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The Political Capacitation of Local Authorities on the World Scene
International Climate Negotiations and Transformations to the Governance of Global Public Goods

Abstract
The stakes of the fight against global warming are closely linked to the increasing consideration given to territories and the local level, at strategic and operational as well as national and international levels. The demands of sustainable development in general, and the fight against climate change in particular, considerably reinforce this process of integration into the globalized economy. The emergence of local authorities on the international scene participates fully in the globalization process which implies an ever more intensive interaction between the *local* and the *global*. In this respect, the principal resource of these reticular actors resides in the implementation of a strategy of adaptation to the properties and constraints of globalization. In fact, this *ambiguous* non-state diplomacy takes a syncretic form which combines the range of actions specific to NGOs, firms and the state. Howewer, the adoption of statutes instituting a North/South balance, an agenda which is coherent with that of the UNO, bring first and foremost into play values which are coherent with their normative representation of the world but its effects remain rather modest and don't seem likely to bring about, in the short and medium term, major restructuring in favour of the regions within the existing or future realizations of world governance.

Introduction
Between 7th and 19th December 2009, Copenhagen was the scene of the 15th CP (Conference of the Parties) under the aegis of the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). The aim was to adopt an internationally binding judicial instrument in order to 1) reduce global production of GHG (greenhouse gases) and 2) adapt the models of development to the foreseeable consequences of climate change. The relative failure of this summit should not, however, occult the emergence of original structures of governance of Global Public Goods which the climate, as a *pure* Global Public Good, requires. As Ulrich Beck wrote, the contemporary perception of the risk on the planetary scale creates a space which is propitious to new transnational possibilities of power (Beck 2003, 43). "*The globality of the civilizational dangers echoes the everyday meaning of a cosmopolitan community of destiny. It thus opens a new area of experience which can be said to be global, individual and local at one and the same time*" (Beck 2003, 46).

The international response to climate change took the shape of the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992. This convention established the institutional framework for stabilizing the concentrations of GHG in the atmosphere. In December 1997, at the 3rd CP in Kyoto, the delegates agreed upon a protocol which committed the industrialized countries – mentioned in Annex 1 – to reducing, by 2012, their global emissions of GHG by an average of 5.2%, below 1990 levels. The Kyoto Protocol came into force on 16th February 2005 and arrives at its term on 31st December 2012, without, as yet, being ratified by the greatest per capita GHG emitting power, the United States.

In December 2008, at Poznan, during the 14th CP, the executive secretary of the UNFCCC declared that 50% to 80% of concrete action aiming to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and nearly 100% of the measures of adaptation to the consequences of climate change are conducted at an infra-state level. During the September 2009 Climate Week in New York, Ben Kimoon, Secretary General of the UNO, underlined the role of subnational entities. For their part, the leaders of the IPCC (Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change) insist on the territorial disparities which climate change brings about. According to their work, coastal regions, small islands and, more generally, the LDC (Less Developed Countries) will suffer 80% of the GHG-caused damage for which the rich countries are nevertheless 80% responsible (see 4th report of the IPCC).

The stakes of the fight against global warming are therefore closely linked to the increasing consideration given to territories and the local level, at strategic and operational as well as national and international levels. Consequently, particularly within the framework of international climate negotiations, the question of the investing of the world scene by non-central governments is posed (Sassen 2006, 365-375). As a global risk, climate disturbance and the implementation of measures to alleviate and anticipate it "*[particularly] demand a new dialectic between global issues and local issues which slip through the net of national policy*" (Beck 2003, 171). The elaboration, definition and implementation of public environmental policies now involve all infra-state levels, with the regions at the forefront. As early as 1995, in her article dealing with the diffusion of the authority of the state, Susan Strange called for research into the issue of the diffusion of the power of the central state towards sub-state entities, a phenomenon, which may in part be analyzed as "*a process of dilation of politics which tends to emancipate itself from the sole state rationality*" (Laïdi and Lamy 2002, 203).

At the same time, the retreat of state power and of its means of regulation and intervention has accelerated. Indeed, this often precedes the re-composition of the governmental scene by lowering the costs of entry for previously marginalized actors. From a Weber-inspired point of view, the state is then lead to decentralize and externalize certain of its operational policies, while organizing a re-centralization of decision-making. However, as a consequence, these dynamics contribute to making international organizations both autonomous and weaker. The intrusion of new players constitutes for these organizations the opportunity to diversify their means of intermediation. However, this also threatens their claim to incarnate global governance.

Within this framework, the approach using Global Public Goods (GPG) can be considered to be a "soft ideology" (Jobert 1992, 224), a *catch-word*, the plastic properties of which ensure the diffusion and consolidate the apparent obviousness of the paradigm. Nevertheless, the concept of Global Public Goods (see Kaul et al. 1999) also enables the

highlighting of the failure of not only the markets but also the states to produce them. Global problems, such as they are perceived today, can indeed no longer be resolved through the sole means of inter-state cooperation. What is more, this category was not created by an intentional action to develop economic ties, nor by *laissez-faire*, but by merely belonging to a shared space (Jacquet et al. 2002, 60-62). Consequently, it requires the coordination of decentralized and mostly non-state actions. Paradoxically, GPG contribute to the re-legitimization of public intervention at the international level, while demonstrating the need to go beyond the inter-governmental framework (see Constantin 2002). This nevertheless demands the overcoming of difficulties arising from the non definition of the title deeds and leads to entrusting specific missions to specialized international institutions. "*Within this logic, this concept enables certain regulatory bodies or international institutions such as those of the United Nations to be placed in the foreground. It is ultimately a matter of recognizing the political importance of new actors in the international game*" (Gabas and Hugon 2001, 30-31), new actors such as local authorities.

Since the Second World War, non-central governments – the American federated states, the Canadian provinces, French regions and cities, the Belgian and Spanish communities – have progressively invested the global scene, which had historically been structured by the balance of inter-state power. Marked by a state-centred bias, comparative politics and international relations have often minimized the importance of the international action of local authorities which did not dispose of the necessary legitimacy and means to be considered as true international actors. In fact, it is less a question of opposing the *state-centred world* and the *multi-centred world* than of directing research towards the examination and interpretation of their interactions (Krasner 1995, 260).

Indeed, the analysis is, in part, paradoxical: these non-central governments which, by definition, do not possess the international status of states, suppose the existence of these very states to be envisaged as sub-state entities. From this perspective, we shall employ the approach developed by James Rosenau to define the singular modalities of their investing the world scene (Rosenau 1990, 36). Local authorities enjoy an ambiguous status which simultaneously links them to and partially liberates them from the exercise of sovereignty, making them both *sovereignty bound* and *sovereignty free*. They are indeed likely to operate within extremely heterogeneous (Hocking 1993, 152 *sq.*) networks and, following the example of the Quebec government, likely to simultaneously participate in the summits of both Davos and Porto Alegre. For its part, the Ontario government has also defended its cause concerning acid rain before the American courts, something a sovereign country could not have done. Within this framework, the internationalization and regional integration of local authorities, notably in Europe, have transformed, on a long-term basis, the nature of allegiance regarding the state. The degree of intensity of this property completes the distinction between them and other non-governmental actors. Granted, their sovereignty remains more circumscribed, particularly because it is embedded in constitutional and legislative measures – whether they are regions of federal or decentralized states; it is also looser since these same measures can also represent the structures of political and legal opportunities (see Duchacek 1990) which the international struggle against climate change consolidates and expands.

1 State-nation mediations on the road to transnationalization

The international climate negotiations only officially recognize as parties the states which have ratified the UNFCCC. Consequently, all the other actors concerned by this process – NGOs, firms... – must be content with more or less peripheral positions. As for local authorities, they enjoy a situation which is full of ambiguities: they claim a governmental character, yet the international groups to which they belong – the most important of which have observer status at the UNFCCC – are still considered as NGOs by the UNO.

1.1   A historical framework of international socialization

In this respect, the networks of regions benefit indirectly and partially from the relational power of certain of their members. Belgian provinces, German Länder, or, to a lesser extent, Spanish and Canadian provinces have their place within their national delegations. They can therefore directly submit amendments to the Secretariat of the UNFCCC and thus contribute to the different stages of the negotiations.

For all that, more often than not, the regions must at least obtain the formal backing of their state in order to have any hope of seeing their request succeed. In this matter, apart from very rare exceptions, only states are authorized to table amendments to the texts negotiated in the work groups created by the Bali Roadmap in 2007. Consequently, during the official negotiation sessions – either CP or intermediate meetings – the local authorities are actively involved in the intense lobbying of national delegations which are likely to provide them with support and relay their requests.

It is worth mentioning here the work undertaken by Thomas Risse-Kappen, one of whose main objectives is to answer the following question: "*Why have "epistemic communities" and INGOs been able to set the agenda on global warming in Japan and in many European Union (EU) countries, but apparently less so in the United States?*" (Risse-Kappen 1995, 4). In fact, the impact on state policies of transnational actors and coalitions varies, in part, according to "*differences in* domestic structures, *i.e., the normative and organizational arrangements which form the "state", structure society, and link the two in the polity and [...] degrees of* international institutionalization, *i.e., the extent to which the specific issue-area is regulated by bilateral agreements, multilateral regimes and/or international organizations*" (Risse-Kappen 1995, 6). Moreover, the degree of decentralization of decision-making affects the more general working of the political system: the more the system is decentralized, the more political mediation and coordination are complicated and the more unpredictable results become. The American example is particularly enlightening: simply observe the difficulties of the American administration in maintaining a strong position in climate negotiations – notably at Copenhagen – which ultimately obliges it to withdraw into a position of exerting pressure upon developing countries (Severino and Tubiana 2002, 369).

The complexity of international negotiations enables the division and hierarchical organization of transnational actors, and the disqualification of the weakest and most isolated. Scientific and technical expertise constitutes a political *census*, even, for some, the very sense of the transactions. In this respect, the cost of access remains extremely high since it is based on the availability of individual capital and very specific organizational resources, comprised of the experience, the institutional and interpersonal networks, the level of training, the geographical origin and the quality of the links established with other

actors in the negotiations (state of origin, allied states, NGOs, international organizations, the private sector). To these structural constraints one can also add the more material concerns which thus enable a better comprehension of the particularly selective nature of these international summits. The implementation by the UNFCCC of a logistical structure has reduced neither the obstacles nor the high costs of the logistics involved. In this case, the windfall effect favours deep speculative movements, all the more so as, during the CoP, the national delegations saturate the accommodation market.

The emergence of local authorities on the international scene participates fully in the globalization process which implies an ever more intensive interaction between the *local* and the *global*. For their part, the transformations of the world economy lead to a new international division of labour: the conflictual situation between the sovereign states competing for the acquisition of new territories today leaves room for increased competition between regional governments and the great metropolitan areas for the acquisition of global market shares (Paquin and Lachapelle 2004 ; Sassen 2001). Within this framework, globalization appears as a force of constraint and capacitation (Hocking, 1993). It increases their capacities for action, while reducing the strategic and paradigmatic universe which frames the elaboration and implementation of this action.

In this particular case, regional and local mobilizations must be understood as vast strategies of an entrepreneurial nature, including a double political and commercial dimension. They represent both the condition and the outcome of the regions' international investments. Besides, regional authorities possess imposing networks of representation abroad, sometimes greater than those of numerous sovereign states (Fry 2000). It therefore appears that their repertory of actions remains "*as extensive as that of classic diplomacy, with the notable exception of the recourse to military force*" (Philippart 1997, 6). On this account, an increasing number of both public and private transnational actors (firms, NGOS, states) solicit them as operational partners or mediators regarding state authorities and international organizations (Hocking 1999, 25).

The demands of sustainable development in general, and the fight against climate change in particular, considerably reinforce this process of integration into the globalized economy, to the same extent in a federal state such as the United States as in a hyper-centralized state such as China (Qi et al. 2009, 148-149). Well before they started taking political and administrative measures against global warming, most of the Chinese provincial authorities were implicated in the implementation of the CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) projects provided for in the Kyoto protocol. The situation of the sub-state entities does, however, differ greatly from one state to another, or even within the same state.

1.2   A partial emancipation from state heteronomy

More generally, non-central governments "*pursue their own agenda, independently from and sometimes even contrary to the declared policies of their national governments*" (Risse-Kappen 1995, 4). In so doing, through their activities, they can embarrass governments and create new international networks of their own (Hill 2003, 210). Moreover, one may observe the setting of a new trend: the international projection of local authorities cannot be construed as a separatist strategy aiming at independence (Viltard 2008). The

participation of regions in international networks and the investing of European arenas thus appear to represent double structures of mediation and pressure *vis-à-vis* the state: "*We work directly at the European level where we are genuinely listened to. We are obliged to be astute, to forge original alliances*"[i]. Commitments in favour of the struggle against climate change typically belong to this category and are thus of such a nature as to limit conflicts of authority and sovereignty.

For local political deciders and administrators, confrontation with the state is, in the vast majority of cases, not only avoided but unthinkable or even unthought-of. This reality can also be verified for the United States, where the early mobilization of certain federated administrations or cities cannot be envisaged as a movement against federal power. On the contrary, the relationships between the peripheral actors and the central agents exist within the dynamics of dialogue, even cooperation. These new, largely informal, spaces mainly belong to two registers – interpersonal and reticular – registers which escape the Weber-inspired ideal of a judicial-rational administration (Weber 1971, 229). But, by only conceiving of state actions within this well-determined area "*one [would] forbid oneself from thinking the potential transformations of interventionism in order to see but destruction, disappearance, withdrawal or loss of control*" (Hibou 1999, 6).

These two modes of action correspond, in fact, to a pluralistic interpretation of the state (see Dahl 1961) which the stakes of climate change reinforce. It considerably intensifies the porosity of the frontiers between the internal and the international and favours the emergence of specialized expertise taken on board by a multitude of services, or even, for some areas of expertise, externalized to semi-public or para-public service-providers.

In this instance, the collaboration between the state and local authorities finds its place in the strategies of reciprocal instrumentalization which the work of the sociologist Norbert Elias can explain. The change can be analyzed as the result of interactions between partially determined actors and more general mechanisms which are imposed upon them with more or less rigour (Elias 1975, 183). Without abandoning the core of its sovereignty[ii], the state can then promote these political and symbolic transactions, particularly in order to transfer to the local authorities the financial burden of certain of its international commitments (see Putnam 1988).

A work group entitled *Towns and territories against climate change* was created by the diplomatic unit of the MEEDDM (French ministry for the environment, ecology, sustainable development and the sea) at the beginning of 2009. Concrete propositions were formulated: the strategic sharing by France of the propositions of the European Union (WPIEI Climate Change[iii], the informal working party of the Swedish presidency), supporting the publication of infra-state level data within the framework of the 5th report of the IPCC. In actual fact, this unofficial space for dialogue has enabled the informal institutionalization of infranational demands avoiding the creation of an official and visible instance of contestation, all the more so as its audience is limited to those who are most engaged and most likely to disturb French international negotiation strategy. Within this context, the struggle against climate change, a clearly identified issue for public opinion, could become a political platform which might be used against the state. Consequently, on both the internal and international levels, it seems necessary to accredit these actors in order to neutralize them. In return, the making of interpersonal ties between elected local representatives and

the negotiators represents a social and political capital which is particularly decisive at the international level and distinguishing at the local level.

These cooperative strategies are also likely to provide a widening of the traditional sovereignty of the states, by giving them the possibility to deal with issues upon which they can no longer act in isolation (human security, environmental public goods). Moreover, this evolution is accompanied by the transformation of the monopolization of resources – particularly financial and diplomatic – at the core of the sociogenesis of the modern states (Elias 1975, in particular 102). What is more, far from shrinking, the role of the state is now concentrated on strategic *missions* for the elaboration of tools destined for the local authorities, tools which are harmonized and totally compatible with the instruments elaborated within the UNFCCC framework. Indeed, the respecting of the MRV criteria (measurement, reporting and verification) will remain crucial in guaranteeing the access of local authorities to carbon markets and other financial mechanisms. This methodological harmonization function seems to be totally central since it constitutes a prerequisite for all the other issues, as is clearly illustrated by a recent OECD study (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009), and as the position of China at Copenhagen demonstrated. This territorial division of political labour enables one to grasp how the state can consider local authorities as "*targets and interlocutors*"[iv]. Henceforth, the construction of the social and political order is based less on an auto-centred and hierarchical apparatus than on "*a poly-centric and negotiated process, a multitude of partial adjustments, a network of relationships searching for the principles of coordination*" (Ost 2004, 190).

2 The international recognition of *locality*

In certain respects, the re-appropriation of state-national logics remains nevertheless a serious factor of inhibition and self-denial of capacitation. The representations of the world brought into play find their place, above all, in national contexts, the primary spaces of socialization and political legitimacy. Moreover, this interiorization process is encouraged by international organizations. The partnerships they form with international networks of local authorities do indeed fit into an equivocal process of attaining autonomy with regards to states. These organizations remain financially constrained and must seek from these same states support which is often subject to conditions, a situation which thus limits their capacity for action. In this respect, it is a particularly chaotic transactional game. Inter-governmental organizations represent spaces for mediation and learning which are particularly useful for the regions, since they contribute to the diffusion of a state-centred paradigm of international relations.

2.1 The UNO process of deconcentration

The complexity of the configurations between states, international organizations and local authorities is particularly obvious in the case of the UNDP which was the first UN agency to support decentralized development projects[v]. The study of the origins of the UNDP (Murphy 2006), the difficulties which it encountered and the criticism it was confronted with, consequently enables a better grasp of the reasons which lead it to be the first to advance the concepts of "*human security*" (Krause 2001, 77-79) and *Global Public Goods*. The heart of the matter is "*a broadening of preoccupations and a refocusing of actions*

around the individuals who form the peoples and the nations" (Devin 2005, 24). By supervising and limiting the sovereignty of the states, these new approaches have opened the way for taking greater account of non-state actors and, in particular, local authorities.

Within this framework, the process of deconcentration initiated by and within the UNDP pursues two objectives which contribute to the attainment of partial autonomy by the organization: proving its comparative advantage and, consequently, its institutional *raison d'être*; deploying a network of interconnections with all the actors engaged in development policy in order to reduce the nuisance capacity of the state actors. This accession to autonomy should, however, be seen as relative given the feeble means deployed for the protection of the environment and an absence of institutional legitimacy within the framework of the international negotiations held under the aegis of the UNFCCC[vi].

Above a global total of five billion euros – a derisory amount compared to the budget of the World Bank – its financial structure renders the UNDP highly vulnerable to political and strategic evolutions. This financial structure is based on three poles – its own budgetary resources make up 25% of the total, funding entrusted by program-countries makes up more than 33% and the rest comprises non-budgetary resources destined for the financing of programs defined by the fund-providers themselves. For more than two-thirds of its funds, the UNDP is merely an agency executing programs conceived and decided elsewhere (Graz 2004, 102). Furthermore, the financial crisis has considerably worsened this rarefaction of resources mobilized on the international level and weakened the multilateral institutions – such as the UNDP – the resources of which come mainly from voluntary donations (Laroche 2010). The analysis of the resources of the UNDP for the 2004-2007 period shows that only 80 million dollars were exchanged for national/sector-based policies and planification to combat the emission of greenhouse gases (UNDP 2008, 12). During the same period, the sums allotted to the environment and sustainable development reached 1.26 billion dollars out of a total of 14.2 billion, that is, less than 9%.

In 2006, the report of the High-Level Panel on the reform of the UNO, entitled *Delivering as one, Unis dans l'action* lead to a certain number of evolutions which consolidated the pivotal role of the UNDP. These measures were implemented in 2007 and are articulated around four principles of unification: a single program, a single decision-maker, a single budget and a single bureau (UNDP 2008, 7).They contributed to considerably accentuating the process of organizational deconcentration. The UNDP was transformed further still into a network close to the terrain, directed towards the provision of services (Bellot and Châtaigner 2009, 226). This was the implementation in concrete terms of the *new multilateralism* which develops partnerships with all the actors mobilized in the realization of MDOs: corporations, civil society, infra-state authorities. In order to perpetuate this objective the Geneva bureau created, in 2005, the *Hub for Innovative Partnerships*.

In this context, the promotion of the territorial approach – particularly for the fight against climate change – may thus appear to be the implementation of and the laying claim to a comparative advantage likely to consolidate and legitimize the UNDP (Young 1994, 163-83). This ambition must be apprehended on several levels: within the UNO system; in relation to the international actors of development; in relation to the states. It is estimated that 80% of MDO implementation occurs at the regional or local level, an estimate which is

very close to the percentage of actions against climate change. This new paradigm of public action on the international level is thus supposed to replace, in the long term, "*a simplistic approach which would require that the vulnerable groups would be given a capacity of empowerment which would enable them, through a mere transfer of resources, to attenuate their social and political marginality*" (Dahou 2003, 69).

The TACC program – *Territorial Approach to Climate Change* – gives form to the partnership between five UN institutions[vii] and eight associations of regional governments[viii], and was officialized at the first world summit of regions on climate change held in Saint-Malo. The global objective of the project is to reduce the exposure of local populations to the harmful effects of climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the developing countries and economies in transition. Moreover, the aim is to favour an ascending approach which would enable emancipation from the bureaucratic and political constraints of the states. However, this initiative is confronted by the drastic diminution of state funding. Furthermore, this fragility is reinforced by the as yet marginal nature of the territorial approach within the UNO system, as is the UNDP itself: "*it has not yet been "mainstreamed", that is incorporated into the* corporate *strategy of the UNDP*"[ix] and, consequently, is not likely to benefit from funds from the central budget of the Program.

2.2   The territorialisation of European policies

A great number of policies defined and implemented on a regional level – notwithstanding the nature of the relationship between the central state and the local authorities – remain closely linked to the issue of climate change (transport, habitat, energy...). They thus contribute to the transformation of the nature of the relationship between the two levels of governance, notably regarding the participation at a local level in international negotiations. In this instance, the central role played by the European Union in the recognition of the right of local authorities to act on the international scene, especially through the funds it deploys, should be underlined. Moreover, this non-state diplomacy takes a syncretic form which combines the range of actions specific to NGOs, transnational firms and the state. The originality of the European institutional model resides in the subtle blending of three levels of governance – community (supranational), inter-governmental (national) and regional (infranational) – respectively represented by the European Commission and Parliament, the European Council and the Committee of the Regions. For the regions, the European framework therefore constitutes a window of strategic opportunities for the affirmation of their autonomy, at both internal and international levels (Committee of the Regions 2009, 20). In a zero-sum game, the organized emergence of local governments has contributed to the development of a new European *habitus* which is partly structured around territoriality.

The creation of the Committee of the Regions symbolizes the advances and the limits of this regionalization process. This consultative body was created by the Maastricht treaty yet remains peripheral even marginalized, *a fortiori* concerning issues for which it is competent. In a recent White Paper on Multilevel Governance, the Committee of the Regions "*calls on the Member States to: – invite the CoR to participate systematically in the formal or informal Councils on Community policies falling within the areas in which they must be consulted*" (Committee of the Regions 2009, 10). The political independence of the

members of the CoR, who are often the presidents of regions and the mayors of large cities, must be appreciated in the light of their nomination by their respective national governments. To satisfy oneself with this legal relationship of inter-governmental domination would mean ignoring the accreditational properties of this body arising from the development of both cooperative and conflictual strategies.

The European institutions, and more particularly the European Commission, often support these infranational dynamics in order to modify the balance of power with their member states and reinforce their *right to act* faced with inter-governmental actors. The Commission thus accepted that the CoR would represent the interests of the European regions and cities at Copenhagen within the official delegation of the European Union lead by Sweden. Such an analysis also enables a better understanding of the Commission launching – through the intermediary of the Europe-Aid office, in July 2009 – a call for propositions which was open, for the first time, to local authorities, their representative groups or associations[x].

To the strictly institutional stakes one may add the financial problematic which is particularly crucial to the fight against climate change. The representatives of the local authorities are thus fully conscious that strong commitments made at the CP in their favour would be liable to encourage the European Union to noticeably redirect its financial strategy regarding them. In the same way, European pre-commitments, or even immediate financial mobilizations, would constitute as many means of pressure and windows of opportunity for negotiations, at every level – national, European and international. In this spirit, the CoR recommends recourse to European structural funds by implementing climate or environmental signposting[xi]. Consequently, the European Union exerts a strong polarizing effect in a strongly competitive field. In this respect, Europe must be envisaged both as a factor of competition and as a factor structuring competition, particularly when it initiated a process aimed at constituting a platform for local authorities at the end of 2008.

3 Subnational hybridizations of world integration

The inertia inherent to the great spectacles of the inter-state arena obliges marginalized actors to acquire a critical mass in terms of representation and expertise, which can often only be attained through the construction of more or less coherent coalitions. Like other peripheral actors of the negotiations, the regions have thus come together in more or less specialized transnational networks which construct and take the initiative on both the national and international levels (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 9).

This non-state diplomacy takes a syncretic form which combines the range of actions specific to NGOs, transnational firms and the state. The foremost of these, nrg4SD (Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development), saw the light of day at the millennium summit at Johannesburg in 2002 and models the organization of its events on the UNFCCC calendar. It adopted a first declaration on climate change in 2005 in Montreal and was then strongly involved in the 14th CP at Poznan and subsequently the 15th in Copenhagen. Following the same principles, the FOGAR (Global FOrum of Associations of Regions) was created in Marseille in 2007.

3.1 The asymmetrical mobilization of orthodox resources

Their international action remains largely conditioned by the resources they can muster. In this respect, the organization of the authorities and the legal and practical properties of the devolution process represent a political and institutional capital at the disposal of the elected representatives rather than a legal fact imposed upon them. Furthermore, certain regions such as Quebec, Catalonia, Flanders, Wallonia or Bavaria have greater resources than numerous sovereign countries (Paquin 2004, 108). California could even belong to the G8 since its GDP is greater than that of Canada and Spain.

From this point of view, the identity variable should not be essentialized, even if international projection may have constituted "*a strategy for reinforcing the national feeling on the internal [level]*" (Paquin 2004, 86). It only enables the restitution of certain particularities which are liable to explain the duration of some international mobilizations (see Duchacek et al. 1988). This is much more a spring than a horizon. Henceforth, it would appear that cultural belonging should be envisaged as a strategy of political and economic entrepreneurs to reinforce the international influence of their territory and to be distinctive within a more and more competitive area. It is from this perspective that one should understand the mobilization of their diaspora abroad (Paquin 2004, 87), which is liable to compensate for the weakness of certain financial and social resources. The Brittany region of France thus called upon its *citizens* working at the European Commission or the UNO in order to consolidate the institutional position of the region *vis-à-vis* the French state and the local authorities which are members of the networks it leads.

The reaching a critical mass and procedural aligning, however, constitute but the most visible components of an efficient pressure strategy on the European and international level. One of the principal factors of legitimization, which represents the most costly institutional toll and the most distinctive one in the area of non-state actors, concerns the capacity for expertise. In this instance, they must reinforce the interdependence between the representative structures and the international organizations which must unceasingly update data emerging from practice in order to avoid disqualification in their relationships with state bureaucracies.

Even more than the state, regional authorities possess strong bureaucratic expertise, notably in all the greatest greenhouse-gas-producing public policy areas (habitat, transport) (Paquin 2004, 110). In this respect, the location of the ClimSAT centre in Brest within the TACC framework represents a tool which is liable to favour the autonomous development of territorialized knowledge and know-how concerning the fight against climate change. This *centre of excellence in the evaluation of the vulnerability of local territories* is co-financed by the UNDP, the Regional Government of Brittany, the Finistère Departmental Authority and the Brest Métropole Océane urban community, with the support of the French ministry for foreign affairs. Within the UNDP, it is linked to the Hub for Innovative Partnerships for financial and administrative matters and to the Environment and Energy Group based in New York for scientific and technical matters. This international centre of climate expertise is entrusted with the establishing of a dedicated internet platform, the training of local technicians in the use of the most modern technologies and the assistance of target regions in their development projects.

Finally, the social, cultural and political capital of political decision-makers, much more than their *personality*, must also be integrated into the analysis in order to account for

the disparity in the international mobilization of local authorities (Balme 1996, 29). This is an important instrument in the limited repertory of the peripheral actors in international negotiations. In this instance, it is crucial to note a particularly strong limit to the total implication of the regions in international negotiations, that is, the small number of elected representatives mastering several languages and who can be easily mobilized in the international arena. This constraint is reinforced by the economic crisis which obliges the elected representatives to be even more present in their territory.

Some, like Ronan Dantec or Christian Guyonvarc'h are considered to be "*recognized and competent*"[xii] leaders. The environmental concerns of the one and the practical knowledge of the mysteries of the European scene of the other have lead them to personally invest in the very widely internationalized spaces of secondary socialization. They have progressively constructed an area of interaction within which they have developed certain *unconscious strategies*, "t*he real principle [of which] is practical sense, or, if one prefers, what sportsmen call the sense of the game [...] which is acquired by experience of the game and which functions beneath the consciousness of speech*" (Bourdieu 1988, 77). This practical sense constitutes as such an area of expertise, granted not theoretical expertise, but highly efficient in a very competitive universe in which anteriority and international immersion contribute to the logic of *distinction*.

During the final phases of negotiations, the concentration of power in the hands of a few public personalities contrasts singularly with the dispersion of the actions and demands of the transnational actors. One can indeed observe two parallel processes, likely to mutually reinforce each other, according to the social contexts and conditions of production: a process of personalization and a process of functional differentiation. This double process can be summarized by the image of the "*centipede*"[xiii] but it blocks attempts to limit the analysis to the existence of a charismatic or even heroic power (Weber 1971).

3.2   An entrepreneurial strategy of transnational projection

The formal and informal international networks which local authorities can build thus appear to be so many uncertain remedies for the relative *international powerlessness* of their *local power*. Nevertheless, the working of these international networks of local authorities remains undermined by the inequalities and development differentials which characterize globalization. This observation is reinforced further each time the networks are joined by regions from the South, which are weakly developed and often marginalized within countries which are themselves dominated.

The principal resource of these reticular actors resides, in fact, in the implementation of a strategy of adaptation to the properties and constraints of globalization, similar to the strategies employed by transnational firms (see Cerny 1995). This may take, for instance, the form of a search for economies of scale or a multiplication of public-private partnerships.

In their reciprocal interactions, the networks of regions thus tend to create links of horizontal and vertical dependence, following a process of division into subsidiaries and functional specializations (see Strange 1988). The European association CPMR (Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions) thus provides strategic and logistic support to the nrg4SD network, notably by managing its accounts free of charge. Moreover, the president and the general secretary of the CPMR, Claudio Martini and Xavier Gizard, are president and general

secretary of FOGAR, a global network, the environmental and sustainable development interests of which are defended by nrg4SD.

The rise of public-private partnerships represents another aspect of the development of this entrepreneurial *habitus*. In May 2009, Catalonia organized *Carbon Expo*, bringing together the largest producers of eco-technologies, the principal fund-providers in the fight against climate change and the involved international organizations. The creation, within the TACC program, of the ClimSAT centre completely follows this logic. In order to perpetuate its activity and to fund training programs, a GIP partnership (Group for the Public Interest) is being created with the involvement of private and public partners as well as a foundation. Furthermore, its provisional budget relies on contributions from Breton local authorities, the UNDP and a certain number of firms and banks. During the 14th Conference of the Parties, held at Poznan in 2008 under the aegis of the UNFCCC, the networks of regions were associated to the organization of a parallel event directed by *The °Climate Goup* (T°CG). On 15th December 2009, at the Copenhagen conference, 60 regional leaders again participated in the Climate Leaders Summit, directed by *The °Climate Group*. In fact, this is an international club – founded under the aegis of Tony Blair – which brings together some fifty representatives of the largest global firms which are joined by some thirty regional governments, including California, Quebec, and Bavaria.

The study of the organization, funding and the strategy of this hybrid NGO (Levy and Egan 2000, 142) enables a better understanding of its facility to structure power struggles between the different peripheral actors of the negotiations. Its director general, Steve Howard, created it at the end of 2003, thanks to the support of the *Rockefeller Brothers Trust*, an American philanthropic foundation which is rooted in the business and political milieus. Before undertaking consulting work for several globalized firms of the environmental sector (Kingfisher, ABN Arno, EDF Energy, BP...), he began his career with the WWF (World Wildlife Fund) advising more than 700 firms using tropical timber. He continued his career as English president of the Forest Stewardship Council (an NGO certifying timber from sustainable sources) and then created the Tropical Forest Trust in 1999. T°CG employs about a hundred people worldwide and is essentially present in countries and zones which are determining influences in the international climate change negotiation process: North America, Australia, India, China, Brussels and London. This choice seems, in fact, to correspond to the interests of HSBC which provided T°CG with 100 million dollars of funding for the 2007-2011 period. HSBC holds shares in two other banks and a Chinese insurer and is the first non-Chinese bank to attack the rural Chinese market. For HSBC, T°CG represents a non-governmental Trojan horse which enables it to observe the market for tradable pollution rights and watch over the emergence of Chinese eco-industries in order to elaborate efficient strategies to conquer the Chinese green-economy market[xiv].

Conclusion

In the era of globalization, it must be observed that collective action is more probably inscribed in the logics of responsibility than in the classic logics of sovereignty. Such an emancipation from state heteronomy should not, however, be interpreted as the abandon or repression of the state-nation framework, the resonance of which was, on the contrary,

demonstrated by the conclusions of Copenhagen. It should rather be apprehended within the framework of a vaster process of the dissemination of political authority.

In this respect; the ambition of the regions to reconfigure the national relationships of domination fits better into an essentially symbolic policy. The adoption of statutes instituting a North/South balance, the organization of decentralized meetings, an agenda which is coherent with that of the UNO, bring first and foremost into play values which are coherent with the normative representation of the world, a representation the committed regions would like to see realized. But, ultimately, it remains rather modest and does not seem likely to bring about, in the short and medium term, major restructuring in favour of the regions within the existing or future realizations of world governance.

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i Interview with Renaud Layadi, International Project Manager of the regional council of Brittany, April 14th, 2009.

ii The French State didn't really support the organization of the first world summit of regions on the fight against climate change, in Saint-Malo in October 2008, by the Brittany Region, the CPMR and nrg4SD. Besides, the numerous mails sent to the president of the French Republic to get the recognition of the infra-State level in the Copenhagen agreement stayed without answer.

iii Working Party on International Environment Issues

iv Interview with Gilles Pennequin, counsellor t

o the the French Republic presidency, Mai 18th, 2009.

v ART, Prodere, Smalp, Hedip, Pdhl, Sehd, Atlas, Print, Pasarp, City to City, Appi, Universitas...

vi Howewer, the EEG (Environment and Energy Group) of the UNDP provides important know-how to the UNFCCC. Besides, the UNDP, with the UNEP and the World Bank, is in charge of executing the projects financed by the GEF (Global Environment Facility), drawing the worry of the developing countries which consider that these projects do not enough meet the needs of the South.

vii UNDP, UNEP, UNITAR, UN-Habitat, UNCDF.

viii FOGAR (Global Forum of Associations of Regions), nrg4SD (Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development) and six other international networks with regional character (Europe, Latin America).

ix Interview with Cécile Molinier, director of the UNDP office in Geneva, Mai 1st, 2009.

x Call for Proposals n°128320, July 31st, 2009.

xi Interview with Luc Van den Brande. 2009. Énergie-Climat, sur la route de Copenhague. *Régions Magazine* 94: 7-9.

xii Interview with Baptiste Legay, negociator of the European Commission, November 6th, 2009.

xiii Interview with Ronan Dantec, deputy-mayor of Nantes, Februar 14th, 2009.

xiv. China is from now on the first photovoltaic panels producing country throughout the world.