Sep 15, 2012 | Culture en, Global Public Goods, Passage au crible (English), UN
By Alexandre Bohas
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°74
Wikipédia
The looting of Muslim shrines perpetrated in Mali in 2012 by religious extremists has raised consternation of global proportions. However, after this unanimity without effect, it is important to examine the specificity of the common goods of a cultural nature that requires a renewed governance.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
On May 4th 2012 the graves of Timbuktu – classified by UNESCO as World Heritage of Humanity –are destroyed by Islamists who consider the cults of Muslim saints contrary to the fundamentalist Islam they claim to ascribe to. These abuses have continued despite these monuments being declared as Heritage in Danger and despite the condemnation of these acts by many countries and international organizations such as UNESCO and the International Criminal Court.
Northern Mali, including the cities of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal, has been occupied for several months by armed gangs, which came into rebellion on January 17th, 2012. The latter consisted of a motley alliance of Islamic movements such as Eddine Ansar, AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), and MUJWA (Movement for Unicity and Jihad in West Africa), as well as some Tuaregs form the NMLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), ousted from the coalition shortly afterwards.
To achieve territorial conquest, the rebels relied on the particularistic claims of indigenous populations and on the revenues of traffics combined with the vacuum of the State in the region and with chaos in Libya. They were then able to make quick advance through the dislocation and mutinies within government forces in Bamako.
Theoretical framework
1. The peculiarity of certain common goods. Unlike global public goods, cultural goods may be subject to rivalries and are characterized by their non-exclusivity. With the process of globalization, they cover more and more areas including culture where they are doubly threatened. They undergo behaviors of “free-riders” (Mancur Olson) and sub-optimal logics of self-interest (Garrett Hardin). As evidence of cultural diversity and as expression of a universal community in the making, they symbolize a vision of the world which many economic, social and religious actors do not share and even oppose.
2. Inadequacy of institutions in post-Westphalian times. International organizations are obsolete in “post-Westphalian” times (Richard Falk). The process of globalization that currently undermines the state system established by the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), leads to a compression of space-time (David Harvey), an ever higher interconnection (David Held), a dissemination of authority (Susan Strange) along with a plurality of spheres and global actors (Philip Cerny). The preponderance of non-state and identity violence as well as the emergence of territories beyond any political structure, reflect the interstate inability to resolve global issues. In other words, it cancels all proceedings based on sovereign States.
Analysis
Presupposing the existence of a proto-community of planetary order, International Relations theorists have formally considered the legal and institutional mechanisms with a view to global governance (David Held). In this regard, common goods of a cultural nature refer to the substantive definition of the latter. Also, the Convention for the Protection of the World Heritage, adopted on November 16th 1972 under the auspices of UNESCO, recognizes “the outstanding interest which requires the preservation of [some goods] as part of the World Heritage of all mankind [and] the importance which represents, for all the peoples of the world, the safeguarding of these unique and irreplaceable goods, whatever people they belong to 1 “. In March 2012, 189 States had ratified 774 artifacts classified in this list. The Ad Hoc Committee stated in its Global Strategy that it wants a classification that better reflects “the diversity of cultural treasures […] of our world […] recognize and protect sites that are exceptional evidence of interactions [. ..] among human beings, of cultural coexistence, spirituality and creative expression 2”. Thus, this patrimonial policy induces a recognition of universal values and of common goods on a human scale. However, integrating transformations are accompanied by a fragmentation that causes the return of Manichean logic and identity and religious tensions. Destructive madness manifested in Timbuktu, “the city of 333 saints”, provides an illustration.
Responsible for “ensuring the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural heritage”, states play a central role in dealing with fully global issues 3. This state-centered vision is based on the realistic hypothesis that they remain capable and legitimate to resolve these issues. However, nowadays, this theoretical framework is exceeded as the non-state dimension of international relations is clear. In this case, the Malian failed state is emblematic of territories where a myriad of uncontrollable networks of all kinds, economic, criminal and religious, remain entangled in the trading of licit and illicit goods, smuggling, and illegal migration.
We witness the relative failure of state intervention. Indeed, UNESCO alerts as to the degradation of certain monuments multiply while mobilizations against the imminent destruction of sites remain without avail. Besides the case of Mali, remember the Bamiyan Buddhas destroyed by the Taliban in Afghanistan in March 2001. In the future, these problems can only worsen due to inadequate governing and the exacerbation of identities caused by globalization. Finally, there is a vibrant lack of instruments of a cosmopolitan governance to achieve a consensual classification of this common heritage, its global ownership and its promotion. Its definition and its preservation, which cannot be left to market mechanisms nor to intergovernmental organizations, are a challenge today as the symbolic effect and the impact on knowledge of this recognition face anti-universalist conceptions relayed by archaic institutions.
References
Chirac Jacques, Diouf Abdou, « Urgence à Tombouctou. Il faut sauver la paix au Sahel », Le Monde, 16 juillet 2012.
« Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine – Les crises malienne et soudanaise préoccupent», All Africa, 18 juillet 2012.
Cerny Philip, Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010.
Falk Richard, « Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia », The Journal of Ethics, 6 (4), Dec. 2002, pp. 311-352.
Grégoire Emmanuel, Bourgeot André, « Désordre, pouvoirs et recompositions territoriales au Sahara», Hérodote, (142), mars 2011, pp. 3-11.
Hardin Garrett, « The Tragedy of the Commons », Science, 162 (3859), Dec. 1968, pp. 1243-1248.
« La folie destructrice d’Ansar Dine », Al-Ahram Hebdo ,19 juillet 2012.
Harvey David, The Condition of Postmodernity : An Enquiry into the Origins of Culture Change, Cambridge, Blackwell, 1990.
Held David, « Restructuring Global Governance: Cosmopolitanism, Democracy and the Global Order », Millenium, 37 (3), April 2009, pp. 535-547.
Olson Mancur, La Logique de l’action collective, [1965], trad., Paris, PUF, 2001.
Rémy Jean-Philippe, « Mali : La Route de Tombouctou passe par Bamako », Le Monde, 17 juillet 2012.
Strange Susan, The Retreat of the State: the Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
UNESCO, Convention pour la protection du patrimoine mondial culturel et naturel, Adoptée par la Conférence générale à sa 17e session à Paris le 16 novembre 1972, consultable à l’adresse suivante http://whc.unesco.org/.
UNESCO, Stratégie Globale, 1994, consultable à la page web : http://whc.unesco.org/fr/strategieglobale.
1. UNESCO, Convention pour la protection du patrimoine mondial culturel et naturel, Adoptée par la Conférence générale à sa 17e session à Paris le 16 novembre 1972, consultable à l’adresse suivante http://whc.unesco.org/,p. 1.
2. UNESCO, Stratégie Globale, 1994, consultable à la page web : http://whc.unesco.org/fr/strategieglobale.
3. UNESCO, Convention, op. cit., p. 3.
Apr 8, 2012 | Global Public Goods, Passage au crible (English)
By Alexandre Bohas
Translation: Pierre Chabal
Passage au crible n°63
Qatar. Baie de l’Ouest. Pixabay
Qatar regularly features high in newspaper headlines for its acquisition of works of art. The reining family, aware of the limited resources of their territory, has invested abroad. This paper seeks to understand this involvement in the field of art, reputed uncertain and unproductive.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In tune with the increase in hydrocarbon prices and the financial crisis, Qatar’s micro-monarchy has been proceeding with several investments in various strongholds of the world economy. It already owns luxurious touristic institutions such as the Carlton, the Royal Monceau, Harrods and the Savoy Hotels. It holds also minority participations in French multinationals: Vinci, Lagardère, Vivendi, Total, LVMH, Suez Environnement, as well as in European ones: Volkswagen, Porsche or Barclays.
Beside these assets, the Qatari monarchy is also buying masterpieces by famous painters. In 2011, it ranked 1st in the list of the greatest investors on the art market. One estimates that, in just seven years, US exports to Qatar represent US$ 428 million. For instance, in 2009, the Emirate bought the Rothko of Ezra Merkin, the financer, for US$ 310 million, only two years after buying those of the Rockfeller collection. Similarly, Qatar acquired for € 45 million Euros the Claude Berri Fund, originally destined to France. And, in order to exhibit these works of art, Qatar calls upon the greatest, internationally-recognized architects. The Qatari National Museum was thus designed by Jean Nouvel ; the Museum of Islamic Art, inaugurated in 2008, was designed by the Sino-American Pei ; and the Museum of Modern Art by Jean-François Bodin.
Theoretical framework
The anarchical society of the international. Although anarchy characterizes the international sphere, such a situation can take on various forms and is, to be sure, shaped by ideological and material factors, so that it is rather akin to an « international society » (Hedley Bull) than to the perpetual war depicted by the realists. Its members are drawn to entertain cooperative relations, to participate in institutions and to internalize common values, such as loyalty and mutual recognition.
The paradoxical power of small states. While these are often neglected by internationalists, theories relevant for them tend to restrict them to diplomacies aimed at the promotion of norms, of peace and of humanitarian operations (Christine Ingebritsen). Yet, in the recent years, there has been a relative decline of great powers and a contrario, the « Lilliputian States » (Robert Keohane) seem to have benefited from a globalization marked by an intensification of relations as well as from a surge of transnational actors. In such a dynamic, several of them seems to be at the outposts as they concentrate huge amounts of capital and as they position themselves as unavoidable nexi of financial, cultural, commercial and human flows.
Analysis
Taking advantage of the rapid mutations of capitalism and of the world order, Katzenstein’s observations as to the adaptation and the resistance of small States are being confirmed. In effect, globalization has intensified inter-sectoral competition, causes the formation of “économies-monde” as well as the concentration of riches. Thus, power no longer supposes simply the control of the productive and distributive capacities that ensure the independence, if not the autonomy, of Nation-States. Conversely, power is rather derived from the authority and the radiance resulting from the possession of one or several of these nexi of global attraction. In other words, the logic consists not in withdrawing oneself from the international game but on the contrary to find in it a position of prime relevance. For instance, if the United States today keep up nowadays a structural preponderance, this is due also to the central position of Hollywood in the cinema industry, or Wall Street in the world finance, or the Silicon Valley in the new technologies of information and communication.
In a world today having become fragmented and organized in archipelagos, small-sized countries are prompt to polarize around a specific field. This is why some of them, like Qatar, are experiencing a spectacular development. Similarly to Singapore or even to tax heavens, Qatar seeks now to specialize in the world of knowledge and fine arts. These sectors are to enable the country to reach world recognition as a protective rampart against threatening neighbors such as Saudi Arabia or Iran; and they are to contribute to the development of a territory that derives the better part of its resources from the gas industry. Let us remind ourselves that Qatar launched in 1996 the world-famous television channel Al-Jazira, which has since imposed itself in and onto the audiovisual landscape. The kingdom then went on to welcoming artists seeking asylum from Iraq, while its leaders are proving great collectors of art. Moreover, it has attracted several universities, such as the American Georgetown, Northwestern, Carnegie and Cornell, or the European from Stenden and Canadians from Calgary and North Atlantic, who have settled and developed complete curricula in the country. This strategy resembles that of Abu Dhabi, a state which embarked upon the construction of branches for the Le Louvre and the Guggenheim museums not long after inaugurating campuses of Paris-Sorbonne, HEC and New York universities, even one for the Beirut Saint Joseph University.
All in all, this policy of cultural grandeur demonstrates rather well that power cannot equated solely with capacities and geostrategic resources but results pointedly from world transformations which create opportunities for certain, hitherto neglected, actors. Enjoying an autonomous form of government and formally sovereign – in accordance with their statist character – these attract non-state organizations, such as economic firms, in order to form themselves into attractive centers within globalization.
References
« A Smithsonian in the Sand », The Economist, 29 Dec. 2010.
Barthe Benjamin, « Qatar. Les ambitions démesurées d’une micro-monarchie », Le Monde, 25 fév. 2012, pp. 4-5. Supplément Géo et Politique.
Bull Hedley, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, New-York, Columbia University Press, 1977.
« Ce que le Qatar possède en Europe », Challenges, 14 fév. 2012.
Elkamel Sara, « Qatar Becomes World’s Biggest Buyer of Contemporary Art », The Guardian, 13 July 2011.
Hartvig Nicolai, « Qatar Looks to Balance Its Arts Scene », New York Times, 6 Jan. 2012.
Ingebritsen Christine, “Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics”, Cooperation and Conflict, 1 (37), 2002, pp. 11-23.
Katzenstein Peter J., Small States in World Market: Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1985.
Katzenstein Peter J., « Small States and Small States Revisited », New Political Economy, 8 (1), 2003.
Keohane Robert O., « Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics », International Organization, 2 (23), Spring 1969, pp. 291-310.
Laroche Josepha (Éd.), La Loyauté dans les relations internationales, 2e éd., Paris, Harmattan, 2011.
Le Grand Dominique , « Le Qatar, premier acheteur d’art », Le Soir, 2 août 2011.
Waage Hilde Henriksen, « The ‘Minnow’ and the ‘Whale’: Norway and the United States in the Peace Process in the Middle East », British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 34 (2), Aug. 2007, pp. 157-176.
Feb 27, 2012 | Digital Industry, Internet, Passage au crible (English), Publications (English)
By Alexandre Bohas
Translation: Melissa Okabe
Passage au crible n°58
Pixabay
The Megaupload affair could simply be considered as the last of a long series of copyright disputes. But its global character as well as its consequences, with the rejection of the PIPA and SOPA laws, makes for a pivotal event in the normative and institutional construction of the internet.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
On January 19, 2012, 18 main Megaupload managers, including the emblematic Kim « Dotcom » Schmitz, were arrested for violating copyright laws, money laundering, and racketeering. Then the FBI decided its closure by blocking its web domain. For millions of users, this had a global effect, both by media coverage and by the consequences of these police operations. Based in Hong Kong, this leading company in direct downloads attracted, up to that date, nearly 50 million visitors per day, and counted 150 million official users, their connections generating nearly 4% of the global digital traffic. We counted, 525 servers in America, 630 in Holland allowing this connection.
In reaction to this sudden raid, a number of anonymous hackers and simple users protested against this ruling. The leaders even pirated highly symbolic sites such as the American Presidential site or Universal’s site, sites that were made unavailable. At the same time, Congress had to vote on two legal bills against cybercrime and counterfeiting, PIPA and SOPA. In particular, they expected to widen US judicial powers by allowing the possibility to proceed in taking down all suspicious internet content, whether it originated from the United States or abroad. However, in front of the mobilization of numerous organizations, and also influent groups, their adoption was pushed back.
Theoretical framework
1. Global commodification of the Internet. Introduced by multinational firms, this process aims at establishing principle trade as the fundamental framework of this sphere. It « dis-embeds » its social environment, an image that Karl Polanyi previously qualified in another time and place as The Great Transformation. Progressively replacing relationships based on free access (wantonness), reciprocity and exchange, principle trade came to threaten cultural, economic and social diversity, and demonstrated once and for all that the market remained a constructed, even compulsory institution.
2. Governance of digital training technology. This notion indicates a way to exert power which is supposedly less constraining, more consensual and more representative than the concept of the government. This is the reason that it is used in an increasing manner both by international organizations and specialists to describe the types of regulation adapted to globalized societies marked by a multitude of stakes and transnational actors. Yet, it nevertheless silences the violence of oppositions and the means of police and judicial coercion, put in place to regulate the concerned sectors.
Analysis
At present, the internet forms an integral part of society where one goes for distraction, to carry out research and to work. In this way, the internet leads to numerous interactions of exchange and sharing. These often register outside the trade framework and arise rather from reciprocity. For example, peer-to-peer and streaming constitute modes of original distribution and on a world scale. Moreover, networks such as YouTube favored community type de-territorialized links where innovative forms of expression and creation were able to manifest. Yet, transnational firms deliver a real fight to take part in structuring this central space for millions of consumers. Indeed, within its behavior, it is important to encourage values as well as representations which are favorable to them. But it assumes that the principle of private property has been previously established and recognized as such that they can then legally claim rights to the exchanged goods and services. This so that the market establishment allows them to commercially value their productions. Such an organization according to the laws of supply and demand would confer on themselves a de facto supremacy because they would centralize the copyright, as well as the means to create, produce and diffuse its goods.
Where does the battle over the legal rules of Internet come from? We have already evoked the international elaboration processes of substantive law as well as the huge trials in this matter*. Since the first legal proceedings against Napster until the one against Megaupload, they tried hard to contain, otherwise to reduce, flows escaping the intellectual property rules and thus the copyright payments. Over the years, sites deemed as pirated no longer proposed anything but legal offers, following the example of Napster or Kazaa; or either they were forced to purely and simply stop their activity as in the case of Emulator or Limewire.
However, strength is to observe that the influence of these groups does not remain unlimited. By shaping this sphere, they collide, on one hand, with the diffuse and ill-assorted world of Internet users; on the other hand they have to face other companies directly resulting from Internet. These companies – such as Wikipedia or Google – benefited from creativity and freedom allowed on the Internet *, which explains their active mobilization against the PIPA and SOPA laws.
During these last weeks we’ve seen a violent clash between two centers of the American economy, Hollywood and Silicon Valley. Taking advantage of the support of public opinion, the latter knew how to lead, despite the lobbying of the former. In terms of these confrontations, they take the shape of new rules and institutions. Far from a consensus obtained by negotiation or dialogue, governance of the Internet emerged from the fight between challenger firms which also have to count with the government of the United States as decisive authority.
References
Auffray Christophe, « MegaUpload : décryptage de l’affaire et des accusations », ZDNet France, 23 janv. 2012, disponible sur le site web : www.zdnet.fr.
*Bohas Alexandre, « Coup de force numérique, domination symbolique. Google et la commercialisation d’ouvrages numérisés », Passage au crible, (5), 16 nov. 2009, disponible sur le site web : www.chaos-international.org.
*Bohas Alexandre, « Une construction mondiale de la rareté. Le projet ACTA d’accord commercial sur la contrefaçon », Passage au crible, (22), 22 mai 2010, disponible sur le site web : www.chaos-international.org.
« De Napster à Megaupload, le long affrontement entre la justice et les services de téléchargement», Le Monde, 23 janv. 2012.
Finkelstein Lawrence S., « What Is Global Governance ? », Global Governance, (1), 1995, pp. 367-372.
Hewson Martin, Sinclair Timothy J. (Eds.), Approaches to Global Governance Theory, Albany, NY, SUNY Press, 1999.
« Lois antipiratage : sous pression, Washington fait machine arrière », Le Monde, 20 janv.2012.
Laroche Josepha, La Brutalisation du monde, du retrait des États à la décivilisation, Montréal, Liber, 2012.
May Christopher, The Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights: The New Enclosures, 2nd Ed., London, Routledge, 2010.
Polanyi Karl, La Grande transformation : aux origines politiques et économiques de notre temps, trad., Paris, Gallimard, 2009.
« Peer-to-peer, la fin d’un protocole ? », Le Monde, 11 mars 2011.
Sell Susan, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Jan 9, 2012 | China, International commerce, Passage au crible (English)
By Alexandre Bohas
Translation: Davina Durgana
Passage au crible n°52
Many observers are moved by the iconic movement of firms operated on the Old Continent by the Chinese, while at the same time, they regret the outsourcing and Foreign Direct Investment of European firms outside of Europe. In these two cases, these Cassandras were saddened by a decline. This leads us to further define the concept of power in order to better understand the multi-dimensional relations of power that have taken place on the world stage.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In recent years, Chinese companies have invested heavily in Europe taking advantage of the weak economies. Making headlines, they have acquired leading companies such as Volvo (Sweden), the Chateau de Viaud (France), Club Med (France), and Rover (Great Britain), but also specialized and innovative entities such as Medion (Germany), Elkem (Norway) or BorsodChem (Hungary), as well as logistics and distribution companies, such as Marionnaud (France), the Port of Piraeus (Greece) and Priceminister (France).
In total, from 2007 to 20100, Foreign Direct Investment by China grew by 339% compared to 133% in North America and 115% in South America. Representing 64 Billion Euros for the single period of October 2010 to March 2011, they have pursued foreign exchange reserves in China amounting to public value of 3,620 Billion Euros. In other words, the opportunity to acquire the 80 largest firms in the Euro area has emerged. Note, however, that there are presently only 2% of invested funds from outside the European Union.
These acquisitions mean, without a doubt, a dependence on Chinese companies, technology transfers in their favor and up-market moves. Some relate this breakthrough to the policy of Beijing Zouchuqu (“Spirit of Conquest”), which supports the commercial ambitions of its companies thanks to Eximbank, a dedicated credit agency. All of these issues have not failed to cause many hostile reactions in Europe, a continent engaged in a financial crisis and anticipating economic recession.
Theoretical framework
1. An Irreducibility of Power to the Sum of Assets. Power must be seen structurally as the result of political, cultural, social and economic arrangements. It must not be understood in a substantive manner, as this does not hold. In other words, we could not in a strict sense, have power, but still remain powerful. So it is important to abandon the Neo-Realist ontology that evaluates power according to only a small number of divisions, such as military or economic strength.
2. A Competitiveness of Actors in Interdependence. Far from pervasive Neo-Realism, it must be seen that competition is based on complex interdependent relationships: these territorial collectivities benefit from direct and indirect foreign investment of non-state actors such as these most recent thanks to strategic locations in centers of excellence developed with private-public partnerships. If Neo-Classical economists – following the studies of Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson or Michael Porter – rightly use an abundance of production factors to explain international trade, and take into consideration contemporary globalization resulting in a triple transnationalization: such as in trade, firms and investments.
Analysis
As with Western firms, the Chinese seek to hold transnational corporations through their purchases of intangible assets mainly such as new technologies, notoriety and ingenuity as reflected in the icons and symbols of European luxury products. The value of these has increased in a configuration of a saturated market and characterized by a homogenization of production for demanding clientele. Now, the experience of consumption, rather than simply purchasing products, has created the value that Chinese covet and seek to acquire. Note how these narratives will always be inherently commercial creators and associated with high technology research centers of the Old World, all from its own place and particular culture. Additionally, they develop thanks to the institutional concentration and socio-industrial tissues that relocation would reduce to nothing.
Additionally, the innovation and business management taken over by the Chinese are the result of “symbolic manipulators” (R. Reich), whose functions are not easily interchangeable. In fact, the different steps of production require highly qualified and well-paid workers. One understands better, in this regard, the issues of information, knowledge, and the crucial place accorded to research. In other words, the non-replication of work accomplished has proven to be the main foundation of European power and its value worldwide. The direct investments of China represent the source of future locations in Asia and a surplus of activity for Europe. Well-aided by the Beijing government, they are based on firm strategies that have estimated the potential of more promising growth potential than other assets existing in the United States, Japan or even China.
Finally, these invested funds in the socio-cultural and symbolic domains and consecrate the dominance of the Western lifestyle and within which the Euro-American consumer functions as the principal client and Western societies are the reference. Such as one often sees in the Chinese consumer, a source of growth for the Middle Kingdom, it must be stated that this is not the case. These enterprises remain centered on the West, implicitly recognizing its global-economy despite the systemic crises and challenges to the system that the West is currently facing.
If care is taken to overcome a misconception of power, then it is impossible to jump to the conclusion today that these Chinese redemptions signify a systematic change in favor of the Asian continent.
References
Baldwin Robert, The Development and Testing of Heckscher-Ohlin Trade Models: A Review, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Press, 2008.
Cerny Philip, Rethinking World Politics. A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.
Fromm Erich, Avoir ou être ? Un choix dont dépend l’avenir de l’homme, trad., Paris, Editions R. Laffont, 1978.
Julian Sébastien, « La carte des investissements chinois en Europe », L’Expansion, 25 Nov. 2011, disponible sur le site web :
http://lexpansion.lexpress.fr/economie/la-carte-des-investissements-chinois-en-europe_272330.html
Juvin Hervé, « Union européenne – Ce libre-échange qui nous ruine », L’Expansion, 19 déc. 2011, disponible sur le site web : www.lexpansion.fr.
Nueno Pedro, Liu Gary, « How Geely Watched and Waited for Volvo », Financial Times, 19 Dec. 2011.
Porter Michael, L’Avantage concurrentiel des nations, Paris, Dunod, 1993.
Reich Robert, L’Economie mondialisée, Paris, Dunod,1993.
« Volvo Cars ne regrette pas son passage sous pavillons chinois », Les Echos, 21 Nov. 2011, p. 22.
Walt Vivienne, « Feasting On Europe », Time, 19 Dec. 2011, pp. 51-54.
Dec 5, 2011 | International commerce, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Alexandre Bohas
Translation: Davina Durgana
Passage au crible n°50
Announced with a bang by Western media, the Nano was hailed in March 2009 as the car of the emerging world, while others have condemned the pollution that its mass-market production would entail. However, all agreed that this would be the car of the newly industrialized countries, the Model T of the Roaring Twenties. However, it is clear that it has not achieved its expected success.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Similar to the rest of the economy, the Indian auto industry is experiencing explosive growth with over 2 million vehicles produced and the objective to exceed 3 million by the end of 2016. The main player is Maruti-Suzuki, which owns 45% of the market share while Tata – still a giant heavyweight – only holds 12% of market shares. Potential clients are countless: 81 million households with over 75,000 rupees per year. Their purchasing power continues to grow steadily, and they aspire to join the consumer society. In addition, it sells 13 million bikes per year. This is often used as the means of family transport, but they must be gradually replaced.
In this context, the commercialization of Nano meets the expectations of rich Indians. Indeed, at the time by proposing 100,000 rupees (1,700 Euros) Tata computed this model at the lowest possible cost to conquer a preponderant position in this market, and thus dethrone Maruti-Suzuki. With an ambitious objective of 15,000 sales per month, they thus have a production capacity of 20,000 units monthly. They have also begun a strategy of systematic distribution because it wishes to distribute this vehicle in the most rural areas in which the bike is still the most commonly used form of transportation. However, when faced with a decline in orders – the lowest level was reached in November 2010 with only 509 sales – it has lowered its margin to support its points of sales. They then extended their warranty from 18 to 60 months and offered a more efficient engine and more customized options, without recovering a satisfactory level of sales. In fact, with the exception of April 2011, these stated objectives were never realized. Despite the underlying complications of 1) errors in communications and marketing, 2) industrial troubles caused by a poorly placed production site, and 3) shortages incurred in the first month of sales, the most fundamental cause appears to be poor sales.
Theoretical framework
Socio-cultural Structuring of Markets. Often naturalized by analysts, the markets have not resulted uniquely from an adjustment between supply and demand. In many ways this demand seems to be structured on a social and cultural field. First, it has emerged in a society and in a very specific context. Then, in determining ways, its functioning begins as strongly marked by symbols and cultural representations which determine the desire of procurers and its fixed value.
The Hegemonic Character of the Western Lifestyle. If hegemony is often assimilated to the military supremacy of a State, it is necessary to first remember the socio-cultural dominance of transnational groups.

Analysis
Too quickly addressed by specialized publications, the cultural dimension of the failure of the Nano seems incontrovertible. In fact, the Tata Group wanted to attract the middle classes of India who wished to acquire a car. In order to do this, they have presented an offer of a very competitive price. While this element has become the main selling point of the Nano, this assimilation of the vehicle to the poor has tarnished its image and discredited the Group’s reputation to potential buyers. Evidenced by the manufactured nicknames of, the people’s car in India and the car of taxis in Sri Lanka, where many drivers of this profession have acquired these cars. However, this vehicle still carries status, and serves as an outward sign of social success, values, “an extension of power… [and] a manufacturer of self ” in the words of Erich Fromm. In this regard, some have often compared the Nano with the Model T, while ignoring symbols of collective representations of freedom, leisure and the embodiment of the modern American sedan. In fact, Western manufacturers thrive in this symbolic aspect. They are based on the use of latent technology, branding a premium, luxury interior and innovative lines that design what Roland Barthes has already perceived, through the Citroën Goddess creations that are “consumed in their image, if not in use by a whole population which appropriates it as a perfectly magical object”. As analyzed by Peter Wells, the Nano has represented to the contrary a challenge to the industry by promoting a Western business model, which focuses on functionality.
However, customers wanted to withdraw from the basic model that accounted for only 20% of sales. They even preferred cars that were up to 38% more expensive. Consider in this regard that it often serves as the second vehicle of the home. In India, buying patterns show the identification of Indian middle classes with the American Way of Life. The latter desire to distinguish themselves from the bourgeoisie, implicitly acknowledging that the European-American companies hold the right to define what constitutes as a legitimate cultural reference. Finally, they are merely reproducing imported practices.
Lastly, this case is highlighting a North-South divide. In so-called North, the car is now considered harmful and polluting and is seen more as commonplace and as a simple means of transportation. To demonstrate this, the Dacia Logan destined for Eastern Europe has created a stir by selling well in Western countries like France where carpooling and self-service car systems are rapidly growing. Also, if the Nano comes to access European markets as it desires, it will succeed against all odds to achieve greater success, even in India.
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