May 24, 2010 | Defense, Passage au crible (English), Security, Terrorism
By Jean Jacques Roche
Translation: Melissa Okabe
Passage au crible n°23
On April 12-13 2010, United States President Barack Obama welcomed 47 heads of State and government to the Washington Summit on Nuclear Terrorism. This summit took place prior to the conference examining the Treaty of Non-Proliferation, which was held on May 3-28, 2010 in New York.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Terrorism has long been considered a weapon of the poor. It is historically noted that throughout the Cold War terrorist threats were used to cut Western means of communication, thus, subduing this type of threat became a concern unique to Occidental Nations. In this respect, it is important to mention the 1979 Convention against the taking of hostages, the 1988 Convention organized against maritime piracy, and finally the Protocol to the 1988 Rome Convention, concerning the security of platforms situated on the continental shelf. With the bipolar international political environment coming to an end, there has been a renewal in the method of approach toward assessing the major stakes in international relations. At the dawn of the early 1990’s this change allowed in particular for the raising of opposition of developing countries. A declaratory resolution made by the UN General Assembly concerning “the measures looking to eliminate international terrorism” was passed on December 9, 1994. This text prefigured the official January 12, 1998 adoption of the “Suppression of Terrorist Bombings” Amendment.
Nuclear armaments have existed since 1945, however at present, only 9 countries have retained official or non-official possession; these countries include China, North Korea, the USA, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, the UK, and Russia. It is now routine that disarmament diplomacy resides under state control, as determined by the eight conferences examining the Treaty of Non-Proliferation (signed in 1968 and renewed sine die in 1995), and the 4 START treaties focusing on the reduction of nuclear armaments, (a new version entitled START follow-on was agreed upon and signed by President Medvedev of Russia and President Obama of the United States on April 8th, 2010 in Prague). Finally the CTBT (The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) was adopted in 1996. However, at present this last treaty has not been put into full effect- this is due to a lack of sufficient number of ratifications and additional threats by the Iranian Government to undermine the entire process of denuclearization.
In this context, the Washington Conference has insisted on the risk surrounding the nuclear sector, and how it has weighed heavily on world security. In effect, it is no longer sufficient to just take into account nuclear warheads and their vectors; matters of security must also assess the totality of physical property which can be used to construct a dirty bomb. Present in civil power plants or in nuclear powered ships as in warheads/ nose cones accumulation, – sometimes with low security warehouses – more than 1600 tons of uranium and 500 tons of plutonium, are disseminated, in this instance, within close to 60 countries across the globe.
Theoretical framework
1. Global security: this concept was first appeared in 1983, introduced by Richard Ullman’s article entitled “Redefining Security”. Accredited as the founder of global security, his works were further developed by Barry Buzan in People, States and Fear published later that same year. It was then a question of completing the traditional security approach in diplomatic-strategic terms by organizing the material in four sectors: 1) the economy, 2) the rights of man, 3) values, and 4) the environment. Originally developed under a constructivist perspective by the Copenhagen School, the concept of global security has now been imposed as an operational framework on states and international organizations, all the while being the object of intense re-appropriation.
2. Modeling crises: Following the works of Brubacker et Laitin, the model has since disassociated crisis from violence, as situations of tension do not necessarily entail violence. With Kenneth Waltz’s publication of Man, the State, and War (1959), further research began to make clear distinctions among the following three levels: 1) man or the individual, 2) political institutions namely the state, and 3) international structure or the system of states at the international level. It is henceforth important to recombine the three categories in the same frame of analysis, by doing so one can try to understand the crucial interplay of individual actions and their consequences, relating to both the internal and international model.
Analysis
The Washington Summit leads us to question the aptitude of the secure bureaucracy in the face of nuclear terrorism. The apocalyptic character of the nuclear threat indeed implies the need for a considerable investment by various services, and makes international cooperation absolutely indispensable. If the danger as stated above results from dirty bombs, one must also know that these bombs leave traces everywhere and are at least easily located. If the alert signals are transmitted in time, the efficiency of counter-intelligence services and the police can effectively reduce the possibility of a successful (latent) terrorist attack. As such, strategies to assemble special services at the heart of the unitary structure (e.g. Homeland Security in the USA, and DCRI in France) allow for a more accurate analysis and treatment of terrorist information while reducing intra and inter institutional competition.
Inversely, the problem of dirty bombs- (exposing death to those who decide to resort to it) highlights the failure of the public structure to act effectively when confronted with such individual decisions. Moreover, national administrations have been slow in adapting to the concept of global security, which no longer requires focusing on the state as the principle designatory, but rather emphasizes the importance and concern of the human community in general. This likens to the fact that the threats no longer arise from the interstate agenda, but rather prove to be transnational in form. The French Government’s White Books (Livres Blancs) are an example of the difficulty in adjusting to the new world outlook. While the concept of global security has appeared in academic literature since the early 1980’s, the 1994 White Book does not make any reference to it. In fact, it is not until the 2008 White Book that the notion of global security finally became central to public authorities, at the very moment when the 1994 writer had become a president of the committee in charge of the 2008 document. With this approach, global security contributes to the “stressful perversion of strategic speech” – according to the expression made by Jean Dufourqc – in heightening the emotion of insecurity with the dilution of danger. As all other exercises of the same style, the French White Book reveals the mental representations its’ writers, without shedding even the slightest light on a path which could be used to anticipate future processes of destabilization. In other words, the current reflection led by political-administrative authorities seems to be adapted to filling today’s informational gaps by updating the attacks of the past. On the other hand, this reflection proves to be totally incapable of anticipating the operating modes of future acts of terrorism based on individual decisions.
References
Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, Brighton, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983. Rogers Brubaker, “David Laitin, Ethnic and Nationalist Violence”, Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 1998, pp. 423-452. Jean-Jacques Roche, “Épistémologie de la Prospective Sécuritaire”, Défense Nationale, juillet-août 2009, pp. 166-185. Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security”, International Security, 8 (1), Summer 1983, pp. 129-153.
May 22, 2010 | International commerce, Passage au crible (English)
By Alexandre Bohas
Passage au crible n°22
After secret negotiations, the European Union, the United States and Japan, joined by a dozen of other states elaborated in April 2010 a treaty entitled ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement). The aim was to impose more restrictive norms in the field of intellectual property.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
With the globalisation of economic-cultural exchanges and the rise of new information technologies, developed countries – strongly supported by transnational firms – have encouraged the international recognition of intellectual rights. Accordingly, the TRIPS agreement (Trade-Related Issues of Intellectual Property) was concluded in 1994 in the framework of the WTO (World Trade Organisation). It was then transposed in state-members’ legislations with the assistance of international organisations, advocacy networks and firms. However, this transposition generated strong reactions – in Brazil and South Africa – notably in the pharmaceutical sector about the AIDS treatment.
After 2007, while the United States encountered difficulties during the Doha Cycle, it led secret talks on the subjects of counterfeiting with the European Union, Switzerland and Japan joined by Australia, Canada, South Korea, Jordan, Morocco, Mexico, New Zealand and Singapore. In April 2010, the draft of the treaty has been finally released.
Theoretical framework
1. The legal and political structuration of capitalism.In a market economy, the capital accumulation lies in legal and political structures. Assisted by industrialised states, major corporations, owners of brand, copyrights and patents, have undertaken to widen and deepen their stranglehold in privatising more and more intellectual property goods. Whereas the latter are non-rival – their actual use not endangering future uses – firms wish to receive a fee per every purchase. In doing so, they « build scarcity » according to the phrase of Christopher May, and assure substantial income.
2. An unequal access to intellectual property governance. In a globalised world, this regulation mechanism is often regarded as respecting all the stakeholders. In this respect, it continues to nourish projects of cosmopolitan democracy on a global scale. Yet, this is not the case. To the contrary it confirms the domination of transnational firms and Western governments in a domain which involves civil society, consumers, and developing countries.
Analysis
Described as a modest effort of customs coordination, ACTA marks actually a major turning point. It proposes firstly a reinforcement of cooperation in the matters of data-sharing on counterfeiting acts particularly perpetrated on the internet. In addition, it reinforces the 61 article of TRIPS since it criminalises non-commercial individual behaviour such as Peer-To-Peer activities. Fundamentally, it harmonises legislations according to a strong approach of intellectual property protection by generalising the harshest practices and doctrines put in place fragmentarily and partially in national legislations. Let’s note that its formulation remains particularly vague concerning its mandatory nature and its enforcing domains, which hides asymmetrical power struggles between states, firms and civil societies. Once signed then ratified, it will support in each nation proponents of an always higher intellectual property protection. The latter supporters now press Western governments to assure a lego-political structuration of the world economy which is likely to assure a situation rent and a long-term prosperity to intellectual property companies.
Dealing with controversial questions, stakeholders of ACTA wished to come with an agreement at the margins of the world scene. Yet, this way of doing goes against new power struggles, notably the determining presence of emerging powers such as the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) whose development implies the purchase and import of intellectual rights. For all that these countries have been excluded from talks while they have already provided important efforts in the domain of copyright and patent protection with TRIPS. This method of negotiation shows the wish to impose brutally international norms once they are already negotiated, which reduces all the more possible contestations. In the same logic, it reduces to silence governmental and non-governmental organisations which could have reacted and mobilised public opinions. In this sense, the internal logic belongs more to the « raison d’Etat » than the « raison du monde » notion that Philip Cerny coined.
Talks of the ACTA project belongs to a politics of fait accompli. In doing this, they contradict the world diffusion of political authority which characterized now international relations. In fact, the number of issue-areas to deal with as much as the dispersion of legitimacy oblige now international policymakers to take into account developing countries and non state actors, and in the framework of multilateralism to take decisions by consensus. Consequently it is not surprising that these procedures provoke hostile reactions from developing countries and civil societies.
References
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. Public Predecisional/Deliberative Draft, April 2010, available on: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc_146029.pdf.
Bohas Alexandre, Disney. Un capitalisme mondial du rêve, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2010.
Cerny Philip G., Rethinking World Politics. A Theory of Transnational Pluralism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010.
EFF, « Preliminary Analysis of the Officially Released ACTA Text », April 2010, available on: http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/eff-analysis-officially-released-acta-text.
FFII, « Analysis Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement », April 2010, available on: http://action.ffii.org/acta
/Analysis#Executive_Summary.
May Christopher, The Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights: The New Enclosures, 2nd Ed., London, Routledge, 2010.
Sell Susan, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
May 10, 2010 | China, Passage au crible (English), Symbolic politics
By Jenna Rimasson
Passage au crible n°21
On 30th April 2010, the Chinese president, Hu Jintao, inaugurated the Shanghai world’s fair which will remain open until 31st October 2010. After the inauguration of the Olympic Games in August 2008, the eyes of the world are once again directed at the People’s Republic of China. Nearly 72,000 volunteers on the exhibition site and 100,000 more across the city will welcome the Chinese and foreign visitors during the event. With 182 countries and 57 international organizations represented, Shanghai has launched the most expensive world fair ever, with a budget of 4.2 billion dollars, or 50 billion if we take into consideration the expenditure on city development.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
With the Industrial Revolution in full swing, the first world’s fair was organized in London in 1851 with the objective of presenting technological innovations and the different participating states. In Paris on 22nd November 1928, 31 countries signed an agreement which created the Bureau International des Expositions (BIE) to regulate the organization of these events. It was subsequently modified by various protocols and amendments, the latest of which was enacted in 1988. At present 157 states are signatories; these do not however include the United States. With its headquarters in Paris, the BIE is entrusted with promoting confidence and solidarity between the cultures of the world through two types of exhibition: international (specialized) exhibitions or recognized international exhibitions, and world’s fairs or registered international exhibitions.
Bringing together representatives of states, international organizations, as well as those of civil society, these exhibitions represent privileged showcases for their comparative advantages within the framework of peaceful competition. In the past, they have also highlighted colonial conquests before bearing witness to the Cold War, particularly in the 1958 Brussels world’s fair. Initially the participants were housed in a central construction. Nowadays they build their own pavilions and thus compete in the architectural domain – the Eiffel Tower in Paris (1900), the Atomium in Brussels (1958), the Space Needle in Seattle (1962), or the Biosphere in Montreal (1967) provide emblematic examples.
Theoretical framework
1. Structural power. Distinct from the relational power of the realist school, this concept, created by Susan Strange, refers to the capacity of certain actors to shape international policy. It includes structures of security, production, knowledge and finance. Here, only the last three are important. The participants provide visibility for certain of their national products which demand specialized knowledge and know-how – illustrating the Foucauldian principle according to which knowledge constitutes power – involving the mobilization of public and private funds.
2. Soft power. Far from being reduced to influence and persuasion, this concept characterizes a process of cultural and ideological attraction which distinguishes itself from traditional power of military and economic nature.
Analysis
This world’s fair enables China to deploy all its magnificence. This is illustrated by the Chinese pavilion which dominates the entire exhibition park with its height of 49 metres, a height the Chinese prohibited other participants from exceeding. With this splendour and ostentation China exerts symbolic violence towards the other nations. After remaining at the margins of the world-system until the 1980s, then becoming just a workshop of the world economy, China is no longer content with undergoing globalization. On the contrary, from now on, it intends to be one of its principal movers. This ambition to reconfigure the world order is above all based on the diffusion of soft power, the force of the globalized projection of conquering Chinese influence. This shows the extent to which the performances organized by China during this exhibition are far from insignificant. This can be exemplified by the martial arts performances of Wudang and Shaolin which attract an international audience, especially after the worldwide success of the film, Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon. The performances of the tea ceremony and those of puppet and shadow theatre – aimed at a younger audience – also belong to this double logic of affirmation and seduction.
The Chinese authorities systematically emphasize these cultural specificities in order to reinforce the cohesion with the Chinese diaspora and, more widely, with all Asian countries on behalf of which China intends to speak. In this respect, it should be remembered that the Shanghai world’s fair mascot, Haibo, has been drawn from the Chinese sign: (ren: Man), just as the logo for the Shanghai world’s fair has been drawn from the sign: (shi: world). While English is progressively replacing other languages as the Esperanto of commerce and diplomacy, the Chinese language, on the contrary, is envisaged as the privileged vector of a strategy of resistance or even of a linguistic and cultural counter-offensive.
In accordance with the BIE regulations which demand a specific theme for each world’s fair, the Chinese authorities have chosen “Better City, Better Life”. The aim is to turn China into an unavoidable actor in the dynamics of modernity (urbanization, sustainable development, international solidarity). In this respect, the economic aid granted by China to African countries to finance their participation confirms its ambition of future hegemony coinciding with the opening of the 20th World Economic Forum on Africa in Dar es-Salaam (Tanzania), an event aimed at “rethinking Africa’s growth strategy”. Moreover, the erection of the world’s tallest thermometer (165 m) within the exhibition park also bears witness to China’s proclaimed interest in environmental issues while the country now holds the world record – in absolute terms – for greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, confronted with international condemnations for violations of intellectual property rights, the Chinese authorities have chosen to use the Shanghais exhibition to launch a vast campaign against piracy and imitations.
Despite the record cost of the organizing the world’s fair which has been underlined by numerous observers, the potentialities for a return on the investment should be taken into account. It contributes to facilitating the negotiation or even the conclusion of major commercial contracts, especially with the twenty foreign heads of state present at the inauguration ceremony. In this vein, Nicolas Sarkozy, for example, secured the contract for providing a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.
In spite of the current crisis in world finance, China, which on 25th April 2010 became the third shareholder in the World Bank, displays an insolent image of prosperity. By hosting an event based on technological innovations and serving economic growth, China demonstrates its capacity to further advance the decentring movement of the world economy.
References
Kita Julien, La Chine, nouvel acteur du système multilatéral, Minutes of the seminar: China: a New Player in the Multilateral System, 18th April 2008, IFRI, Paris, 18th July 2008.
Kurlantzick Joshua, Charm Offensive, How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2007.
Official website of the Bureau International des Expositions available at: http://www.bieparis.org/site/fr.html [5th May 2010]
Official website of the Expo 2010 Shanghai world’s fair, available at: http://fr.expo2010.cn/ [5th May 2010]
Apr 21, 2010 | Humanitarian, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Clément Paule
Translation: Davina Durgana
Passage au crible n°20
The International Conference of Donors for Haiti has taken place on March 31st, 2010 in New York. 9.9 billion dollars have been promised, mid-term, for the reconstruction of this Caribbean state. While the damages caused by the earthquake on January 12th have been valued at 7.9 billion dollars, which is 120% of the Haitian GDP (Gross Domestic Product), this diplomatic event has been considered a great success. Commentators have first of all emphasized the success of the financial mobilization, much better than was anticipated, and which covers the bulk of the estimated needs by the Préval Government. Many analyses have brought to the foreground the participative aspects of a process that equally implicates bilateral and multilateral donors as well as NGOs (non-governmental organizations), the Diaspora, the private sector and local authorities. From this point forward, the issue resides in the effective use of the assembled resources and the coordination of the multitude of actors implicated at varying degrees in the reconstruction of the country. Hence, the creation of institutional mechanisms is necessary in order to guarantee transparency and responsibility – accountability – in the use of international funds.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Over the last few decades, Haiti has seen many catastrophes of large magnitude, provoked above all by the combination of hydrological and meteorological phenomena. Among the most recent catastrophes, cyclone Jeanne caused thousands of deaths in 2004, notably in the region of Gonaïves – a town situated 150 kilometers north of Port-au-Prince. This same zone was devastated by four successive hurricanes in August and September of 2008, which caused about 800 deaths. These drawbacks have affected more than 800,000 people and have caused considerable damages, valued at over 1 billion dollars in damages.
The country was brought under international attention because it is considered to be a fragile state, truly failing – failing State – which could potentially destabilize the Caribbean region. The tense relations between Haiti and its Dominican neighbor, the question of migration – the Haitian Diaspora is estimated to have almost 2 million people – and environmental questions comprise recurring concerns. The persistent precarious nature of Haitian socio-economic indicators, combined with fluctuating and unequal international aid that is situation-dependent has driven donors to diagnose the failure of their successive development programs. These last years, bilateral and multilateral actors have met many times to coordinate their strategies towards Haiti, occasionally of political crises – the military coup of 1990, the ousting of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2004 – as well as natural disasters. Therefore, a conference of donors to Haiti was held on April 14th 2009 in Washington, a little after the hurricanes and the hunger riots of 2008.
Theoretical framework
1. Diplomacy of catastrophes. The occurrence of natural disasters and technical incidents of great magnitude has historically made Haiti the object of mobilizations of international solidarity towards its disaster victims. It seems as though states and intergovernmental organizations invest more and more in the field of action that provides a lot of visibility – truthfully, to make a scene – of their interventions in consistently in the most publicized disasters.
2. Rationalization of aid systems. The reconstruction of Haiti has revived many debates on the best practices of bilateral and multilateral donors. In this case, the instruments and institutions that are in place tend to complicate rather than resolve difficulties that seem political, but they have been identified as simple technical problems, such as coordination or effectiveness of these programs.
Analysis
Certain actors, among which are local and international non-governmental organizations, have criticized the omnipresence of the United States on the ground nearly 20,000 American military members have been deployed – as well as in diplomatic negotiations. The location of the donor meeting and the roles played by the Clinton couple appeared to have been an example of the symbolic illustration of this investment. The fact that the American Secretary of State co-chairs all of the successive sessions – at the side of President René Préval and of the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon – translates into their narrow control on the unfolding of the conference. This is what has incited criticism, such as the New York Times notably reporting that a European diplomat ironically referred to this event as the Bill and Hillary Show. To this end, however, one must recall that former President Clinton intervened in his capacity as the Special Envoy of the United Nations in Haiti – a position that he has held since May 2009 – after having been an actor in the reconstruction of South-East Asia following the tsunami. However, the modalities of aid have created behind-the-scenes tension, the Haitian government worries about being sidelined in the State Department projects that have been put into action unilaterally.
The organization of the conference also revealed the contradictions and the inconsistency of European Diplomacy. In effect, the European Union has provided the most important contribution to the reconstruction, currently almost 1.6 billion dollars – of which 243 million dollars are promised by France. This figure is clearly superior to American aid – 1.15 billion – or Canadian – 390 million. And yet, the European representatives do not seem to exercise a proportional impact to this amount, far from it, in fact. On this subject, it is important to recall that Catherine Ashton – the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs – was very criticized at the time of the catastrophe ; the diplomat did not show up in Haiti immediately after the earthquake, unlike her American counterpart, Hillary Clinton. Since January 19th, Michèle Striffler, European deputy and permanent rapporteur for humanitarian aid, deplored the less visible action of the European Union, with regard to the ostentatious intervention of the United States. Additionally, Ashton, disparaged for her diplomatic inexperience, had to face the competition of the Spanish President of the Union, who is very active in Haiti. The High Representative must be equally composed in light of unilateral announcements, such as the unexpected actions of certain member-states, such as when France proposed for example an international conference on January 14th. The European countries can seem scattered and sometimes divided in their aid efforts, notably where they had to send many hundreds of police officers to reinforce the MINUSTAH or Mission of the United Nations for Stabilization in Haiti at the end of January 2010. Even more, if France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands accept to provide personnel, Germany and the United Kingdom will, in return, refuse to join the operation. Finally, it seems however to qualify this dysfunction in the measure where Haiti does not represent the same stake for the European Union that it does for countries that are concentrated with a strong Haitian Diaspora such as the United States or still Canada.
More generally, the conference is marked by the interest that the participants are accorded for good use aid that will henceforth be efficient, coordinated and transparent. The victimized State must first be placed at the center of this system that will be requested in vain by successive Haitian governments. And yet, this aspect tends to reverse the persistent tendency of donors to channel assistance funds by non-governmental organizations – since the middle of the 1980’s – in order to by-pass a State actor that has been determined corrupt and incapable. In this instance, they are equally permitted to exercise their pressure on recalcitrant governments: such as the embargo decided upon by the United States in 1991, after the coup against President Aristide, which forbade all assistance. But the new Interim Commission for the Reconstruction – Interim Haiti Recovery Commission – is co-presided by the Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive and the Special Envoy of the United Nations, Bill Clinton. The opening towards Haitian actors stays therefore limited and full of suspicion. As for local associations, some consider themselves excluded from the process. Finally, the international funds administered by the World Bank must gather the contributions of multiple donors. This upcoming coordination is presented as the key to good governance that must be applied to the aid system. In this way, it is clear that this rationalization looks to counterbalance the heterogeneity of the international public action already, which from now on is ongoing. These initiatives risk nevertheless a clash of realities put in place and again towards the existing competition between the different international actors, competition, which has already impeded the reform of the United Nations for many decades. In many ways, the reconstruction of Haiti could consequentially soon seem to the world plane as a test, in terms of collective action.
References
Buss Terry, Gardner Adam, Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid Has Failed and What We Can Do About It, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 2008.
MacFarquhar Neil, “Haiti Frets Over Aid and Control of Rebuilding”, The New York Times, March 31, 2010.
Maguire Robert, “Haiti: Towards and Beyond the Donors’ Conference”, USIP (United States Institute of Peace) Peace Brief, USIP, (17), April 8, 2010.
Apr 20, 2010 | Humanitarian, Passage au crible (English)
By Philippe Ryfman
Passage au crible n°19
Measuring 7.0 to 7.3, the earthquake that occurred in Haiti on 12th January 2010 already appears to be one of the most severe in the last twenty-five years. The human toll has reached at least 230,000 dead, 300,000 wounded and 1.2 million homeless in the capital and neighbouring towns. Moreover, there are some 750,000 displaced persons in the provinces. As for material damage, it could reach 120% of the GDP. Confronted with a catastrophe of this extent, the deployment of relief agencies on the island has been massive. However, the saturation of the Port-au-Prince airport, the blocking of the port, the destruction of infrastructures and the intervention of an inefficient administration all had to be contended with.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
The international system of humanitarian aid has been characterized since the 1990s by a wide diversity of actors including NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and UN and state agencies.
Contrary to received wisdom, a natural catastrophe always has an eminently political dimension. It underlines the greater or lesser ability of a country to cope, the ability of the state apparatus or its civil society. The earthquake which occurred in Chile on 27th February demonstrated this with an opposite example. On a regional level, in the case of Haiti, the considerable effort of the Dominican Republic should be noted given the traditionally poor state of relations between the two states. The role played by Brazil should also be noted in contrast to the near total absence of Mexico, which, nevertheless, is geographically nearer. Finally at the crossroads of the regional and international levels, the massive intervention of the United States remains the striking element. However, the positioning of certain actors of the system of aid, the context and the sequence of events of this crisis induce the major risk of seeing humanitarian action reconfigured in the future.
Theoretical framework
1. Private transnational actors – NGOs and the International Red Cross Movement – or public transnational actors – UN agencies, the European Union – have long occupied essential places in the humanitarian field. After the tsunami of December 2004, despite the usual interactions and partnerships, the idea of a reinforced and rationalized coordination between the different humanitarian actors has progressively imposed itself. This measure would indeed enable aid responses to be more appropriately dimensioned while avoiding a duplication of interventions and optimizing their coverage.
2. This beginning of world governance of relief has been realized under the aegis of the United Nations, entrusted with the management of the entire international structure.
Analysis
From 2005, a reconfiguration by key sectors – or clusters – corresponding to major operational or transversal areas was promoted. A second effort focused on the reorganization of funding, with the creation of a financial structure, the CERF (Central Emergency Response Fund) which aims at replacing the system of appeals, specific to each UN agency. Moreover, the General Secretariat – with its Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – is empowered to supervise the whole.
In Haiti, however, these coordination mechanisms experienced serious deficiencies, as the Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, john Holmes, admitted. Furthermore, they were immediately in competition with, even ousted by the humanitarian action of states, particularly the United States – all the more so as this was deployed around a military-humanitarian axis. This American choice appears to provide cause for concern. In the first place, because this formula had already been tested in the early 1990s and rapidly abandoned for practical reasons; a series of failures – from Somalia to Rwanda – had demonstrated its inefficiency. It also induced a calling into question of the foundations and principles governing humanitarian action. What has subsisted of this approach – in Afghanistan, particularly since 2001 with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) — has confirmed this questionable nature. Secondly, this military-humanitarian presence is not that of the knight in shining armour landing on virgin territory devoid of all aid. Indeed, before its deployment, Haitian or international NGOS such as MSF, ACF and CARE had already come to the aid of the population alongside the IRCC (International Red Cross Committee) and several national Red Crosses. For example, the French arm of MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières), alone deployed in several days four hospitals in containers or inflated structures and treated, from January, several tens of thousand wounded. As for ACF, it daily assists 100,000 people with its water and sanitation (WASH) programs. Finally, Solidarités, Oxfam, CARE, the French Red Cross and various UN agencies played and still play key roles for the homeless and the displaced.
The speed with which the Americans discussed the reconstruction at the international level – during the conference held at New York on 31st March 2010 – seems to substantiate the idea that the humanitarian crisis is over. On the contrary, however, it continues since the post-emergency context cannot be reduced to mere technical factors – the number of the homeless, the wounded, persons displaced to other towns and the countryside, or destroyed buildings – and to a time-scale of several weeks. The crisis will persist for months, even a year or two. The short-term humanitarian needs are still considerable and the present priority consists in foreseeing and budgeting for the funding, as well as the requisite human and material resources. There is a real risk of the rainy season, tropical storms or cyclones constituting factors of deterioration. Needless to say, the reconstruction of Haiti supposes not only the implication of the entire civil society through the NGOs, but also that of the associations of the diaspora and the civil societies of the international partners.
Ultimately, this earthquake has pointed the spotlight at a long-underestimated element, which should henceforth be at the top of the international agenda. On a more and more urbanized planet – 25 cities with more than 10 million inhabitants in 2025, 10 of which exceeding 20 million – with an ever-increasing population, over the coming decades, this sort of catastrophe will provoke considerable human and material losses, particularly in the poor countries. In this respect, Haiti has demonstrated that the more a population lives precariously, the more its vulnerability to catastrophes increases almost mechanically. Consequently, the issue of the coordination of all the participants is all the more acutely raised. Yet, although the control of the world governance of humanitarian action had just de facto passed into the hands of the states, the pivotal role played by non-governmental actors and UN agencies would be the one called into question. The optimum level of aid and assistance to the victims would then be subordinated to political considerations, with the possible risk of aid being split and drastically diminished.
References
Action Aid, The Evolving UN Cluster Approach in the Aftermath of the Pakistan Earthquake: An NGO Perspective, London, Action Aid International, 2006.
Adinolfi Costanza, Bassiouni David, Lauritzsen Halvor, Williams Roy, Humanitarian Response Review, OCHA, New York, Geneva, 2005.
Chevallier Éric, “Politique et catastrophes naturelles”, Questions internationales, 2006.
FICR, Rapport sur les catastrophes dans le monde, Geneva, HCR, 2009.
Makki Sami, Militarisation de l’humanitaire, privatisation du militaire, Paris, CIRPES. Coll. Cahiers, 2004.
Ryfman Philippe, Une Histoire de l’humanitaire, Paris, La Découverte. Coll. Repères, 2008.
Feb 26, 2010 | European Union, Foreign policy, Passage au crible (English)
By Elsa Tulmets
Passage au crible n°16
After the failure of the Copenhagen climate conference in December 2009, the new president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, summoned the representatives of the member states of the EU (European Union) to a special summit on 11th February 2010, a summit devoted to boosting the economy. This was the first publicized event of an EU now governed by the Lisbon Treaty. However, despite some innovations, foreign policy did not attract attention. Hardly has it been enshrined in treaties than EU foreign policy seems destined to remain in the background.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has constantly had to redefine its role in a multi-polar world in which it shows itself to be incapable of responding to crises, including those in its immediate vicinity (the Balkans). In 2002, the European Convention, which was to simplify the treaties and bestow upon it the status of subject of international law, proposed advances concerning foreign policy. After the rejection of the constitutional treaty in 2005, a redrafted version – adopted in Lisbon, on 23rd December 2007 – finally came into force on 1st December 2009. However, this first European summit completely occulted international issues by choosing to focus on aid for Greece and the plan for boosting the economy for growth and employment – Europe 2010.
Theoretical framework
The act affirming a new authority – that of the President of the EU – implicitly reveals the weaknesses of EU soft power and the limits of its spill over.
1. Soft power. When he created this concept, Joseph Nye meant to characterize the power of attraction which the United States had abroad. With this term, he also wanted to designate their ability to influence their partners through means other than coercion. Based on the economy and social and cultural resources, it is defined in opposition to hard power which is military in nature.
For its part, to a great extent, the EU uses the projection of its more integrated policies (internal market) and the attraction exerted by the euro zone in order to impose itself on the international scene. The very term, soft power, has recently been used in EU political speeches to legitimize the strategy of expansion in the East. In this particular case, the ongoing negotiations for membership reiterate this approach which, moreover, has been adapted to the ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy) that, since 2004, has been intended for the countries South and East of the enlarged EU.
2. Spill over. This expression was conceptualized by David Mitrany and taken up by the theoreticians of European integration. It refers to the close cooperation existing in apparently non political sectors of shared interest, such as agriculture or transport. Then, secondly, it conveys the process of diffusion towards more openly political areas. Following this logic, the creation of a single currency – the euro – represents the states renouncing one of their exclusive prerogatives, the archetypal symbol of their sovereignty. The spill over of one sector into another also leads to better integration in the area of foreign policy. For example, the common trade policy was created through the integration of the domestic market. As for the means mobilized for the prevention of crises, they come, in part, from the Schengen zone. Certainly, the European summit of 11th February 2010 illustrated the close ties between the various actions of the EU; however, it also revealed a lack of coherence.

Analysis
1. Protecting European soft power. In a period of crisis, the EU intends to preserve its international credibility and protect the essentials of its soft power, by exploiting its economic and institutional assets. The Lisbon Treaty provided the EU with a telephone number, taking up the famous challenge of the former American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. By virtue of this same treaty, the president of the European Council – Herman Van Rompuy, the holder of this new post, created in addition to the revolving presidency – was able to organize this summit: “If international developments so require, the President of the European Council shall convene an extraordinary meeting of the European Council in order to define the strategic lines of the Union’s policy in the face of such developments.” (art. 26 of the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union). However, although this agreement has endowed the EU with certain essential functions, for all that, it does not make provision for a functional distribution capable of improving its visibility. In this respect, the new president must come to terms with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – post occupied by Catherine Ashton, who is highly criticized abroad – whereas the diplomatic service, which has just been instituted, represents a structure which is not yet fully operational. Moreover, the heads of state and government retain significant power since “The European Council shall identify the Union’s strategic interests, determine the objectives of and define general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy” (art. 26).
The financial crisis, a global crisis since 2008, has otherwise revealed the flaws of EU economic soft power. The priority given to the euro zone and the labour market thus express the inability of the European states by themselves to confront the forces of a non regulated global market. If, however, the euro zone weakens, a negative spill over might destabilize the internal market and the capability of the EU for external action. Consequently, the EU must confront the challenges of its internal functioning before being able to express itself as a single actor.
2. France and Germany, the motor of European spill over no more. For a long time during the process of European construction, the Franco-German tandem provided the ultimate means of elaborating a political consensus. Nevertheless, the summit of 11th February underlined the fact that these two founding countries were no longer able to create European compromise. In the areas of growth and employment, for instance, the measures to be implemented did not obtain unanimous support from the twenty-seven member countries. Likewise, although France and Germany called for the creation of an economic government of the EU, the idea was not retained. Finally, the importance both countries gave to external action had little effect upon the European agenda.
From now on, Franco-German cooperation can be seen to be powerless to stimulate political integration in order to affirm the EU on the international scene. Undoubtedly, this arises from the dividing lines which have changed since the end of the Cold War and the expansion of the EU to the East. These lines have indeed moved and settled, not on the division between “old” and “new” Europe – as some American conservatives claim – but on political divisions. Today, one can note that to the dissensions about the institutional mechanism of European construction – the inter-state or federal dimension – one can also add profound disagreements on the relationships to be established between the economic and political areas.
References
Laïdi Zaki, La Norme sans la force: l’énigme de la puissance européenne, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2005.
Mitrany David, A Working Peace System, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943.
Nye Joseph, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Political Science Quarterly, 119 (2), 2004, pp. 255-270.
Tulmets Elsa, “A ‘Soft Power’ with Civilian Means: Can the EU Bridge its Capability-Expectations Gap in the ENP?”, in : Delcour Laure, Tulmets Elsa (Eds.), Pioneer Europe? Testing European Foreign Policy in the Neighbourhood, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2008, pp. 133-158.
Feb 18, 2010 | Climate change, environment, Multilaterism, Passage au crible (English)
By Simon Uzenat
Passage au crible n°15
Organised under the aegis of the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), the aim of the negotiations was to reach a legally binding agreement at the 15th CP (Conference of the Parties), held at Copenhagen from 7th to 19th December 2009. The objective was to prolong and intensify the efforts programmed at Kyoto, which reach their term on 31st December 2012, and to thus establish the future multilateral regime of climate regulation.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In December 1997, at Kyoto, the delegates of the 3rd CP agreed upon a protocol, which formally came into force in 2005, and which committed the industrialized countries, mentioned in Annex 1, to reducing, by 2012, their global emissions of GHG by an average of 5.2%, below their 1990 levels. Furthermore, this agreement organized an international system of verification and provided for the institution of sanction mechanisms. Moreover, the discussions held at the Bali conference of December 2007 (CP 13) lead to the adoption of the BAP (Bali Action Plan) as well as a biennial process – the Bali Roadmap – which set a deadline for the end of negotiations during CP15 at Copenhagen.
In this respect, the direction pursued followed a super-national approach, marked by the strength of transnational expertise (IPCC), the legitimacy of the UNO system and European unity; to such an extent that the Clinton administration signed the Kyoto protocol without, for as much, obtaining ratification by Congress. Today, this treaty counts 189 signatories; and although the United States today recognizes the effects of GHG on climate and health, it still refuses the Kyoto logic which demands a global objective shared between the countries in proportion to their past and present responsibilities. As for the emerging countries, in the forefront of which are Brazil, China and India, and the LDC (Less Developed Countries), they intend, above all, to uphold their right to development. To achieve this, they have no hesitation in using international organizations to correct economic, social and territorial disparities between the industrialized and developing countries. Therefore, the Copenhagen agreement mainly appears to be the product of these power struggles and registers the pursuit of a global redistribution of political authority.
Theoretical framework
The conclusion of this agreement and the commitment made by the states on 31st January 2010 echo two closely linked concepts.
1. Multilateralism. Far from being limited to the description of a new inter-state configuration, this designates the emergence of a new global governance which is fragmented and hybrid. This associates private and public sector actors, states and civil societies, superimposes micro and macro, and remains the focus of research into and discourse on a so-called democratization of international relations. However, it turns out that this process includes several equivocal processes and thus involves extremely heterogeneous visions of the world. Multilateralism can thus be better apprehended as an ideological and operational resource at the disposal of international actors.
2. Global Public Goods. Before they represented a major stake in international relations, global public goods seemed to be the original product of a social construction which drew its meaning from an integrated, even sacralized, vision of development, in both space and time. In this respect, transnationalized expertise and knowledge would constitute both a condition of possibility and the privileged tools of evaluation of an objective approach. Nevertheless, this contemporary rationality sometimes enters into violent conflict with the historical frameworks of closely circumscribed public and private sovereignties.
Analysis
A large number of observers consider that the Copenhagen summit only lead to a minimalist agreement which sacrifices the general interests of Humanity. Indeed, it brutally breaks away from the spirit of Kyoto. Admittedly, it conforms to the 7th principle of the Rio Declaration (1991) relating to the “shared and differentiated responsibilities” of states, but it goes no further than to register the IPCC proposition to limit temperature increase to 2°C. Otherwise, it provides for no international verification procedures and no sanctions. Furthermore, it must be noted that, in December 2009, no country formally signed it and the plenary assembly of the UNFCCC merely took note of it.
However, one should go beyond these normative approaches in order to better identify the organizing principles and the lines of force of global governance – of the environment, in particular – which is still very largely in the making. Generally, the Copenhagen Agreement, which was reached 16 months after the fall of Lehmann Brothers, indicates an important stage in the redefinition of the public and private spheres. Instead of stigmatizing state-national individualism, it would be more fitting to analyze how the economic and financial crisis – as well as the new relationships formed between international organizations, banking systems and governments – has accelerated the hybridization of governance frameworks and contributed to the increased heterogeneity of the interests of more and more numerous and competent actors. In so doing, the negotiation strategies of states express visions of the world which are more specific and, consequently, more difficult to reconcile. Finally, the lack of transparency during the Copenhagen negotiations – developing countries were excluded, while NGOs could not access the conference centre – largely contributed to making all positions more rigid and the more ambitious ones more fragile.
This is less the failure of an interstate system proposed by the UNO than the difficulty of establishing a multilateral regime integrating all the concerned parties: firms, local authorities, or NGOS. Moreover, even if, since the CP held in Berlin in 1995, the thinking of the UNFCCC has been based on the work of the IPCC, its legitimacy crisis has considerably weakened its authority. In this context, the adoption of a legally binding measure applicable to all states was quite improbable. Inverting the logic which prevailed at Kyoto – and drawing lessons from its failure, the failure to reach even the 5% objective – the Copenhagen Agreement thus defines a framework for cooperation based on flexibility and voluntarism alone. This is illustrated by the diversity of the commitments made by the states as transmitted to the UNFCCC on 31st January 2010. Taken together, these commitments enable the a reduction of between 13.30% and 17.9% over the 1990 levels to be envisaged for the emissions of the industrialized countries by 2020 – a far cry from the 25% to 40% judged necessary by the IPCC in its 4th report (2007). Europe has planned a reduction of 20% compared to 1990, the United States 17% compared to 2005 (that is, 4% compared to 1990), Russia 25% compared to 1990 (up by 13.5% compared to 2007), China a reduction in its carbon footprint of 45% compared to 2005 and India 24%.
Multilateralism should therefore be considered as a new window of opportunity and the expression of singular strategies. In this respect, the Copenhagen summit traced a new architecture for the global scene and the Agreement a global process of consent.
References
Kaul Inge, Grunberg Isabelle, Stern Marc (Ed.), Global Public Goods. International Cooperation in the 21st Century, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999.
Keohane Robert O. (Ed.), International Institutions and State Power, Boulder, Westview Press, 1989.
Kindleberger Charles P., The International Economic Order. Essays on Financial Crisis and International Public Goods, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1986.
Knight Andy, A Changing United Nations: Multilateral Evolution and the Quest for Global Governance, New York, Palgrave, 2000.
Petiteville Franck, Le Multilatéralisme, Paris, Montchrestien, 2009.
Feb 11, 2010 | Global Public Health, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Clement Paule
Translation: Melissa Okabe
Passage au crible n°14
On January 29, 2010, during the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Bill and Melinda Gates announced that their foundation would finance the research, development and distribution of new vaccines in developing countries, at the level of 10 billion local dollars in 2020. According to the ex-CEO of Microsoft, this investment should allow for the considerable reduction of infant mortality tied to infectious diseases. So, the richest man of the world – Ranking Forbes 2009 – wishes to contribute to the amelioration of global public health by means of his foundation created in 1999. Indeed, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, represents the first philanthropic organization in the world, with donation funds estimated at 34 billion dollars in September 2009. In the space of a decade, this private actor has imposed itself on the international scale as a major stakeholder in health policy. So much are its’ annual contributions in this domain – which already exceeded 1 billion dollars in 2007 – exceed henceforth the budget of the WHO and the bilateral financing of numerous States.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
This type of philanthropic organization, associated with the patrimony of a captain of industry, has particularly developed in the United States for more than a century. Certain specificities of this country, such as the place occupied by the state, the non-profit sector or third sector, or better yet the Protestant work ethic, are not foreign here. In fact, the massive enrichment of a generation of American industrialists at the end of the 19th century allowed for the emergence of these of private actors. The big three embody this first philanthropic moment; this concerns the Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford foundations established respectively in 1911, 1913, and 1936. These last foundations differentiate themselves from traditional charitable works by their will to rationalize the donation and by the amplitude of their endowments. Investing by means of their subsidies granted to education, to the preservation of peace or to medicine, they have quickly acquired world influence. At first suspected as a means of tax evasion, they have also been accused of diffusing American cultural imperialism. Case in point, researches conducted on the big three have particularly shown the weight of these members on United States foreign policy. Today, these foundations continue to endure and have even increased their donation funds; in 2008, for example, the Ford Foundation had more than 11 billion dollars.
However, if this first philanthropy knew to adapt to evolutions of the 20th century, it is at present exceeded by another generation of private foundations. This progression comes from a recently formed financial aristocracy, made up of entrepreneurs taking advantage of new technologies and economic deregulation: Bill Gates, the Walton family or Eli Broad, constitute the emblematic paragons. As for Warren Buffet, in 2006 he committed himself to give the largest part of his fortune to the Gates Foundation, amounting to about 30 billion dollars over several years. Such a true concentration of finances permitted the ex-CEO of Microsoft to massively invest in a health program directed toward developing countries. However, let’s recall that the implication of these philanthropic actors in this domain isn’t a novelty. Isn’t it in the Rockefeller foundation laboratories that Max Theiler – Nobel Prize laureate in medicine, 1951 – created the vaccination for yellow fever in 1937? However, Gates’ massive financing over the decade marks a considerable quantitative jump.
Theoretical framework
1. Philanthropic-capitalism (venture philanthropy). The new social entrepreneurs, including the Gates, rationalized the third sector by importing entrepreneurial techniques of capital risk firms. This doctrine opposes itself to traditional philanthropy, cancelling out the bureaucratic burden imposed on the traditional sector. In fact, this doctrine is insistent on flexibility, evaluation and social return on investment.
2. Diplomacy of a private actor. Since its creation, the Gates Foundation has found itself at the origin of major innovations in the health domain. If the international organizations and the states remain as principal actors in the sector, the financial contributions of the philanthropic giant allow it to pave the way for true diplomacy. It just so happens that this normative impact induces effects on the forms and contents of the international policies in matters of health.
Analysis
The rise in power of the Gates Foundation cannot be explained without taking into consideration the repositioning of the WHO (World Health Organization) which has been in operation since the 1990’s. Confronted by budgetary difficulties and internal dissections, this international organization has therefore opted for a strategy open to private actors who would associate the grand philanthropic foundations with international institutions in the frame of public-private partnerships. However, this being the case, these new entities have determined the definition and the establishment of health programs at the global level, specifically in the fight against infectious disease. For its part, the Gates Foundation has shown itself to be omnipresent at the heart of these organisms, participating in global funds in the fight against AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. It has equally played a decisive role in the creation of GAVI (Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization), endowing it with 750 million dollars. However, the Gates’ investment does not reduce itself to financial involvement for its’ sitting experts to the committee of partnership directors. In addition, the Foundation supported the creation of new financial mechanisms – such as the IFFIm (International Finance Facility for Immunization) – specific for interesting the pharmaceutical industry in the research of new vaccinations.
The health strategy promoted by Bill Gates in fact resides in a generalized immunization to benefit developing countries, a solution judged to be profitable and efficient. In doing so, the ex-leader of Microsoft relaunches initiatives which have fallen short in the past, very reminiscent of the possible eradication of malaria in 2008. However, this angle has been qualified to be too narrow by specialists of public health and development, who reject a technological ideology. According to these specialists, this vertical vision neglects the political and socio-economic aspects of local realities. Moreover, certain key scientific figures are concerned about private actors, likely to use their weight to impose priorities. The head the WHO program against malaria complained in this manner of the 2007 pressures exerted by the Gates Foundation in favor of adopting the controversial program IPT (Intermittent Preventive Therapy). More generally, the intrusion of the philanthropic giant in the governance of global health risks wrecking havoc on the national health policies in developing countries. In this respect, such a gamble on the vaccination isn’t without consequence, as it can lead to imbalance in health offerings to the point of detriment, for example, less publicized obstetrics or nutritional care.
While the financial contributions of the Gates Foundation are welcomed by numerous observers, they also arouse certain reservations already appropriated to established organizations, at the time, by Rockefeller or Ford. Following this logic, the technological and entrepreneurial discourse of philanthropic-capitalism could conceal a redeployment of American soft power. Without presuming about the Gates and their intentions, it is strongly noted that their contribution has lead to encourage public-private partnerships and hybrid mechanisms of financing. Now, such a system constitutes a true re-legitimization of the market.
References
Abélès Marc, Les Nouveaux riches. Un ethnologue dans la Silicon Valley, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2002.
Guilbaud Auriane, Le Paludisme. La lutte mondiale contre un parasite résistant, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2008. Coll. Chaos International.
Muraskin William, « The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization: is it a New Model for Effective Public-Private cooperation in International Public Health? », American Journal of Public Health, 94 (11), Nov. 2004, pp. 1922-1925.
OCDE, Fondations Philanthropiques et Coopération pour le Développement, Tiré-à-part des Dossiers du CAD, 4 (3), 2003.
Piller Charles, Smith Doug, “Unintended Victims of Gates Foundation Generosity”, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 16th 2007, web: http://fairfoundation.org/news_letter/2008/01march/criticism_of_gates_foundation.pdf [Feb. 6th2010].
Feb 2, 2010 | Defense, Passage au crible (English), Security, Terrorism
By Hervé Pierre
Passage au crible n°13
“We must reach out to all of our countrymen, especially our disenchanted brothers, who are not part of al-Qaida, or other terrorist networks”, Hamid Karzaï declared before the delegates from 70 countries assembled in London on 28th January 2010. The reconciliation option was announced by the Afghan president as early as 2003, when it already distinguished between the good and the bad Talibans, and became a political priority for Kabul in 2009. In spring 2010, this strategic change of direction should lead to the summoning of a major traditional gathering (Loya Jirga). It should also lead to the creation of a 358 million euro fund aimed at dissuading the poorest Afghans from joining the rebellion.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
In 1979, the Soviet invasion followed the overthrow of President Daoud by the communist insurrection. It provoked the emergence of numerous resistance groups which – in the Cold War context – received substantial support from the United States. However, the relative unity of the various mujaheddin movements did not outlast the withdrawal of the Red Army which began in 1989. The situation rapidly became anarchic and the rivalry between the chiefs caused numerous civilian victims. From 1992, students (taleb), who claimed to re-establish order and justice, gathered in Pakistani tribal areas around Mullah Omar. Their military successes culminated in the taking of Kabul in 1996. The new regime, which, initially, was not necessarily anti-occidental, rapidly became more radical through contact with Ben Laden. It then developed a political program exclusively based on the sharia and clearly favoured the Pashtun ethnic group.
Dominated by Tadzhiki elements, the Northern Alliance – supported by the United States – overturned the Taliban government in 2001 with the fall of Kandahar in 2002 representing its end. From 2003, the rebellion progressively took over the struggle. It is made up of a myriad of competing groups sharing only the will to resist any form of external interference. The orientation of these groups remains highly diverse and the pragmatism of certain leaders – the latecomers to the Taliban movement – is blatant. In 2003, The Economist evoked for the first time the existence of neo-Talibanism to describe what researchers such as Amin Tarzi then considered to be a totally new phenomenon.
Theoretical framework
Paradoxically, the performative discourse aiming to demonize the enemy serves the interests of both sides engaged in this fight to the finish. Consequently, it leaves little place for a third way seeking to distinguish the good from the bad.
1. Performative discourse. J.L. Austin demonstrated how certain discourse types do not fulfil a descriptive or informative purpose, but, instead, constitute acts in themselves. To call the Afghan rebels Talibans presupposes both the de facto existence of a unity between the combatant groups and the possibility of establishing a historical link with the movement which ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. Moreover, the strong emotional content of the term represents a political weapon which serves in equal measure those claiming to adhere to the movement and those fiercely combating it.
2. Demonization. The enemy is perceived as a homogenous, negatively defined block in opposition to another model. As classically analyzed by Robert Jarvis, at the base of this simplistic and deformed vision of reality there exists a tendency to overestimate one’s own referents which, through lack of empathy, leads to denying the pertinence or even the very existence of different rationalities. Once reduced to a supposed essence, the other incarnates solely the Enemy – irreducible, the catalyst of every fear, anguish and fantasy.
Analysis
The process of reconciliation through the reintegration in the national political interplay of a fraction of the Talibans marks a notable evolution which illustrates a more astute appreciation of this rebellion without unity. Should it materialize, this outstretched-hand policy could sound the death knell for the Talibans both literally, with diminishing numbers of combatants, and figuratively, with the disappearance of any unicity in its discourse. However, this evolution encounters two major difficulties.
1. The credo of the war against terrorism. The promotion of a policy of national reconciliation shows the weakness – perceived by all the actors on the Afghanistan scene – rather than the strength of President Karzaï, whose weakened popularity and credibility greatly suffered from the pretence of democratic elections in August 2009 and whose relations with the Obama administration are highly strained. Consequently, the perspective of drastic reductions to the Coalition forces by 2011 leaves him no choice other than to reinforce his own numbers.
More than disarming the Dushman (rebel), the Afghan executive intends, above all, to conquer a power capable of modifying the balance of power. Within this line of reasoning, the reconciliation for peace appears to be a decoy, a political calculation by President Karzaï, solely destined to reinforce his personal position in a war context.
Demonizing the enemy justifies the combat, the appeals for funds and the troop reinforcements. It also supposes the unconditional support of public opinion since the local enemy is linked to transnational guerrilla warfare of which Mullah Omar, or even Ben Laden would be the instigators. In reply to President Karzaï’s propositions, the American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has chosen to brandish the spectre of a return to religious obscurantism preferring to essentialize the Talibans rather than to grant them some portion of rationality. In support of this policy of rapprochement, she ultimately declared that “you don’t make peace with your friends”. Committed to total war against terrorism, the United States divides the world into two mutually exclusive groups leaving no room for a third way.
2. Contesting, a profitable resource. At the micro level, the marginal who proclaims himself Taliban cheaply obtains local visibility out of all proportion to the reality of his power. In this way the Dushman of the Tagab Valley places his local and opportunist struggle within a wider mythical whole. Such a stance provides him with logistical support and an echo for his demands. At the macro level, the global jihad leaders, from their refuges in the tribal zones of Pakistan, catalyze and appropriate various forms of social violence which they then turn into a profitable resource on the global scene. So it is that the propositions of the London conference are rejected as a whole by those who have turned the struggle against the Occident into a business. In this respect, on 28th January 2010, the commanding council of the Talibans clearly indicated that the enemy’s attempts to buy the mujaheddin with offers of money and work so that they abandon the jihad were vain.
The solution to the Afghan problem through national reconciliation conceals its ambiguities with difficulty. Indeed, this policy is promoted out of self-interest, supported by default, even refused as a whole by its principle protagonists. As it happens, the final communiqué of the London conference seems to be highly revealing since, despite the number of discussions of the subject, the very term reconciliation is only mentioned once.
References
Tarzi Amin, Crews Robert D., The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2008.
Austin John, Quand dire, c’est faire, translation, Paris, Seuil, 1970.
Ledgard Jonathan, “Taking on the Warlords…”, The Economist, 22nd May 2003.
Jervis Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976.
Jan 26, 2010 | Global Public Goods, Global Public Health, North-South, Passage au crible (English)
By Clément Paule
Passage au crible n°12
The PACE (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe) should begin an investigation into the threat of false pandemics end of January 2010. In a motion voted on December 18, 2009, the Health Committee of this institution accuses the pharmaceutical industry and WHO (World Health Organization) experts of potential collusion. In this case, this inquiry should evaluate the management of the H1N1 flu pandemic and more specifically the recommendation for a global immunization campaign. This controversy seems to be reinforced by the last epidemiological reports confirming a strong decline of the virus activities in many countries, especially in the United States and in the main parts of Europe and Asia. Main pharmaceutical laboratories – or big pharma – are under suspicion of having participated in the setting-up of a psychosis allowing them to sell insufficiently-tested products; moreover, these companies seem to benefit massively from the national policies of vaccination. Thus, on January 15, 2010, the firm GSK (GlaxoSmithKline) that had been extensively marketing the vaccine Pandemrix™ announced a 945-million-euro revenue for the last quarter of 2009.
> Historical background
> Theoretical framework
> Analysis
> References
Historical background
Since its outbreak in spring 2009, the H1N1 virus is suspected to have caused more than 14 000 casualties in 209 States. The transnational struggle against the flu pandemic shifted rapidly towards immunization measures recommended by the SAGE (Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization). National preventive strategies were nevertheless diverse and heterogeneous. Some states like France, Canada or Switzerland decided to target a high rate of immunized population – more than 75% – whereas a low-profile policy was chosen by Germany or the United States. Only 5% of the Chinese population – around 65 million people – had been vaccinated at the beginning of 2010. At that stage, vaccination campaigns were beginning in Vietnam and Saudi Arabia. But Poland took a unique stance by refusing from November 2009 onwards the purchase pharmaceutical products which it estimated unreliable. The fact that many states could not access immediately the vaccine market should be noted. In fact, extensive orderings by Northern countries – more than 1 billion vaccines in September 2009 – had been prioritized.
Then, the immunization scheme started changing during November 2009 with the reduction to one shot instead of the two initially planned. This dramatically disrupted national policies and created surplus. The situation worsened with the populations’ reluctance regarding the vaccine that was injected to date to only 8% of the French – 5 million – almost half a million of Moroccans and less than 4 millions of British. 62 million Americans followed the recommendations of WHO, in spite of the 1976 precedent during which the suspicion of an outbreak of flu epidemic caused a large-scale vaccination campaign.
Theoretical framework
1. The precautionary principle. Included in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in June 1992, this norm aims to meet the uncertainty provoked by health or environment risks. It was written down in the French Constitution in 2005 after the infected blood scandal and the mad-cow disease crisis, and was invoked to justify massive preventive campaigns against the H1N1 virus.
2. Socio-technical controversies. Proposed by Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes and Yannick Barthe, this concept tries to reconstruct the struggles concerning the definition of hardly-governable situations. The pandemic management take place in a context of uncertainty in which a scientific authority discourse is challenged by other expertise.
Analysis
The WHO leadership in the struggle against the H1N1 virus showed the normative power of this international institution and its ability to define the contents of local preventive policies. However, the legitimacy of this health organization was weakened when its Director-General recognized on January 18, 2010 an excess of prudence towards the pandemic which she justified by public health imperatives. This resort to the precautionary principle opened a policy window – according to the concept of John Kingdon – for many dissenting actors claiming alternate or even profane expertise. It should be noted that from the beginning some physicians have taken a skeptical stance towards vaccination campaign in spite of the advices of the SAGE. For instance, one of them evoked in July 2009 the financial and industrial interests likely to overestimate the threat of flu viruses. But WHO have also been the target of conspiracy theories which blamed the institution for having purely and simply created the pandemics. Austrian journalist Jane Burgermeister notably pressed charges against the health organization and the laboratory Baxter in June 2009, accusing them of bioterrorism and attempt of genocide.
Up to then without any media coverage, these denunciations were reinforced by the failures of immunization campaigns often depicted as disproportionate – 13 millions of doses ordered by the Swiss government for 7.7 million citizens – considering an actually moderate pandemic. Thus, the fifteen experts of SAGE soon were at the center of collusion suspicions with the pharmaceutical industry well-known for its lobbying capacities. WHO officials were forced to several public justifications under the pressure of member-States: such as India or Vietnam. The health organization tried furthermore to provide guarantees of transparency and in the same time – in spite of the confidentiality of the debates – to detail safeguards which are supposed to avoid conflicts of interest involving SAGE experts. It seems nevertheless that those scientists have partly lost their legitimacy as they have been getting out of the monopoly of the authority discourse they had been maintaining on their specialty. The latter configuration of knowledge – conceived in its absolute form as a real ideology by Jürgen Habermas – appears disputed by that kind of overt accusations and by a sort of passive resistance expressed by the low rates of people willing to be immunized despite the SAGE recommendations.
The proliferation and growing audience of alternative discourses in the form of multiple and rival expertise are going together with the weakening of the vertical system of decision and information. Such a process reminds other examples of socio-technical controversies, like the infamous infected blood scandal or the mad-cow crisis, which involved both scientific uncertainty and divergent actors’ strategies. However, a specificity of the present case relies in a particular side effect of the precautionary principle. It can be observed in the way governments stood up for their management of pandemic risk. The French Health Minister answered thus to her detractors by the invocation of the precautionary principle. According to François Ewald, this norm would lead to overestimate risk but it seems to be a necessary justification for decision-makers, especially in a context of uncertainty. Indeed, the political costs of a potential catastrophe would make stakeholders systematically picturing the worst. Therefore public policies would be more and more depending of a blurred responsibility shared by both governments and their specialized advisers, this pattern carrying the risk of a global delegitimization. The failure of an official expertise suffering from lack of transparency would then add to health risks the social threat of an easily exploitable market of anxiety.
References
Abécassis Philippe, Coutinet Nathalie, « Caractéristiques du marché des médicaments et stratégies des firmes pharmaceutiques », Horizons stratégiques, (7), 2008, pp. 111-139.
Hamdouch Abdelilah, Depret Marc-Hubert, La Nouvelle économie industrielle de la pharmacie : structures industrielles, dynamique d’innovation et stratégies commerciales, Paris, Elsevier, 2001.
Juès Jean-Paul, L’Industrie pharmaceutique, Paris, PUF, 1998. Coll. Que sais-je ?
Pignarre Philippe, Le Grand secret de l’industrie pharmaceutique, Paris, La Découverte, 2003.
PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers), Pharma 2020 : the Vision – Which Path will you Take ?, 2007, consulté le 14/01/2010 sur le site de PwC : http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/pharma-life-sciences/pharma-2020/pharma-2020-vision-path.jhtml
