Apr 15, 2012 | Africa, Passage au crible (English), Security, Terrorism
By Philippe Hugon
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible 64
Sahara. Pixabay
In Mali, in a context of failure of both political power and of the army, Touareg rebels of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA or MNLA), acting jointly with Islamic movements have unilaterally proclaimed, in May 2012, the independence of Azawad. This situation, which leads to the de facto secession of Mali has already led to the fleeing of numerous Malians leaving in the North of the country. Timbuktu, The Mecca of the Sahara, is henceforth controlled by Ansar Dine , whereas some Algerians are known to have been taken hostages in Gao. Beyond these conflicts, the whole Sahelo-Saharan region is concerned.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
These Touareg movements have existed for some time. Colonial France had opposed Touareg warriors during World War I – while at the same time enrolling them in the Saharan Meharist Companies. At the turn of the 4th and 5th Republics, around 1958, the Common Organisation for Saharan Regions (COSR or OCRS) had as its ambition to create an independent Touareg space, notably to dissociate from Algeria the hydrocarbon-rich Sahara. Azawad has been marked since the independence of Mali by cycles of rebellion, of repression and of negotiation. Kaddafi’s regime had thus recruited in 1972 numerous Touaregs from its Islamic region and periodically revived tensions, before imposing itself as negotiator. However, agreements acknowledging more autonomy and rights to the Touaregs have generally remained a dead letter. The recent downfall of the Kaddafi regime has reactivated these antagonisms, on account of migrants and mercenaries returning home equipped with heavy armament.
One can note nowadays a novel amplitude and nature of claims present. To be sure, the NMLA movement (3000 heavily armed men) has proclaimed independence in rupture with former claims which dealt hitherto simply with equality of rights, a greater autonomy and a lessened marginalisation of Northern Mali. To do so, it was backed by Islamist militias, the Ansar Dine of Lyad ag-Ghali Movement – which advocates Charia – and the MUJAO or UMJWA (Unity Movement for Jihad in West Africa), both having links with Al Qaida Maghreb Islamique or AQMI and even, according to certain sources, with Boko Haram.
Theoretical framework
1. The weakness of the State. The mutiny of rank-and-file military quickly became a putsch with accusations of laxity, nay connivance between the political power and the rebel movements. President Amadou Toumani Touré quickly had to give up his position and National Assembly President Traoré was designated as the transition head of State. This politico-institutional crisis, however, bears testimony first and foremost to the extreme weakness, if not the vacuum of the State. In a country where one witnesses a demographic explosion made worse by recurrent draughts, the situation is marred by traffics of all kinds (cocaine, automobiles, hostages, weaponry), armed conflicts (various Katibas, Al Qaida Maghreb Islamique, Touareg movements) as well as rivalries linked to mining and to the oil industry. This situation brings extreme weakness to portions of population exposed to tensions as recurrent as ancestral (between sedentary farmers and nomadic herdsmen, between descendants of razzia raiders victims of raids).
2. The mounting power of non-State actors. The saharo-Sahelan arc brings together the conditions necessary for non-State actors (such as the NMLA, the Mujao, etc.), however heterogeneous, may now extend their grip on the territory.
Analysis
The objectives of the NMLA (the independence of Azawad), that of Ansar Dine (to establish the Charia in Mali) and that of certain Katibas of AQMI (to set up a khalifat of Mauritania and Somalia) differ. A priori, links appear limited between the djihadist Salafists of AQMI and the Berber Touaregs, who are part of the Malekite branch, which is opened to the Soufism of the Tidjânyia or Kandinya brotherhoods and crossbred with animism. However, the territories where AQMI reins remain the same ones as those where Touaregs are deployed. As to the Adrar region of the Ifaghas, it seems to be a sanctuary for certain katibas. Morever, connivance of interests exist undoubtedly within the control of cocaine- and weapon-trafficking even if some were hoping that the Touareg mercenaries who had returned from Libya would mobilize to oppose AQMI.
Actors concerned by the Malian crisis appear most diverse. Algeria cannot accept the independence of Azawad. Northern Niger shelters some 700 000 Touaregs and is close to Northern Mali. The ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) is concerned by the regional dimension of the conflict: the Community can utilize, within the ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group) a Force of between 2000 to 3000 men. However, history shows the low efficiency of ECOWAS troops and this Force would require time before it proved efficient, besides the fact that it would be confronted with problems of logistics. France has for its part been present in the onset of the crisis with the collateral effects of the NATO intervention in Libya, and is felt to be close to the Touareg movements and to be directly concerned by the future of the hostages at a time of elections. France has thus asked its citizens to temporarily leave Mali, without doing as much as intervene militarily.
Humanitarian drama is enhanced by the incoming flows of refugees (200 000 on Malian territory and in neighboring countries, Burkina Faso, Niger, Algeria – as of March 2012) as well as of displaced peoples. The disorganization of production and the impossibility for humanitarian actions to take place normally make the situation all the worse. A mobilization of international aid appears therefore urgent. The independence of Azawad has no legitimacy but the de facto secession will endure. However, solutions seem less military as diplomatic and economic.
References
Boiley Pierre, Les Touaregs Kel Adagh. Dépendances et révoltes du Soudan français au Mali, Paris, Karthala, 1999
Bourgeot André (Éd.), Horizons nomades en Afrique sahélienne, Paris, Kathala, 1999.
GEMDEV, Mali-France. Regards pour une histoire partagée, Paris Karthala, 2005
Hugeux Vincent, Thilay Boris, « Les 12 plaies du Mali », L’express, 11-17 avril 2012w
Hugon Philippe, Géopolitique de l’Afrique, Paris, SEDES, 3e ed. 2012.
Apr 8, 2012 | Global Public Goods, Passage au crible (English)
By Alexandre Bohas
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°63
Qatar. Baie de l’Ouest. Pixabay
Qatar regularly features high in newspaper headlines for its acquisition of works of art. The reining family, aware of the limited resources of their territory, has invested abroad. This paper seeks to understand this involvement in the field of art, reputed uncertain and unproductive.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In tune with the increase in hydrocarbon prices and the financial crisis, Qatar’s micro-monarchy has been proceeding with several investments in various strongholds of the world economy. It already owns luxurious touristic institutions such as the Carlton, the Royal Monceau, Harrods and the Savoy Hotels. It holds also minority participations in French multinationals: Vinci, Lagardère, Vivendi, Total, LVMH, Suez Environnement, as well as in European ones: Volkswagen, Porsche or Barclays.
Beside these assets, the Qatari monarchy is also buying masterpieces by famous painters. In 2011, it ranked 1st in the list of the greatest investors on the art market. One estimates that, in just seven years, US exports to Qatar represent US$ 428 million. For instance, in 2009, the Emirate bought the Rothko of Ezra Merkin, the financer, for US$ 310 million, only two years after buying those of the Rockfeller collection. Similarly, Qatar acquired for € 45 million Euros the Claude Berri Fund, originally destined to France. And, in order to exhibit these works of art, Qatar calls upon the greatest, internationally-recognized architects. The Qatari National Museum was thus designed by Jean Nouvel ; the Museum of Islamic Art, inaugurated in 2008, was designed by the Sino-American Pei ; and the Museum of Modern Art by Jean-François Bodin.
Theoretical framework
The anarchical society of the international. Although anarchy characterizes the international sphere, such a situation can take on various forms and is, to be sure, shaped by ideological and material factors, so that it is rather akin to an « international society » (Hedley Bull) than to the perpetual war depicted by the realists. Its members are drawn to entertain cooperative relations, to participate in institutions and to internalize common values, such as loyalty and mutual recognition.
The paradoxical power of small states. While these are often neglected by internationalists, theories relevant for them tend to restrict them to diplomacies aimed at the promotion of norms, of peace and of humanitarian operations (Christine Ingebritsen). Yet, in the recent years, there has been a relative decline of great powers and a contrario, the « Lilliputian States » (Robert Keohane) seem to have benefited from a globalization marked by an intensification of relations as well as from a surge of transnational actors. In such a dynamic, several of them seems to be at the outposts as they concentrate huge amounts of capital and as they position themselves as unavoidable nexi of financial, cultural, commercial and human flows.
Analysis
Taking advantage of the rapid mutations of capitalism and of the world order, Katzenstein’s observations as to the adaptation and the resistance of small States are being confirmed. In effect, globalization has intensified inter-sectoral competition, causes the formation of “économies-monde” as well as the concentration of riches. Thus, power no longer supposes simply the control of the productive and distributive capacities that ensure the independence, if not the autonomy, of Nation-States. Conversely, power is rather derived from the authority and the radiance resulting from the possession of one or several of these nexi of global attraction. In other words, the logic consists not in withdrawing oneself from the international game but on the contrary to find in it a position of prime relevance. For instance, if the United States today keep up nowadays a structural preponderance, this is due also to the central position of Hollywood in the cinema industry, or Wall Street in the world finance, or the Silicon Valley in the new technologies of information and communication.
In a world today having become fragmented and organized in archipelagos, small-sized countries are prompt to polarize around a specific field. This is why some of them, like Qatar, are experiencing a spectacular development. Similarly to Singapore or even to tax heavens, Qatar seeks now to specialize in the world of knowledge and fine arts. These sectors are to enable the country to reach world recognition as a protective rampart against threatening neighbors such as Saudi Arabia or Iran; and they are to contribute to the development of a territory that derives the better part of its resources from the gas industry. Let us remind ourselves that Qatar launched in 1996 the world-famous television channel Al-Jazira, which has since imposed itself in and onto the audiovisual landscape. The kingdom then went on to welcoming artists seeking asylum from Iraq, while its leaders are proving great collectors of art. Moreover, it has attracted several universities, such as the American Georgetown, Northwestern, Carnegie and Cornell, or the European from Stenden and Canadians from Calgary and North Atlantic, who have settled and developed complete curricula in the country. This strategy resembles that of Abu Dhabi, a state which embarked upon the construction of branches for the Le Louvre and the Guggenheim museums not long after inaugurating campuses of Paris-Sorbonne, HEC and New York universities, even one for the Beirut Saint Joseph University.
All in all, this policy of cultural grandeur demonstrates rather well that power cannot equated solely with capacities and geostrategic resources but results pointedly from world transformations which create opportunities for certain, hitherto neglected, actors. Enjoying an autonomous form of government and formally sovereign – in accordance with their statist character – these attract non-state organizations, such as economic firms, in order to form themselves into attractive centers within globalization.
References
« A Smithsonian in the Sand », The Economist, 29 Dec. 2010.
Barthe Benjamin, « Qatar. Les ambitions démesurées d’une micro-monarchie », Le Monde, 25 fév. 2012, pp. 4-5. Supplément Géo et Politique.
Bull Hedley, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, New-York, Columbia University Press, 1977.
« Ce que le Qatar possède en Europe », Challenges, 14 fév. 2012.
Elkamel Sara, « Qatar Becomes World’s Biggest Buyer of Contemporary Art », The Guardian, 13 July 2011.
Hartvig Nicolai, « Qatar Looks to Balance Its Arts Scene », New York Times, 6 Jan. 2012.
Ingebritsen Christine, “Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics”, Cooperation and Conflict, 1 (37), 2002, pp. 11-23.
Katzenstein Peter J., Small States in World Market: Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1985.
Katzenstein Peter J., « Small States and Small States Revisited », New Political Economy, 8 (1), 2003.
Keohane Robert O., « Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics », International Organization, 2 (23), Spring 1969, pp. 291-310.
Laroche Josepha (Éd.), La Loyauté dans les relations internationales, 2e éd., Paris, Harmattan, 2011.
Le Grand Dominique , « Le Qatar, premier acheteur d’art », Le Soir, 2 août 2011.
Waage Hilde Henriksen, « The ‘Minnow’ and the ‘Whale’: Norway and the United States in the Peace Process in the Middle East », British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 34 (2), Aug. 2007, pp. 157-176.
Mar 28, 2012 | Uncategorized
By Yves Poirmeur
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°62
Pixabay
On 3rd February 2012, the Red Khmer Kaing Guek Eav, alias ‘Dutch’, was sentenced on appeal to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity, serious violations of the Geneva conventions, manslaughter and torture by the extraordinary chambers of the Cambodian courts. In the 1970s, ‘Dutch’ had been at the head of the Phnom Penh secret Detention Centre S 21. This sentence extends the thirty-five year imprisonment judgement of the first trial and cancels the compensation granted him for his illegal detention by the Cambodian military court between 1999 and 2007. This sanction comes late and over thirty years after the death, between 1975 and 1979, of at least 12 272 victims in the prisoners camp under the direct supervision of ‘Dutch’. It is still an exemplary sanction, which marks the progress of the fight against the impunity of the perpetrators of the worst international crimes.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The creation of extraordinary chambers entrusted with the task of judging the high-ranking officials of Kampuchea and the highest culprits of the genocide having led to nearly two millions victims was made possible after an evolution of particularly chaotic power relations. The Paris agreements (1991) had at first favoured the national reconciliation and provided for the integration of Red Khmers into political life, rather than their prosecution. It is the failure of this process, made complete with the “outlawing of the clique of democratic Kampuchea” (Act of 7th July 1994), the falling-in of one of their leaders, Leng Sary, pardoned by the King and the condemnation of Pol Pot by his own army (June 1997), which led the Cambodian government, in search of international legitimacy, to seek UN support in order to prosecute Red Khmer leaders. This request for help was accepted by the UN General Assembly (Resolution 52/135, 12th December 1997). The setting-up of a third International Criminal Tribunal (ICT), alongside those already created by the security council to prosecute regime officials having violated humanitarian international law in Yugoslavia (TPIY, 1993) and committed the genocide in Rwanda (TPIR, 1994) did not meet the expectations of the Cambodian government, who wished to retain control of his penal actions for reasons of national security and had already promulgated to that effect an Act which provided for the creation of extraordinary Chambers (10 June 2001). Such an ICT, besides stirring up the opposition of China and the reticence of many States at having to fund yet another international court, could not rest on a legal foundation such as the existence of a threat against peace and security (UN Charter, art. 41), because the crimes in question had occurred so long ago.
Theoretical framework
1. A negotiated justice. Differently from International Criminal Tribunals created unilaterally by the Security Council (Chapter VII), internationalised penal jurisdictions rest on a contractual foundation. A bilateral agreement, taking for granted the existence of a State with which the UN can negotiate the setting-up of penal courts specialised in the repression of precisely-defined international crimes, establishes on a case-by-case basis 1) the creation of the tribunals, 2) their modus operandi, 3) their mode of financing and 4) specifies the respective rights and obligations of the signatories. Such a negotiation has the disadvantage of being slow but it offers the advantage of bringing the State to subscribe to a body of substantial obligations regarding the operations of the jurisdiction as well as the rules of penal law. The negotiation follows these rules while imposing demanding criteria of justice in exchange for international support and for the legitimacy which, in returns, it offers.
2. The internationalisation of national penal courts. The extraordinary Chambers belong to the Cambodian judiciary system. However, the UN remains narrowly associated with their management and their operations. The UN assumes the better part of their expenses and intervenes in the designation of certain of their members, which makes them mixed jurisdictions.
Analysis
It is after a very long process of negotiation conducted between Cambodia and the UN General Secretary that a bilateral agreement on the modalities of international cooperation for “the prosecution, according to Cambodian law, of perpetrators of crimes committed during the period of the democratic Kampuchea”, was signed on 6th June 2003. The fruit of a compromise, this internationalised justice is characterised fundamentally by a ‘mix’ (mixité), which generates ambiguities. This appears foremost in the composition and the administration of the extraordinary Chambers, which are managed by an administrative Bureau headed by a Cambodian director and a vice-director appointed by the UN. These Chambers are composed of a first-degree court with five judges, three Cambodian and two foreign, and an appeals Chamber of the Supreme Court with seven members, four Cambodian and three foreign. The inquests and the prosecuting are in the charge of, respectively, two judges and two prosecutors, of whom one is a Cambodian and the other a foreigner. Judges and prosecutors are appointed by royal decree. The judge, the prosecutor and the international judges are chosen, respectively, by the Supreme Council of the magistracy from three lists drawn up by the UN General Secretary. Although the international judges are the minority and do not preside over any decisive organ, decisions cannot be reached without the approval of at least one of them, as they are decisions by qualified majorities of at least four judges in the first instance and of five judges in appeal. Still, foreign judges can never impose their judgement without the support of at least two Cambodian magistrates, which casts a doubt on the independence of these jurisdictions, the appointment to which rests with the national authorities. Last, a pre-trial Chamber resolves eventual disagreements between prosecutors and judges.
This hybridity is also derived from the law, which these jurisdictions apply. The latter are competent not only for crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes such as defined by international criminal law, but also, subsidiarily, for offenses of common law provided for by the Cambodian penal code of 1956 to which the law having created them refers (art. 3), namely manslaughter, torture and religious persecutions. As their rationae personae competence is limited to the sole “high-ranking officials” and “highest culprits”, such an extension of the incriminations concerned offers the advantage to enable prosecuting them when elements constitutive of international crimes are not present. This however is at the expense of a modification of the rules of prescription as established at the time when the facts were committed, which hardly agrees with the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law. As to the penal procedure that is applied, it ascribes to Cambodian procedural law but subject to the conformity of this law to the principles of international law, in particular to the rules of a right to an equitable trial.
If the conviction of ‘Dutch’ bears testimony to the undeniable interest of the mechanism of internationalised jurisdictions when it comes to fighting against the worst international crimes, the modalities of the institutionalisation of extraordinary Chambers enhance the capacity of the political to largely leave room for impunity.
References
Martineau Anne-Charlotte, Les Juridictions pénales internationalisées. Un nouveau modèle de justice hybride ?, Paris, Pedone, 2007
Boyle David, Lengrand Julie, « Le retrait des négociations pour un tribunal mixte au Cambodge », Actualité et droit international, mars 2002 ;
Ung Boun-Hor, « Le drame cambodgien : des victimes en quête de justice », in : Gaboriau Simone, Pauliat Hélène (Éds.), La Justice pénale internationale, Limoges, Presses Universitaires de Limoges, 2002.
Mar 17, 2012 | environment, Global Public Health, Passage au crible (English)
By Valérie Le Brenne
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°61
Wikimédia
On February 13th, 2012, the high court of Lyon, France, ruled that the American firm Monsanto was guilty of the poisoning of a grain farmer by a pesticide, Lasso, banned in France since 2007. The court then required an expert’s report in order to determine the amount of damages which the firm is to pay in compensation to the victim. In France, this first conviction could constitute a precedent, should further cases linked to the use of this chemical come before the courts.
This case, linked to the many health and sanitary scandals involving the American firm, Monsanto, raises the issue of the need to regulate the use of phytosanitary chemicals.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In 2004, a grain farmer inhaled toxic fumes while inspecting a tank on his property. After the accident, medical analyses revealed a contamination due to monochlorobenzene, a solvent used in a pesticide, Lasso. In 2008, the Mutualité Sociale Agricole or MSA, an agricultural insurance fund, established a cause-to-effect link between the farmer’s neurological disorders and the use of the phytosanitary chemical. This led to the admission of his disability as a professional disease. The farmer then filed a suit in civil liability against the giant American firm, Monsanto, which made him the spokesperson of victims of pesticides in France.
One should recall that during the 1960s, experts in demography had pointed to the increase of the world population and warned about the risks of food shortages. The objective of raising agricultural outputs thus imposed itself onto all western societies. Urged on by national governments, farmers therefore invested heavily in order to modernize their activities. This ‘green revolution’ led to the mechanization of production, land restructuration, the use of synthetic inputs, the selection and hybridization of cultivations and crops.
The American firm Monsanto, founded in 1901 in St Louis, Missouri, represents an emblematic instance of a firm having benefited from this context and hoisted itself to the level of a major player in the agrochemical sector. Yet, the world reputation of this conglomerate is often marred by sanitary and environmental scandals.
Theoretical framework
Two lines of reasoning are relevant.
1. A technological acceleration. in order to anticipate agricultural needs, agrochemical firms develop products aiming at improving agricultural outputs. They thus contribute to the process of ‘technological acceleration’, as Susan Strange conceptualized it. At the same time, these firms gradually cover sectors hitherto monitored by the sole State actor and thereby keep on chipping at the regulatory capacity of the State.
2. A failed regulatory capacity. Pointing to numerous sanitary scandals, ‘sovereignty-free actors’ – to quote James Rosenau – gradually favored the emergence and the dissemination of norms in the field of the world governance of phytosanitary products. Yet, the persistence of conflicts of interest between market dynamics and health interests or sanitary stakes seems to have triggered a lack of precaution as well as an inadequacy of the State regulatory mechanisms.
Analysis
The conviction of Monsanto by the high court in Lyon shows the extent to which agricultural practices have been transformed under the impact of the green revolution. To be sure, the increase in world population induces a constant pressure on agricultural products. Farmers, in order to reduce the risks of food shortages and remain competitive, must continue to expand the outputs of their crops. For chemical firms, the agricultural sector thus represents a substantial market on which to position themselves. These firms therefore develop and sell chemicals aimed at improving the level of agricultural productivity. While fuelling the process of ‘technological acceleration’, these private actors thus contribute also to the reversal in power relations between the State actor and the markets. While assuming responsibility for sectors hitherto subject to State monitoring, these firms substantially curtail the capacity of public authorities to intervene. Henceforth, the regulatory power of the State is only exercised marginally, outside markets. The conviction of the Monsanto firm by the Lyon high court, symbolic as it might be, shows the regulatory limits in France as to phytosanitary products. One must recall that France is both the number one agricultural producer in Europe as well as the number one consumer of pesticides. The intertwining of agricultural and economic stakes has long eclipsed the sanitary impact of pesticides and begotten a lack of precaution on the part of States.
Yet, the numerous denunciations of agrochemical firms by actors of the civil society have gradually led to the elaboration and dissemination of norms in the field of phytosanitary products. From this perspective, several agencies of health safety were set up in France during the 1990s in order to prevent, early on, the risks linked to the use of chemical inputs in agriculture. This led, at the European level, to the adoption of Directives aimed at the harmonization of the conditions in which pesticides are put on the market in Member-States. These regulatory mechanisms, in constant evolution, are built on the basis of an accumulation of experiences and often enter into force only after the putting on the market of the products in question. One might as well state how ineffective these preventive mechanisms are for farmers and farm workers, a population foremost exposed to these products. The increase in the numbers of cancer patients and the multiplication of neurological disorders remain among the principal professional diseases linked to the use of pesticides. However, the gradual recognition by the MSA of these medical conditions contributes to the emergence of a professional claim. Despite an important phenomenon of self-censorship, a number of farmers are now mobilizing some of the modi operandi displayed by environmental NGOs in order to bring their concerns to the attention of public authorities.
In all, damages caused by the unreasoned use of pesticides constitute today a precedent in the field of the effort to regulate biotechnologies, notably at a time when agrochemical firms suggest that GMOs are an alternative to the use of phytosanitory products. In this vein, certain European States show more and more reserve when it comes to authorizing the import of these seeds into their territory. One must yet underline that the logic of the market leads these firms to turn to developing counties in order to export banned phytosanitory products and commercialize transgenic seeds.
References
Champion Emmanuelle, Gendron Corinne, « Le ‘développement durable’ selon Monsanto », Écologie et politique, 29 (2), 2004, pp.121-133.
Parmentier Bruno, Nourrir l’humanité. Les grands problèmes de l’agriculture mondiale au XXIe siècle, Paris, La Découverte, 2009.
Rosenau James, Turbulence in World Politics: a Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990.
Strange Susan, Le Retrait de l’État. La dispersion du pouvoir dans l’économie mondiale, [1996], trad., Paris, Temps Présent, 2011.
lemonde.fr, Planète, « Monsanto, un demi-siècle de scandales sanitaires », disponible à la page: http://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2012/02/16/monsanto-un-demi-siecle-de-scandales-sanitaires_1643081_3244.html, dernière consultation: 8 mars 2012.
Mar 11, 2012 | China, Global solidarity, Human rights, Internet, Passage au crible (English)
By Justin Chiu
Translation: Davina P. Durgana
Passage au crible n°60
Pixabay
On February 4th, 2012, China and Russia vetoed a Security Council draft resolution condemning UN repression in Syria. Beginning in Derra in March 2011, the Syrian revolt has already killed over 8,000 civilians. Videos showing the bloody repression – including Homs – which were broadcast worldwide via the Internet, have not gone unnoticed in China. Many intellectuals, for example, question the decision of their government. The official arguments – Reason of State and the principle of non-interference – no longer seem like legitimate comments as social networks have demonstrated. Following the emergence of public opinion in China, authorities are forced to evolve. Thus on February 14th, 2012, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said he was ready to discuss the situation in Syria.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The Arab Spring awoke the repressed affects and emotions of the Chinese population. Recall that in 1989, students who demanded more democracy and freedom were violently repressed by the regime. Beginning in the late sixties, the economic reform and open policy of Deng Xiaoping had resulted in a minimum of public space throughout the eighties to the point that this decade has proven exceptionally rich in political debates and intellectuals. However, after the repression at Tiananmen Square, political demands were forcibly disappeared social movements. The strict state control, improvement of living standards and the weakening of external support prompted the heirs of the democratic movement to promote the emergence of a civil society based on the protection of civil rights.
According to the Chinese government, the collective number of incidents rose from 8,700 incidents in 1993 to 74,000 in 2004. Emphasize in this case that social movements represent all social strata because the Chinese have had their lives disrupted by the dismantling of the Communist social system and the integration of their countries in globalization. Now, the protests come both from workers, city dwellers, peasants, servants or the unemployed: they are very heterogeneous. Meanwhile, the awareness of civil rights in an enriched China, legislators in general and lawyers in particular have become not only stakeholders of civil society, but their spearhead. At the turn of the twentieth century, the construction of a rule of law stands at the heart of the Chinese Communist Party propaganda. Facing international pressure, the notion of human rights was official adopted in 2004 at the 12th Congress of the National Assembly Party.
Considered as a security threat, the new social media from foreign countries are censored or banned outright in China. Yet, contrary to what one might think, the social networking market is now flourishing and highly competitive. Nevertheless, some private actors dominate the world of 513 million Internet users. In this case, Tencent (established in 1999 and the equivalent of MSN Messenger), RENN (the equivalent of Facebook created in 2005) and Weibo (created in 2009 between Facebook and Twitter).
Theoretical framework
1. Increased awareness of human rights. The economic and institutional reforms, initiated over three decades ago, have enabled the development of the Chinese economy and have significantly improved the lives of a majority of the population. However, GDP growth cannot hide social inequalities, regional disparities and profound environmental degradation in the Middle Kingdom. All the less they are now largely borne on the web. Well educated and rich, the Chinese tolerate the increasingly bad and miserable situation of the poor and demand the respect they deserve as human beings.
2. The mounting strength of civil society through social networks. Considering efficiency, low cost of intermediation and powerful means of communication that crystallizes the Internet, we understand better then that it has become an empowering and valuable tool for large segments of the population. With the Internet, the relationship between time and distance between civil society and the state are radically changed. That is why the state actor must find new sources of legitimacy and new ways of governing the face of criticism from civil society.
Analysis
Asserting itself as a leader of emerging countries, China does not hesitate to express a different view from Western countries, as we saw at the Copenhagen Conference on climate change in 2009. Second, nationally, it must pass this year’s political transition by placing Xi Jinping at the head of the party-state. In this sensitive period, the government cannot support an international project that would overthrow an authoritarian regime.
Although messages of compassion multiply on social networks, this does not mean that all Chinese recognize the democratic demands of the Syrian opposition. In fact, Chinese society especially disapproved of his government because it prohibits Syrians any possibility of external assistance and supports a repressive regime. But the debate over the Syrian situation quickly finds its limits since a few days after the veto, Chinese Internet users are already fascinated by other major events.
Critics of the press and intellectuals are not absent in China. Nevertheless, the one who cannot exercise self-sufficiency and crossing the red line is still insignificant. Indeed, they risk being accused of crimes of subversion, such as was the case of Professor Gui Quan who denounced the management of the Sichuan earthquake in 2009.
Democratization of the Internet is a major issue for people and concern for the Chinese government. That is why 30,000 service officers of the Ministry of Information exercised continuous censorship. However, this activity appears increasingly ineffective under the massive number of users. To avoid skidding, the social networking sites are supposed to monitor their users. Thus, the messages published in Tibetan on Weibo are systematically monitored. Last December, the Chinese state required micro-bloggers to register under their real names. This measure was directed to the 200 million users of Weibo. However, the incessant responses mini-bloggers had against this interference with their privacy were enough to demonstrate an increased awareness of human rights in China.
References
Chen Yingfang, « Les mouvements de protestation des classes moyennes », in: Jean-Louis Rocca (Éd.), La Société chinoise vue par ses sociologues, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2008, pp. 187-219.
Elias Nobert, La société des individus, trad., Paris, Fayard, 1991.
Laroche Josepha, La Brutalisation du monde, du retrait des États à la décivilisation, Montréal, Liber, 2012.
Merklé Pierre, La Sociologie des réseaux sociaux, Paris, La Découverte, 2010. Coll. Repères 398.
Nangfang Zhoumo (南方周末 ou Southern Weekly) : http://www.infzm.com/ Pedroletti Brice, Bougon François, « Le veto de Pékin sur la Syrie critique en Chine », Le Monde, 8 Fév. 2012.
Rosenau James N., Turbulence in World Politics: a Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990. Simmel Georg, Les Pauvres, trad., Paris, PUF, 1998. Zheng Youngnian, « China and Democracy: Not a Contradiction in Terms », in: John Wong, Bo Zhiyue (Éds.), China’s Reform in Global Perspective, Singapore, World Scientific Publishing, 2010, pp. 13-53.
Feb 28, 2012 | Africa, China, Development, Passage au crible (English), Security
By Philippe Hugon
Translation: Melissa Okabe
Passage au crible n°59
Pixabay
Meetings dedicated to food security multiplied at the beginning of 2012, while studies reporting the assessment of land transactions show that between 2000 and 2010, on 200 million hectares of monopolized land, three-quarters were intended for biofuels and not for food security (Cirad, IIED, ILC,2012). Cornering of land in developing countries, in Africa and South America in particular, are therefore the object of increasing anxiety, while in a context of high agricultural and food prices, food security is threatened. Generally, these misconceived and nontransparent transactions lead to violent controversies, in particular between NGOs, international organizations, political decision-makers, peasant organizations and researchers. In Madagascar, for example, these deals played a decisive role in Marc Ravelomanana’s departure following the planned contract with the Korean firm Daewo.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In the Southern countries, over a period of about thirty years, we observed a low rate of agricultural investment and a downward trend of public aid in agriculture. Yet, the turning point of the 21st century is marked by an inversion of this trend. Large-scale international land acquisitions, like those of China, are multiplying in the Southern countries especially in Africa. Indeed, this continent is not only coveted for its under-ground resources (mines, hydrocarbons), but also for the wealth of its lands. In this respect, we can talk about a global game of Monopoly to acquire land. However, there are numerous unknown factors in the effective realization of these projects, compared to publicized announcements.
Theoretical framework
1. The fast growth of transactions. In a global context of rising agricultural prices, strong instabilities in financial markets and anticipation of an increase in organic-food consumption, land transactions under the forms of purchases or long-term rents (long leases) are quickly growing.
2. The emergence of a new neocolonialism. Do China’s land investments respond to a strategy of development aid as stated by authorities and several international organizations; do they create real opportunities, or are they rather a form of neocolonialism denounced by numerous NGOs?
Analysis
First off, land cornering aims to produce biofuels. It also corresponds to anticipations in terms of food security or changes in the modes of consumption. Finally, they represent security investments. This results from three types of investors: 1) states deficit in lands and strong food importers, possessing strong financing capacities. 2) big food-processing groups but also industrialists, who most often testify to the logic of integrating the upstream in the downstream and/ or contractual farming for foodstuffs. 3) investors and banks considering land as securities investments.
The sellers and renters are countries with weak financial means but apparently have available land. This is the case in Africa where, since 2004, states have rented or sold more than 2.5 million hectares. Benefiting from more than 80 % of non-cultivated farmland1 this continent thus became the object of greed by investors in search of food and/or energy security. Also, Africa has seen a multiplication of bio-industrial and security investments.
China invests all over the world in the farming sector. Globally, it possess 2.1 of 2.8 million hectares in South America, Africa, South-East Asia (300,000 of 400,000 hectares – rice, wood), in Australia, in Russia and in Kazakhstan (87,400 hectares). Appropriation of lands movements in Africa emanate from: 1) government corporations (such as the China State Farm Agribusiness in Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Tanzania, Togo or Zambia). 2) regions with a measure of autonomy (for example the Shanxi Province Agribusiness Group). 3) from individual initiatives.
Several types of profits are expected, such as the influx of investment which would compensate for the reduction in Public Development Aid, technology and skill contributions, improvements in yields and productivity, food safety, or moreover, obtaining currencies (as in the case of biofuels). In fact, Chinese seeds can multiply the yields by two. On the other hand, other effects are more problematic. For example, Chinese installation in Mozambique’s big farms, planned exports, before the fall of Gaddafi, rice for the Chinese in Libya via the Malybia project or the biofuel project for 2 million hectares in Zambia and palm oil in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The main risks are: 1) land conflicts as vulnerable communities, among which 80 % are without title deeds, risk to lose their land rights. 2) lack of transparency of contracts. 3) infringement on food security and sovereignty. 4) negative environmental effects, connected in particular to hybrid rice, GMOs, and control of seeds.
On the contrary, seizing opportunities connected to land transactions implies that various actors are stakeholders in the contracts, that the farmers’ property rights are protected and that family farms benefit, thanks to subcontracts, infrastructure arrangements, input location and credit, the appropriate externalities for big operations.
References
Afrique contemporaine « Investissements agricoles en Afrique » (237) N, 2011. CIRAD, IIUED, ILC (M Taylor ,al) www.landcoalition.org/cpl/CPL-synthesis-Report, déc 2012.
“Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa” Juin 2009 – IIED, FAO and IFAD – Lorenzo Cotula, Sonja Vermeulen, Rebeca Leonard, James Keeley. Philippe Hugon, Fabienne Clérot « Les relations Chine-Afrique- les investissements agricoles au Mali », Rapport MAEE, 2010
1. 1.5 billion of 2.7 billion hectares of arable land are cultivated in the world, that is 55 %. Approximately only 190 million hectares of farmland on the African continent are exploited, which is a fifth of the total potential (source Agrimonde, FAO).
Feb 27, 2012 | Digital Industry, Internet, Passage au crible (English), Publications (English)
By Alexandre Bohas
Translation: Melissa Okabe
Passage au crible n°58
Pixabay
The Megaupload affair could simply be considered as the last of a long series of copyright disputes. But its global character as well as its consequences, with the rejection of the PIPA and SOPA laws, makes for a pivotal event in the normative and institutional construction of the internet.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
On January 19, 2012, 18 main Megaupload managers, including the emblematic Kim « Dotcom » Schmitz, were arrested for violating copyright laws, money laundering, and racketeering. Then the FBI decided its closure by blocking its web domain. For millions of users, this had a global effect, both by media coverage and by the consequences of these police operations. Based in Hong Kong, this leading company in direct downloads attracted, up to that date, nearly 50 million visitors per day, and counted 150 million official users, their connections generating nearly 4% of the global digital traffic. We counted, 525 servers in America, 630 in Holland allowing this connection.
In reaction to this sudden raid, a number of anonymous hackers and simple users protested against this ruling. The leaders even pirated highly symbolic sites such as the American Presidential site or Universal’s site, sites that were made unavailable. At the same time, Congress had to vote on two legal bills against cybercrime and counterfeiting, PIPA and SOPA. In particular, they expected to widen US judicial powers by allowing the possibility to proceed in taking down all suspicious internet content, whether it originated from the United States or abroad. However, in front of the mobilization of numerous organizations, and also influent groups, their adoption was pushed back.
Theoretical framework
1. Global commodification of the Internet. Introduced by multinational firms, this process aims at establishing principle trade as the fundamental framework of this sphere. It « dis-embeds » its social environment, an image that Karl Polanyi previously qualified in another time and place as The Great Transformation. Progressively replacing relationships based on free access (wantonness), reciprocity and exchange, principle trade came to threaten cultural, economic and social diversity, and demonstrated once and for all that the market remained a constructed, even compulsory institution.
2. Governance of digital training technology. This notion indicates a way to exert power which is supposedly less constraining, more consensual and more representative than the concept of the government. This is the reason that it is used in an increasing manner both by international organizations and specialists to describe the types of regulation adapted to globalized societies marked by a multitude of stakes and transnational actors. Yet, it nevertheless silences the violence of oppositions and the means of police and judicial coercion, put in place to regulate the concerned sectors.
Analysis
At present, the internet forms an integral part of society where one goes for distraction, to carry out research and to work. In this way, the internet leads to numerous interactions of exchange and sharing. These often register outside the trade framework and arise rather from reciprocity. For example, peer-to-peer and streaming constitute modes of original distribution and on a world scale. Moreover, networks such as YouTube favored community type de-territorialized links where innovative forms of expression and creation were able to manifest. Yet, transnational firms deliver a real fight to take part in structuring this central space for millions of consumers. Indeed, within its behavior, it is important to encourage values as well as representations which are favorable to them. But it assumes that the principle of private property has been previously established and recognized as such that they can then legally claim rights to the exchanged goods and services. This so that the market establishment allows them to commercially value their productions. Such an organization according to the laws of supply and demand would confer on themselves a de facto supremacy because they would centralize the copyright, as well as the means to create, produce and diffuse its goods.
Where does the battle over the legal rules of Internet come from? We have already evoked the international elaboration processes of substantive law as well as the huge trials in this matter*. Since the first legal proceedings against Napster until the one against Megaupload, they tried hard to contain, otherwise to reduce, flows escaping the intellectual property rules and thus the copyright payments. Over the years, sites deemed as pirated no longer proposed anything but legal offers, following the example of Napster or Kazaa; or either they were forced to purely and simply stop their activity as in the case of Emulator or Limewire.
However, strength is to observe that the influence of these groups does not remain unlimited. By shaping this sphere, they collide, on one hand, with the diffuse and ill-assorted world of Internet users; on the other hand they have to face other companies directly resulting from Internet. These companies – such as Wikipedia or Google – benefited from creativity and freedom allowed on the Internet *, which explains their active mobilization against the PIPA and SOPA laws.
During these last weeks we’ve seen a violent clash between two centers of the American economy, Hollywood and Silicon Valley. Taking advantage of the support of public opinion, the latter knew how to lead, despite the lobbying of the former. In terms of these confrontations, they take the shape of new rules and institutions. Far from a consensus obtained by negotiation or dialogue, governance of the Internet emerged from the fight between challenger firms which also have to count with the government of the United States as decisive authority.
References
Auffray Christophe, « MegaUpload : décryptage de l’affaire et des accusations », ZDNet France, 23 janv. 2012, disponible sur le site web : www.zdnet.fr.
*Bohas Alexandre, « Coup de force numérique, domination symbolique. Google et la commercialisation d’ouvrages numérisés », Passage au crible, (5), 16 nov. 2009, disponible sur le site web : www.chaos-international.org.
*Bohas Alexandre, « Une construction mondiale de la rareté. Le projet ACTA d’accord commercial sur la contrefaçon », Passage au crible, (22), 22 mai 2010, disponible sur le site web : www.chaos-international.org.
« De Napster à Megaupload, le long affrontement entre la justice et les services de téléchargement», Le Monde, 23 janv. 2012.
Finkelstein Lawrence S., « What Is Global Governance ? », Global Governance, (1), 1995, pp. 367-372.
Hewson Martin, Sinclair Timothy J. (Eds.), Approaches to Global Governance Theory, Albany, NY, SUNY Press, 1999.
« Lois antipiratage : sous pression, Washington fait machine arrière », Le Monde, 20 janv.2012.
Laroche Josepha, La Brutalisation du monde, du retrait des États à la décivilisation, Montréal, Liber, 2012.
May Christopher, The Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights: The New Enclosures, 2nd Ed., London, Routledge, 2010.
Polanyi Karl, La Grande transformation : aux origines politiques et économiques de notre temps, trad., Paris, Gallimard, 2009.
« Peer-to-peer, la fin d’un protocole ? », Le Monde, 11 mars 2011.
Sell Susan, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Feb 7, 2012 | China, Development, environment, Passage au crible (English)
By Valérie Le Brenne
Translation: Davina Durgana
Passage au crible n°57
Pixabay
On January 15th, 2012, mining company Guangxi Jihne Mining Co. Ltd. Polluted the Longjiang river (situated in the autonomous region of Guangxi, south of China) by dumping cadmium (mineral related to the operation of the zinc and highly toxic). As fish farming remains a core activity, the death of hundreds of fish gave the alarm to the local authorities who immediately tried to neutralize the product. Liuzhou, the second largest city in the region, located 60 km downstream of the pollution, is thus directly exposed. Despite official speeches tinged with optimism, the inhabitants of the city rushed to supermarkets to stock up on bottled water, reinforcing the risk of shortages.
This incident adds to a long list of industrial pollution of waters registered in China in recent years. These damages occur even though the country is experiencing considerable disparities in water and a growing water scarcity, besides the need for multiple energy resources which is increasing exponentially.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Since 1979, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China has progressively entered the market economy and achieved levels of growth and competitiveness that now make it the second largest economic power in the world. Among the many objectives of this transition, one was to reduce the volume of imports while increasing exports resulted in strong industrial development, posing the question of de facto energy supply necessary for this level of activity. The existence of sub-soils rich in energy (oil, coal, uranium), metallic ores (copper, zinc, bauxite) and non-metallic (graphite, sulfur, phosphorus) quickly led extensive campaigns of prospection and the opening of many mining sites, coinciding with the creation of many extraction companies.
Since the 1990’s, the question of energy is equally posed with the problem of the unequal partition of water on the territory. In fact if South China presents abundant hydraulic resources, allowing rice cultivation, the North remains, however, marked by a lack of water and an arid climate. The aim of rebalancing the South-North transfer peaks elsewhere in the project of Three Gorges Dam completed in 1992, and for which China was sentenced to the International Water Tribunal in The Hague, following a complaint by Canada.
Meanwhile, China has entered a process of urban transition. The influx of rural migrants has led to the emergence of new towns, whose numbers increased from 69 in the late 1940’s, to 670 during the 2000’s.The increase in demand for consumer goods, to which is added the economic opening of coastal cities to foreign companies are increasing industrial production. Therefore, the pollution associated with industrial activities, whether the air pollution, linked to coal mining, or that of water by the discharge of toxic effluents, have multiplied, generating heavy risks to public health.
Theoretical framework
Retain two lines of thought:
1. Pressure on energy resources to meet both local and global demands of economic development poses imperatives of productivity to Chinese industry. Thus, by increasing the pressure on energy resources the privatization of Chinese state enterprises was accelerated. However, the transition to market logic involved, in the words of Susan Strange, “a dispersal of power” that makes more complex attempts at state regulation.
2. The emergence of a Chinese civil society: the increasing amount of industrial incidents has encouraged the emergence of a civil society. This is particularly evident in public health and the environment. These issues represent for social actors poles of structuration, some – strong transnational ties – seem now to be considered by the authorities.
Analysis
Cadmium pollution in the Longjiang River by the mining company Guangxi Jinhe Mining Co. Ltd. is symptomatic of the imperatives of productivity and competitiveness posed by the economic growth of the industry. Indeed, the weight of industrial production generates a constant pressure on energy sources whose control is a major strategic issue. In this perspective, mining firms must enhance their level of activity, achieving higher yields and diversifying their supply sources. Now, many Chinese firms are located in Africa and compete with Western companies in the energy market. However, if the increasing privatization makes the transformation of these companies into transnational companies more possible, it simultaneously reduces the regulatory capacity of the state.
In fact, this incident reveals the absence of binding legislation on corporate environmental responsibility, which has nevertheless generated considerable industrial pollution. Multiple discharges of toxic effluents, such as cadmium, are now causing a real public health problem. Consumption of non-potable water exposes people to serious risks of cancer. Moreover, agriculture is also affected by the environmental impacts of these activities. In 2011, a study published by the economic weekly Xin Shiji revealed that 10% of rice produced in China and exported abroad showed traces of cadmium.
Given the scale of this environmental damage, and under the combined pressure of international organizations and NGOs, the Chinese authorities now aim to reduce their energy consumption and fight against industrial pollution. Besides the creation of local authorities to monitor pollution levels, the government authorizes, under very strict conditions, the existence of environmental NGOs and the presence of international NGOs. Boasting a deficit of state support, the players in the Chinese civil society are therefore taken to be structured around the environmental cause. While informing people of the risks, they also hold some ability to influence state policies, relying in particular on multiple transnational solidarity networks. In evidence of their growing importance, the Chinese government now encourages environmental NGOs to participate in the “black listing” of polluting firms.
References
Chen Jie, « ONG chinoises, société civile transnationale et pratiques démocratiques », Perspectives chinoises, 97, sept-déc 2006.
Colonomos Ariel (Éd.), Sociologie des réseaux transnationaux: communautés, entreprises et individus. Lien social et système international, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1995.
Keck Margareth, Sikkink Kathryn, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 1998.
Strange Susan, Le Retrait de l’État. La dispersion du pouvoir dans l’économie mondiale, [1996], trad., Paris, Temps Présent, 2011.
Jan 26, 2012 | Communitarianism, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Philippe Hugon
Translation: Melissa Okabe
Passage au crible n°56
Pixabay
At the beginning of 2012, Nigeria, ally to the United States and Great Britain, has been undermined by two great crises: 1) that of the North-South confrontation characterized by the spiral of ethno-religious tensions; 2) that of the general strike tied to the increased price of gasoline. Threats by the two great labor unions to stop petroleum production of the prime producer in Africa equally contributed to the gravity of the situation. Certain authorized voices – such as the Nobel prize winner Soyinka – went so far as to evoke the risk of a civil war. Others for their part highlight the risk of secession advancing the comparison of Nigeria to the case of Sudan divided between the Muslim North – where the Sharia reigns – and the Christian South. A leading African country with its population of over 150 million habitants, this federal state– where there is no stop to alternating civil and military regimes –, is familiar with endemic violence which weakens it.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Formerly a British colony, today Nigeria is a federal state composed of 36 states contested by centripetal forces which were contained until the present by strong military and civil powers or by federalism. The increase in the number of federal states or rules relative to the transfer of political power between the North and the South or yet still the territorial sharing of income, equally contribute to this logic.
The systems of sultanates and chieftainships of Northern Nigeria strongly differ from the rather cemented sociopolitical organizations of the South. These differentiations were maintained by the indirect rule of the British colonial administration. Since then, the North, where 12 States established Sharia rule, remains altogether disadvantaged in comparison to the South.
The country has been torn by several conflicts of which the most violent being the Biafra war of secession (1967-1970) which saw the opposition of the Ibos (supported by France, Israel and Portugal) against the federation (supported by the United Kingdom and the USSR).The causes of this war are likened at the same time to sociopolitical and religious factors and especially the oil stakes setting major powers and chief warrant officers against each other; these tensions led the internal rivalries in Nigeria. In 1970, 3 R’s (reconstruction, rehabilitation, reconciliation) symbolized the end of the conflict. But the country was familiar with numerous tensions between the North and the South and conflicts at the heart of the Niger Delta.
Theoretical framework
The Nigerian crises reveal two main arguments:
1. Nigeria presents itself as a society characterized by petroleum income and its economic, social and political impact. Richly equipped with hydrocarbons, it also offers easy extraction conditions and transport options made possible by sea access. All together these factors make Nigeria one of the most coveted extraction sites in Africa. However internal tensions have intensified because 90% of these riches are concentrated in the Niger Delta.
2. Nigeria has been historically marked by North-South cleavages both on the social and religious planes. The confrontations between Christian and Muslim communities show that these cleavages are tied to the differences of rights and disparities in the division of the oil pension.
Analysis
The Nigerian conflicts can be deciphered under two main criteria.
The first refers to hydrocarbons. Indeed this sector is strategic from a macro-economic point of view with an oil pension which represents between 35-40 % of the GDP (Gross Domestic Product), 80 % of fiscal receipts and 97 % of the country’s exports. In 2011, the level reached 2.5 million barrels per day at 75 dollars the barrel, making Nigeria the eighth world exporter of oil. Six multinationals control 95 % of the production among which more than 40 % is exported towards the United States being 10 % of their imports. In fact, oil aggravates the number of political tensions because it is concentrated in the Southeast and leads to strong differentiations between states. In the Niger Delta (9 federated states including 30 million inhabitants), certain movements, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and certain dissident factions have developed considerably. The hydrocarbons sector and the price of the gasoline appear just as much in the heart of social conflicts as far as the oil pension arouses grand corruption and strong capital flight. Now, the redistribution of pensions between states and populations should have particularly been passed as a subsidy allowing two thirds of Nigerians (having an income lower than 2 dollars a day) to access primary necessities.
Within these oil challenges, overlaps a second crisis factor: the North-South cleavages. In the Plateau State capital, Jos, conflicts see opposition between the Fulani Muslims and the Christian Berom, two populations which have different rights. As for the Islamic spheres of influence in the North, they are plural (Sufism of the traditional brotherhoods, the Salafiste, Maadhistes and Shiite movements) with 12 (of 36) states having established Sharia law. The situations of great inequality and exclusion from the rights in a country where the division of the oil pension remains uneven, constitute the main elements explaining the power of Muslim networks; certain politicians want to instrument religious oppositions and spread the Sharia in the Plateau State. The most important question, due to upheavals that occurred in Libya, is at the moment the proliferation of the AQMI (Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb) nebula. The anti-western Boko Haram movement appeared after September 11th, 2001 located in the State of Borno henceforth developed djihadisme; the movement split into several branches, one being close to the Chebabs of Somalia and Aqmi. Now by its radicalization and violent actions, the movement favors a religious cleavage engendering a spiraling of violence, reprisals and repression.
External powers are also determining actors. Notably the United States to whom Nigeria provides more than 40% of their brut petroleum imports. As for China and India, they look to have their interests prevail in this region. Regarding the Arab petroleum powers and Iran, they press on the Muslim states in the North threatened by radical networks and zones of productions and petroleum transport to the South.
Today, the federal structure of Nigeria, the power of large retails in the North and the memory of Biafra make the process of a North-South separation, under the Sudan model, very improbable. Also, an extension of religious conflict is hardly possible because the North would be defeated. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the present regime has been questioned. The violence will lead to new compromises concerning: 1) redistribution of the oil pension, 2) eradication of corruption and 3) negotiations with the various political, labor-union, and religious protagonists? A contrario, is a return of the Jacobin army and the layman majority possible if violence is extended?
References
Draper Michael I., Shadows: Airlift and Airwar in Biafra and Nigeria, 1967-1970, Hikoki Publications, 2006.
Perouse de Monclos Antoine, “Le Nigeria entre deux eaux”, Ramsès, 2011.
Tai Ejibunu Hassam, “Nigeria’s Delta Crisis: Root causes and Peacelessness”, EPU, research paper, Issue 07/07.
Jan 20, 2012 | Constructivism, Passage au crible (English), Peace
By Thomas Lindemann
Translation: Davina Durgana
Passage au crible n°55
Pixabay
The death of President Kim Jong-Il and the probable succession by a triumvirate driven by his son Kim Jong-Un raises the question again of available options to appease and transform the North Korean regime. The first declarations of the Western chancelleries suggest that our leaders are primarily concerned to show their determination to resist any plans to attack North Korea. Some have even envisioned encouraging a Korean Spring to discard quickly the considerable military potential of this Asian Sparta. Yet, beyond the moral issues, it appears that this regime is not a power challenging the territorial status quo. Recent history shows that the renouncing of any offensive position remains possible if one takes greater account of the symbolic dimension of the aspirations of a regime seeking recognition.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
North Korea is engaged in an armed conflict in 1950 against its southern neighbor. During the war, U.S. General MacArthur envisioned the recourse to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The armistice was established in 1953 without a peace treaty regarding the 38th parallel. Since this date, many skirmishes have taken place without provoking a major armed confrontation. More recently, in the March 2010, North Korea was accused of sinking the South Korean corvette Cheonan. Due to this affair, the country was sanctioned and ostracized on the global scene. Then, the North Korean bombing of the island of Yeonpyeong – situated to the west of the peninsula and near the maritime boundary (contested on November 23rd, 2010) – brought attention to the fragile situation between the two Koreas. The new leader, Kim Jong-Un has just pledged that South Korea would be punished for its disrespectful behavior at the funeral of Kim Jong-Il. As for nuclear ambitions, North Korea has since 1993 violated the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on multiple occasions. The Agreement Framework of 1994 and that of Beijing dating from 2007 have driven the temporary abandonment of nuclear weapons in exchange for economic concessions and a certain diplomatic recognition. However, in May 2009, North Korea conducted a second nuclear test, following a nuclear test in 2006. Today, negotiations are deadlocked.
Theoretical framework
Retain two currents of thought:
1. Traditional approaches to so-called rational choice must often consider that crises are resolved peacefully when the net material benefits of peace outweigh the net material benefits of war. Realist theorists emphasize the importance of security costs in the equation of costs/benefits. In this logic, the more important and credible military threats that are addressed by the United States to North Korea, the more North Korea should be encouraged to behave peacefully and to give up its nuclear plans. Other analysts of a more liberal orientation, place, for their part, more emphasis on the utility of economic sanctions to prevent the deviant behavior of a State.
2. However, a firm policy is far from sufficient and may even be counter-productive if it threatens the survival of a regime or induces threats publicly perceived as humiliating. In a more constructivist view, it seems that the North Korean actors are concerned with confirming a certain image of themselves on the political scene. Thus, diplomatic inclusion – symbolic recognition – could be determinant in the appeasement of this conflict. To the contrary, the stigmatization of a State risks leading to the radicalization of the identities of actors that are formed and transformed by these interactions.
Analysis
All analysis of the North Korean situation raises two questions: are the ambitions of these leaders compatible with the territorial status quo and for what reasons are the North Korean leaders engaged in a policy that seems to be on the brink of the abyss?
Above all, despite the boastful rhetoric of North Korean leaders, there is little evidence in favor of a policy of territorial expansion because the legitimacy of the Kim dynasty resting on his deification is primarily internal. Additionally, since 1953, the North Korean State has had an advantage illustrated by searching for self-sufficiency from bellicose businesses. A very hypothetical conquest of South Korea would not pay for North Korean leaders. How could they in fact require that South Koreans enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of Spain in an authentically totalitarian state?
Everything leads us to believe that the North Korean regime exploits the nuclear agenda in order to gain better recognition. This then poses the problem of the legitimacy of a regime that struggles to meet the most basic needs of its population. Additionally, it is known that North Korean authorities were deeply offended by their inclusion in the Axis of Evil in 2002. George Bush has even called the North Korean regime of the “detestable pygmy” alluding to the small size of Kim Jong-Il. When the North Korean leader launched a satellite into the atmosphere with revolutionary songs on the American Day of Independence in 2009, the message seems clear: “We will force you to recognition by arms.”
Faced with such actors, threats, sanctions and disrespectful declarations could in turn drive a hardening of the regime. They could reinforce the internal legitimacy of the North Korean regime by considering opponents as traitors that were bought by Americans. This could also lead to military escalation. The outcome of this tough policy is negative. The South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has ended the “sunshine policy” of his predecessor by initiating military maneuvers close to the line. But this diplomatic isolation has not ended with the Obama administration coming to power. The latter has relied instead on “strategic patience” and has advocated a policy of openness previously conditioned by evidence of the North Korean goodwill. Worse yet, the South Korean President Lee has implicitly announced on August 15th, 2010 the imminent demise of the North Korean regime by introducing to its citizens the introduction of a new tax intended to prepare the unification of the two nations.
In this context, it is necessary to analyze the North Korean bombing of Yeonpyeong Island in December 2010 as the result mainly of existential fears, rather than as the manifestation of an imperial policy.
References
Bourmaud Daniel, « Le complexe obsidional de la Corée du Nord », in : Josepha Laroche (Éd.), Passage au crible de la scène mondiale, Analyse de la scène mondiale 2009-2010, Paris, 2011, L’Harmattan. Collection Chaos International, pp. 89-92.
Braud, Philippe, L’Émotion en politique, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2006.
Laroche Josepha, La Brutalisation du monde, du retrait des États à la décivilisation, Montréal, Liber, 2012.
Lindemann, Thomas, Sauver la face, sauver la paix, sociologie constructiviste des crises internationales, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2010. Collection Chaos International.
Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
