Korean government was also targeted. The following year, the Chinese hackers were introduced in the networks of the largest Japanese firms – notably, Mitsubishi and Sony – the Embassies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Note that this operation arose after the defeat of the PRC in facing the Country of the Rising Sun, before the Asian Soccer Cup, an event illuminated by the emergence in China of anti-Japanese sentiment. In 2006, the Navy War College system, in Newport, United States, was infiltrated before they were pirated by the French and German Ministries of Defense. Denying all responsibility of their Government, Prime Minister Wen JIabao had then presented his apologies to German Chancellor Angela Merkel on August 27th, 2007.

Theoretical framework

Cyber-criminality. It seems that criminal infractions such as fraud, violations of intellectual property rights, and of confidentiality, are perpetrated by technological tools, in particular with the advantage of the Internet. In accordance with this concept, issues are properly posed by new technologies as well as by the Revolution of Aptitudes of citizens and by their mobilizations in networks. Cyber-criminality has thus allowed different contested transparencies of State monopoles, notably that of the control of territory and security. Beyond the public order, Governments are sometimes obliged to negotiate with non-conventional actors, capable of exerting an impact on structures of knowledge and production. Industrial espionage is accomplished by technological means, such as to this end, through cyber-crimes.

Decompartmentalizing Public and Private Spheres. Already emphasized by Norbert Elias, the evolution of macro-social practices does not seem to be without ties with those of micro-social components. The acceleration of globalization, a global process, consolidates the interactions between heterogeneous actors. More than an interaction between these two spheres, one observes currently a remodeling of the international order previously dominated by States with entities capable of challenging them, that is to say equaling, national authorities.

Analysis

Desiring to preserve sovereign monopoles, the Chinese government attempts to control the development of emerging activism, associated with New Technological Information and Communication (NTIC). To this end, it integrates in its fight citizens competent in this growth. The SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army) has invested in this domain and has consecrated today a Cyberspace Department. Thousands of engineers are thus recruited as Soldiers of the Net. The State and Civil spheres overlap and – thanks to this technological development – offer Beijing the opportunity to undertake a democratic opening from above. All at once, distinguishing this fundamental distinction is made more difficult – in the case of Cybercrime – by the incrimination of Chinese authorities by other countries; the State can always argue of a lack of jurisdiction and use as an excuse their powerlessness in facing private entities to exonerate all responsibility.

The control of these immaterial and decentralized flows as well as the elaboration of judicial measures reveal to be as complex at the international level as on the domestic level because the young generations, aspiring for more freedom, are exploring the possibilities offered by the Web and are forcing the adoption of a new mode of regulation policy. From this point on, the Government can no longer pretend to control all of the emissions of information and can see for example, the concurrence with citizen journalism. The security response demonstrates its inefficiency in a globalized world; the attempt of Chinese leaders to install filtering software on Internet sites – a Green Block – on particular computers has been unsuccessful. The inadequacy of these devices is much more confirmed on the transnational scene. Currently, the collectives formed on the Web, whether they are illegal or legal, allows them to voice their demands in a public space and to directly access the global arena. The distinction between local, national and international seems outmoded and suggests a glocalized universe.

The operations orchestrated on the Internet require the highest technological competencies, but remains inexpensive and acquires a strong media impact. They are far from being reserved for actors of the civil society that contest official actions; economic operators, public administrators and even illicit organizations will also use it. These network struggles are established between entities with similar natures and capacities, which are equally asymmetrical. To this end, recall the example of Sony where the network was pirated a week after the electronic mailboxes of Google. The interference of the border between individuals and the State thus extends to different fields in which the latter is successful as far as the creation of monopoles, and the abolishing of the hierarchal system dominated by public authorities.

If Cybercrime assumes certain characteristics of terrorism – surprise attacks, symbolic targets, media attention and a political objective – the past events have proven that the State actors are not only the targets. They can also retake to their side this informal instrument of combat with the objective of acquiring intelligence, of manipulating information or of degrading the systems which transmit information. Additionally, the process used and the achieving entity already contains in itself, a message. In the present case, the violation of the Gmail message service by Chinese dissidents and by American leaders is not harmless. Recall the trade dispute that had already taken place in 2010 between China and Google. This firm, accusing Chinese authorities of operating important censures, decided to transfer its network to Hong Kong. Additionally, this infraction and effect to the confidentiality has been inscribed in the context of financial tensions between Beijing and Washington. In fact, the PRC has announced in March the sale of 9.2 billion dollars in American Treasury bonds. Indirectly, this transaction has been translated into a contestation of the monetary hegemony of the United States where the credibility of gold is already attacked by a colossal public debt. Since the attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001, the American authorities have adopted a repressive attitude and have implemented an active fight against these types of actions. Then, the heterogeneity of implicated actors and the fluidity of their mobility, questions the adequacy of the Stateframework, that is to say inter-state, to curb these threats. Plus, the refusal of governments has thwarted the installation of a global cyber-police since the creation of which would suppose an abandonment of powers of States for the global benefit. Finally, cyber-attacks perpetrated by other States and which the White House has lively condemned, emphasizes the stigmatization of promoting processes favoring entryism of non-State actors, destabilizers of the Westphalian order.

References

Arquilla John, Ronfeldt David, Networks and Netwars. The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy, Santa Monica, Rand Corporation Publishing, 2001. par la Maison Blanche
Douzet Frédérick, « Les Frontières chinoises de l’Internet », Hérodote, 125, (2), 2007, pp.127-142.

PAC 43 – The Legalization of Current Humanitarian Aid The Insurrection in Libya of Colonel Gaddafi

May 28, 2011 | Human rights, Humanitarian, Passage au crible (English)

By Philippe Ryfman

Translation: Davina Durgana

Passage au crible n°43

Since mid-February 2011, the confrontations between insurgents and the loyal forces of Colonel Gaddafi have provoked a humanitarian crisis. Nearly 750,000 people (Libyans and Foreigners) have left the country since the end of the month of May. First mobilized by the massive exodus of foreign workers, humanitarian organizations have extended their activities towards the injured and towards the assistance of the civil population in combat zones and have taken charge of refugees.

> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References

Historical background

Humanitarian action is particularly visible in the public space through the prism of natural catastrophes, such as in Haiti in 2010 for example. However, recall that in the first place, the violence of the wars to which it remains indissolubly tied since its origin, in the XIXth century. In a conflict context, this is articulated around three areas: 1) Medical needs of civilian and military victims, 2) Essential services (food, water, sanitary), 3) population displacement. The principle humanitarian preoccupations (autonomy of aid agencies, access, logistic difficulties, insecurity, logic of instrumentalization, humanitarian law) remain recurring, but progressive.

Theoretical framework

1. During an armed conflict, the humanitarian role of non-governmental agencies and specialized United Nations forces has been proven essential. They must respect five basic principles – humanity, impartiality and non-discrimination, neutrality, independence and responsibility – as distinguished from politics. Then, operators must not have a monopoly with respect to other actors – notably State actors – who pursue overtly political objectives.
2. The situation in Libya reflects in international public law a non-international armed conflict with civilian populations as the principal victims. Additionally, on the humanitarian field, the distinction between civilians and combatants reveal a normative imperative. Finally, Resolution 1973 of February 26th, 2011 of the Security Council serves as the foundation of a military campaign – under the leadership of NATO – driven since March 19th, 2011, constituting the first concrete application of a new concept of International Humanitarian Law, as that of R2P (the Responsibility to Protect).

Analysis

Since the end of the month of March, the number of Libyans leaving the country has remained weak. The economy of oil rents function in Libya and rests on the number of foreign workers engendered by unsolicited humanitarian consequences. The flow of Egyptians, Chinese and Filipinos has been rapidly reabsorbed thanks to the intervention of their governments, of European countries and the IOM (International Organization of Migrations). In return, the departure of many Sub-Saharan nationals or natives of the Horn of Africa has remained precarious. Some have been able to regain their country, but many have not been able to or do not desire to. The EU (European Union), who dreads a migratory influx, is enforcing the prevention of all entry into the Schengen space, especially by sea. This humanitarian situation seems new, as well as the magnitude of the population flows due to the absence of all protective statutes. Around 55,000 Libyans are refugees in Tunisia, while 15,000 have succeeded in winning Italy.

Nevertheless, the two camps opened by the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees at Dehiba and Ramada thus have been put in place by Qatar in Tataouine which are practically empty and which cannot shelter but hundreds of people. All of the other refugees are sheltered by their parents, individuals, or by local charitable associations. Often stripped and victims of violence on the road of exile, many – estimated at more than a thousand – are also dead in traversing towards Italy on small rafts of fortune. Thousands of Eritreans, Somalians and Sudanese continue to crowd into Tunisia in the camps of Chouch and of Ras Jdir, while on the Egyptian coast, at Saloum, they have sheltered cottages of fortune, authorities are resolutely opposed to the installation of camps. For now, ACF, Solidarity, CARE, the Red Cross and the Red-Crescent have provided sanitation needs, water and food. Considered as migrants and not as refugees – which explains further why the IOM is present on the sides of the UNHCR – their departure continues to be uncertain. While IOM has repatriated to Egypt 35,000 people in three months, but thousands are still blocked. At the same time, Somalians, Eritreans, and Darfouris have demanded to be recognized as refugees. Nevertheless, only Australia, the United States and Sweden have accepted for now to study reinstallation dossiers.

On the interior, the humanitarian situation seems very contrasted. Thus, in the Western part placed under the control of the NTC (National Transition Council), the needs today are limited and are almost covered by local aid and by international aid. As for the front line around towns of Brega and Ajdabya, specialized agencies in war surgery and the needs of the wounded (Medical NGOs and ICRC) have achieved punctual interventions. Note on this regard that the sanitary system put in place by the regime – overall of good quality – has not collapsed and continues to function. In return, humanitarians are busy by the departure of civilians living in the rebel villages besieged by government troops and blindly bombed, particularly Misrata and Zinten. The use of heavy artillery and of Grad missiles has been revealed to be deadly and destructive. Misrata, between mid-March and the beginning of May, has consequently become known as an urgent humanitarian situation; the health structures have been overwhelmed by the influx of wounded, combatants and overall civilians. Access to food, drinkable water and medications has been limited and directly dependent on supplying by sea. Thousands of foreigners have run for flimsy cover while ICRC and MSF have assured the essentials of the humanitarian response. The conditions are now improved, the rebel forces have succeeded in loosening the stranglehold of government troops. However they continue to bombard many quarters. In the mountainous zone, people of the Berber tribes, situated in the South-West of Tripoli and towards the Tunisian border, humanitarian agencies have virtually no access. The needs in terms of aid are probably considerably, even as all evaluation remains currently impossible.

It is important to emphasize the absence of the distinction between combatants and civilians, asserted by the regime, constituting a violation characterized by IHL (International Humanitarian Law). To this end, it must provoke the engagement of prosecution before the ICC (International Criminal Court).

References

Barnett Michael, Weiss Thomas. (Eds.), Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics, New-York, Cornell University Press, 2008.
Holzgrefe J.-L., Keohane Robert O., Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal and political dilemmas, Cambridge, CUP, 2003.
Ryfman Philippe, Une histoire de l’humanitaire, Paris, La Découverte, Collection Repères, 2008.
Société Française de Droit International, La Responsabilité de protéger, Paris, Pedone, 2008.

PAC 42 – Separating the Political from the Religious for Democracy The Retreat of the Dalai Lama

May 27, 2011 | China, Human rights, Passage au crible (English), Peace

By Anaïs Henry

Translation: Melissa Okabe

Passage au crible n°42

On March 10th, 2011, the fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, decided to relinquish his political power to the Prime Minister of the Tibetan Government in Exile. Thus, since April 27th, Lobsang Sangay has held the role of leader of the Tibetan community. This decision was very surprising, because for nearly four centuries the Dalai Lamas have embodied a power both political and spiritual at the same time, particularly in the eyes of the 150,000 Tibetans in exile worldwide.

> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References

Historical background

Tibet has experienced different periods of Buddhist diffusion since the 8th century. However, it was not until the 16th century that Sonam Gyatso, third monk of the Gelugpa (school of Buddhism) of the Drepung Monastery, was recognized for the first time as the Dalai Lama. Retrospectively, his two predecessors became the first and second Dalai Lamas; from then on they were all representative of the system of reincarnation. Initially, they only held religious power and were thus guarantors of four branches of Tibetan Buddhism, namely those of the Nigmapa, Kagyupa, Sakyapa and Gelugpa sects. But in 1642, “thanks to the support of the Mongols, the fifth Dalai Lama unified, […], a vast territory under the authority of an ecclesiastico-nobiliary government, in Lhasa, the Ganden Phodrang”. From this moment, the Dalai Lamas would exert a power equally religious as political in Tibet.

In 1949, Mao Zedong, who came to form the People’s Republic of China (PRC), ordered the invasion of Tibet. In 1950, Tenzin Gyatso – then only 15 years old – was inaugurated as the Dalai Lama. Despite his negotiation efforts with the Chinese government, he was forced into self-exile in India, on March 10th, 1959. Since this date, a number of Tibetans have similarly found refuge abroad. A majority among them has settled in border states (India, Nepal, Sikkim, Ladakh), but also in Europe and in Anglo-Saxon countries. From these first years, the Dalai Lama has laid the foundations of a government to protect his people and his culture. Thanks to the constitution that he established, a government in exile was formed in Dharamsala, in a democratic spirit and in respect of human rights.

The Dalai Lama received many awards for his battle in favor of nonviolence, human rights and peace. In this respect, let’s recall that he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on December 10th, 1989. More recently, the American Congress returned his gold medal in October 2007, to acknowledge its commitment in favor of nonviolence.

Theoretical framework

Let us retain two lines of force:

1. The Fulfillment of a Process of Democratization. The decision of the Dalai Lama illustrates Laurence Whitehead’s thesis. According to Whitehead, since the end of the bipolar world, we would witness the standardization of the process of democratization on the international scene, which would occur with the free election of political leaders.
2. Crossed-Games of Qualification. Let us emphasize the exile strategy developed by China and its implementation on the world scene, aiming at the Tibetan Nobel Peace Prize winner.

Analysis

Since his inauguration, the fourteenth Dalai Lama wished for a democratic change. In this perspective, before even leaving in exile, he modified the judicial system and raised the hereditary debt, which subjected the peasants to the aristocracy. After his departure abroad, he put in place a number of guarantor institutions for the Tibetan identity and facilitated the emergence of a democratic system. In the 1980’s and 1990’s, he encouraged the creation of offices in countries where important Tibetan communities were found to be settled. Thus, these populations can at present vote for their representatives. So, by entrusting the executive power to the Prime Minister, the Dalai Lama finalizes a process of democratization already in motion. More recently, the populations of the Arab world have up-risen against their leaders to demand democracy. But here, we are in a particular case of another configuration, because it is not the Tibetans who asked their leader to leave power, rather the contrary. This is no more a result from an exterior directive. Rather, it is a question of the paternalistic and charismatic politics of a seventy-five-year-old man who considered the time would come for the self-government of his people.

In addition to this consideration, one must equally understand that the Dalai Lama was the object of the politics of disqualification on the part of the Chinese authorities. Indeed, when he achieves an act or is in movement, the Chinese authorities criticize him. For them, it is about a friar in a monk’s robe, a separatist, a despot, trying to maintain his subjects in submissiveness. Mao Zedong has moreover legitimized, a posteriori, the invasion of Tibet, invoking the necessity to liberate it from a theocratic regime. At the heart of this operation includes, however, a manipulation of information, the researched objective being the illegal securement of an international legitimacy. However, today, the political leader of the Tibetan Government in Exile is henceforth a non-religious person elected by universal suffrage, by the majority of Tibetans in exile (55%). However, in the future, the Chinese government can no longer use this repertoire of stigmatization toward this new leader. Finally, China, but also other countries, have previously denounced the status of the Dalai Lama who mixes the religious and the political. Now, the change carried out recently in the devolvement of the executive power has negated this criticism.

This decision inscribes itself within the framework of a political fight, which has lasted for more than sixty years. By the act of nonviolence, the Tibetan people show how much they aspire to improve human rights in China, and to respect the right of all peoples to self-determination.

References

Heath John, Tibet and China in the Twenty-first Century, Londres, Saqi, 2005.
Stil-Rever Sofia, Le Dalaï-Lama. Appel au monde, Paris, Seuil, 2011.
Travers Alice, « Chronologie de l’histoire du Tibet », Outre-Terre, (21), janv. 2009, pp. 109-128.
Withehead Laurence, « Entreprise de démocratisation : le rôle des acteurs externes », Critique internationale, (24), mars 2004, pp. 109-124.

PAC 41 – European Minimalism Towards Ghaddafi The European Union and the Libyan Crisis

May 23, 2011 | European Union, Human rights, Passage au crible (English)

By Franck Petiteville

Translation: Davina Durgana

Passage au crible n°41

Faced with the Libyan Crisis in the Spring of 2011, the European Union (EU) has progressively taken part in the Benghazi protests, demanding the depart of Colonel Ghaddafi, by adopting sanctions against his regime on March 11th, 2011 and proposing a European military operation for humanitarian purposes on April 1st.

> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References

Historical background

The calling of the EU to manage international crises is as old as the first experience of collective diplomacy via the European Political Cooperation of the 1960’s. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) has raised the ambitions of the EU in the management of crises, in creating the CFSP (Collective Foreign and Security Policy), remaining overall powerless in the conflicts of the Former Yugoslavia (250,000 deaths). The launching of the European policy of defense in 1999 has progressively endowed the EU with military instruments to handle the crisis, which have been notably used in Africa in the 2000’s (interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, in Chad in 2008, and on most of the Somalian coast in 2008-2009).

For their side, the involvement of the EU in the Mediterranean is equally old. It has known different levels during the last fifteen years: the process in Barcelona (1995), resting on an ensemble of accords of economic cooperation and development aid, the neighborly policy (2004), and then the Union for the Mediterranean launched in 2008.

The EU has been suddenly caught by surprise by the Arab Spring. Emerging initially in a dispersed manner, the heads of State and the Government of the EU have searched to show a common position during the Extraordinary European Council on March 11th, 2011. They have affirmed their support for the Arab revolutions and notably with the announcements of democratic transition in, Egypt and Tunisia. As for Libya, they have inversely condemned the repression, declaring Colonel Ghaddhafi “illegitimate”, and recognizing the “National Council of Transition” established by the Benghazi protesters as a “political representative”. In support of the Security Council resolutions of the United Nations, the EU has equally adopted diverse sanctions against the Ghaddafi regime (arms embargo, visa ban, freezing of assets, etc.) It has notably demonstrated the intention to prevent the regime from gathering the dividends of the exportation of petrol and gas. On April 1st, EU crossed a new stage in creating bases of EUFOR Libya, a military operation relevant to the CFSP, aiming to secure humanitarian aid for displaced persons by the conflict and is susceptible by prompting demand on the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations.

Theoretical framework

Retain two lines of reasoning:

1. The Libyan Crisis as a Litmus Test for the Cohesion of the 28

In a Realist theoretical perspective of international relations, the notion of European foreign policy seems improper. In fact, only States possess the attributes of foreign policy: sovereignty, national interest, military power. In this perspective, the Member-States of the EU should always be reticent to cede their sovereignty in the matter of high politics, as it has done in the economic domain. Thus, Realists are not surprised that, following large international crises, the Member-States of the EU respond in a dispersed manner and demonstrate initially their national interest, such as the European division in 2003 on the war in Iraq. In turn, the Libyan crisis could give the sentiment of reinforcing this vision because the Europeans have not shown a very strong or very visible common position. The France of Nicholas Sarkozy and the United Kingdom of David Cameron have thus precociously imposed the idea of an exterior armed intervention. As for Germany of Angela Merkel, they have to the contrary, refused all risk of involvement in war, and have abstained during the vote on Resolution 1973 on March 17th, 2011 on the Aerial Exclusion Zone of the Security Council. For their side, the Italy of Berlusconi has not stopped procrastinating, since the reaffirmation of the Italian-Libyan friendship at the beginning of the crisis until the conversion pressured on coalition armed operation at the end of April 2011.

2. A Credibility Test of European Foreign Policy after Lisbon

Many attempts have occurred in recent years simultaneously in the new potentialities of the European policy of collective defense and in the new levers of European foreign policy created by the Lisbon treaty: the President of the European Council, the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security, and European Service of Foreign Action. For now, it is not sure that the handling of the Libyan Crisis by the European Union has responded to these attempts. In fact, on the military plan, it’s NATO and not the EU that has taken in charge of the operation of bombardment of the forces of Colonel Ghaddafi. The European defense policy was not mobilized for conflict margins, but to eventually put in place a humanitarian operation. On the diplomatic plan, Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton have ensured that they can relay European positions on the international scene, but their visibility has remained limited by the minimalism of the harmony between the 28. It could then be said that the Libyan Crisis has at once revealed the capabilities and expectations gap maintained by European treaties and the official discourse of the EU. Otherwise said, the pit continues between the attempts incited by the EU before public opinion and its effective realizations in the international order.

Analysis

The Arab revolutions globally, and the Libyan crisis in particular, have proven the limits of European Foreign Policy. Europeans have taken time to react positively to the democratic claims of Arabic peoples and have shown a clear position in favor of the resignation of dictators, as Obama had rapidly states about Ben Ali and Mubarak. Substantively, this spiral of revolutions is empty of consistence with the policies of cooperation promised from a long time by the EU in favor of the Mediterranean. Never has the democratization of the region appeared as a central stake of this policy (the clauses of democratic conditionality inserted in the Euro-Mediterranean accords have never been activated). In return, the European fear of immigration from Northern Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa has been revealed as a long-term structural stake of European policy. This is more than ever the case in the aftermath of the Arab revolutions and the Libyan crisis.

Faced with the perspective of an armed intervention in Libya to give substance to the famous “responsibility to protect”, Europeans have not thus reached a substantial agreement. While the EU has supported successive resolutions of the Security Council, notably on the sanctions against Ghaddafi, on the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and toward the launching of an aerial exclusion operation. The EU has also participated in talks of the Contact Group on the future of Libya with the Arab League and the African Union. In doing so, the EU always remains in retreat behind the Security Council, and relatively absent behind the initiatives of certain Member States (France and the United Kingdom at the lead). On the military plan, the European offer of a military-humanitarian complementary intervention was not negligible, but – if it sees realization – it will never be anything but a limited and auxiliary operation of the strong military intervention of NATO. The European management of the Libyan Crisis leaves thus the souvenir of a reaction contingent on the smallest common denominator (sanctions, humanitarian operation) between the Member States divided again on legitimacy or the recourse to use of force.

References

Delcourt Barbara, Martinelli Marta, Klimis Emmanuel (Éds.), L’Union européenne et la gestion de crise, Bruxelles, éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2008, 270 p.
Petiteville Franck, « Les mirages de la politique étrangère européenne après Lisbonne », Critique internationale, avril-juin 2011, pp. 94-112.

PAC 40 – The Repressive Arsenal of the ICC and its Limits International Mandates against Libyan Leaders

May 2, 2011 | Human rights, International Justice, Passage au crible (English)

By Yves Poirmeur

Translation: Davina Durgana

Passage au crible n°40

The United Nations Security Council decided in Resolution 1970 on February 26th, 2011 to give jurisdiction to the ICC (International Criminal Court) on the situation in Libya. In fact, the regime of Colonel Ghadaffi is suspected of committing crimes against humanity since February 15th, 2011 in repressing the insurrection which had broken out in the East of the country and in directing systematic and generalized attacks against the civilian population. The Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, opened an investigation from March 3rd, 2011. Then he announced on Friday, May 13th, 2011 that he would ask the judges to deliver international arrest warrants against “three people that seem to carry the most responsibility“. Additionally, recall that as Resolution 1970 has not dissuaded the Libyan government from pursuing its military repression, the Security Council authorized an aerial military intervention. (Resolution 1973, 2011).

> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References

Historical background

Created in 1998 by the Rome Convention, the ICC represents the first permanent and independent international criminal jurisdiction charged with judging the perpetrators of the most serious international crimes, which the State Parties have not prosecuted, in application of their universal jurisdiction. As 78 of the Member-States of the UN have not ratified the Statute and can provide asylum to these criminals, the option offered to the Security Council to use this jurisdiction, as a measure which can be taken against a situation that threatens international peace and security (Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter) is a complementary means of efficiently fighting against impunity. This procedure was already used for the first time for the crimes committed in Darfur (Resolution 1593 on April 1st, 2005). In utilizing this again, the Security Council has thus confirmed the legitimacy of the ICC to address situations where States refuse its competence and denounce the ICC as a Western instrument of Imperialism. In quickly deciding to refer this situation, the Security Council has renewed interest in this mechanism for preventative usage as well.

Theoretical framework

1. The penalization and judicialization of international conflicts. The authority of the ICC is not imposed only on States that have accepted its jurisdiction by ratifying the Rome Statute. In fact, as they are by nature rare and precise, the resolutions of the Security Council extend to the situations that they have referred to the ICC the global authority that it retains. In quickly deferring a situation as was done with Libya, the Security Council consequently does not only support the legitimacy of the ICC as a global criminal judge, charged with surveillance over the obligation of States to protect their populations. It additionally replaces conflict on the domestic criminal domain, and in doing so, increases the repertoire of measures with which they could treat the conflict.
2. Economy of international sanctions extended to criminal threats. The referral of the Libyan situation to the ICC confirms the idea that the threat of international criminal repression could play an important role in the prevention of international crimes in dissuading the fulfillment of an act. The use of the ICC enriches the arsenal of measures intended to prevent a conflict and to reestablish the peace. It participates in a new economy of international threats placed on political leaders. This rests upon: 1) highlighting the gravity of the criminal sanctions incurred; 2) the certainty of prosecutions that will be engaged against perpetrators of crimes; 3) the existence of a competent jurisdiction in which to judge these crimes. Nonetheless, if this doctrine of employing this threat is clearly established, its dissuasive power remains however very limited.

Analysis

Unanimously adopted among the six members of the Security Council – of which three permanent members (United States, Russia, China) – have not ratified the Rome Statute, Resolution 1970 consolidated more legitimacy as the ICC received support from the Arab League and the African Court of Human Rights. This approach is invoked by the Security Council immediately as a State can no longer assure the responsibility of protecting its population from genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (World Summit 2005, (60/1)) and is fully recognized. Ranging symbolically from the side of people against their tyrants and presented as capable of retaining them in their criminal institutions, the ICC is inserted in the coherent institutional network of the protection of human rights and the fight against impunity which includes notably NGOs which defend human rights, the Committee of Human Rights, and regional organizations. The ICC seems to be a crucial component of regional organizations and benefits in this respect from its sympathetic capital. Globally, the context of Arab revolutions has proven to be helpful in diffusing the image of the ICC as a protector of the people. It additionally permits the disqualification of the idea of the ICC as simply a Western instrument of Imperialism. As interventions are reclaimed by insurgents who denounce the crimes of the dictatorship, which are then condemned and defended with great difficulty by the leaders of authoritarian regimes who have attempted to maintain their power with limited democratic overtures (Morocco, Algeria).

If the open investigation is directly aimed at Libyan authorities and if the Prosecutor of the ICC chooses to act based on the fact that it also covers the crimes eventually committed by the insurgents, Resolution 1970 has strictly defined the object of its jurisdiction – crimes against humanity committed since February 14th, 2011 – and excludes the nationals of States which have not ratified the Statute of the Court. This arrangement shows that the fight against impunity always resides directly tied to the interests of States. While the legitimacy of the ICC will be without a doubt better assured without such exceptions, which incurs criticism of selectivity. However without this, the situation could not have been deferred and the decided American participation in the aerial military intervention would have then been compromised.

As the arsenal of classic measures does not allow the use of force (United Nations Charter, Article 21 and Article 41) applicable to persons – travel restrictions, freezing of assets – immediately affect their targets, for international justice to act as a threat and to have a dissuasive role, it must confer a high probability of arrest, prosecution and conviction of the leaders of international crimes. Additionally, even if the credibility of the international criminal court could commend strong convictions since the creation of the ICTY and current open investigations, they remain too rare to enter the criminal risk into the calculations of dictators as hardened as Mr. Ghaddafi, of military leaders and special police in the repression of armed factions, all ready to maintain to ascend to power. The pursuit of the repression has, in fact, confirmed that the guide and the majority of Libyan leaders are inaccessible to this argument. Only systematic references intervening from the first warning to the provision of sufficient financial means (Resolution 1970 leaves the financing to fall to the burden of the State-Parties to the ICC Statute) to lead investigations, converting this risk into quasi-certainty that could perhaps render the criminal activities of less determined leaders susceptible. The slowness and restraint with which the Security Council, for reasons and specific interests for the region concerned, dealt with the Libyan situation and lateness in sending it to the ICC (if it ends up completing its investigation) contrasts with its promptness – only 10 days after the beginning of the conflict we saw the first information retrieved by the Commission on Human Rights – to defer the Libyan situation. Such a discrepancy confirms that it will take a lot of time for the certainty of punishment to be able to lead to preventative virtues for the jurisdiction of the ICC. On the other side, it seems likely that international stigmatization of main regime leaders such as international criminals in power will encourage their separation, retreat, and the rallying of insurgences of less engaged political and military leaders that will remain loyal to the regime. However, beyond this uncertain preventative effect, such a jurisdiction presents other repressive merits. Thus, allowing the ICC to open an investigation and to immediately collect evidence that would be more difficult to collect later and – if the elements are all met – to rapidly deliver international arrest warrants before the conflict has even ended. The emission of such orders has rendered impossible – or at least made extremely difficult – all political arrangements, which are designed to ensure impunity after finding themselves in a safe haven.

References

On the conflict: Marzouki Moncef, Dictateurs en sursis. Une voie démocratique pour le monde arabe (entretien avec Vincent Geiser), Paris, Éd. de l’atelier, 2011.
Security Council: Résolutions 1970 (2011) et 1973 (2011) on the Libyan situation.

PAC 39 – From the Opacity of Responsibility towards the Forced Pooling of Risk The Management of the Nuclear Accident by TEPCO in Fukushmina-Daiichi, March 11th, 2011

May 1, 2011 | environment, Passage au crible (English), Security

By Clément Paule

Translation: Davina Durgana

Passage au crible n°39

FukushimaSource : Flickr

According to the May 3rd edition of the Asahi Shimbun journal, the Japanese government has evaluated the sum of compensations to be paid by TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) to be nearly 50 billion dollars. Nearly three months after the earthquake of May 11th, 2011 the accident that took place in the middle of Fukushima-Daiichi did not always seem to be mastered by the first Asian electrician. For now, the question of the indemnification of victims – individuals and collective localities – has already incited controversies so that the industry authorities have remained very criticized for their handling of the crisis. Thus, the President of the powerful parental organization Nippon Keidanren (Federations of Japanese Economic Organizations), Yonekura Hiromasa has challenged the responsibility of the State, which is supposed to ensure the entirety of compensations. For now, according to the group JP Morgan Chase, the financial cost of the catastrophe has risen by 24 billion dollars for TEPCO while Bank of America-Merrill Lynch evokes a figure five times greater.

> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References

Historical background

As the third global producer of nuclear energy – behind the United States and France – today, Japan has fifty active reactors generating nearly 30% of the electricity of the country. In order to reduce their strong dependence to fossil fuels, the Japanese State has opted since the 1970’s for a strategy that privileges the atomic industry. Stimulated by gigantic investments and American cooperation, this sector was considerably developed through Toshiba, Hitachi and Mitsubishi Heavy Industry. In 2006, the METI (Ministry of Economy, Commerce and Industry) has reaffirmed the objective of producing by 2030, 50% of electric needs through this technology. Towards this end, the construction of a dozen new structures has been planned for the coming decades.

Recall equally that TEPCO, leader of the Japanese market and the fourth global firm – after RWE., EDF. (Electricity of France), and EON – was created in 1951 in the framework of the end of a State energy monopoly. In the 1960’s, business saw great growth and invested in nuclear energy: the complex of Fukushima-Daiichi became operational in March 1970. In little time, TEPCO has become the first multinational producer of electricity in Asia. Additionally, this dazzling ascension has been marred by numerous scandals: in August 2002, authorities revealed the falsification by the operator of dozens of documents in order to hide incidents in their installations since the 1970’s. In a general manner, these controversies implicating the industry have multiplied with the accidents of Tokaimura in 1999 or in Mihama in 2004. As for TECPO, the earthquake of Chuetsu in 2007 has induced the closing of their large central location – Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, located 250 kilometers North of Tokyo – within 21 months. The company has thus incurred their first loss in 28 years, estimated at 4.4 billion dollars.

Theoretical framework

1. Network of Allegiances of the Nuclear Sector. Denounced by ecological movements under the term of oligarchy, the collusions that unite the public and private nuclear actors seem structured in the sequencing of the crisis. Characterized by their political and judicial irresponsibility, the decision-makers seek to maintain solidarity, facing the rise of profane criticism.
2. Strategies of Avoiding Blame. Then, the handling of the crisis became equally the theatre of tensions between the same stakeholders in terms of the accusation of fault. In this respect, the government, made more fragile since the earthquake, tends to attribute the responsibility of the accident to TEPCO.

Analysis

For the first time, relating the similarities of this event with the implication of the major gas company BP with the oil slick in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 is relevant. In fact, the stigmatization of a deviant multinational firm, the questioning of subcontracting or the price drop of the firm seems now to be the common elements of these post-accident economic activities. Additionally, TEPCO does not seem to be capable of controlling the situation because their first crisis exit plan was not presented until April 18th, 2011, though the disaster happened April 7th. As for its directors, they have simply taken refuge in public contrition. Also, the communication of the company has proven lacunal, that is to say erroneous. These repetitive losses, which have achieved the destruction of the reputation of this actor critiqued by the State, has stimulated the development of socio-technical controversies and alternative evaluation. All the same, inversely of BP in 2010, it imported and retained the failure of national agencies of regulation, in particular the NISA (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency), in charge of inspections of METI, and the commission of the NSC (Nuclear Safety Commission). Despite the actions of whistleblowers such as seismologists Katsuhiko Ishibashi and Kiyoo Mogi who have denounced conflicts of interest, noting that norms have not been revised. Precisely such as certain recommendations of the AIEA have been equally ignored, through the moratorium of five years on enrichment and reprocessing, publicized by former Director Mohamed El Baradei.

Noteworthy is the ambiguous attitude of the government towards TEPCO, which has threatened nationalization, but has simultaneously been supported by the State. To this regard, the sidelining of the NGO Greenpeace – to proceed to measuring radiation or the development of indemnification funds destined to avoid the bankruptcy of the enterprise – can translate this support. Recall that in the past the authorities have covered the accidents that compromise the operator, and that the scandal of 2002 has not had but a very limited impact on the group. Then, emphasized are the effects of internationalization of Japanese nuclear actors, which have accompanied increased deregulation since the 1990’s. For example, the JINED accord (International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan Co. Ltd.) established in October 2010 between the State and Industry on the export of technology abroad. Additionally, one mentions the central role of TEPCO in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol, in order to attain the objectives of the country in terms of the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. One sees here that institutional and strategic proximities are reinforced by the network of allegiances unifying the top administration and the leaders of electricity, crystallized in the METI, charged with the promotion of atomic energy, but also in security controls.

For now, this configuration has lead to a closing of the managing spaces of the catastrophe, notably in the production of evaluations of radioactive leakages. As evidenced by the resignation at the end of April by Professor Toshiso Kosako – scientific advisor to the Prime Minister – who was in disagreement with the measures taken by the Cabinet. Furthermore, critical commentators have castigated the circular circulation of information – according to the expression of P. Bourdieu – disclosed by loyal leaders of the nuclear sector. Contrary to the United States with respect to BP, the Japanese authorities have thus turned towards a certain solidarity with TEPCO and a strategy of blame avoidance caused by the stigmatization of an actor that was already deviant. In any case, the collusion and the straddling between the public and private are not questioned as such. Seemingly there is the risk of free-riding – or a lone-rider – of a State participating in control, that is to say the concealment of information on behalf of its strategic priorities. This secret organization – which cannot be attributed to an alleged Japanese specificity – represents a danger not only to the population, but in this precise case, also for global public goods. Additionally, this has now proven to be more problematic than international instances of regulation – such as the AIEA – which is more concerned about the military advantage of this technology than its civil use which is, however, particularly risky.

References

Chateauraynaud Francis, Torny Didier, Les Sombres précurseurs : une sociologie pragmatique de l’alerte et du risque, Paris, EHESS, 1999.
Ishibashi Katsuhiko, “Why Worry? Japan’s Nuclear Plants at Grave Risk from Quake Damage”, International Herald Tribune, 11 août 2007.
McCormack Gavan, « Le Japon nucléaire ou l’hubris puni », Le Monde diplomatique, avril 2011.
Poirmeur Yves, « Qu’est-ce qu’une information loyale ? », in: Josepha Laroche (Éd.), La Loyauté dans les relations internationales, 2e éd., Paris, L’Harmattan, 2011. Coll. Chaos International.
Weaver Kent R., « The Politics of Blame Avoidance », Journal of Public Policy, 6 (4), 1986, pp. 371-398.

PAC 38 – Migratory Challenges of Arab Revolutions Schengen Accords at the heart of the Franco-Italian Meeting on April 26th 2011

Apr 26, 2011 | Diplomacy, International migrations, North-South, Passage au crible (English)

By Catherine Wihtol de Wenden

Translation: Davina Durgana

Passage n°38

The meeting on Tuesday, April 26th 2011 between Nicolas Sarkozy and Silvio Berlusconi was held on the control of consecutive migrations of Arab revolutions; France has announced the beginning of a safeguard clause planned by the Schengen against immigrants arriving at the Franco-Italian border.

> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References

Historical background

The revolutions that have arisen on the southern shore of the Mediterranean (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya) have aroused alarmist discourse on the migratory risk implicit for Europe. Thus, in his speech on February 27th 2011, President Sarkozy has with all in agreement – discussed the situation derived from the growth of migration and Islamism. He has indicated that major consequences of “migratory flows that have become uncontrollable and on terrorism” should be assumed, adding that, “it’s all of Europe that would be on the front lines”. Since then, the Media has not stopped interrogating the tie that exists between the Revolution on the interior of these countries and the migratory movements that have resulted, though it is rare to see revolutionaries leaving their country without waiting for the aftermath of their victory in growth of liberties and equality. One month later, the arrival of approximately 28.000 Tunisians and Libyans on the Italian island of Lampedusa has provoked contention between the President of Council, Silvio Berlusconi – who had decided to deliver temporary visas of three months to those who requested asylum in the form of territorial asylum – and France who has refused to allow migrants to breach the Franco-Italian border though regulated by the Schengen Accords (free movement on the interior of the Schengen Zone, of 28 European countries). On April 20th, 2011 French authorities have announced that they have decided to suspend the provisory application method of this convention to apply the clause of preemptive safeguard “in cases of threats to the public security” and to allow them to resume state control of borders.

Theoretical framework

We consider two lines of logic:

1. The Multilateral and Bilateral Accords of Border Control, a new diplomacy of migrations. Signed between an E.U. country and a coastal country within the E.U. or between a non-European country and the European Union, these accords often aim to limit migratory flows by policies of control of departure and the redirection of undocumented persons to the border, in exchange for development policies, commercial accords or the attribution of visas for certain elites. The most emblematic example remains those of the readmission accords in terms of the European Pact on immigration and asylum of 2008, already put in place by a number of States in a bilateral fashion. Thus, Italy and Libya have already signed many texts in this sense, making Libya the border-guard for Europe against undocumented migrants and requestors of asylum and has engaged in filtering them, without being a signatory to the Geneva Convention on Asylum (1951). In exchange, Tripoli requested 5 billion Euros from the Government of Berlusconi. For their side, Tunisia has also signed bilaterally with Italy and with France documents through which they are engaged in controlling borders and to return redirected undocumented immigrants.
2. The Policy of Outsourcing Borders. The loss of control of the Readmission agreements linked to the end of the dictators of the South poses the question of the efficiency of other European instruments of border control. It would mean on one side, the Schengen Accords on the control of external European borders, and on the other side, the Dublin Accords on the right of asylum within Europe. Finally, Frontex has placed European police in control of borders. Nevertheless, faced with the weak establishment of bilateral readmission accords and border control signed with Libya and Tunisia, one could question what determinations weigh on the instruments of external border control of Europe, spearheaded by the European Policy on Immigration and Asylum since the beginning of the European Pact in 2008. What is Frontex doing? It will carry support for the shipwrecked of the Mediterranean to bring them to European coasts, despite the lack of resources, even when their budget in 2010 was 88 million Euros. Additionally emphasized, is that the European system seems to be less effective when bilateral accords are tied to signatory dictators. In fact, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt did not have a multilateral readmission accord with the European Union. The signed bilateral accords on border control, that is to say, commercial, between heads of States have seemed consequently less efficient because the regimes that have succeeded dictators are considered to be held in less respect. Finally, the current difficulties of managing migratory flows have equally demonstrated a lack of solidarity in the European countries not “sharing the burden” of Italy.

Analysis

An overview of the migratory context of depart and return on the Southern bank of the Mediterranean has driven us to identify very diverse migratory situations. Tunisia is a country of emigration in which 50% of the population is under 25 years of age, is largely urban, educated and racked with unemployment. Nevertheless, due to its proximity to Europe, it is also a transitory country for sub-Saharans. Another transit country, Libya, which in 2009 sheltered 780.000 foreigners, according to the report of the United Nations on Population, represents a country of immigration, considering its oil resources. This country attracts a southern migration (to say South-South) essentially coming from neighboring states (Egypt, Niger, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria). Most of these migrants are now repatriated to their country of origin, which has sometimes organized the return of their deported, such as Morocco for example. Others are returned to their homes by all means, anxious about climates of violence. As for Egypt, it’s a country of depart towards the countries of the Gulf, Italy, Libya and to a lesser degree, some other European countries (France, Spain).

These States have signed bilateral and multilateral readmission accords with their European neighbors through which they are engaged in sending home undocumented migrants redirected to the border of the European countries, despite their nationalities or if they are migrants in transit on their territory are then arrested in Europe. Since these conventions were signed between States or with the European Union, they have often been negotiated directly between Presidents Berlusconi, Kaddafi and Ben Ali, in exchange for funds such as the obtainment of visas for candidates (very qualified) initially, measures of aid or development or gifts, such as the construction of a freeway from the East to the West from Libya to Egypt. However, has the end of these authoritarian regimes led now to the end of their engagement as shields of Europe?

In Tunisia, the candidates of departure previous to the Jasmine Revolution profited from the opportunity of more relaxed police control of the borders. They have attempted to leave from less common points of departure such as the Zarzis region, near the Island of Djerba. Unemployment, poverty, and hopelessness faced with the consequences of a revolution in employment and standard of living have incited them to leave. The majority are not requesting asylum, but they are mostly economic migrants that dream of Europe in general, and France in particular. A majority of these migrants are found on the Island of Lampedusa. In return, the migrants in transit in Tunisia have taken other routes or are repatriated to sub-Saharan Africa. As for Libyan migrants, they are often considered as requesting asylum by the Italian State. Globally, the labor migrants of the south have taken the route of return towards their country of origin, repatriated sometimes by the Italians or regrouped behind the borders of neighbor countries of Libya: 336. 658 people have thus gone to Libya, and 165,000 towards Tunisia. Then, the U.N has invited these States to maintain their open borders because for William Swing, Director General of the International Organization of Migrations, “it is one of the most important humanitarian evacuations of history”.

References
Cassarino Jean-Pierre, Unbalanced Reciprocities: Cooperation on readmission in the Euro-Mediterranean Area, Middle East Institute, September 2010, 93 p.
Wihtol de Wenden Catherine, La Question migratoire au XXIe siècle. Migrants, réfugiés et relations internationales, Paris, Presses de sciences-Po, 2010.

PAC 36 – The Solidarity of an Infra-State China The Chinese Aid given to Japan after the March 11, 2011 Earthquake

Apr 1, 2011 | China, Diplomacy, Passage au crible (English)

By Jenna Rimasson

Translation: Melissa Okabe

Passage au crible n°36

On March 11, 2011, Japan experienced an earthquake with a magnitude of 9 on the Richter scale, the epicenter of which was located in the Pacific Ocean. These tremors had immediately prompted a tsunami which devastated the east coast of the archipelago region, where the country’s nuclear power stations are concentrated. Therefore, a nuclear catastrophe is added to this humanitarian crisis, making it a concern of the entire world. The Chinese state, a close neighbor to Japan, quickly reacted to the Japanese tragedy. It sent rescue teams, emergency equipment for the survivors, and even fuel, while organizing blood donations in its universities and certain public spaces. Finally, its government evacuated 3000 citizens from disaster zones. However, this situation leads China to especially question its own management of nuclear energy.

> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References

Historical background

In 1281, the Kamikaze typhoon (divine wind) destroyed Kubilai Khan and his Mongolian fleet, which attempted to invade the chain of Japanese islands. This natural element guaranteed the independence of the country from China, a situation preserved until World War II.

China, on the contrary, experienced two major defeats against Japan, in 1895 and in 1931. The latter ended with the Japanese occupation of Manchuria until 1945, the year in which the atomic bombings of Nagasaki and of Hiroshima forced Tokyo to surrender.

These historic episodes always arouse diplomatic tension, such as Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto sanctuary in Tokyo, or even the Chinese territorial claims over the Diaoyu Islands. However, the earthquake which occurred in the Chinese province of Szechuan, on May 12, 2008, allowed for a Sino-Japanese rapprochement. Indeed, Peking accepted humanitarian aid offered by the Japanese rescue teams.

Regarding the nuclear file in its entirety let us recall that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is part of the nuclear powers; its first nuclear test was carried out on October, 16, 1964 in Lop Nor, in the Xinjiang province. In 1984, China became a member of the lAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and on March 9, 1992, after years of refusal, Peking finally ratified the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty).

Theoretical framework

1. Emergency Aid. During natural disasters, states but also NGOs – in particular those who possess an international dimension – provide financial and material aid to disaster-stricken regions. Besides this display of compassion, this assistance increases the visibility of the donor and allows him to impose his ethical values on the global scene.

2. Re-appropriation of diplomatic action by informal means. Civil Society Actors by-pass traditional institutions to implement a foreign policy which distinguishes itself from that of States. This phenomenon illustrates a revolution of capacities, evoked by the American political analyst, James Rosenau, when he invites us to revalue their role, taking micro-macro mixing into consideration.

Analysis

Chinese-Japanese relations actually find themselves in a difficult phase, due to military tensions in the China Sea and the economic crisis heavily felt in Japan. Often paralyzed, traditional diplomatic institutions stop real dialogue between Peking and Tokyo. Yet, the earthquakes in Szechuan, and that which largely destroyed the Hondo Island, were the occasions of the greatest solidarity between these two peoples. In fact, the Chinese remember the aid offered by their neighbors and at present, mobilize themselves to go to their rescue. Micro-social interaction, at the level of the individual, establishes itself, making the erosion of the stato-national frame apparent. In this context of crisis and emergency, Central Administrations of the State and PCC are by-passed to the benefit of local levels – sister cities to Japanese municipalities are at present making their contributions – or still, civil society with the intervention of associations, and national NGO’s, such as the Red Cross for example. Therefore, one sees the necessity of rapid action favors a redistribution of authority to profit sub-national and transnational entities. The cooperative dynamic which establishes itself obliges political powers to bend their strategy; the diplomatic play of these new actors is forcing them to modify their initial positions. Often criticized for their lack of autonomy, Chinese NGOs at the moment use their privileged governmental connections to bend the decision of the latter. These organizations impose themselves on political institutions thanks to their more appropriate routine of action and the fact that the source of their legitimacy comes from below. As time goes by, they become indispensable interlocutors at the very moment when the Chinese State attempts to maintain its monopolies despite controversy. This operation appears more well-to-do as the assistance offered to inhabitants of the archipelago agrees with the Chinese conception of human rights, oriented more toward the economic and social, rather than political, dimension. It is emphasized, on the other hand, that the crisis affecting Japan also benefits the Sino-Taiwanese relations, with the implementation of increased cooperation in sanitary risk prevention and emergency aid.

The impact on Chinese politics is also shown through the State Administration’s emphasis on Nuclear Security and the greater role granted to the Ministry of the Environment. Previously maintained at the level of a simple agency, this henceforth has a more important budget. However, the increasing influence of the experts in the decision-making of Zhongnanhai constitutes the most considerable element because knowledge became a legitimizing tool likely to modify the hierarchy of the priorities on the governmental agenda. Peking, which at the moment manages the construction of 25 nuclear power stations, 13 already being in service, has just halted the decision to set up new infrastructures and to substantially strengthen safety standards, systems of alert / measure of the radioactivity.

The natural elements and nuclear technology strain the Sino-Japanese relationships as much as questions of national security and public health. They impose more transparency on Chinese leaders and also a bigger consideration of the public opinion. Nevertheless, the energy needs of China remind the government of priorities of another order. Indeed, in 2007, Peking and the French company Areva signed the biggest contract ever concluded in the nuclear domain – at 8 billion euro – to increase its’ energy production and acquire new technology: the famous reactors of the EPR (European Pressurized Reactor) generation.
The operation of the atomic energy remains – as in numerous countries – a subject of secret defense and consequently difficult to deliver to the democratic debate. However, the partnerships which form between public spheres in this strategic sector reveal a certain decline of the State to the benefit of the economic entities.

References

Areva, « Dossier de presse. Areva en Chine », nov. 2007.
Fossier Astrid, « Présentation générale de la société civile en Chine », Monde chinois, (19), aut. 2009, pp.9-14.
Niquet Valérie, « Du Tremblement de terre du Sichuan aux Jeux olympiques : la Chine face aux défis politique de l’année 2008 », Asie Vision, (8), sept. 2008, en ligne, www.ifri.org/downloads/Asie_Visions_8_Niquet.pdf, consulté le 10 juillet 2010.
Xinhuawang, « La Chine accorde avantage d’aide au Japon », 17 mars 2011, En ligne, http://french.news.cn/chine/ 2011-03/17/c_13782500.htm, consulté le 25 mars 2011.
Xinhuanet, « 山西省红十字会开展日本地震后寻人工作 », [La Croix Rouge de la province du Shanxi déploie ses activités de recherche des rescapés japonais après le séisme], le 17 mars 2011, En ligne, http://www.sx.xinhuanet.com/jryw/2011-03/17/content_22301497.htm, consulté le 25 mars 2011.
The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, « 日本发生特大地震后中国多部委表示向日 提供援助 » [Après le séisme, les différents ministères chinois offrent leur assistance au Japon], le 16 mars 2011, En ligne, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2011-03/16/content_1825560.htm, consulté le 25 mars 2011.

PAC 34 – European Union Soft Power and its Limits Montenegro’s Official Candidate Status for EU Membership, December 17, 2010

Feb 3, 2011 | European Union, Passage au crible (English)

By Klaus-Gerd Giesen

Translation: Justine Davis

Passage au crible n°34

On December 17, 2010, the European Union granted Montenegro official candidate status. This was the only nation authorized by the European Council to join the group that included Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, and Turkey, whereas the Albanian and Serbian requests were postponed. A few days after this decision, the Prime Minister, Milo Djukanovic, left the post that he had occupied almost completely without interruption since 1991. And yet, the two events are intimately connected.

> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References

Historical background

At the age of 29, Milo Djukanovic took the reins of power when Montenegro was still part of Yugoslavia. With the support of his mentor, Slobodan Milosevic, he achieved success in the Anti-bureaucracy revolution within the Communist League. Ever since, Djukanovic has constantly ruled over the little Balkan state, with the lone exception of a 16-month interruption (October 2006-February 2008). He served five terms as chief of government and two as president. Beginning his political career as a dogmatic communist, he was quickly converted to Serbian nationalism during the civil war that unsettled Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Afterwards, he turned against his old ally, Milosevic, before finally embodying a freedom fighter leadership, which was fulfilled by Serbia’s secession in 2006.

As for the European Union enlargement process outside of the 27 current member states, it appears to be at a complete halt since the 2005 referendums on the European Constitution, and further weakened by the severe economic crisis of 2008-2009. A certain enlargement fatigue has been felt; for example, Croatia still has not succeeded in finalizing its membership. In this context, it is all the more surprising that Montenegro succeeded in passing the first step in the membership process, namely the Stabilization and Association Agreement.

Theoretical framework

There are two combining explanatory factors:

1. The unilateral mastery of all the stages of the European Union membership process raises an efficient lever of soft power. It allows the European Union to influence the domestic politics of the countries desiring to join.
2. Nevertheless, certain endogenous forces remain in a position to structurally resist Brussels guardianship and to adapt themselves to pressure.

Analysis

Official membership status was given to Montenegro in exchange for the departure of Milo Djukanovic from his state functions. Djukanovic, who benefited from the support of his friend, Silvio Berlusconi, became, over the years, an embarrassing figure for the majority of other heads of state or for Western European governments. As the head of a progressively transforming nation, under his neo-patrimonial leadership, he also led a clan that was qualified by numerous observers as a mafia. Additionally, implicated in countless corruption scandals, Djukanovic has been considered a pariah since enormous cigarette smuggling took place that he supported, or even supervised, between 1995 and 2002, causing the loss of billions of Euros worth of taxes of the member states of the European Union. Finally, his regime, though elected with all of the appearances democratically, regularly intimidates the independent media. For example, Italian and German judges took interest in his case, but were hindered in their investigations by his immunity thanks to his status as Prime Minister or president.

Dominating the local structures of power, which are profoundly flooded with corruption and vote-buying, Djukanovic’s departure – at the age of only 48 – could only have been imposed from the outside. Supported primarily by Germany, the European Commission discretely made Montenegro understand that it would not gain candidate status as long as its leader remained in power. His promise to depart was thus able to drive the European Council’s decision on December 17, 2010.

In reality, Brussels exerted pressure due to the problems that were encountered during the last enlargement, which went into effect January 1, 2007. Indeed, admitted to the EU even though reservations were expressed about the integrity of their judicial systems, their level of corruption and the governmental will to fight against organized crime, Bulgaria and Romania have since been the object of an absolutely new European follow-up. Four years later, the results remain insufficient. Regularly reprimanded by the Commission for the passivity of their political elites, the two newcomers are still as tainted by corruption and organized crime. This is a true affront for the European institutions, and all the more so since the freezing of important subsidies to Bulgaria has not succeeded in changing the situation. This is the reason that the European Commission decided to change its strategy and require, henceforth, an acceptable level of combat against corruption and organized crime, occurring preferably long before any membership negotiation or at the latest just before negotiations begin. This is the credibility of a European integration project where the core remains the demonstration of a unique and completely transparent market which functions without illegal obstacles. Croatia has already been subjected to these expenses (rather belatedly), because the former Prime Minister, Ivo Sanader, has been imprisoned since December 10, 2010 in Austria, after being accused of being directly implicated in several corruption scandals that shook Croatia.

It remains to be seen whether the European Commission’s new approach will really allow for encouragement of structural reforms. In Montenegro’s case, one could express serious doubts due to the fact that the former Prime Minister, Milo Djukanovic, will not at all step down from politics and will remain at the head of the principle governmental party, DPS, which followed the old Communist League.

Accordingly, he will continue to control the government of the new Prime Minister, Igor Luksic, a 34-year-old, young technocrat. One might say that the maneuvering margin of the latter to modernize the country and initiate membership negotiations appears to be narrow. We must see here the proof that though the European Union Soft Power is perhaps successful at influencing these events, it does not succeed in modifying the structures – especially in occurrences of neo-patrimonial organizations – that are within the nations on its outskirts.

References

Giesen Klaus-Gerd, « La crise économique et l’érosion de la souveraineté monténégrine », Le Courrier des Balkans, 31 mars 2009, http://balkans.courriers.info/article12586.html
Krifa-Schneider Hadjila (Éd.), L’Élargissement de l’Union européenne, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2007.
Sajdik Martin, Scwarzinger Michael, Europen Union Enlargement, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 2008.
Telo Mario, Europe: A Civilian Power?, Basingstoke, Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007.