PAC 107 – The Protection of Intellectual Property as a Monopolistic Weapon The Sale by Google of Motorola Mobility to Lenovo

By Robin Baraud

Translation: Lawrence Myers

Passage au crible n°107

Pixabay

On Wednesday, January 29, 2014, Google announced the sale of Motorola to Lenovo for only 2.91 billion dollars, while the group had acquired it in 2012 for 12.5 billion. This resale of a pioneer of mobile telephony, which has not been corrected despite the significant job cuts, at first seems therefore to be an ill-fated transaction. But this observation must be tempered since only 2,000 of the 17,000 patents held by Motorola will ultimately be ceded to Lenovo. Besides, the latter will benefit from use agreements for part of the 15,000 others.

Historical background
Theoretical framework
Analysis
References

Historical background

Lenovo acquired international renown with its purchase of IBM’s laptop computer department in 2005. The cost of the operation proved to be equal to more than two times its own value. After having achieved the integration of this service and having changed directors – both with difficulty – in mid-May 2013, Lenovo attained the status of first producer in the world in this sector. From the beginning of this acquisition, the company was seeking a transfer of technologies as well as of the IBM image, in part thanks to the name ThinkPad, already well implanted in western markets.

About 70% of smartphones sold in the world today are equipped with an operating system developed by Android. Google makes this system available to its manufacturers as a software base; manufacturers are then able to make a certain number of modifications, which allow for adaptation to the needs of their products. Google’s partners – including the Taiwanese company HTC, the Japanese company Sony or the South-Korean company Samsung – were worried about the purchase of Motorola in 2012, fearing that the brand would eventually become the lone distributor of their products. In 2010, Google had begun to release in partnership with its manufacturers – first of all HTC, then Samsung, Asus and LG – a line of top-end model smartphones and tablets at low prices, using a non-modified operating system by Android. It was therefore logical for these firms to see Google’s strategy as a way to exclude them.

In the war that Google waged against its principal competitors, it nonetheless used the patents that it had acquired with Motorola. On February 27, 2012, it lost a major lawsuit against Apple. In the proceedings, it asked for the removal of the iPad and the iPhone, since Apple had used certain industrial properties belonging to Motorola. It clearly understood, however, the power of their control. With the sale of each one of its Android terminals, manufacturers must pay Microsoft a sum of 5 to 15 dollars to pay back the use of inventions patented by Microsoft.

From now on, thanks to the acquisition of Motorola Mobility, Lenovo has passed from the fifth to the third rank of world smartphones producers, behind Apple and Samsung. Already well-established in China on the low-end market, it currently foresees also investing in the mid-range market in order to make its appearance in American, or even European markets, starting in 2014. In this situation, Motorola’s brand image and its already-significant presence could facilitate its access. In other words, the technology transfer seems to be of secondary importance in this transaction. While on the other hand it had determined on Thursday, January 23, 2014, the purchase of an aging server farm for 2.3 billion dollars. For reasons similar to those of the Motorola Mobility dossier, Lenovo had shown Blackberry ambitions in November 2013. However, Canadian authorities had forbidden these aims, fearing that the company may become Chinese.

Theoretical framework

1. Intellectual property as a weapon of transnational competition. The deregulation of world trade was realized in parallel to the homogenization of national legislation in matters of protection of intellectual property. This concept allows firms that hold patents to legally prohibit their competitors from producing goods – material or immaterial – equivalent to theirs.
2. Research by transnational firms for a return on their monopoly. For an economic actor finding itself in a situation of monopoly, by definition no competition in its business sector is to be feared. Hence, it no longer seeks to win comparative advantages, but rather strives to unilaterally perpetuate its dominance. In fact, resisting the toughness of competitive logic always proves to be costly; this is why it appears rational to establish a monopoly to bolster its profits.

Analysis

The regime for the protection of intellectual property defended by the WTO authorizes the establishing of monopolies on patented technology. The objective involves assuring remuneration to companies on their investments in research and development. This regulatory measure of the global economy, which attempts to encourage innovation and progress, confirms the nonexistence of the ideal type of perfect competition. In the mobile telephone sector, these provisions have favored the emergence of an oligopoly composed of transnational firms. They benefit from such financial means that they hold or negotiate the utilization of numerous indispensable patents for the development of competitive products. These titles of industrial property useful for the production of portable telephones can be classed into two main categories. On the one hand, those which concern the physical part of the device, on the other hand, those relative to the software assuring their operation. However, the current competition between smartphones primarily concerns this second group. Despite the marginal contributions to existing technology – unlocking by tactile recognition by Apple for example –, the improvement of performances of the material components of the telephone remain limited due to battery life, an aspect difficult to develop.

Google has positioned itself exclusively in the realm of software development and therefore makes use of the situation. In order to set themselves apart, smartphone manufacturers using Android have developed more and more elaborate accessories. Proposed by certain smartphones, the suspension of the telephone’s sleep mode while the user is looking at the screen is an example one such strategy by Samsung. But this practice progressively hides the software base Android which becomes difficult for the consumer to recognize. This appears problematic for Google, since the products that assure its collection and analysis of personal data (Gmail, Google Maps, Google Calendar, etc.), which make its economic model viable, cease, consequently, to be highlighted. Its principal objective continues to be the establishing of a norm around which its products, like Microsoft was able to do with its computer operating systems. The interest in a global framework of this type is linked to the fact that it would be difficult to compete in so far as a large majority of users have adopted it. In other words, the conditions for a return on monopoly have been brought together.

By acquiring the Motorola patents, Google has reinforced its monopolistic capacity on the development of smartphone operating systems. Its advantage appears to be twofold. First of all, from now on, it holds the possibility of putting its primary competitors in a difficult situation by rendering innovation efforts more difficult and more costly. Otherwise, it accentuates the dependence of its partners on its Android operating system. Beyond the Motorola brand, Lenovo also possesses precious technological knowledge and benefits from the good integration of its new branch into the American market. As China is a member of the WTO, it is indeed indispensable for companies currently in China to purchase their entrance into protected markets by numerous patents, like with mobile telephony.

References

Andreff Wladimir (Éd.), La mondialisation, stade suprême du capitalisme ? Mélanges en hommage à Charles-Albert Michalet, Paris, PUN, 2013.
Chiu Justin, “Worldwide Anarchy in the Mobile Phone Market Patent War between Smartphone Manufacturers”:
Le Monde, « Google revend Motorola au chinois Lenovo mais garde les brevets », January 30, 2014, [March 2014].

PAC 106 – The Global Restructuring of the PC Industry Microsoft’s Forced Restart

By Justin Chiu

Translation: Lawrence Myers

Passage au crible n°106

Pixabay

On February 4, 2014, Satya Nadella succeeds Steve Ballmer and thus becomes the third general manager of the American giant Microsoft. As for the group’s founder, Bill Gates, he is leaving his position as president of the board of directors stating that he wishes to devote more time to the company as a technical advisor. In all reality, observers were expecting an outsider to come on board in order to overhaul the company’s current strategies. Clearly, this internal nomination is evidence of the desire to go beyond the PC industry since S. Nadella had been directing the division known as Cloud and Enterprise until his recent promotion. This division has been the sole branch within the company posting positive growth. However, in recent years, the major weakness of Microsoft as dwelt precisely in its inability to surprise and in its slow decision-making.

Historical background
Theoretical framework
Analysis
References

Historical background

In 1981, the firm IBM produced the first successful personal computer – IBM PC – selling millions of units. By choosing Microsoft and Intel and its operating system (DOS/Windows) and its microprocessor (Intel 8088), IBM furthermore contributed to the rapid growth of both companies. With respect to their products, Microsoft and Intel collectively control the structure of the PC. Since the 1980s, they have developed common strategies, simultaneously launching their new efforts. In so doing, the component manufacturers have no choice but to continuously increase their standards. According to this logic, the Wintel alliance has permitted the PC industry to be completely innovative all the while allowing Microsoft and Intel to maintain their monopoly. On the other hand, the component manufacturers must constantly lower their production costs due to competition. As a result, it is equally important that a PC running Windows software cost less than an Apple computer which keeps the entire chain of production. This in turn reinforces Microsoft’s dominance.

If Microsoft was able to make use of its software in the world market, the American government also played a significant role. In point of fact, at the beginning of the 1980s, Washington defended the protection of intellectual property, in a multilateral framework, as for example with the TRIPS Agreement (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) finalized in 1994 in the framework of the WTO (World Trade Organization) or on a bilateral level with China in order to obtain more strict regulations in this matter.

Thanks to its dominant position, we shall recall that nine out of ten computers in the world today are still equipped with Windows – Microsoft grants colossal benefits assessed at nearly 27 billion dollars in 2013. But even so the company has lost its innovative image with the emergence of social networks which have put at end to its instant messenger service MSN. Moreover, its search engine Bing, in competition with Google, has proved to be a financial catastrophe (a cumulative 9 billion dollars lost between 2005 and 2011). For that matter, in the cloud computing division, it’s Amazon that until now has taken the upper hand. Ultimately, Google and Apple have succeeded in developing their own smartphone and tablet ecosystems, while Microsoft and Intel are struggling to penetrate this market.

Theoretical framework

1. The creative destruction of digital innovation. Created by Schumpeter, the concept of creative destruction designates a process of industrial change during which the creation of new economic activities brings about the disappearance of more obsolete activities in a given domain. According to the economist Schumpeter, several types of innovation can trigger this process, including the manufacturing of innovative products, previously unseen production or management methods, the opening of untapped markets, etc.
2. The control of the production structure. For two decades, the alliance between Microsoft and Intel has dominated the world PC market along with the norms and standards created jointly by the two groups. Yet, the structural power – concept dear to Susan Strange – exercised by the coalition Wintel on the digital component manufacturers is today largely weakened. Admittedly, the two firms are no longer capable of dictating their personal production rules to the rest of the world. This is even truer for Microsoft which has lost its reputation as an innovative leader following its series of failures.

Analysis

Begun in the 1980s, the convergence of information technology and telecommunications has facilitated the arrival of smartphones and tablet computers, goods intended for the global market. If the PC industry continues to resist this digital wave, its stakeholders will have to innovate more and diversify their activities in order to slow down the decline of this sector which henceforth has become the traditional activity of the high-tech industry.

Undoubtedly, the first objective of S. Nadella’s nomination will be the reinforcement of the cloud-computing division. This will include a host of online information technology services dedicated to companies and public administrators. This new manager will then be able to realize the buyback of Nokia’s cellular division, a deal sealed by S. Ballmer in December 2013. However, it appears difficult to imagine that the combination of the two fallen stars of the high-tech world will be able to produce attractive smartphones. These tiny handhelds lie at the heart of our daily lives and have become so personal and intimate that we must also take into consideration the symbolic value that consumers give them. Moreover, in order to increase its share of the market, Microsoft will certainly not allow itself to produce low-end models. Thus, with a price deemed too high, the tablet that Microsoft created in 2012 – the Surface – does not seem to have been met with definite success. Ultimately, the delay that it endured with Intel in its smartphone and tablet industry hindered Microsoft from taking initiative.

Additionally, the Windows 8 operating system on the market since October 2012, has elicited neither enthusiasm nor replacement of computing hardware. This new phenomenon has disappointed its manufacturers. Acer’s manager was even quoted as saying, “The Wintel era is over” because some manufacturers now prefer to collaborate with other Internet giants like Amazon or Google. Case in point, Google has created products with Asian firms, formerly faithful allies of Microsoft: here we can name the assortment of portable PCs known as Chromebook developed by the Korean Samsung and the Taiwanese Acer, or else the series of Nexus smartphones created with the Korean LG and the Taiwanese Asus.

At any rate, even if Microsoft has lost its reputation as an innovator as well as its structural power in the information technology sector, it should be noted that the other American Internet giants continue to insure that the United States will maintain its global supremacy. Until now, only Google, Apple, Amazon and Facebook have been able to create their own ecosystems based on new technologies and have shown themselves capable of moving closer to manufacturers from around the world.

References

Chiu Justin, « L’anarchie mondiale dans la téléphonie mobile », in : Josepha Laroche (Éd.), Passage au crible, l’actualité internationale 2012, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2013, pp. 117-122.
Kim Sangbae, Hart J. A., « The Global Political Economy of Wintelism: A New Mode of Power and Governance in the Global Computer Industry », in : Rosenau James, Singh J. P. (Éds.), Information Technologies and Global Politics, The Changing Scope of Power and Governance, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2002, pp. 143-168.
Laroche Josepha, « L’Économie politique international », in : Balzacq T., Ramel F. (Éds.), Traité de relations internationales, Paris, Presses de Science Po, 2013, pp. 631-659.
Le Monde, « Avec Satya Nadella, Microsoft mise sur l’après-PC », 5 fév. 2014.
Reich Robert, The Works of Nations. Preparing Ourselves for 21st-Century Capitalism, New York, Vintage Books Edition, 1992.
Schumpeter Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, [1943], Londres, Routledge, 2010. Stopford John, Strange Susan, Henley John., Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991. Strange Susan, States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy, Londres, Pinter, 2e éd, 1994.

PAC 22 – The Global building of Scarcity The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Project

By Alexandre Bohas

Passage au crible n°22

After secret negotiations, the European Union, the United States and Japan, joined by a dozen of other states elaborated in April 2010 a treaty entitled ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement). The aim was to impose more restrictive norms in the field of intellectual property.

Historical background
Theoretical framework
Analysis
References

Historical background

With the globalisation of economic-cultural exchanges and the rise of new information technologies, developed countries – strongly supported by transnational firms – have encouraged the international recognition of intellectual rights. Accordingly, the TRIPS agreement (Trade-Related Issues of Intellectual Property) was concluded in 1994 in the framework of the WTO (World Trade Organisation). It was then transposed in state-members’ legislations with the assistance of international organisations, advocacy networks and firms. However, this transposition generated strong reactions – in Brazil and South Africa – notably in the pharmaceutical sector about the AIDS treatment.

After 2007, while the United States encountered difficulties during the Doha Cycle, it led secret talks on the subjects of counterfeiting with the European Union, Switzerland and Japan joined by Australia, Canada, South Korea, Jordan, Morocco, Mexico, New Zealand and Singapore. In April 2010, the draft of the treaty has been finally released.

Theoretical framework

1. The legal and political structuration of capitalism.In a market economy, the capital accumulation lies in legal and political structures. Assisted by industrialised states, major corporations, owners of brand, copyrights and patents, have undertaken to widen and deepen their stranglehold in privatising more and more intellectual property goods. Whereas the latter are non-rival – their actual use not endangering future uses – firms wish to receive a fee per every purchase. In doing so, they « build scarcity » according to the phrase of Christopher May, and assure substantial income.
2. An unequal access to intellectual property governance. In a globalised world, this regulation mechanism is often regarded as respecting all the stakeholders. In this respect, it continues to nourish projects of cosmopolitan democracy on a global scale. Yet, this is not the case. To the contrary it confirms the domination of transnational firms and Western governments in a domain which involves civil society, consumers, and developing countries.

Analysis

Described as a modest effort of customs coordination, ACTA marks actually a major turning point. It proposes firstly a reinforcement of cooperation in the matters of data-sharing on counterfeiting acts particularly perpetrated on the internet. In addition, it reinforces the 61 article of TRIPS since it criminalises non-commercial individual behaviour such as Peer-To-Peer activities. Fundamentally, it harmonises legislations according to a strong approach of intellectual property protection by generalising the harshest practices and doctrines put in place fragmentarily and partially in national legislations. Let’s note that its formulation remains particularly vague concerning its mandatory nature and its enforcing domains, which hides asymmetrical power struggles between states, firms and civil societies. Once signed then ratified, it will support in each nation proponents of an always higher intellectual property protection. The latter supporters now press Western governments to assure a lego-political structuration of the world economy which is likely to assure a situation rent and a long-term prosperity to intellectual property companies.

Dealing with controversial questions, stakeholders of ACTA wished to come with an agreement at the margins of the world scene. Yet, this way of doing goes against new power struggles, notably the determining presence of emerging powers such as the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) whose development implies the purchase and import of intellectual rights. For all that these countries have been excluded from talks while they have already provided important efforts in the domain of copyright and patent protection with TRIPS. This method of negotiation shows the wish to impose brutally international norms once they are already negotiated, which reduces all the more possible contestations. In the same logic, it reduces to silence governmental and non-governmental organisations which could have reacted and mobilised public opinions. In this sense, the internal logic belongs more to the « raison d’Etat » than the « raison du monde » notion that Philip Cerny coined.

Talks of the ACTA project belongs to a politics of fait accompli. In doing this, they contradict the world diffusion of political authority which characterized now international relations. In fact, the number of issue-areas to deal with as much as the dispersion of legitimacy oblige now international policymakers to take into account developing countries and non state actors, and in the framework of multilateralism to take decisions by consensus. Consequently it is not surprising that these procedures provoke hostile reactions from developing countries and civil societies.

References

Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. Public Predecisional/Deliberative Draft, April 2010, available on: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc_146029.pdf.
Bohas Alexandre, Disney. Un capitalisme mondial du rêve, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2010.
Cerny Philip G., Rethinking World Politics. A Theory of Transnational Pluralism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010.
EFF, « Preliminary Analysis of the Officially Released ACTA Text », April 2010, available on: http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/eff-analysis-officially-released-acta-text.
FFII, « Analysis Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement », April 2010, available on: http://action.ffii.org/acta
/Analysis#Executive_Summary.
May Christopher, The Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights: The New Enclosures, 2nd Ed., London, Routledge, 2010.
Sell Susan, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

PAC 11 – Between Global Solidarity and Strategic Donor Competition The Catastrophe of Torrential Floods in Pakistan, July 2010

By Clément Paule

Translation: Davina Durgana

Passage au crible n°11

On October 29th, 2010, many spokespeople for the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations have reaffirmed their worries regarding the fragile situation of millions of displaced Pakistanis. These alarming statements emphasize the lack of shelter and food with the approach of winter, three months after the downfall of torrential rain that have ravaged Pakistan. Since the 26th of July 2010, the massive floods have in effect reached almost a fifth of the country, from the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – located in the Northwest – all the way to the Southern region of Sindh. For now, the human death toll has risen to nearly 1800 deaths and around 14 million victims. According to the material damages, it can be estimated that 43 million dollars from the agriculture sector – crucial to the national economy – has been deeply affected. According to U.N. officials, this could be the worst catastrophe in the history of Pakistan. Henceforth, many analysts have brought up the uncertain future of a destabilized State that will intensify the internal conflict of opposition to the authorities by Islamist groups.

Historical background
Theoretical framework
Analysis
References

Historical background

In the first place, it must be emphasized that Pakistan – the 6th most populated country in the world – is particularly vulnerable to natural risks, above all seismic and hydrological. Since the beginning of the 1990s, many significant floods have struck this territory equally vulnerable to earthquakes. Recall for example the 6 million people that were affected – including more than 1300 deaths – by the strong rains accompanying the monsoon of the winter of 1992. The Emergency Events Database of the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters has accounted for dozens of similar phenomena since 1900. For now, the rising numbers as well as the socio-economic costs tied to this type of disaster appear to have much greater of an impact than large earthquakes as well as incurring more deaths.

Then, it is important to recall certain historical precedents establishing a structural link between the management of catastrophes and the political situation. In this respect, the cyclone of Bhola that hit Eastern Pakistan – currently Bangladesh – in November 1970 seemed to reveal this interdependence. The passivity of the Federal Government had them stigmatized by the separatist opposition – The Awami League – allowing them at the last moment to win the provincial elections a month later and to proclaim the Bengali secession. If the success of this secession had a lot to do with the Indian involvement in the conflict, it was not less so than this natural disaster that was strongly exploited by political actors. Finally, the recent earthquake of October 2005 – which occurred in the disputed region of Kashmir – has equally evoked a powerful transnational mobilization. However, there are many tensions due to those opposed to Western non-governmental organizations and the Pakistani army critical of their supervision, minimize their assistance. Ultimately, the national agency, the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority that had been put in place by the authorities to centralize aid flows, were accused of corruption and massive embezzlement.

Theoretical framework

1. Internationalization of the Catastrophe. It is important to recall here that disaster is inscribed in a system of historical, political and strategic pressures. With this logic, the international dynamics of humanitarian intervention must be analyzed with a perspective to these regional issues.
2. Concurrent Aid Management. Obviously, there are many divides that pervade the space of the aid operators and determine the distribution of scarce resources and its terms. In other words, the dispersion of strategies – and of objectives – transforms aid into an object of competition, extending diplomatically to the heart of the Pakistani State.

Analysis

Clearly, in the first place, certain characteristics of this catastrophe present a slow process – contrary to the tsunami of 2004 or the Haitian earthquake – where the impact manifested in the mid-term. In this instance, the damages incurred by the floods are decreased by the economic crisis that has clamped down on this country that has recently called to the International Monetary Fund. Emphasized by the four million hectares of arable land that were submerged, Pakistan is restricted to the importation of foodstuffs to attempt to prevent a probable soaring in prices. And yet, this leaves the prediction of a rise in social tensions in a State already profoundly divided by ethnic conflicts – tied to a contested centralization – religious and overall political. In this regard, it is important to recall the specific role of military that took power from 1999 to 2008 with General Musharraf, and their ambivalent relations to the current civil government. In addition to this view, the national authorities – traditionally allied with the United States – have been facing for a decade an insurrection of armed groups tied to the Afghan Taliban. This complex configuration of opposing interests has been re-transcribed in the post-disaster crisis. Additionally, the management of the disaster seems to be a way of changing the existing relationships of power, for both local and international actors.

Behind the consensual rhetoric of the global solidarity demonstrates, in effect, a true catastrophe of diplomacy formed by the strategic objectives of donors. To this end, it must be mentioned that American aid has risen to almost a half-million dollars. If this commitment could permit the ameliorating of the image of Washington – marred by the mistakes in the war in Afghanistan – they could sustain overall a traditional and indispensible ally for their regional establishment. This imperative of national security, according to the expression of Senator John Kerry, has been confirmed by the recent announcement of military assistance of two million dollars in five years. In this same logic, the considerable mobilization of the Muslim world can hardly be reduced to a simple expression of mutual aid. Additionally, the Saudi contributions – 365 million dollars – and Iranian – 100 million – evokes their influence as an approach of soft power aiming to affirm their presence in the disaster-struck region. In the same manner, their Chinese neighbors, emergent donors, have promised nearly 250 million the 23rd of September 2010. In addition, the entanglement of symbolic and political dimensions are expressed in the refusal of the Pakistani Government to accept direct aid from its Indian rival.

Remarking equally on the process of the appeal of the United Nations – in requesting from this point forward 1.9 million dollars – have not assembled to this day, but 39% of the solicited sum. After the world crisis, the forms of financing allowed the explanation of this shortcoming: Muslim countries and China seemed to give priority to bilateral aid, while the Western donors do not trust them and attribute all of their funds to the United Nations System, to non-governmental organizations, or also to the International Movement of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Movement. For now, the Pakistani authorities have recently attempted to affirm their leadership on the reconstruction plan in refusing the direct control of projects by external actors. This demand for control of aid seems to be vital for a weakened government, which was very criticized for its inefficiency, notably for their regional officials. Moreover, according to certain analysts, the strong mobilization of the army – 60,000 soldiers were deployed at the end of August – has eclipsed civil power and has made possible a coup d’état similar to that of 1999. Finally, other commentators have emphasized the growing role of Islamist organizations – such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa or Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat – in the assistance, likely to accentuate the delegitimizing of a regime allied with Americans. This extreme fragility of the Pakistani state, especially on their borders, reinforces the necessity of international aid where the donor’s local mastery is not crucial.

References

Jaffrelot Christophe (Éd.), Le Pakistan, carrefour de tensions régionales, Bruxelles, Complexe, 2002.
OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), FTS (Financial Tracking Service), Table A: List of All Commitments/Contributions and Pledges as of 02 November 2010, 2 novembre 2010, consulté sur le site : http://www.reliefweb.int/fts [2 novembre 2010].
Questions internationales, « Les catastrophes naturelles », (19), mai-juin 2006.
Site internet de l’agence pakistanaise NDMA (National Disaster Management Authority) : http://www.ndma.gov.pk/.